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........
Agreement" or "MSA").l)ecision on Objections to Jurisdiction

~

12 (July 20, 2006). These measures

were not adopted at the federalleve1 of the United States government and never received any
endorsement or approval from Congress.
One type of measme - enacted by 46 states - purports to directly impose a financial obligation
upon the deemed "manufacturer" oftobacco products, which could be the actual manufacturer or an
importer. Relevant state enforcement officials deem such products to have been intended for sale in the
United States. Id. This so-called "escrow measure" requires deemed "manufacturers" to deposit large
sums, measured in the millions of dollars, into escrow accounts annually, to be held for 25 years. The
amount of such escrow deposits purports to be based upon tobacco products allegedly sold within a
state, ignoring whether or not the location in which the sales were made constituted Indian country. Id.
Under this escrow measure, a state court may be petitioned to impose an injunction against sales or
distribution of tobacco product brands manufactured or imported by a defined "manufacturer," as well
as monetary penalties in addition to payment of escrow payments demanded. Id. at

~~

] 3-] 4.

These 46 identical state-adopted escrow measures were each amended between 2004 and 2006,
removing the regional exemption mechanism upon which the Claimants had relied when they
established their Seneca brand outside of Indian Country by commencing off-reserve sales in 2002. Id.
at ~~ 15-16. See generally Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and
Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 8-1] (Nov. 6, 2006).
Several of the escrow measures have been expressly applied to on-reservation sales, Statement
of Claimants' Claims Arisiin~ Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share
Amendments ~~ 81-85; 95-96 (Nov. 6, 2006); while other escrow measures have been explicitly
applied to off-reserve sales, id.

~~

78-80; 89-94. See generally id.

~~

42-43.

The other measure at issue in this proceeding operates to prohibit distribution of products made
by a "manufacturer" within any given state, by not listing all brands allegedly produced by a non
compliant "manufacturer" on that certification list of approved brands and manufacturers ("the
contraband measure"). A brand can be removed from this certification list (and thereby effectively
banned) when a State Attorney General (without any requirement of court hearing or review)
determines that its "manufacturer" has not made allegedly required escrow payments or penalties
demanded by that state under its escrow measure. See Statement of Claimants' Claims Arisin~ Directly
Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 45-47 (Nov. 6, 2006).
Each escrow measure adopted by the affected states permits any deemed "manufacturer" of
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tobacco products that is the subject of an escrow demand to elect to "join" the MSA. Decision on
Objections to

Jurisdiction.~

agreement executed
1990s. Id.

~

10 (July 20, 2006). The MSA constitutes a 1997 litigation settlement

betw~:en

46 states and the large tobacco manufacturers they sued in the early

8. This agreement was not approved by and had no sanction from the Congress of the

United States government. The MSA requires payments to be made by its members into a fund that is
distributed to the participating states. Id. If a "manufacturer" petitions to join the MSA, it must agree to
make back-payments alleged as owing under the MSA. Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising
Directly Out ofthe Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~ 10 (Nov. 6,
2006).
All of the Claimants' "on-reserve" or "tribal sales" sales were manufactured by GRE on the Six
Nations of the Grand River Reservation and distributed through NWS, under the Claimants' Seneca
brand. This Expert understands that Seneca branded products intended for "off-reserve" sales were
manufactured on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reservation by GRE and that permission for their
importation by the distributor was granted by NWS, the trademark holder.
All products manufactured by GRE were shipped 'FOB' Ohsweken, located on the Six Nations
of the Grand River Reservation, meaning that title and responsibility for these products was deemed by
the vendor and purchaser to have passed to the purchaser on the Six Nations of the Grand River
Reservation. See Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and
Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 33 (Nov. 6,2006).
Finally, this Expert understands that with respect to the distribution of their own Seneca brand,
GRE contracted with an independent trucking firm, Walker Transport, to ship all of their production to
Free Trade Zones located in the United States. This Expert is also informed that GRE shipped all
Seneca branded products it manufactured using Walker Transport. After picking up the shipment in
Oshweken, the trucker would take the products to a Free Trade Zone storage facility within the United
States designated by the purchaser. At all times, GRE was responsible for, and paid, Walker
Transportation for its services. Accordingly, while title and risk did pass in respect of Seneca branded
products at the moment they departed GRE's facilities in Oshweken, it was GRE's responsibility to
arrange and pay for their being delivered to a US FTZ warehouse designated by the purchaser. 3 GRE
did not provide the same shipping arrangements for private label customers, who were responsible for
3

This Expert is also infonned that on the occasions when GRE shipped unusually high quantities of Seneca cigarettes to
its off-reserve distributor, Tobaccoville, GRE arranged for them to be held in a separate, bonded warehouse, to be
released, as necessary, only upon payment by Tobaccoville.
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making their own shipping arrangements.

Questions Addressed

Professor Clinton has been asked to address the following issues:

1. At the time of the negotiation and ratification of the 1794 Jay Treaty, would it be fair to say
that United States of America understood that it could not, and would not, attempt to assert its
regulatory jurisdiction over the commercial activities of Haudenosaunee individuals and
enterprises, which took place in the territory of the United States of America, as demarcated by
the terms of the 1794 Jay Treaty and 1814 Treaty of Ghent? If yes, to the best of your
knowledge, would Haudenosaunee tobacco trading be of a kind of commercial activity
contemplated by the parties to these treaties the description above?

2. During the first !half of the 19th century, would it be fair to say that United States ofAmerica
would have understood that, in good faith observance of the terms of the 1794 Jay Treaty and
1814 Treaty of Ghent and under its own laws dealing with Indian tribes, that the states
comprising its Union did not have authority to regulate the commercial activities of
Haudenosaunee individuals and enterprises in the territory of the United States ofAmerica, as
demarcated by the terms of those treaties, on the grounds that they were domiciled or otherwise
resided outside of that territory?

3. Given both the historical treaty context, and the state of United States federal Indian law
between 1994 and 2006, please explain whether and how the Claimants, as Haudenosaunee
tobacco manufacturers and traders, could have reasonably expected that their business would
not be subjected to the two types of regulatory measure at issue in this dispute (i.e. the state
government-enacted escrow measures and the effective banning of non-certified brands in each
state)?

a.

In answering; this question, please indicate whether the Claimants' entitlement to hold
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,.-
such expe(;tation would differ as between the three categories of their tobacco sales:
(i) Distributed under the Claimants' Seneca brand, on-reservation in the territory of
the United States;
(ii) Distributed under the Claimants' Seneca brand, off-reservation in the territory of
the United States; and
(iii) Third party brands, made under contract, on-reservation in Canada, sold directly
to unrelated third parties who would import and market such products under their
own brand labels.

After setting forth in an initial section the background explaining the historical setting for an the
negotiation posture of the Haudenosaunee in early treaty negotiations, this Report will proceed to
address each of these questions sequentially.

Discussion
A. Background on Indian Treaty Negotiations and the Haudenosaunee
As one of the

earli(~r

aboriginal groups in North America contracted by first Dutch and, later,

British colonial settlement, the Haudenosaunee (People of the Longhouse) played a pivotal role in
colonial and early American diplomacy. The Haudenosaunee constitute a confederation originally
composed of five separate aboriginal nations - the Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, and the
Seneca nations. 4 After being displaced from their southern home, a sixth Iroquoian speaking tribe, the

Tuscarora, joined their brothers and sisters in the early seventeenth century, albeit not as a full-fledged
member of the Confederation. Thus, the Haudenosaunee are variously referred in historical sources
and the literature to as the Iroquois Confederation, the Five Nations or the Six Nations.
4 Each of these aboriginal nations employs its own Iroquoian language to name its people. With the single exception of
the confederation name of Haudenosaunee, this Expert Opinion Report will employ the names traditionally used by the
English and American colonists for these nations, rather that the nation's own name in its own language. In adopting this
convention the author intends no disrespect for the native language and the tribal names employed thereby. Rather, the
names of these nations commonly used by the Anglo-American settlers are used here simply because those names,
unfortunately, are the names most commonly employed in the historical sources and secondary literature. Thus, to avoid
confusion regarding the tribal named referenced, the author has employed the names commonly used in such sources.
Nevertheless, he recognizes that the tribal nation's own name for itself in its own language constitutes the preferable
reference and would use it here if he did not anticipate that it could cause considerable confusion.
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Sometime before the advent of major European contact, a leader known as Dekanawida (The
Great Peacemaker) and his spokesman Hiawatha helped unite the then warring members of the
Haudenosaunee by creating an oral constitution for the Confederation known as Gayanashagowa (the
Great Law of Peace). 5 Cell1tral to the Great Law of Peace was an agreement to end all warfare and
hostilities between the Haudenosaunee. 6 The emergence of the Haudenosaunee Confederation created
a very powerful and united Confederation that controlled most of what is now trans-Allegheny western
New York to Lake Erie and large portions of western Pennsylvania and Northern Ohio.? Given their
geo-political position, Haudenosaunee control of trans-Allegheny upstate New York was pivotal to the
European colonial powers since this powerful Huadenosaunee alliance sat athwart most of the colonial
trade routes between western tribes and the English and, earlier, Dutch settlers on the east coast of the
North America and also placed them in a pivotal position during the seventeenth and most of the
eighteenth century between French settlements in Quebec and the English settlement on the east coast
of North America. Based on both their military might and their control of pivotal trade routes, all
European colonial powers who settled in northeastern North America diplomatically courted and
sought alliances with the Haudenosaunee. This history ofHaudenosaunee diplomacy produced perhaps
the richest history of Indian treaty understandings in North America between and among the European
settlers and aboriginal nations..
Not surprisingly, these diplomatic exchanges initially were couched in the lingua franca of
Haudenosaunee understandIngs of political relationships, which, like many Indian tribes, were on
going, organic, and modeled on metaphoric extensions of the extended kinship and clam relationships

5 An English translation of Gayanashagowa (or the Great Law of Peace) is available at
http://www.humanistictexts.org/dekanawidah.htm
6 Id. at ~ ~ I & 2; see generally, S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 79 (2000); C, Colden, Cadwallader.
The History ofthe Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province ofNew-York in America. ( Orignal 1727ed. Repinted
1958); B. E. Johansen, The Encyclopedia ofNative American Legal Tradition 81-82 (I 998);
7 See generally, F. Jennings, Thl: Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation ofIndian Tribes with
English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (1984).
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on which most oftheir int,ernal political relationships were organized. 8 Thus, to the Haudenosaunee, a
treaty agreement was not a momentary set of agreements memorialized in a written document, it was,
rather, an organic and on-going allegiance that bound the parties to continuing reciprocal obligations
that were periodically rent:wed and refreshed by observance and by periodic diplomatic meetings that
might be seen as a type of renewal that occurs at a family reunion. While there might be an English
memorialization of either discussions at such meeting, or, later, of agreements achieved during such
diplomatic discussions, th(: Haudenosaunee, whose Iroquoian language was oral, rather than written,
relied upon both their oral tradition of the meetings and wampum belts (ornately decorated belts made
of wampum shells) to memorialize the relationship.
Thus, for example,. throughout most of the first half ofthe eighteenth century the Indian
Commissioners at Albany, New York would periodically meet with representatives of the
Haudenosaunee to renew and refresh the Covenant Chain that bound the Huadenosaunee to an alliance
with the British Crown. These meetings were occasions not only renew alliances, but also to hear and,
sometimes, attempt to redness any source of grievance or harm that might tarnish the Covenant Chain
that since at least since] 692 metaphorically bound the Haudenosaunee in an alliance with the British
colonies. The largest fear of the Anglo-American settlers during most of the meetings in the first half
of the eighteenth century was concern that the Haudenosaunee might be seduced into trade and
alliances with the French, then in Quebec.
The basic Haudenosaunee diplomatic position and understanding regarding such alliances was
reflected in what may be their first, or one oftheir first, major diplomatic alliances with a European
settler power - the 1613 treaty with the Dutch - the Guswhenta (Two Row Wampum Treaty).9 This
8 For an extended discussion of original aboriginal notions of diplomatic relationships. see R. Clinton. C. Goldberg. and
R. Tosise, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System 1-13 (5 th edit 2006).
9 Some sources. perhaps errone:ously, attribute the Two Row Wampum Belt to the 1692 Covenant Chain council with the
British. For purposes of this Expert Opinion this discrepancy need not be resolved since the basic noninterference
principle symbolized in the Two Row Wampum Belt Treaty was central Haudenosaunee diplomacy continued
throughout negotiations with the Dutch. British. and. later, Americans and Canadians.
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treaty was memorialized by the Two Row Wampum Belt, a replica of which is depicted below:

The Two Row Wampum Belt is intended to depict the two nations, Haudensaunee and Dutch,
each traveling in a canoe down their river, shown in purple, in parallel and allied ways, albeit each
without intersection or interference from the other. 10 G. Peter Jemison, a Faithkeeper at the Cattaraugus
Reservation of the Seneca Nation, has been quoted in describing the oral tradition surrounding the Two
Row Wampum Belt as folIows:
The purple lines represent the Haudenosaunee traveling in their canoe. Parallel to
them, but not touching, is the path of the boat of the Europeans that came here.
In our canoe is our way of life, our language, our law and our customs and
traditions. And in the boat, likewise, are the European language, customs, traditions, and
law. We have said, "Please don't get out of your boat and try to steer our canoe. And we
won't get out of our canoe and try to steer your boat." We're going to accept each other
as sovereign - we'n: going to travel down the river of life together, side by side. II
These principles of parallel development, mutual support and alliance, but, most importantly, mutual
non-interference, so graphically captured by the Two Row Wampum Belt, lie at the core of both
Haudenosaunee diplomacy and their understandings of alliances and diplomatic agreements thereafter
negotiated. The subsequent diplomatic history supports their understanding.
British colonial diplomatic discourse with the Haudenosauneee continued this tradition. 12
Beginning with a treaty council in 1692, the Haudenosaunee described their relationship as being
bound together in a Covenant Chain that linked them in an alliance for mutual defense and

10 See Robert A. Williams, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions ofLaw and Peace, 1600-18004-5,9,
12,51(1999).
11 Quoted at http://www.pbs.org/warrior/content/timeline/hero/wampum.html
12 For excellent surveys of the Haudenosaunee diplomatic relationship with the British, see, F. Jennings, The Ambiguolls
Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation ofIndian Tribes with English Colonies, from Its Beginnings to the
Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (1984); The History and Culture ofIroquois Diplomacy (F. Jennings, ed. 1985); Beyond the
Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (D. K .. Richter, and J. H.
Merrell, eds. , 1981); F. Jenniings, in 115 American Philosophical Society Proceedings 88-96 (Apr 1911).
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development, albeit independent of one and other at each end of the Covenant Chain. This alliance was
continually renewed and refreshed by periodic meetings between the Indian Commissioners at Albany,
New York and the Haudenosaunee. After disgruntled Mohawks declared the Covenant Chain broken in
1753 on the eve of a decade of conflict commonly known as the French-Indian Wars, the British
recognized the necessity of safeguarding their critical alliance with the Haudenosaunee. Thereafter the
British gradually removed responsibility for diplomatic relations with the Haudenosaunee from the
colonial authorities and vested it in agents of the Crown. This gradual centralization resulted in a
renewal of the Covenant Chain, the establishment of the British Indian Department in 1755, the
Proclamation of 1763, and ultimately a trade plan that removed control of the regulation of non-Indians
who traded with Indians from local colonial authorities and vested in agents of the Crown. 13
The English victory, in alliance with the Huadenosaunee, during the he French-Indian Wars of
the second half of the eighteenth century ultimately removed the French from colonial North America.
This fact temporarily diminished the pivotal geo-political position held by the Haudenosaunee who,
nevertheless, still controlled major western trade routes important to the northeastern American
colonies.
The American Revolution between 1775 and 1783 again renewed the geopolitical importance of
Haudenosaunee as the ersn.vhile American colonists were pitted against British forces in Canada and
Great Lakes. Not only did the Haudenosaunee control the western trade routes, they also controlled the
lands that provided access to each of the belligerent parties between the British forces in Canada and
the Great Lakes and the Americ:an revolutionary forces in the northeastern American colonies. This
renewed geo-political importance of the Haudenosaunee would continue until the War of 1812 finally
ended any possibility of Briitish alliance with the Haudenosaunee against the United States. The results
of the American Revolution were not entirely happy ones for the Haudenosaunee but provide the
13 R. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries ofFederal-State Conflict Over the
Management ofIndian Affairs, 69 Boston University Law Review 329-85 (1989) (set forth as Appendix D).
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background for the important treaty guarantees at issue in this matter.
The Haudenosaun{:e were bound by the Covenant Chain of friendship to the British colonists
and therefore the British Crown .. Thus, when the British Crown found itself at war with its own
colonists, the Haudenosaunee, by virtue of their geographic position, found themselves diplomatically
courted by both sides.

Th~~ir

problem, of course, turned on whether their Covenant Chain of friendship

was with the British colonists or with the British Crown. No self-evident answer to this question
emerged, resulting in different portions of the Haudenosaunee supporting and even fighting for
opposite sides in the Revollution. The Oneida, for example, helped provision and assisted General
Washington including supplying his sick and starving army with com during its difficult winter at
Valley Forge in 1777-78. 14 By contrast, other portions of the Haudenosaunee, including some of the
Mohawk and Seneca, sided with and fought along side the British troops.1S Thus, the American
Revolution not only divided English colonial society in North America, it also split the Huadenosaunee,
causing them, probably for the first time since its founding, to violate their Great Law of Peace by
going to war against one another. American success during the Revolution, caused British loyalist
factions of the Haudenosaunee to flee into present day Canada, a fact that contributed to an artificial
international boundary

ben~een

the United States and Canada dividing the erstwhile unified

Haudenosaunee. The intemational boundary established by the Treaty of Paris of 1783, therefore,
constituted a dividing line

(~stablished

by non-Indian communities that, for the most part, the

Haudenosaunee did not recognize as reflecting any division of their Confederation.
When the American Revolution was brought to an end through the Treaty of Paris of 1783,
Great Britain respected the diplomatic autonomy of its Indian allies, leaving each of the Indian nations
to make separate peace treaties with the newly independent United States government. 16 A number of
] 4 B.A. Mann, George Washington's War on Native America 34 (2005).
15 See generally, B.A. Mann, George Washington's War on Native America 34 (2005).
]6 F. P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 42 (1984)
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separate such treaties were negotiated and adopted between 1783 and the adoption of the Jay Treaty. 17
In fact, the United States even directly negotiated a separate peace with some portions of the
Haudenosauee who had fled into Canada, by which they relinquished their remaining claims to
ownership of their former lands in New York. IS For present purposes the most important of these
treaties was the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794 between the United States government and most of the
Haudenosaunee.1 9 This treaty recognized Haudenosaunee ownership and control over approximately 6
million acres (roughly 24,000 km 2 ) of land, primarily in the State of New York. In addition to
reestablishing peace and friendship between the United States and the Haudenosaunee and establishing
clear political lines demarcating Haudenosaunee territory, Article IV of the treaty expressly provided
that the:
United States having thus described and acknowledged what lands belong to the
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas and Senekas, and engaged never to claim the same, nor
to disturb them, or any ofthe Six Nations, or their Indianfriends residing thereon and
united with them, in the free use and enjoyment thereof
(Emphasis supplied). The Treaty of Canandaigua therefore continued the tradition of Haudenosaunee
diplomacy upon which the Confederation insisted. It involved the reestablishment of friendly and
peaceable relations in exchange for treaty guarantees of parallel but separate development and political
noninterference from Euro··American governments.
The British ultimatdy questioned their policy of leaving their allied Indian nations to separately
negotiate with the United States because the United States negotiating position involved efforts, not
always successful, to dictate treaty terms to aboriginal nations, on the ground that having won the
Revolutionary War, the United States was the victor and the Indian nations, both friend and foe alike,
17 E.g. Treaty between the United States and the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga and Cayuga Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat.
15; Treaty between the United States and the Oneida, Tuscorora and Stockbridge Nations, Jan. 21, 1795,7 Stat. 47:
Treaty between the United States and Cherokee Nations, Nov. 28, 1785 , 7 Stat. 18; Treaty between the United States
and Cherokee Nations, Feb. 7, 1792,7 Stat. 39; Treaty between the United States and Cherokee Nations, June 26, 1794,
7 Stat. 43; Treaty between the United States and Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21.
18 Treaty between the United States and the Mohawk Nation of Upper Canada, Mar. 29, 1797, 7 Stat. 61.
19 Treaty between the United States and the Six Nations, Nov. II, 1794, 7 Stat. 44
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constituted "conquered nations.,,2o This policy was widely unpopular with the fanner Indian allies of
the British and caused so much Indian unrest and discontent that even the United States decided to
fonnally abandon it in their later diplomacy in the 1790s. Nevertheless, as a direct result of the hostile
relationships that the policy helped develop between Indian nations and the United States government,
the British government abandoned the approach it previously took in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 in
20 For a discussion ofpost-Re:volutionary American diplomacy with Indian tribes, see F. P. Prucha, The Great FatherL The
United States Government and the American Indians 17-22 (1986); F. P. Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The history
ofa Political Anomaly 41-1102 (1994). Illustrative of aboriginal resistance to this conquered nation theory of diplomacy
was the speech of a Cherokee leader at the negotiations of the Treaty of Hopewell with that nation. Corn Tassel
responded the claims of United States treaty commissioners that his tribe was a conquered nation as follows:
Suppose, in considering the nature of your claim (and in justice to my nation I shall and will do it freely),
I were to ask one of you, my brother warriors, under what kind of authority, by what law, or on what
pretense he makes this exorbitant demand of nearly all the lands we hold between your settlements and
our towns, as the cement and consideration of our peace.
Would he tell me that it is by right of conquest? No! Ifhe did, I should retort on him that we had last
marched over his territory; even up to this very place which he has fortified so far within his former
limits; nay, that some of our young warriors (whom we have not yet had an opportunity to recall or give
notice to, of the general treaty) are still in the woods, and continue to keep his people in fear, and that it
was but till lately that these identical walls were your strongholds, out of which you durst scarcely
advance.
If, therefore, a bare march, or reconnoitering a country is sufficient reason to ground a claim to it, we shall
insist upon transposing the demand, and your relinquishing your settlements on the western waters and
removing one hundred! miles back towards the east, whither some of our warriors advanced against you in
the course of last year's campaign.
Let us examine the facts of your present eruption into our country, and we shall discover your pretensions
on that ground. What did you do? You marched into our territories with a superior force; our vigilance
gave us no timely noti,;e of your maneuvers; your numbers far exceeded us, and we fled to the stronghold
of our extensive woods, there to secure our women and children.
Thus you marched into our towns; they were left to your mercy; you killed a few scattered and
defenseless individual!., spread fire and desolation wherever you pleased, and returned again to your own
habitations. If you meant this, indeed, as a conquest you omitted the most essential point; you should have
fortified the junction of the Holstein and Tennessee rivers, and have thereby conquered all the waters
above you. But, as all are fair advantages during the existence of a state of war, it is now too late for us to
suffer for your mishap of generalship!
Again, were we to inquire by what law or authority you set up a claim, J answer, none! Your laws extend
not into our country, nor ever did. You talk of the law of nature and the law of nations, and they are both
against you.
Indeed, much has been advanced on the want of what you term civilization among the Indians; and many
proposals have been made to us to adopt your laws, your religion, your manners and your customs. But,
we confess that we do not yet see the propriety or practicability of such a reformation, and should be
better pleased with beholding the good effect of these doctrines in your own practices that with hearing
you talk about them, or reading your papers to us upon such subjects.
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leaving each aboriginal nation to separately negotiate its terms with the United States government.
Therefore, in its later negotiations of the Jay Treaty of 1794 21 and in the Treaty of Ghent of 181422
ending the War of 1812, Great Britain expressly negotiated for and received treaty guarantees from the
government of the United States assuring non-interference with trade and travel in both directions by
its Indian allies across th{: international border between its Canadian territory and the United States.
SpecificalIy, Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 expressly provided in relevant part:
It is agreed that it shall at all Times be free to His Majesty's Subjects, and to the Citizens
of the United Stat4~s, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said Boundary
Line freely to pass and repass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the respective
Territories and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent ofAmerica (the Country
within the Limits of the Hudson's Bay Company only excepted) and to navigate all the
Lakes, Rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carryon trade and commerce with each
other....

No Duty of Entry shall ever be levied by either Party on Peltries brought by Land, or
Inland Navigation into the said Territories respectively, nor shall the Indians passing or
repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the same
any Impost or Duty whatever. But Goods in Bales, or other large Packages unusual
among Indians shall not be considered as Goods belonging bona fide to Indians. No
higher or other Tolls or Rates of Ferriage than what are, or shall be payable by Natives,
shall be demanded on either side; ...
These provisions were fully implemented immediately and one historian notes that, as a consequence,
British trade with the area of the United States known as the Northwest Territory expanded by 50% in
the period between 1796 and 1798 by virtue of the treaty alone. 23
While the onset of hostilities during the War of 1812 might have been thought to end the legal
obligations under the Jay Treaty of 1794, particularly since many aboriginal nations allied themselves

Set forth in Native American Testimony 122-23 (P. Nabokov, ed. 1991). For a history of the central government's brief and
unsuccessful invocation of the "conquered nation" theory to impose treaty tenns on Indian tribes, see F. P. Prucha, The
Great Father: The United Stares Government and the American Indians 43-50 (1984)
21 The full text of the Jay Treaty of 1794 is set forth at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/jay.htm.
22 The full text ofthe Treaty of Ghent is set forth at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/ghent.htm
23 B. Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805,184 (1955). Since the first United
States statute implementing the Indian free trade provisions of the 1794 Jay Treaty was not passed until 1799, this
increase in trade reflects the fact that both the United States and British Canadian authorities then regarded these Indian
free trade and passage provisions as self-executing, a position that would be called in question without referencing the
historical experience by United States courts almost 130 years later.
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with the English during the hostilities, Great Britain was careful to negotiate an express textual
refutation of such claims in the Treaty of Ghent of 1814. Specifically, Article 9 expressly provides:
The United States ofAmerica engage to put an end immediately after the Ratification of
the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they
may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have
enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such
hostilities. Provide:d always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all
hostilities against the United States of America, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the
Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so
desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages on his part to put an end
immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes
or Nations of Indians with whom He may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and
forthwith to restort~ to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and
privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight
hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or
Nations shall agree: to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty and His
Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or
Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.
,Therefore, the aboriginal nations at peace with the United States after the end of the War of 1812,
including the Haudenosaunee, retained any and all rights that they had prior to the onset of hostilities,
including their rights of free and undisturbed travel and trade across the international boundary under
Article 3 of the Jay Treaty. See, McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo, 25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928)
(Indian guarantees of free passage and trade contained in the Jay Treaty survived the War of 1812 and
remained in full force and

l~ffect).

Notwithstanding what appears to be the clear and explicit language ofArticle 9 of the Treaty of
Ghent of 1814, American courts are split on the question of whether as a matter of domestic law the
rights for which the British negotiated on behalf of their Indian allies among the Haudonasuanee
survived the War of 1812. The McClandless court clearly indicated that they did. Nevertheless, in

United States v. Garrow, 410, 88 F.2d 318 (C.C.P.A. 1937), the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals somehow incorrectly concluded that the War of 1812 had ended any and all rights the
Huadenosaunee has under Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794. The Court claimed that Article 9 of
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Treaty of Ghent of 1814 was not self-executing and that no domestic legislation ever had been enacted
to implement it. Since Congress had in fact enacted legislation in 1799 that remained on the books
after 1814 implementing the free trade provisions, Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627,
702, and provisions enforcing the free passage provision of the Jay Treaty of 1794 remain in force in
the United States Code to this day in 8 U.S.C. § 1359, the conclusion reached by the Garrow court was
surely improperly analyzed and is highly questionable. See also, Guiles v. United States, 100 F.2d 47
(9 th Cir. 1938) (simply following Garrow without any analysis); United States v. Booth, 80 F.3d 580 (I st
Cir. 1996); Atkins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222 (C.C.P.A. 1977); United States v. Miller, 26
F.Supp.2d 415 (N.D. N.V. 1998) (following Garrow). The Garrow result is rendered even more
questionable by the fact that almost a decade previously in McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo,
25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928), the Court ofAppeals had expressly held that Haudenosaunee rights under
Article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794 had not been extinguished by the War of 1812 and that therefore
highly skilled Haudenosaunee high steel workers from Canada could freely cross the international
border and enter the United States without interference. The world renown skill and the importance of
Haudoneosaunee high steel workers in the building of the City of New York is legendary and it is safe
to say that the skyline of New York might look very different had the view offered in Garrow prevailed
over the McCandless decisiion. 24
The continued existence and enforcement statutes like 8 U.S.c. § 1359 and the Act of March 2,
1799, ch. 22, § 105, I Stat. 627, 702, implementing the Indian free trade and passage provisions of the
Jay Treaty of 1794 long

aftt~r

the War of 1812 concluded clearly demonstrates that contrary to the

conclusion reached by the Garrow court, the United States government did not regard those guarantees
to have been abrogated by the War of 1812 since Congress and the Executive behaved consistently
24 See, E. Darton, Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York City's World Trade Center 106 (l999) (documenting the
important role of Mohawk high steel workers in the construction of many of New York's skyscrapers since the 1930s,
including the lamented World Trade Center buildings).
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thereafter as if the provisions remained in fuJI force and effect. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Karnuth v. United States ex rei. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929) that the free
passage provisions of Jay Treaty had in fact been abrogated, as a matter ofAmerican domestic law, by
the War of 1812 and not revived by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent 1814. Oddly, that ruling came
when the predecessor of 8 U.S.C. § 1359 enforcing that very free passage passage provisions remained
in the United States Code. In fact, in In the Matter ofB-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 191 (1948), the
Immigration and Naturalization branch of the United States government, while acknowledging the
decision in Karnuth, nevertheless enforced the free passage provisions on the strength of the continued
Jay Treaty rights enforced by 8 U.S.c. § 1359.
Thus, it appears that the various branches of the federal government, like the federal courts, are
split on the issue of whether the Indian rights of free trade and passage set forth in Article 3 of the Jay
Treaty of 1794 remain in force and effect. While this opinion assumes that they do, its conclusions are
not completely dependent on that position. Two reasons, nevertheless, suggest to this Expert that the
War of 1812 did not abrogate the Indian rights of free trade and passage protected by the Jay Treaty.
First, the very purpose ofArticle 9 of the Treaty of Ghent was the preserve, not abrogate, those
rights and, accordingly, those courts that have come to a contrary conclusion have totally ignored both
the intent and the precise language of the treaty resolving the War of 1812. Since some of the Indian
Claimants/Investors are aboriginal members of First Nations and were born in and reside in Canada, it
remains unclear to this Expert how unilateral actions taken by American courts, and not by either the
Congress or President of the United States, can abrogate treaty right to which such Canadian Indian
Claimants/Investors are entitled as a matter of international, rather than domestic law. In fact, as one
commentator has pointed out, Canadian common law continues to honor the Indian free trade and
passage provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1794 on the assumption that they remained in full force and
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effect. 25
Second, since international affairs, including the negotiation or abrogation of international
treaties constitute the constitutional responsibility of the political branches of the United States
government, the Congress and President,26 this Expert fails to see how the federal judiciary legally can
unilaterally declare an end to Indian rights secured by the Jay Treaty, particularly when neither
Congress nor the President has done so. Furthermore, this is not a case where the political branches of
the United States government have been silent on the issue. The continuation of the provisions of 8
U.S.c. § 1359 in force in the United States Code reflect a Congressional determination to continue to
honor and treat the Indian free trade and passage provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 as
being in full force and

effi~ct.

Thus, given a conflict between the Congress and the federal judiciary on

this question, since Congress has the preeminent constitutional authority over foreign affairs, this
Expert understands that its view on the issue prevails. Thus, notwithstanding contrary federal judicial
decisions, this Expert is ofthe view that the Indian free trade and passage provisions of the Jay Treaty
of 1794 remain in full force and effect both as a matter of international law and as a matter of United
States domestic law. That appears to be the view of the Congress of the United States reflected in its
continuation of the provisions of 8 U.S.c. § 1359 and its view should be controlling as a matter of
American constitutional law. It is also view of the leading scholarly commentators on the issue. 27 The
remainder of this Expert Opinion therefore will proceed on that assumption.

B. Effect of and Continuation of Rights Under the Jay Treaty of 1794
The guarantees of Jree travel and trade by Indians across the border between Canada and the
25 B. Nickels, Native American Free Passage Rights Under the 1794 Jay Treaty: Survival Under United States Statl/tory
Lmv and Canadian Common Law, 24 B.C. Int'\ & Compo L. Rev. 313 (2001).
26 See U.S. Const., Art. I. sec. 8 (Congress regulates foreign commerce and declares war) and Art. II, sec. 2 (The President
negotiates treaties with the advise and consent of the United States Senate and receives foreign ambassadors and
ministers).
27 S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev.
315,315-21 (1984).
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United States contained in the Jay Treaty of 1794 are consistent with both the long-standing
Haudenosaunee understandings of their political relationships with the Euro-American settlers and with
the renewed British effort to protect their Haudenosaunee allies by assuring that the newly created
international boundary to which Great Britain and the United States agreed upon in the Treaty of Paris
of 1783 did not interfere with the on-going political, family, social and economic relationships between
those portions of the Iroquois Confederation who had fled to or resided in Canada and those who
remained in the United States. Thus, insofar as the Haudenosaunee were concerned, the purpose of the
guarantees contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 were to assure that neither Great Britain nor
the United States, the two signatories to the Treaty, nor any political subdivisions thereof, including the
states and provinces, would interfere with, regulate, tax or otherwise impede the free movement of
Indians, including in particular the Haudenosaunee, across the international border between Canada and
United States or the free trade 28 by Indians, both among themselves and with non-Indian traders, across
that boundary. Based on the Treaty guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, the
Claimants had every right Ito expect, when they founded their business and when NAFTA was adopted,
that their sale of tobacco products, both with respect to the on-reserve and off-reserve sales, would be
completely free of interfen:nce, taxation, or regulation by the states of the United States in the fashion
undertaken here. This conelusion is based on a number of considerations.
First, the express language ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, which, according to
McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo, 25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928) remained in full force and effect,
compels that result. 29 The express Treaty language guarantees free passage across the international
28 While the term "free trade" may have many different meanings in varied legal contexts, it is employed in this Expert
Opinion to denote the precisf: trade related guarantees for Indians contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 - the
treaty guarantee ofnoninterff:rence with the free passage oflndians across the international border in either direction
between British Canada and the United States and the treaty guarantee that the Indian trade across that boundary in their
goods (as opposed to goods that were not deemed to be Indian owned) would not be subject to any tariffs, duties,
excises, or other forms of taxation.
29 See generally, S. O'Brien. The Medicine Line.' A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families. 53
Fordham L. Rev. 315, 331 (1984) (the seminal scholarly article discussing the legal effects and history of the Indian free
trade and passage guarantees.ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794); B. Nickels, Native American Free Passage Rights Under the
Page 22

000698

border between the United States and British Canada and expressly indicates that such free passage
includes commercial tradt:, by guaranteeing the right of "Indians dwelling on either side of the said
Boundary Line freely to pass and repass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the respective Territories
and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent of America ... and to navigate all the Lakes,
Rivers, and waters thereof; andfreely to carry on trade and commerce with each other...." (Emphasis
supplied). The third paragraph of the same Article reemphasizes that the Indian trade across the
international border shall not be impeded by the impositions of tariffs, taxes or other excises. It
expressly provides "nor shall the Indians passing or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects
of whatever nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever." Since the first paragraph of
Article 3 expressly indicated that such passage was in part for trade and commerce and first part of
paragraph 3 expressly exempts peltries, which were then the single most important part of the Indian
trade, from taxation or other excises, the express treaty exemption of Indian "Good and Effects" from
"any Impost or Duty what(:ver," clearly included any and all trade goods any Indian chose to take
across the international border so long as the trade goods were of a type that could be identified as
belonging to an Indian. 3D While goods that were "unusual among Indians," were not included in the
treaty guarantee of Indian (:xemption from tariffs, excises, or other taxation, that limitation has no
application to this case because, as discussed more fully below, tobacco constituted a normal staple of
the Indian trade, including trade involving the Haudenosaunee, and because there is absolutely no
dispute that the tobacco products at issue in this claim were manufactured and distributed by the Indian
Claimants/Investors.
Second, insofar as Indians were concerned, the history surrounding the negotiation and adoption
1794 Jay Treaty: Sun-ivaI Under United States Statutory Law and Canadian Common Law, 24 B.C. Int'l & Compo L.
Rev. 3 I3 (2001) ..
30 The third paragraph ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 did contain a provision designed to prevent Indians from
relying on their exemption from duties, excises, and other taxes on their imported goods to smuggle goods not belonging
to them across the international boundary between British Canada and the United States. Thus, that paragraph provided
that "Goods in Bales, or other large Packages unusual among Indians shall not be considered as Goods belonging bona
fide to Indians." (Emphasis supplied).
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of the Jay Treaty of 1794, clearly indicates that the British sought to include the guarantees set forth in
Article 3 into the Jay Treaty to protect their Indian allies, whose ancestors included the Canadian
Claimants/Investors in this case, from the type of unilateral treaty negotiations that the United States
had undertaken in dealing with aboriginal nations located within its boundaries after the Treaty of Paris
of 1783. As noted above, in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Great Britain left its Indian allies to separately
negotiate peace treaties with the United States government. Diplomatic relations between the United
States government and thle Indian tribes who negotiated such treaties deteriorated greatly between the
negotiation of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and the negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794. The primary
reason for this deterioration was the United States negotiating positions, under which the United States
government sought to dictate treaty terms on the theory that the Indian nations, both friend and foe
alike, constituted conquered nations as a result of the United States victory in the American Revolution.
The United States still regarded Indian nations as separate states with whom treaties constituted the
normal means of affecting change in the relationships between the Indian tribes and the United States.
The United States government theretofore assumed at the time ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 that the
consent of the Indian nation was required as a necessary legal precondition to its imposition for any
measure affecting them or their members. 31 While the United States government formally abandoned
their "conquered nation" theory as a basis for negotiating treaties with Indian nations approximately
three years prior to the Jay Treaty of 1794,32 the extraordinary hostility this policy produced among the
Indian nations 33 prompted Great Britain to alter its negotiating approach while negotiating both the Jay
31

The term "member" is commonly employed in the United States as a legal term of art designating one who is a citizen
ofan Indian nation. For purpose of this opinion the term citizen and member therefore are employed interchangeably to
designate a person who is a Ilegally recognized citizen in the Indian nation. The law governing that citizenship in the
United States generally is tribal law. This Expert is advised that the Claimantsiinvestors are all citizens (members) of
their respective Indian nations in Canada and the United States.
32 See, F. P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 43-50 (1984)
33 The importance of good rellations between the United States government and the Indian nations was emphasized in
President George Washington's Seventh Annual Message (1795) to the United States Congress, which is set forth in full
at http://www.yaJe.edu/law\\.ebl avalon/presiden/sou/washs07.him#jay.This message is the same message in which the
President formally announced thf: successful negotiation of the Jay Treaty. Specifically, President Washington, focusing
on the recent warfare in the Ohio valley and the unsettled nature of the frontier, noted that "the adjustment of the terms
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Treaty of 1794 and the later Treaty of Ghent of 1814. Great Britain therefore sought to protect the
Indian nations from the dictatorial negotiating position previously undertaken by the United States
government by successfully insisting on adequate protections for Indian nations in both the Jay Treaty
of 1794 and the later Treaty 0 f Ghent of 1814. 34 In particular, Great Britain sought and secured the
guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 of free passage and unimpeded and untaxed
trade for Indian nations, including especially their allies among the Haudenosaunee who had been
separated by the American Revolution from their relatives among the Confederation remaining in the
United States. These guarantees merely reaffirmed and renewed the traditional diplomatic relationship
between the Haudenosaunee and the Euro-American settlers that dated back to the Two Wampum Belt
Treaty with the Dutch, a relationship of parallel economic development and economic noninterference
that constituted the central hallmark of Haudenosaunee diplomacy, now ratified and guaranteed through
British diplomatic efforts with the Americans.
Third, while renewed warfare between Great Britain and the United States during the War of
1812 might have imperiled the guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794,35 Great
Britain again took great pains during the negotiation of the peace treaty that resolved that conflict, the
Treaty of Ghent of 1814, to again protect her Indian allies and renew the prior treaty guarantees of free

the satisfaction of the Indians was deemed worthy no less of the policy than of the liberality of the United States as the
necessary basis of durable tranquillity. the object, it is believed, has been fully attained." This message indicated that
President Washington recognized that the simultaneous resolution of disputes with Great Britain and with the Indian
tribes were related and essential to the national economic development of the United States. After summarizing "our
affairs with regard to the foreign powers between whom and the United States controversies have subsisted, and with
regard also to those of our Indian neighbors with whom we have been in a state of enmity or misunderstanding," he
noted that the recent accord "opens a wide field for consoling and gratirying reflections."
34 For a succinct summary of the history surrounding the adoption of the Indian-related provisions of the Jay Treaty of
1794 and the Treaty of Ghent of 1814, see S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty.
Economies, and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315, 315-21 (1984). For a detailed history of the treaty and the general
structure of relationships between Great Britain and the United States during the period of the Jay Treaty (including a
detailing analysis of the displiltes over its ratification, see B. Perhins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United
States, 1795-1805 (1955).
35 The United States Supreme Court ruled that the rights of non-Indians under Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 were in
fact abrogated by the War of 1812. Karnuth v. United States ex reI. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). As discussed above,
however, the express language ofArticle 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of 1814 clearly prevents application of the Karnuth
analysis to the Indian rights since those rights were expressly preserved by the Treaty ending that conflict.
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trade and free passage belween British Canada and the United States. Thus, in Article 9 of the Treaty
of Ghent of 1814, Great Britain and the United States mutually agreed" to restore to such Tribes or
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been
entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities," so long as the
affected tribes remained at peace with each nation, as the Haudenosaunee had done since the end of
that war. During the negotiation of this Treaty provision, the British negotiators had sought an even
more expansive set of guarantees for their Indian allies, including guarantee oftheir continued rights to
occupy and govern their lands. 36 The United States negotiators responded that such expansive
guarantees were unnecessary since:
[u]nder [the United States constitutional] system, the Indians residing within the United
States are so far independent that they live under their own customs, and not under the
laws ofthe United States; that their rights upon the lands where they inhabit or hunt
are secured to them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United
States and themselves; and that, whenever those boundaries are varied, it is also by
amicable and voluntary treaties, by which they receive from the United States ample
compensation for every right they have to the lands ceded by them. 37

Clearly, the express renewal of pre-existing Indian rights, including the rights of free passage and free
trade contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, contained in Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of
1814 reflected the fact that those rights remained in force. Furthermore, the United States claimed
during the negotiations of the Treaty of Ghent that it had no power to unilaterally alter such guarantees
and directly regulate the Indians.
Fourth, as reflected in the immediate preceding quotation, the American constitutional position
since the time of its formation had been that only those who consented to governance by the United
States were subject to its lawful regulatory authority. This notion, commonly known as popular
36 This diplomatic exchange is discussed by the Expert at R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribe. 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 136-37 (2002) (set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion).
37 Quoted in VI Gale & Seaton's: Register of Debates in Congress, 21st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 1059 (May 19, 1830)
(emphasis added) (diplomatic correspondence during the Treaty of Ghent negotiations quoted in later Congressional
debates)..
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sovereignty, lay at the core of both early American constitutional theory and the early relationships the
United States had with Indian nations. Perhaps the most graphic example of this legal position relative
to the Indian nations can be found in the first ratified treaty the United States entered into with an
Indian nation, the Treaty of Fort Pitt of 1778 signed with the Delaware (Lenni Lenape) Nation,38 allies
of the Huadenosaunee to the South. In Article 6 of that Treaty, the United States set forth the
framework by which the independent and self-governing Delaware Nation might become part of the
United States and subject to its governance and regulation - an offer of formal statehood. Thus, the
Treaty provided:
should it for the future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to
invite any other tribes who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join
the present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the
head, and to have n:presentation in Congress.
Statehood would both

mah~

the Indians subject to American law and would give them formal

representation in Congress where those law were made. Without such consent through statehood,
however, the Delaware Nation, like all Indian nations, were not considered at the time of the
negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794 to be subject to governance by the United States or any of its
political subdivisions, including the states. As this Expert's scholarship has shown, at the time of the
negotiation of the Jay Trea~y of 1794, the United States government claimed no unilateral right to
regulate, tax or otherwise govern Indian nations or their members who resided on tribal lands. 39 Such
claims of unilateral national authority to govern Indian nations and their members without their formal
consent by treaty did not emerge until the last two decades of the nineteenth century - almost a century
after the Jay Treaty of 1794 was negotiated and ratified.
Therefore, when the United States agreed to the right of free passage and free trade for Indians
contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty, American negotiators would not have seen themselves as
38 Treaty with the Delawares, S~:pt. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 [hereinafter Treaty offort Pitt).
39 For the legal theories and historical support for this claim, see generally, R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribe, 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 136-37 (2002) (set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion)
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relinquishing a sovereign power the United States otherwise possessed, but, rather, simply as
reaffirming the fact that notwithstanding the creation of an international border between British Canada
and the United States, the Indians, including the Haudensonaueee, could freely cross that border in
either direction without interference from either American or British authorities and could freely
engage in trade (both with Indians and with non-Indians) across that border under their own tribal laws
and customs without any interference from or regulation and taxation by British or American
governmental officials. These treaty guarantees would not then have been seen as creating any new
special exemption from border crossing and tariff rules that would otherwise apply, but, rather, as a
reaffirmation that the newly created international boundary would make no change in the political
relationships previously existing between the Indian nations, Great Britain, and the United States under
which the Indians formerly were free to pass between the lands then comprising British Canada and
the United States by land or water without any interference and were free to engage in trade without
any interference, levies, tariffs, duties, excises, or other forms of taxation.
Thus, at the time the Jay Treaty of 1794 was negotiated and ratified, the United States would
not have seen the Indian rights of free passage and free trade set forth in Article 3 as creating unusual
special rights, but, rather, merely reaffirming the preexisting legal and political relationship between the
Indian nations and the Euro-American settler states notwithstanding the newly created international
border between British Canada and United States. The United States at the time of the Jay Treaty of
1794 simply did not claim any sovereign power over Indian tribes or their members when engaged in
activities on their lands or in the Indian trade. As this Expert has pointed out, all of the early Trade and
Intercourse Acts enacted by the United States Congress between 1790 and 1834, i.e. relatively
contemporaneously with the Jay Treaty, applied only to non-Indian citizens ofthe United States
engaged in the Indian trade" not to the Indians themselves. 40 American governmental power was
40 Discussed at R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribe, 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 133-35 (2002)
(set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion)
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thought to be limited to those non-Indians who engaged in the Indian trade, not the to Indian traders
themselves. The guarant{:es offree trade and passage for Indians set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty
of 1794 therefore merely constituted a formal treaty guarantee of this preexisting relationship.
Fifth, by its behavior, the United States clearly treated the guarantees of free passage and free
trade contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of ]794 as surviving the War of ] 8] 2 and as remaining in
force throughout its subsequent dealing with the question. Specifically, those parts of the Jay Treaty
dealing with free passage of Indians became codified into United States statutory law as Section 289 of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1359.41 In United States ex reI.

Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660, 661 (W.O.N.V. ]947), a United States district court found free
passage provision of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and its statutory implementation precluded deportation for
lack of visa of a full-blood Canadian Indian woman born on the Six Nations Reserve who was a
member of the Upper Cayuga Tribe of the Six Nations Indians in Canada. Likewise, the tariff
provision was implemented by the United States Congress through the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §
105, 1 Stat. 627, 702, whieh provided:
[N]o duty shall be levied or collected on the importation of peltries brought into the
territories of the United States, nor on the proper goods and effects of whatever nature,
of Indians passing, or repassing the boundary lines aforesaid, unless the same be goods
in bales or other large packages unusual among Indians, which shall not be considered
as goods belonging bona fide to Indians, nor be entitled to the exemption from duty
aforesaid.

This statute remained in force until 1897 when it was omitted without explanation from the Tariff
Revision Act of that year and never subsequently revived. 42 Since the abrogation of preexisting Indian
41 The half-blood requirement was more recently added. An earlier version adopted in 1928 was set forth in the original
language of 8 U.S.c. § 226a (1928) read: "This chapter shall not be construed to apply to the right ofAmerican Indians
born in Canada to pass the bIJrders of the United States; Provided. That this right shall not extend to persons whose
membership in Indian tribes or families is created by adoption". Quoted in United States ex reI. Goodwin v. Karnuth. 74
F. Supp. 660. 661 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). At the time, as the Go(Avin court noted, no definition of Indian existed in the
immigration statute. The half-blood requirement may have been adopted in response to that concern, although it does
not fully comply with the numdates of the Jay Treaty of 1794. which only employs the tenn Indian, without definition or
restriction.
42 TariffAct Revision of 1897, ch. 11,30 Stat. 151. See generally, S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing
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rights generally requires a clear statement of Congress and will not be implied from silence,43 this
Expert concludes that the unexplained omission of this statutory implementation of the free trade
provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1794 from the 1897 general tariff revision legislation and subsequent
legislation was not intend'ed to abrogate or otherwise diminish the rights of the Claimants/Investors and
other Indians under Artide 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794.
While visiting the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation of New York within the past two decades as
an invited speaker for the Tribe, this Expert personally witnessed the continued effect of the Indian free
trade and free passage provisions Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, as he accompanied enrolled
members of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation of New York back and forth across the international
border, only to be waived through the United States border checkpoint upon a showing by the driver of
the vehicle of his tribal me:mbership card. There is therefore no question that the United States has
treated the provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 guaranteeing free passage and trade for
Indians to remain in full force and legal effect throughout its history, including the time frame when the
Claimants/Investors commenced their business and the time frame when NAFTA was adopted.
Finally, this Expert clearly believes that tobacco and tobacco products of the type at issue in this
dispute were clearly within the free trade and free passage provisions ofArticle III of the Jay Treaty of
1794. While Article 3 expressly excluded from its protections of the Indian trade goods "large
Packages unusual among Indians," (emphasis supplied) which "shall not be considered as Goods
belonging bona fide to Indi:ans," this exclusionary provision clearly does not apply to the cigarettes
and other tobacco products produced and imported by the Claimants/Investors. The obvious purpose of
Tribal Sovereignty, Economies. and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315,331 (1984).
43 E.g. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986). As the United States Supreme Court said in United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941), Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and
plain. "Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty
rights ...." Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979); See
generally, Felix Cohen's Handbook ofFederal Indian Law 223 (R. Strickland. ed. 1982 edition); Wilkinson & Volkman,
Judicial Review ofindian Tre'aty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a
Time is That?, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 601 (1975)
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the provision is to prevent the smuggling by Indians of large quantities of goods they do not own. The
primary test, of course, set forth in Article 3 of whether the goods could be considered owned is
whether they involved bales or packages of goods "unusual among Indians." If the goods did not
constitute a nonnal part of the Indian trade, i.e. were "unusual among Indians," the treaty provision
established a presumption (presumably rebuttable) that the goods did not actually belong to the Indians
who were carrying them across the international border between British Canada and the United States.
For two reasons, this exclusionary provision does not apply to the tobacco products manufactured and
distributed by the Claimants/Investors. First, other than perhaps the fur trade, which is expressly
referenced through the term "peltries" in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, no other product was more
quintessentially Indian in origin and involved in the Indian trade than tobacco and tobacco products.
One need think no further than the unfortunately racist wooden caricatures of Indians that commonly
adorned American tobacco stores in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the so-called 'cigar
store Indians," to demonstrate the essential Indian character and origin of tobacco and tobacco
products. Tobacco and tobacco products were not "unusual among Indians," they were quintessentially
associated with Indians, and for good reason. Tobacco was unknown to Europeans prior to contact
with North American natives who grew, traded, and used tobacco and tobacco products, both
ceremonially and as a means of exchange.44 In fact, the leading non-Indian historian of the
Haudenosaunee, the late Francis Jennings, specifically notes that the Iroquois traded tobacco and
tobacco products long before the Jay Treaty of 1794.45 Thus, the tobacco and tobacco products
manufactured and distribut,ed by the Claimants/Investors clearly were not within the treaty phrase
"unusual among Indians" and therefore unquestionably would have been thought to be covered by the
44 F, Jennings, The Founders of America: How Indians Discovered the Land, Pioneered in It, and Created Great Classical
Civilizations, How They Were Plunged into a Dark Age by Invasion and Conquest, and How They Are Reviving 40
(1993).
45 F. Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English
Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744,42,254,356 (1984); see also S. Adams, The Long House
of the Iroquois 158, 160 (1944) (documenting Haudenosaunee tobacco cultivation and ceremonial use).
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guarantees of free trade and free passage contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1793. In fact, both
express language of the Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105,
1 Stat. 627, 702, implementing the free trade provisions of the Jay Treaty expressly applied to "proper
goods and effects ofwhatever nature" (emphasis supplied) so long as the goods were not "unusual
among Indians." Second. since there is no dispute whatsoever in this claim that the tobacco and
tobacco products at issue here were manufactured, owned and distributed by Indian
Claimants/Investors, the express language of Article 3 of the Jay Treaty and its implementing
legislation clearly would have been thought to cover such products.

C. State Authorit), Over the Indian Trade in the Late Eighteenth and First Half of the
Nineteenth Century
Between the time ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 and the first half of the nineteenth century, neither
United States treaty obligations nor United States constitutional and statutory law would have
permitted the state governments (states) that are part of the United States ofAmerica to engage in any
regulation of trade by Indians with others either within Indian reservations (on-reserve sales) or outside
o flndian reservations (off-reserve) sales when, as here, such trade originated with Indians from British
Canada or when it involved Indians indigenous to the United States. The reasons for this conclusion
involve both United States treaty obligations and their relationship to the states and United States
domestic constitutional, statutory and common law dealing with Indians at the time.
First, and perhaps most important, the clear language ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1793 (as
further preserved by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of 1814) exempted Indian trade commenced in
Canada by Indians domiciled within the external territorial borders of British Canada (as well as the
reverse trade by Indians domiciled within the territorial borders of the United States) from any
interference, taxation, tariffs:, duties, or excises. That treaty obligation assumed by the United States of
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America imposed a duty of non-interference with such trade on both the national government of the
United States and any political constituent part thereof, such as the States of the Union comprising the
United States of America. Under American constitutional law, treaties made under the authority of the
United States constitute the supreme law of the land and every state is automatically bound to adhere to
such obligations under the: Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 46 As the Supreme Court
of the United States recently pointed out:
[I]t is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the States pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, and that the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in
the course of adjudicating the rights of litigants. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483 (1880). And where a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no
issue of intruding on the constitutional prerogatives of the States or the other federal
branches. Courts must apply the remedy as a requirement of federal law. Cf. 18 U.S.c. §
2515; United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-525 (1974).47
This principle of state governmental subservience to treaties made under the authority of the United
States, while explicit in

thf~

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, was further buttressed

by the actual Congressional debates over the ratification of the Jay Treaty, where the principle was
unsuccessfully attacked by certain opponents of both the Treaty and President Washington's position on
its ratification. 48 Thus, both the self-executing treaty language ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Treaty
guarantees set forth in Article 3, discussed at length in the previous section, divested alI States ofthe
Union of the United States ofAmerica during the first half of the nineteenth century of any legal claim
to any authority to regulate" tax or otherwise interfere with Indian trade originating in Canada either by
Indians domiciled within the territorial limits of British Canada or by Indians from the United States.
Second, in addition to the Treaty obligations assumed by the United States ofAmerica under
Article 3 of the Jay Treaty 1794, the States of the American Union were also divested of any claim they

'1

46 United States Const. Art. 6, 2.
47 Sanche=-L1amas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,126 S.Ct. 2669,2681 (2006)
48 See generally, B. Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805, 30-44 (1955)
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otherwise might have had to authority over Indian trade during the first half of the nineteenth century
by American domestic law in two different respects. First, the two statutes cited in the preceding
section that implemented the Indian rights of free trade and unimpeded passage set forth in Article 3 of
the Jay Treaty 1794, specifically the statute now found as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 and the Act of
March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627, 702, were in force throughout the first half of the nineteen
century. Under the express provisions of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, these
statutes preempt any state laws that would purport to interfere with such free passage and free trade
provisions, irrespective of the domicile of the Indians originating the trade across the international
boundary between the United States and Canada were domiciled or resided within British Canada or
the United States. In fact, the free passage provision now found in amended form at 8 U.S.C. § 1359
expressly applies to Indians of Canadian origin, indicating the intent to apply these twin statutory
provision implementing thl~ Jay Treaty rights both to Indians of United States domicile as well as
aboriginal persons whose primary residence or domicile was in British Canada. Under the American
constitutional system, any attempt by a state to interfere with the rights granted by these twin United
States statutes was automatically invalidated by the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. 49 Thus, during most of the nineteenth century these two statutes implementing the Indian
guarantees of free trade and free passage found in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 remained in force
and effectively precluded any state effort under the United States constitutional system to regulate, tax
or otherwise impede the free trade by Indians, whether domiciled or residing within British Canada or
the United States, across the international boundary between those two nations.
Second, aside from the fact that the twin federal statutes implementing the Indian free trade and
49 Illustrative early nineteenth ccmtury decisions of the United States Supreme Court invalidating state laws due to conflict
with federal statutes include /tVorcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (Georgia law conflicting with the federal Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts invalid); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (Maryland's efforts 0 tax a federally
charted bank invalidated by the conflict with the federal statute creating the bank); Gibbons l~ Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824)
(state effort to regulate coasta:! trade invalid since it conflicted with the Federal Coastal Licensing Act); Prigg v. Com. of
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539(1842) (notwithstanding inconsistent Pennsylvania law, a fugitive slave must be returned to
his master to due federal consltitutionallaw);
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free passage provisions of the Jay Treaty remained in force throughout most of the nineteenth century
and preempted any state

rc~gulation

in the field, the basic constitutional, statutory and common law

structure ofAmerican Indiian law during the nineteenth century also precluded any of the states
comprising the Union of the Untied States ofAmerica from regulating, taxing, interfering with or
impeding the free trade by Indians across the international border between British Canada and the
United States. This conclusion is based on extensive research conducted by this Expert into United
States constitutional, statutory" and common law surrounding Indian law. Most of that research is set
forth in two published articles - There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribe~o and the

Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,51 which are attached to this Opinion as Appendices Band C
respectively. Since those two articles set forth the research in greater depth, this Opinion will simply
outline the basic conclusions drawn from that research. The basic outline of the analysis is that during
the first half of the nineteenth century, three analytically separate legal doctrines prevailed in American
Indian law, each of which was sufficient to preempt the states of the American Union from exercising
any regulatory, taxing, or other sovereign powers over Indian trade. First, the adoption of the Indian
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution according to its major proponent, James Madison,
was clearly intended to eliminate any claims to any state authority over Indian commerce, such as the
trade in tobacco reflected in this case. Second, federal treaty, statutory or other recognition of lands as
Indian country, i.e. as an aboriginal homeland for native peoples, constituted a geographic preemption
of any state regulation oflndian activities, including Indian trade with non-Indians within that territory.
Finally, where Congress has exercised its powers under the Indian Commerce Clause or ratified treaties
by adopting treaties or enacting federal laws dealing with Indians, it generally has occupied that field to
the exclusion of any state regulation, taxation, or other impediments or interference. Each of these

50 34 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL 113-260 (2002) (set forth in Appendix B)
51 27 Connecticut L. Rev. 1055- 1249 (1995) (set forth in Appendix C)
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legal doctrines by itself constitutes a sufficient justification for a preemption of state authority over
Indian trade. Nevertheless, they each has a different force and will be briefly examined below. The
first and the third apply to any state regulation, taxation or other interference with Indian trade and
affairs, irrespective of location, and therefore would have applied both to what are called in this
Arbitration on-reserve and off·reserve sales. By contrast, the second, legal theory is geographically
bounded in its reach and applied only to activities occurring in Indian country, i.e. on-reserve sales.
First, after an unhappy experience under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation with
bifurcated claims of governmental responsibility for regulating Indian trade 52 and affairs between the
national government and the states, the first written constitution of the United States in force from 1781
through 1789, the drafters of the United States Constitution deliberately omitted from the Indian
Commerce Clause any claim of residual authority by the states over Indian trade and affairs. In The
Federalist No. 42, an essay written to support ratification of the Constitution ofthe United States,
James Madison, generally regarded as the primary figure in the formation of that document, wrote:
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered
from two limitations in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure
and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the
States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own
limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet
settled, and has bee:n a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal
councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing
within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so
far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is
not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored
to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with
complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a
part, and letting the whole remain. 53
52 In using the term trade in this Expert Opinion Report, the Expert employs the term (unless the context otherwise so
indicates) in the broad sense of commerce, which, of course, is not limited to trade in goods but also includes all sorts of
exchanges, including commercial investment. Thus, as used in this Expert Opinion Report trade is synonymous with the
term employed in the United States Constitution - commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824), the United States
Supreme Court defined commerce, as employed in the Commerce Clause of Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United
States Constitution, as intercourse. Both trade in goods and cross-border commercial investment are subsumed with this
broad definition of intercourse.
53 The complete essay is set forth at htlp://www.constitution.org/fed/federa42.htm.
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(Emphasis supplied). In perhaps the most important cornerstone Indian law case decided by the
Supreme Court - Worcester v. Georgia" -- the Court relied on this theory and ruled unconstitutional the
efforts by the State of Georgia to regulate affairs with the Cherokee Nation within that state. After
discussing the history of the Indian Commerce Clause, most of which is set forth in Appendix B, it
ruled that laws of the

Statc~

of Georgia purporting to regulate Indian commerce and affairs "interfere[d]

forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the
regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our Constitution, are committed exclusively
to the government ofthe Union."ss (Emphasis supplied) To emphasize that it was the Congress, not the
state governments, that controlled Indian trade under the Constitution, the Court added. "The whole
intercourse between the United States and this [Indian] Nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested
in the Government of the United States."S6 (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, during the first half ofthe nineteenth century, the express legal doctrine adopted by the
Supreme Court interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause as granting complete and exclusive authority
to regulate trade with the Indians to the national government, to the exclusion of any regulation,
taxation, other other interf{:rence by the states of the Union. Another later illustration of this principle
occurred in Fellows v. Blacksmith,s7 where the Supreme Court ruled that despite the negotiation and
ratification of a federal trea.ty contemplating the eventual removal of the Tonawanda Band of Seneca,
courts of the State of New York had absolutely no jurisdiction or authority to hear a case seeking to
eject the Tonawanda Indians from parcels they had agreed to cede since "a forcible removal must be
made, ifmade at all, under the direction ofthe United States." Therefore at the time of the negotiation
and ratification of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and for the first half of the nineteenth century (through a
considerable period of the twentieth century), it was well understood as a matter ofAmerican
54 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
55 Id. at 561.
56 Id. at 562.
57 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856).
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constitutional law that the exclusive right to regulate, tax, or otherwise control Indian trade and affairs
was vested by the United States Constitution in the national government. The States of the Union
therefore had no authority to regulate, tax, or otherwise interfere with the Indian trade, whether
occurring on or off an Indian reservation. In addition, as this Expert has explained at great length in the
published article appearing at Appendix B, the power vested by the Indian Commerce Clause in the
Congress of the United States of regulating "commerce ... with Indian Tribes" originally was
intended, understood and limited (until the last 15 years of the nineteenth century) to regulating or

taxing non-Indians who traded with Indians. As originally understood, the Indian Commerce Clause
afforded Congress no power to directly regulate, tax or otherwise interfere with the Indians themselves
during the course of Indian trade since the Indians were, throughout this period, understood to be
citizens of their own Indian nations and, for most purposes other than crimes occurring outside their
territory, not subject to the sovereign authority of the United States ofAmerica.
Second, as explaim:d more thoroughly in The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause set forth in
Appendix C, throughout most of the history of the United States, including the first half of the
nineteenth century, American legal doctrine prevented the states from regulating, taxing or otherwise
interfering with Indians and non-Indians who traded or otherwise dealt with Indians within the
aboriginal territories the United States government had set aside and recognized as Indian country, by
treaty, statute, executive orders or otherwise. The very fact of federal governmental recognition of the
land as Indian country gem:rally meant during the first half of the nineteenth century that the land was
set aside for the exclusive use, occupation and governance of the Indian tribe for which it was
desgnated. Thus, in the famous case of Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held in 1832 that
Georgia laws regulating non-Indian missionaries who were located in the territorial limits of the
Cherokee Nation located within the boundaries of that State could have no force and effect there since
"treaties, repeated in a

succl~ssion

of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee
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country from Georgia, guaranty to them all the land within their boundary, solemnly pledge the faith of
the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it, and recognize the preexisting power of

the [CherokeeJ nation to govern itself. ·,58 (Emphasis supplied).
That doctrine continued through the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. For
example, in Williams v. Lee,59 the Supreme Court held that the State ofArizona had no right to
adjudicate contracts claims involving Indian trade, specifically an effort by a licensed non-Indian trader
to enforce a consumer credit contract for the sale of goods entered into on the Navajo Reservation with
Navajo purchasers. The Court indicated that "Congress has also acted consistently upon the
assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation." Noting
the 1868 treaty creating the Navajo Reservation, the Court indicated that such federal recognition of
Indian country constitutes an "understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained

exclusively within the jurisdiction 0.( whatever tribal government existed." (Emphasis supplied). Thus,
for the on-reserve sales at issue in this Arbitration, American domestic law during the first half of the
nineteenth century (or today) would afford no adequate legal justification for a State of Union imposing
any of the regulations or excises at issue in this Arbitration on the Indian Claimants/Investors.
Third, from the

incl~ption

of national governance under its 1787 Constitution, the Congress of

the United States enacted a series of so-called Trade and Intercourse Acts licensing, regulating and
controlling various aspects of United States trade and affairs with Indian tribes. 60 This legislation, as
sequentially amended and altered, remained in force throughout the first hal f of the twentieth century,
and some portions of the legislation remain in force today.6! In Worcester v. Georgia, the United States
58 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-62.
59 358U.S.217(l959).
60 Act of July 22, 1790,ch. 33, I Stat. 137; Act of Mar. l,I793,ch. 19,1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19,1796. ch. 30,1 Stat.
469; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. See generally F. Prucha,
American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, /790-1834 (1962) (discussing
the Trade and Intercourse Acts and their impact).
61 E.g. Oneida Indian Nation o/N. Y v. County a/Oneida. 414 U. S. 661 (1974) (Oneida I); County o/Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation 0/ N. Y, 470 U. S. 226 (Oneida ll) (1985) (recent Indian land litigation based on the restraint against
alienation oflndian land contained in the Trade and Intercourse Acts).
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Supreme Court also ruled that the existence of this extensive national statutory structure regulating
trade and affairs with the Indian tribes had so occupied the field of Indian affairs that it preempted any
exercise of state regulatory or other like powers over Indian trade and affairs. Thus, the Court noted,
that the Trade and Intercourse Acts give to the "chief magistrate" (the President) full control over entry
by non-Indians into Indian country for trade or commerce and therefore the laws of the State of
Georgia purporting exercise a similar authority were invalid because they were in "equal hostility with
the acts of congress for regulating this intercourse, and giving effect to the treaties."62 As described
more fully above, American constitutional law invalidates through the Supremacy Clause any state
legislation or other acts that would interfere with or regulate a field fully occupied by federal
legislation. United States courts have consistently followed this approach to the present day.63 Since
the Trade and Intercourse Acts were in full force and effect throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, American legal doctrines of federal supremacy and preemption would have prevented any state
of the Union for taxing, regulating or otherwise interfering with Indian trade both on and off of any
Indian reservation.
Finally, before 1900 American law appeared to draw absolutely no distinctions between Indians
born, domiciled or residing within the United State and Indians born, domiciled or residing within
British Canada for purposes of any of these legal distinctions. A careful search ofAmerican legal
databases disclosed only one case in which any federal court in the United States confronted the
question of the legal status of a Canadian Indian before 1900. That case dealt with naturalization and
treated a Canadian Indian as an American Indian would have been treaty in a like situation by holding
that the Canadian Indian should be treated as a person of the Indian race and therefore not a "white

62 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562.

63 E.g Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Central Machinery Co. v. Ari=ona Tax
Conn'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (recent examples of the use of modem statutory remnants of the Trade and Intercourse Acts
to invalidate state efforts to tax Indian trade).
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person" then required to be eligible for naturalization. 64 During most of the nineteenth century, the
relevant legal distinctions were Indian and non-Indian. The locale of birth, domicile or residence of the
Indian in question was considered largely relatively irrelevant to resolving border issues, trade, or the
like since both Canadian and American Indians were then simply considered "Indians" and neither was
treated as a citizen of the United States. Until the United States generally granted Indian in the United
States citizenship in the United States ofAmerica in 1924, the United States courts drew absolutely no
distinctions between India.ns of Canadian domicile and residence and those domiciled and resident in
the United States for any purpose related to trade, border crossing or the like.
Perhaps the best non-judicial evidence of this fact involves the flights of two great Indian
leaders toward British Canada after armed conflict with the United State military on the western
frontier. In 1877, Chief Joseph led his beleaguered Wallowa band of Nez Perce Indians on a protracted
and ultimately unsuccessful flight to Canada to avoid American military authorities who sought to
remove these Indians from their aboriginal homelands to a distant reservation not of their choosing.
His band was stopped just 40 mile (60 km) short of the Canadian frontier and relocated to a
reservation. 65 In contrast, after the Battle of Greasy Grass (or, as most non-Indians know it, the Battle
of the Little Big Horn) in 1876, Sitting Bull, the great Lakota (Sioux) war leader, relocated his
followers into Canada where he and some of them remained for almost a half decade, apparently
initially intending to remain permanently resident there. Thus, Sitting Bull and his band of Lakota
followers acquired a new domicile and residence by their flight to Canada. Nevertheless, when Sitting
Bull returned to the United States in 1881, he was treated identically to Chief Joseph and relocated
ultimately to the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation. 66 The identity ofAmerican treatment of Chief
64 See, In re Camile, 6 F. 256 (C.C.D.Or., 1880) (petitioner with white Canadian father and Indian mother from British
Columbia ineligible for naturalization as an Indian and therefore not a "white person" as then required for American
naturalization).
65 See generally, K. Nerburn, ChiefJoseph & the Flight of the Ne= Perce: The Untold Story ofan American Tragedy
(2005),
66 See generally, B. Yenne, Sitting Bull(2008); 1. Manzione, 1 Am Looking to the Northfor My Life--Sitting Bull.
1876-1881 (1994); R. Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times ofSitting Bull (1993); S. Vestal, Sitting Bull:
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Joseph, who had unsuccessfully sought to lead his band to a new life in British Canada, and Sitting
BuH, who had in fact changed his domicile and residence to British Canada with the permission of the
Canadian authorities and who had remained there for five years following the Battle of Greasy Grass,
reflects the fact that before 1900 American law formally drew no distinctions whatsoever between
Indians who were born, domiciled or resided in British Canada and those whose origins, domicile and
residence was in the United States. With limited exceptions, neither were citizens of the United
States,67 and both were simply lumped together for the purposes discussed in this section as "Indians"
of their tribal nation of origin. 68 Consequently, what little evidence exists suggests that federal Indian
law in the United States ofAmerica before 1900 drew absolutely no distinctions between Indians born,
domiciled or residing in Canada and those born, domiciled or residing in the United States for any
purpose relevant to this Arbitration, including regulations involving Indian trade and commerce.

D. Reasonable E][pectations of the ClaimantslInvestors Between 1994 and 2006
Based on the historical context, the relevant treaties involving or affecting the Haudenosaunee,
including the Jay Treaty of 1794, and the basic structure of federal Indian law during the period, this
Expert is of the opinion that the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors could have no reasonable
expectation that most of the business they conducted as tobacco manufacturers and traders could
lawfully be subjected to the two types of regulatory measures at issue in this Arbitration (i.e. the state
government-enacted escrow measures and lists of brands banned from distribution in each state). This
opinion is based on the structure history and context of the Indian free trade and free passage
provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, the modern interpretation of the Indian Commerce
Champion o/the Sioux, a Biography (1932); B. Ladow, Sanctuary: Native Border Crossings and the North American
West, 2001 American Review o/Canadian Studies 25
67 See. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
68 See also, New York Indians ~~ United States, 40 Ct. CI. 448 (1905) (Relying on the example of Sitting Bull and the flight
of the Kickapoo Indians to Mexico to demonstrate that the intended domicile ofIndians was not determinative of United
States Indian law or policy); see also, Sully l\ United States, 195 F. 113 (D. S.D. 1912) (finding offact No, 24 references
the birth of Sioux child named Reanor Waugh in Canada while her mother was there during a "temporary absence" from
the Great Sioux Reservation, probably with Sitting Bull's followers, yet she is treated identically to her American born
Sioux siblings).
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Clause ofArticle I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, and the structure and content
of modem domestic Indian law in the United States. For reasons stated below, all three sources point in
the same direction, i.e that States of the Union in the United States have no power whatsoever to
regulate Indian commerce" particularly Indian commerce protected by treaty provisions like those
found in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of] 794. That conclusion is certainly strongest with respect to (l)
the activities of the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors involving on-reserve sales and (2) products
manufactured under contract on-reserve in Canada, but sold FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada
directly to unrelated third parties who themselves import into the United States and market such
products under their own brand labels. While the States of Union may have a slightly stronger claim
under the law prevailing

b~:tween

] 994 and 2006 for authority to exercise some powers over off-reserve

sales by the Haudenosaunee ClaimantslInvestors within each respective states in which directly market
their products, this Expert, for reasons set forth below, nevertheless concludes that such sales remained
exempt from state regulation and taxation, unapproved by the Congress of the United States, due to the
Indian free trade and free passage provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of] 794, the Indian
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and the continued effects of cases like Central

Machinery.
As the extensive research contained in this Expert's published article entitled The Dormant

Indian Commerce Clause, set forth as Appendix C, indicates, for most of the history of the United
States, American domestic legal doctrine prevented any state regulation, taxation, or other exercises of
sovereign authority over Indians either within Indian country (i.e. on-reserve) or involving Indian trade
and commerce. The basic explanation for that conclusion was set forth in the discussions and
references above to the cornerstone case of Worcester v. Georgia, discussed above. Until the last
quarter of the twentieth century, a combination of the dormant effects of the Indian commerce clause,
the geographic preemption created by federal protection of tribal sovereignty over set aside aboriginal
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lands, and the effects

off(~deral

constitutional, statutory, and regulatory occupation of the field of

Indian trade and affairs precluded any state regulation, excises or other taxes, or other interferences
with Indian trade or commerce that had not been expressly approved by Congress.

~DUring the last quarter of the twentieth century and first part nfthis century, the federal courts
unilaterally began to weaken the absolute preclusion of any regulation or taxation of Indian commerce
or control over activities occurring in Indian country. Those cases, however, are quite limited. In
general, the decisions grant states broader authority than exercised previously over taxing non-Indians
for purchases made in Indian country (i.e. on-reserve), while retaining an absolute bar to any the
application of any state regulatory and tax laws to Indians in Indian country in the absence of
Congressional legislation to the contrary. Most of the cases reflecting these changes are set forth in
Appendix C and will not b,e further discussed in detail here. The best, and perhaps most applicable,
,illustration of these principles involves a series of so-called "Indian smokeshop" cases heard by the
United States Supreme COlJrt between 1976 and 1994 which permitted states to impose cigarette
excises taxes on Indian

sal(~s

of cigarettes to non-Indians within an Indian reservation, while

simultaneously holding that Indian tribal purchasers were completely exempt from the same taxes. 69
Central to the analysis of the Supreme Court in these cases was the fact that the legal incidence of the
tax in question fell on the non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes. In such cases, as the Moe and

Collville cases indicate, Indian sellers could be required to precollect the tax through cigarette excise
stamps and to keep reasonable tax records reflecting the volume of their sale to non-Indians. States,
nevertheless, had difficulty enforcing these requirements since any effort to directly sue the Indian
tribal sellers was thwarted, as the Court held in Citizen Band ofPotowatomi, by the immunity of the
69 Moe v. COIifederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); California Bd. OJEquali=ation v. Chemehuevi Tribe. 474 Us. 9 (/985); N. Y Dept oj Taxation v.
Milhem Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Cifi=en Band ojPotawatomi Tribe oj
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (despite validity of state cigarette excise tax on on-reservation sales by Indians to non
Indians state could not sue to Ithe Tribe to collect the tax due to the sovereignty of the Tribe and its immunity from suit).
This Expert should disclose that worked as a paid consultant for the attorneys representing the Confederated Colville
Tribes on its Brief in the Unite:d States Supreme Court in the Colville litigation.
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Indian tribes from such direct state initiated litigation. Where, however, the state attempted to directly
tax Indian tribal members for tobacco sales, as the various states have attempted to do with respect to
the Haudenosaunee ClaimantslInvestors in this dispute, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held, as it did in both the Moe and ColvWe cases, that the states lacked any taxing power to
directly tax or regulate tribal Indians with respect to on-reservation tobacco sales. More recently, the
Court has reaffirmed the complete and total immunity of tribal Indians from direct state regulation,
taxation and excises for on-reservation activities in a series of non-tobacco related tax cases. 70 A recent
illustration of this principle closer the events that provoked this arbitration occurred in Thompson v,

Country ofFranklin, 987 F. Supp. 111 (N.D.N.V. 1997) where the federal district court ruled that a
New York country had no right to tax the lands of a Mohawk Indian (the Mohawks constituting a
constituent tribe ofthe Hauclenosaunee) even though such lands lay outside of the diminished
boundaries ofthe St. Regis Mohawk Reservation of New York because Congress had never approved
such taxation or reduction ofthe reservation boundaries. Thus, without express authorization from
Congress, states have no power to regulate or tax Indians directly for their commerce or their lands and
the Indian Claimants/Investors had no reason to expect otherwise in the period between 1994 and 2006.
It should also be emphasized that while the United States Supreme Court has modified prior
doctrine to pennit limited state taxation of tobacco sales to non-Indians in Indian country, the Court has

never permitted the direct regulation of tribal Indian activities in Indian country by a state. The prior
law completely preempting and precluding any such direct regulation remains unaffected by the limited
exceptions the Court has made for the collection of taxation of non-Indian for purchases in Indian
country. The state schemes involved in this Arbitration clearly involve significant direct regulation of
Indian manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products with the threat to totally ban sale of the products
of the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors if they do not fully comply with the state escrow
70 See e.g.. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
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requirements. Since both the state-enacted listing ban and the state escrow requirements involved state
regulatory structures that the states in question seek to directly apply to and enforce against the Indian
Claimants/Investors in this

I~ase

for on-reservation activities, the only conceivable conclusion anyone

familiar with domestic American Indian law could draw during the period between 1994 and 2006 is
that such state laws could not lawfully be applied to the on-reserve business activities of the
Haudenosaunsee ClaimantsJ1nvestors. Thus, the Indian Claimants/Investors had no reasonable
expectation between 1994 and 2006 that the state escrow requirements or the listing ban on their
products could be applied to their on-reserve activities.
One other possible change in American law since the nineteenth century is that since Indians
born in the United States were unilaterally, and often involuntarily, granted United States citizenship in
1924 (a act that some of the Haudenosaunee reject as unlawful to this day),?! American Indian law has
increasingly begun to draw a distinction between Indians from tribes outside the United States who
were born and domiciled elsewhere and Indians from tribes indigenous to the United States.
Increasingly, the some courts and federal agencies in the United States have begun to treat the former
as if they were non-Indian, notwithstanding their Indian ancestry.72 Nevertheless, this alteration,
Compare. Albany v. United States, 152 F.2d 266 (6 th CiT. 1945) (Canadian Mohawk Indian resident of the United States
appealing selective service conviction on the grounds that American draft laws did not apply to him); United States v.
Cook, 383 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. N.Y. 1974)(same).ln noting that United States law in 1924 involuntarily conferred United
States citizenship on American Indians from tribes of United States origin or residence, this Expert Opinion Report takes
no position on whether the invc:stors are "nationals of Canada" under the NAFTA, because that is a question of Canadian
law over which this Expert professes no special expertise.
72 E.g. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (Canadian Indian not treated as an Indian for jurisdictional
purposes since unable to show sufficient connection with a United States Indian tribe); Cayuga Indian Nation ofNew
York, v. Coumo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 nA (W. D. N.Y. 1983)(briefly noting a distinction between American and
Canadian Cayugas); but see, Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) (Supreme Court notes that the Canadian Indian
wife of a United States Indian was and should be treated identically to her husband for purposes of the appeal based on
claims of off-reservation hunting rights of their off-reservation hunting conviction). The leading scholarly commentator
on the enforcement of the Indian free trade and passage guarantees of the 1794 Jay Treaty reports that"
Canadian-born Indians frequently find that officials of the INS and other federal agencies are grossly underinformed
about Indian rights." S. O'Bri(~n. The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families.
53 Fordham L. Rev. 315, 330-331 (1984). Congress, nevertheless, sometimes has decided to expressly treat American
Indians, i.e. Indians from tribes located in the United States, but who were born in Canada as otherwise identical to
United States Indians for purposes of certain benefits, such as SSI and food stamps. 8 U.S.C. § I6I2(a)(2)(G).
Likewise, at one time, the federal regulations permitted the United States Indian Health Service to serve any "Indian of
Canadian or Mexican origin rec:ognized by any Indian tribe or group as a member of an Indian community served by the
Indian Health program." Indian Health Service Manual, Part 2, Ch. I, s 2-1.2, quoted in Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F.
71
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adopted by some courts, in the approach to deciding who is an Indian governed by United States Indian
law should have no application to those Claimants/Investors who are are members of Canadian, rather
than United States, Indian tribes. Since the primary point of the Indian free trade and free passage
rights of the ] 794 Jay Treaty was to help reunify the Haudenosaunee who, contrary to their Great Law
of Peace, had become disunified and divided by a then newly-created international boundary between
British Canada and the United States, treating Canadian Indians from the Haudenosaunee as nonIndians for purpose of federal Indian law doctrine would completely subvert the point ofthe treaty
guarantees. Thus, at least one court has recognized that for most federal Indian law purposes, the
Haudenosaunee must be treated as one people despite the international border that involuntarily
separated them after the American Revolution. In re Linda J W, l79 Misc. 2d 96 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998)
(ruling that for purposes of (:hild adoption by a Canadian Indian under the Indian Child Welfare Act of
] 978 "[t]he border which separates Canada from the United States ... has been subsequently adopted
and ratified by the United States and Canada. The existence of this border has no effect on the
community of the Six Nations .... This continuity of the Six Nations community is recognized by the
United States and Canada in the right of free and uninhibited passage of people and goods across the
United States/Canada border which is granted to the Six Nations under the Jay Treaty."). It is therefore
the conclusion of this Expert that as to on-reserve sales, the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors (both
those who are members of Canadian First Nations and those who are members of Indian tribes in the
United States) had absolutely no reasonable expectation in the period of 1994 through 2006 that their
manufacture, importation, and distribution could be subject to any form of state-enacted regulation or
Supp. 652 (D. N.M. 1976). In United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alask. Terr. 1958), the court noted that the
Metlakatla Indian community in Alaska was not aboriginal to Alaska but were Indians who immigrated to Alaska in the
nineteenth century from British Columbia, precisely the reverse of the situation involving the Canadian Indians in this
Artibtration. Nevertheless, the Court held that they were entitled to be treated like any other Indian under American
Indian law. At least one Soliciltor General's Opinion for the United States Department ofthe Interior advances the view
that a Canadian Indian who is l:nrolled member of a United States Indian tribe should be treated as an Indian fully
subject to that tribe's jurisdiction in the same way as any American Member, Op. Sol., Oct. IS, 1936, 1938 WL 6858
(SoI.Gen.).
Page 47

000723

taxation, including the specifically the state-government-enacted escrow measures and lists of brands
banned from distribution in each state, without express approval by Congress (which to date has not
occurred).
As to the actions of the Haudeonosaunee Claimants/Investors in manufacturing and selling
cigarettes and other tobacco products (sold FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada) on-reserve in
Canada to third parties parties who then import them into the United States and sell them under their
own label, the law could not be clearer that no state had authority to project its regulatory or tax laws
outside its borders (and outside the borders of the United States) to reach manufacturing and sales
activities occurring completely within the nation of Canada and outside of the jurisdiction of both the
United States and any state thereof. It is has long been understood that even Congress could not project
its laws into another country and affect the activities of Indians, even Indians domiciled within the
United States borders, within that country. See, Coralitos Stock Company v. United States, 33 Ct. CI.
342 (1898) (rejecting the application of federal Indian claims statutes to the actions of Germonimo's
band of Chiricahua Apache lndians for depredations done in Mexico because the United States had no
power to regulate such actions in a foreign country). The conclusion of the court in Coralitos Stock

Company seems compelled by the very nature of the limits of sovereignty of any nation created by an
international boundary. Any government possesses sovereignty and full governing powers within its

boundaries, not outside ofit.

Ifthe federal government had no such constitutional power to regulate

Indian activities outside of the nation's borders, certainly no State of the Union would have any such
power since foreign affairs are exclusively a federal matter under the United States Constitution. Thus,
this Expert is of the opinion that no reasonable business person would have had any reasonable
expectation during the relevant period that activities involving manufacture and sale of tobacco
products (or any other product occurring) completely within the country of Canada could or would
subject them to any regulation or taxation by any state within the United States, including the two types
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of regulations at issue in this Arbitration.
Finally, with respect to the off-reserve sales undertaken directly by the Haudenosaunee
Claimants/Investors, this Expert is clearly of the opinion that no reasonable Indian business person
could have conceivably expected any state regulation listing and banning their products would have
been legally possible during the relevant period of 1994 through 2006. By contrast, while reasonable
Indian business person might have considered the possibility of state taxation, but not regulation, of
their off-reserve sales (notwithstanding the existence of substantial legal arguments, described below
suggesting the invalidity of such taxation), no reasonable aboriginal investor would have thought
during the relevant period that any state would have authority to regulate Indian trade, not through
taxation, but by demanding the type of escrow payments demanded here by the state-enacted
legislation essentially as reparations or anticipated damages for the tobacco products being sold by
Indian off-reserve. The entire basis for this Conclusion involves this Expert's understanding of the
Indian Commerce Clause ofthe United States Constitution,73 its history and interpretation. The history
of that constitutional clause is the central theme of his published articles set forth in Appendices Band
C. As the article entitled The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, demonstrates, there has been some
erosion in the force of the preemption of state regulatory and taxing authority from the earliest
interpretation of by the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 32 U.S. (6 Pet). 515

(1832). In that case, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court held, among other things, that
the Indian Commerce Clause granted the exclusive right of regulating Indian commerce and trade to
Congress. Consequently, any state regulations or taxation of such Indian trade and commerce was
unconstitutional since it usurped an exclusive function of the Congress.
The exclusivity of national regulation of commerce and trade continued, as The Dormant

Indian Commerce article demonstrates, until the late quarter of the twentieth century. As the Supreme
73

U.S. Const., Art. I sec. 8 cl. 3.
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Court recently ruled, the Indian Commerce Clause makes "Indian relations ... the exclusive province of
federal law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985). For
example, in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts had no
authority to adjudicate a consumer credit contract dispute between a licensed Indian trader and his
Navajo customers since such matters had been left by Congress to the exclusive adjudication of the
tribes. While the Supreme Court subsequently backed away from treating the Indian Commerce Clause
as an automatic absolute barrier to any and all state and taxation ofIndian commerce, in Washington v.

Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980), a case involving the
sale of cigarettes and tobacc:o products, the Court nevertheless ruled:
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own
force, automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political
and economic interests of the Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425
U.S., at 481, n. 17,96 S.Ct., at 1645. That Clause may have a more limited role to play
in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian commerce.

(Emphasis supplied), More recently, in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 US 44, 62 (1996), the
Court again discussed the ejfect of the Indian Commerce Clause on state power to regulate Indian trade
and ruled that under that Clause "the States ... have been divested ofvirtually all authority over Indian
commerce and Indian tribes."74
While most Indian commerce within the United States takes place within reservations (Le. on-

reserve), the effects of the Indian Commerce Clause and Indian law doctrines generally have never
been held limited to reservation boundaries. For example, in Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v.

Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Supreme Court applied the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, a
statute Congress passed under the authority of the Indian Commerce Clause, to the adoption ofIndian

74 This Expert recognizes that is a virtually unanalyzed section of the opinion in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U. S. 163, 192 (1989), the: Supreme Court had previously taken a permissive view toward the effects of the Indian
Commerce Clause on state taxation of Indian commerce. Nevertheless, the later treatment of the effects of the Indian
Commerce Clause on state power to regulate and tax Indian trade and commerce in Seminole Tribe seems to reject that
single aberrant ruling by the Court.
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children that occurred hundreds of miles from their reservation.
Likewise, in Kiowa Tribe ofOklahma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755
(1998), the Supreme Court ruled that conventional doctrines of United States Indian law, such as the
sovereign immunity ofIndian tribes, apply irrespetive of where the Indian commerce occurs, noting
that "[t]o date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based
on where the tribal activities occurred." While the Court did note that "a State may have authority to
tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State but outside Indian country. See Mescalero

Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148-149 (1973); see also Organized Village ofKake v. Egan, 369
U. S. 60, 75 (1962)," it, nevertheless, noted that the limited authority it recognized for such taxation
necessarily means that the state had authority to enforce its laws against an Indian tribe off-reservation,
noting "[t]here is a differen<:e between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means
available to enforce them." It specifically noted that in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of

Potawatomi Tribe ofOkla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991), it had expressly recognized the tribal Indian
immunity from suit by a state over taxation of cigarette sales.
In perhaps the c1eare:st example that Indian commerce includes dealings between Indians and
non-Indians off-reservation, the Supreme Court ruled in Central Machinery v. Arizona State Tax
Comm 'n, 448 US 160 (1980), that the federal Licensed Indian Trader Statute and regulations

thereunder, which were the :first statutes passed under the Indian Commerce Clause and constitute
surviving remnants in the United States Code of the original final Trade and Intercourse Acts,
(discussed above), preempte:d any state sales taxation of the sale of farm machinery by an off
reservation fann implement dealer to Indians even though the sale occurred outside the reservation.
The Court found such state taxation constituted an interference with Indian commerce and trade
regulated under the federal Licensed Indian Trader Statute.
Clearly, as the Supreme Court ruled in the Colville and Citizen Band ofPotawatomi cases, that
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portion of the integrated activities by the Haudensaunee Claimants/Investors involving manufacture,
importation, and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products attributable to and occurring within the
borders of the United States constitutes Indian commerce within the meaning of the Indian Commerce
Clause. It involves Indian trade and commerce. That portion of the state-enacted regulations that lists
of brands cigarettes and other tobacco products which are banned from distribution in each state
constitutes an total and complete embargo on such Indian commerce. No more serious impediment or
interference with Indian commerce can be imagined. Thus, given the Colville decision expressly
indicated that the Indian Commerce Clause operates to prevent states from imposing "undue ...
burdens, on Indian commerce," this Expert is firmly of the opinion that any reasonable Indian investor
would have believed during the relevant period that no state could have imposed a regulatory measure

on Indian commerce that lists certain brands of cigarettes or tobacco products that are prohibited from
sale and distribution within the state. Any reasonable Indian investor would have believed during the
relevant period, for the reasons indicated above, that any such state regulation, when not approved by
Congress, would be per se invalid for totally banning Indian commerce, a subject area left under
prevailing American law to primary federal, not state, regulation.
The issue of state-enacted mandatory escrow payments for off-reserve sales is somewhat more
difficult. As noted above, during the relevant period, American courts have not regarded the mere state

taxation of off-reservation Indian activities as imposing undue burdens and restraints on Indian
commerce or interfering with nation powers, so long as it did not conflict with federal laws regulating
such Indian trade or commerce. Compare, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148-149
(1973) (state taxation ofIndian income from off-reserve ski facility upheld but not state property taxes
on off-reserve equipment otherwise protected by federal statutes) with Central Machinery v. Arizona

State Tax Comm'n, 448 US 160 (1980) (state taxation of off-reservation machinery sale to Indians
invalid as inconsistent with the federal Licensed Indian Trader statute). While cases like Mescalero
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Apache may provide the states with some arguments for authority to collect extract taxes or like excise
payments from Indians engaged in Indian commerce, several considerations suggest to this Expert that
in this case the state-enacted escrow payment requirements would have been thought by any reasonable
aboriginal investor to be legally invalid at all times relevant to this Arbitration. First, unlike the
taxation of activities involved in Mescalero Apache, the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors were
involved in Indian trade and commerce that by the express provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of
1794 were to be exempt from all tariffs, duties, excises, and other interferences. Consequently, as in

Central Machinery, the state-enacted escrow payment scheme at issue in this Arbitration, conflicts with
a federally-approved policy of furthering Indian trade and commerce and, therefore, could not
reasonably have been expected to lawfully apply to the activities of the Indian Claimants/Investors
between 1994 and 2006. Some federal courts have ruled (erroneously in the judgment of this Expert),
as noted above, that the unexplained lack of continuation in the 1897 Tariff Revision Act of the express
of the statutory exemption for Indian commerce and trade from federal tariffs first enacted in 1799 in
the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627, 702 to implement the Indian free trade provisions
of the 1794 Jay Treaty abrogated those rights with reference to the federal government. Nevertheless,
the 1897 Tariff Revision Act is completely silent on and does not in any fashion address the question of
state taxation of Indian trade and commerce crossing the international border under the authority of

Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Tr,eaty. Thus, even if the 1897 Tariff Revision Act can property be seen as an
abrogation of the Indian

frec~

trade guarantees ofthe 1794 Jay Treaty (which this Expert doubts), it

certainly not constitute the type of express Congressional approval which would be required for
imposition of any state taxes on such treaty-protected Indian trade and commerce. No case of which
this Expert is aware has held that the free trade and free passage rights ofthe Haudenosaunee
Claimants/Investors under the 1794 Jay Treaty have been abrogated by federal law as against state

taxation and regulation. Thus, even if, for purposes of argument, the federal government ofthe United
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States may now have a claim to interfere with those rights based on the dubious cases discussed above,
no such claim can be made for state interference with such rights. Congress has simply never approved
the state-enacted tobacco measures at issue in this Arbitration and has never expressly authorized the
states to interfere in any fashion with Indian trade and commerce or with the rights of the
Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors under Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Treaty. Consequently, during the
relevant period no aboriginal investor would have any reasonable expectation that cross-border Indian
commerce or other business activities of the type at issue in this Arbitration could be made subject

without Congressional approval to the state-enacted escrow payments demands involved in this
Arbitration. Second, while the courts have permitted some limited state taxation of off-reservation
Indian commerce and trade, this Expert is aware of no case that authorizes direct state regulation, as
opposed to taxation, of Indian commerce and trade. The state-enacted escrow payment system does not
constitute part of an isolated, self-standing system of taxation. Rather, it is part of an integrated

regulatory scheme enacted by the states as part of a negotiated settlement with portions of the tobacco
industry, not including the Haudenonsaunee Claimants/Investors, to resolve a series of law suits
regarding damages from adverse health effects of tobacco products. While the states have considerable
power without any approval by Congress to apply such regulations to non-Indian commerce in
cigarettes and tobacco products manufactured, sold or distributed in each of the states, each of the
states lacks the ability without express Congressional approval to regulate Indian trade and commerce
of the type undertaken by the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors in this case. The Seminole Tribe
case clearly stated the states have been completely divested of any authority to directly regulate Indian
trade and commerce. Thus, when the escrow payment demand requirement of the state-enacted
tobacco legislation is seen in its full context as part of a state regulatory, as opposed to taxing, measure,
it is clear that the very limited right of states of tax off-reservation Indian activities when not in conflict
with federal law and policy recognized in cases like Mescalero Apache, would not justify the extensive
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state-enacted escrow payme:nt requirement. That requirement is part of a larger, complex regulatory
scheme for the manufacture, distribution, and sale of tobacco products that, when applied to Indian
trade and commerce, would be thought by any reasonable aboriginal investor during the relevant period
to be beyond the authority of any state to enact without express statutory approval by Congress
specifically directed toward its application to Indian commerce.
Finally, this Opinion, has to this point drawn no distinction between the Canadian
Claimants/Investors (the manufacturers), the one Claimant/Investor who is a member of a United States
Indian tribe who serves as the exclusive American distributor for on-reserve sales, and Tobaccoville,
the exclusive distributor of the Claimantsiinvestor tobacco products off-reservation. Rather, most of
the Opinion has assumed that the business activities ofthe all Claimants/Investors in this Arbitration
constitute an integrated business plan, notwithstanding the separate business entities and owners
involved in the operation. The Seneca brand is based upon United States registered trademarks
controlled by Arthur Montour, who is the Claimant/Investor who is a domiciled and enrolled member
of the Townawanda Seneca Band. NWS licenses GRE as the exclusive manufacturer of the Seneca
brand and GRE designates ]\'WS as its exclusive distributor on-reserve (previously everywhere, until
they went off reserve in '02). Additionally, Opal branded cigarettes are sold on-reserve, albeit
constituting a smaller portion ofthe on-reserve sales. The Opal brand is based upon United States
registered trademarks contro:lled by the two Canadian-domiciled Claimants/Investors, the use of which
is licensed to NWS. The reason for this integrated treatment is that in the opinion of this Expert for
almost all purposes, as explained above, it makes virtually no legal difference whether the
manufacturers (GRE) and Indian (as opposed to non-Indian) distributor (NWS) of the tobacco products
in question are regarded as one integrated commercial enterprise or two separate enterprises. In either
event, they are still engaged in Indian trade and commerce in cigarettes and tobacco products and the
all Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors are entitled to avail themselves ofthe Indian free trade and
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passage rights under the 1794 Jay Treaty.
Since GRE sells the: cigarettes and other tobacco products it manufactures under contract with
third parties FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada, neither GRE nor NWS are not involved at all in
the importation, distribution, and sale of such "private brand" cigarette and other tobacco products.
The importation, distribution and sale of such "private brand" products is undertaken by the third
parties and the characterization of the business of the Claimant/Investors manufacture and distribution
scheme as separate or integrated therefore is irrelevant to the "private brand" sales.
Because the importation and all distribution in the United States for on-reserve sales of the
tobacco products in question are controlled by an Indian firm owned by a member of an American
Indian Nation (NWS) and even the right of the Canadian Indian manufacturers (GRE) to import its
product into the United Stat,es free of state monetary excises or other interferences is guaranteed by
the 1794 Jay Treaty, it should make no difference to any legal analysis of on-reserve sales whether
GRE and NWS are regarded as one integrated economic enterprise or two separate enterprises.
There is, however, one important context involving off-reservation sales where the difference in
characterization of the enterprise might affect the legal analysis in question. For off-reserve sales of its
Seneca and Opal cigarettes, GRE sells the cigarettes to Tobaccoville and arranges transport of the
products to a Free Trade Zone within the United States (USFTZ). Since the cigarettes and other
tobacco products legally have not entered the United States while in the USFTZ, GRE, while arranging
for transport to the USFTZ, has technically performed no act within the State of New York (or any
other state, for that matter) which would render it subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of
the state, as explained more fully above. While recognized by Canada, the Six Nations Reserve might
not be seen as constituting Indian country under United Sates domestic law, see Grand River

Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2005), and, as Canadian Indians, GRE
might not, be considered (without the benefit of the guarantees of the 1794 Jay Treaty), as Indians
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protected by American Indian law during the period of 1994 through 2006. Nevertheless, even if GRE
is considered to constitute a separate enterprise (not integrated with NWS or Tobaccoville in a larger
business enterprise), there is no reasonable legal argument for imposing any of the state-enacted
regulatory obligations at issue in this case on GRE. As this expert understands the matter, GRE directly
transports the Claimant/lnvl:stors' own branded products into the territory of the United States by
delivering them to various USFTZs. These products remain outside the regulatory jurisdiction of a
state, as discussed extensively above, unless and until they were removed from the USFTZ by
Tobaccoville or any other non-Indian party. GRE is the only the manufacturer of those products and
all of its manufacturing activities occur on the Six Nations Reserve in Canada. American courts have

long recognized that neither national nor state Indian laws can apply to or reach the activities of
Indians, even natives from Indians Nations aboriginal to the United Sates, when they occur within a
foreign nation. See, Coralitos Stock Company v. United States, 33 C1. CI. 342 (] 898). Thus, if GRE,
the manufacturer, is viewed as a separate non-integrated enterprise, its manufacturing activities, which
occurred solely in Canada, could not reasonably have been thought at any time relevant to this
arbitration to have subjected it the state-enacted tobacco regulations at issue in this Arbitration.
Thus, while the analysis of off-reserve sales might change slightly if one views GRE, NWS,
and Tobaccoville as separate" rather than integrated, enterprises, the ultimate legal result is not altered

with respect to GRE by difference in conceptualization. NWS distributes exclusively on-reserve. As
explained above, its activities are separately fully protected from state regulation or taxation by the
1794 Jay Treaty, the Indian Commerce Clause and the general domestic doctrines of the United States
Indian law. By contrast, however, Tobaccoville itself would not have the same protections if treated
separately with regard to off-reserve sales. It constitutes the exclusive off-reserve distributor of Seneca
and Opal branded products manufactured in Canada by GRE. This Expert understands that
Tobaccoville is a non-Indian owned and controlled firm. Since it takes possession of the cigarette and
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tobacco products at warehouses located within a USFTZ, Tobaccoville's activities, when considered
separately and not as part of an integrated enterprise with GRE and NWS, are not governed by the 1794
Jay Treaty provisions. Likewise, as a non-Indian owned and controlled business, its activities, when
considered in isolation, in distributing Seneca branded cigarettes off-reserve within any state would
neither constitute Indian commerce within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause nor be subject
to any doctrines of federal Indian law excluding state regulation or taxation for its distribution and sales
to other non-Indians off-reserve. Thus, the states would have a perfectly valid justification for
imposing the escrow payment regulation on Tobaccoville for its off-reserve sales of Seneca products
This is not to say that the

ml~asures

at issue may not otherwise violate international law or a particular

provision ofthe NAFTA, which are questions beyond the scope of this opinion.
Moreover, the fact that the states could impose the escrow payment regulation on Tobaccoville,
does not, however, justify the direct or indirect imposition of such regulations on GRE, as the
manufacturer and brand licensee, or NWS, as the trademark holder, of the Seneca cigarettes since the
normal doctrines of federal Indian law discussed above do apply to their involvement in these activities
with Tobaccoville. Likewis{:, state-enacted regulations that ban specific brands cannot be applied to
brands that are owned by Indians and employed both on and off reservation, such as Seneca and Opal.
Tobaccoville is not the owner of the Seneca and Opal brands; it is merely the distributor. Applying this
kind of regulation to the Seneca and Opal brands based on Tobaccoville's off-reserve distribution
would interfere with Indian commerce by the Claimants/Investors on-reserve and illegally and
improperly project state regulatory authority into Indian country beyond the reach recognized by
current American domestic law.

Conclusion
Ever since the Haudenosaunee Confederation negotiated the Two Wampum Belt Treaty with the
Dutch they have maintained a legal conceptualization of their relationship with their non-Indian
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neighbors suggesting that the two communities were each traveling in parallel down the river of life in
in their separate canoes, each taking their separate but parallel course down the river and neither
community interfering with the economic, social or internal affairs of the other. While the American
Revolution and the War of 1812 tore asunder both Gayanashagowa (the Great Law of Peace) that
bound the Haudenosaunee Confederation together and the Two Wampum Belt principles of
relationships with outsiders,. following each of these two wars Great Britain and the Haudenosaunee
acted rapidly in both Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Treaty and Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent to heal those
rifts, reunite the Haudenosauanee politically, if not geographically, and to assure both the parties to the
Treaty and the Huadensosaunee that the international boundary between British Canada and the United
States would not interfere with Haudensosaunee effort to travel down their path of life on this earth as a
united people. By unilateralily seeking to apply to the Indian commerce undertaken by these
Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors the two state-enacted tobacco regulations involved in this
Arbitration, the states have abruptly steered their canoe in an completely unexpected, unprincipled,
and, probably unlawful, manner. These erratic and aberrant state errors in navigating the stream of
Indian commerce have created the single largest collision of the two parallel canoes since the War of
1812. As set forth more fully in this Expert Opinion Report and the attached published articles, no
Haudenosaunee business investor reasonably could have foreseen or legally anticipated such gross
deviations from the course of economic relations between the Haudenosaunee and the Americans
prescribed by the 1794 Jay Treaty, the 1814 Treaty of Ghent, the Indian Commerce Clause of the
United States and domestic federal Indian law. This Expert also has serious and grave doubts about
the legality of such unilateral state-enacted deviations from the parallel course, particularly when they
so grossly violate the rules for the navigation of the field ofIndian commerce prescribed by both the
United States Constitution, Congress, and federally-approved treaties.
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Respectfully submitted,

~ ~. c.e~~~
Robert N. Clinton

Indian Legal Program
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law
1100 S. McAllister St.
Box 877906
Tempe AZ 85287-7906
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In re: Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd.
Jerry Montour, Kenneth Hill and Arthur Montour, Jr.,
Claimants I Investors,

- against-

United States of Amt~rica,
Respondent I Party

Opinion of Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Expertise

This expert opinion has been prepared, and is being offered for, the Tribunal's
consideration in the above-referenced arbitration. It is based upon my professional and
academic training, my personal investigations, and materials provided by the Claimants,
as specified herein. I offer this opinion as an independent expert to the Tribunal, albeit
retained by the Claimants.
I am

Associatc~

Professor at the Michigan State University College of Law and

Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center. I am a co-author of the Sixth edition
of Cases and Materials in Federal Indian Law, forthcoming from Thomson West. I
recently published a book titled American Indian Education: Counternarratives in
Racism, Struggle, and the Law, and I have other books forthcoming from various presses

on the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
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Indians. I have published over 30 law review articles since 2003. I also am an enrolled
member of the Orand Traverse Band.
I graduated from the University of Michigan Law School and I am licensed to
practice law in the State of Michigan and hold inactive licenses from the State Bars of
Arizona and Washington. I have worked as in-house counsel for four different Indian
tribes from 1998 to 2004 - the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, the Hoopa Valley Tribe in
California, the Suquamish Tribe in Washington, and the Orand Traverse Band in
Michigan. I began teaching law in 2004 at the University of North Dakota. In 2006, I
moved to the Michigan State University College of Law. I teach Federal Law and Indian
Tribes, other Indian law-related courses, and Constitutional Law.
Personal Observations

On March 4, 2008, I visited the Six Nations of the Orand River Reserve. I spent
several hours touring the administrative offices and the manufacturing facilities of Orand
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (ORE). During my visit I spoke to several ORE
employees that have knowledge about the enterprise's sales and markets. I spoke with
Jerry Montour (CEO ofGRE); Steve Williams (the President of ORE); Don Richards (the
Vice President of Finance); Don Ferrigan (Purchasing Department); and Pat Johnson
(Accounts Receivabh::). On the same day, from the offices of ORE, I also spoke on the
phone with Bryan Porter, the former Controller of Native Wholesale Supply ("NWS").
I inspected records of the enterprises, including those indicating the customers in
the United States to whom NWS sells the Seneca® brand of cigarettes, and samples of
sales records relating to these vendors, and spoke with various ORE employees about
them. The list includes: (1) wholesaler companies wholly owned by federally recognized
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Indian tribes, such as 4 Bears Casino & Resort, owned by the Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Nation (fornlerly the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation);
(2) federally recognized Indian tribes such as the Big Sandy Rancheria; and (3)
wholesaler companies owned by American Indian people on Indian reservation land, such
as the Seneka Smoke Shop in Salamanca, New York on the Allegheny Reservation of the
Seneca Indian Nation. All three ofthe aforementioned type of customer would constitute
a person or entity entitled to protection under Federal Indian Law.
It is clear to me from reviewing these records that the Tribunal was accurate in

finding that "[aJ significant portion of the Claimants' business ... involves cigarettes
ultimately sold at retail to consumers on Indian reservations in the United States ...."
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 6 (July 20, 2006).
I also spoke on the telephone with Arthur Montour, the CEO of Native Wholesale
Supply, on June 19, 2008, concerning role as exclusive distributor of the Seneca® brand
in Indian Country in the United States. In conjunction with that conversation, I have
reviewed several legal pleadings and demand letters from courts and state agencies
respecting the Grand River Enterprises and Native Wholesale Supply.
As a result of these personal observations and investigations, and based upon my
professional expertise and experience described above, I am prepared to offer my opinion
about the likely immunity GRE possesses from state regulation and taxation for its on
reservation sales under principles of Federal Indian Law.
Facts

All of the individual Claimants are Haudenosaunee nation members, and all were
born in Canada. See I)articularized Statement of Claim

~

3 (June 30, 2005). Two of the
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Claimants, Kenneth Hill and Jerry Montour, are recognized members of an aboriginal
First Nation in Canada. ld. The other individual Claimant, Arthur Montour, is a
recognized member of a United States Indian Nation, the Seneca Nation of Indians, and
resides on the Cattaraugus Reservation of the Seneca Nation. ld. The Claimants
manufacture and distribute their own tobacco products under their own brands. ld. at'i[6.
All of the tobacco products that the Claimants intend for sale in the United States, as well
as on sovereign tribal lands controlled by the United States, bear either the Seneca® or
Opal® brand.ld.

at~'

24.

Kenneth Hill and Jerry Montour are co-owners of, and control, GRE. Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction 'i[2 (July 20, 2006). GRE's manufacturing facilities are located
on sovereign Haudenosaunee territory controlled by Canada. ld. GRE is the exclusive
manufacturer of the Seneca® and Opal® brands. See Particularized Statement of Claim ~
23 (June 30, 2005); and Witness Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be
attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11, 2008). Arthur Montour owns
and controls NWS, which operates and is located on sovereign Seneca territory located in
the United States, the Cattaraugus Reservation. Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction

~

2

(July 20, 2006). NWS holds all of the trademark rights registered in the United States
upon which the Seneca brand is based. Particularized Statement of Claim

~

24 (June 30,

2005). NWS beneficially holds the trademark rights registered in the United States upon
which the Seneca® brand is based for the individual Claimants and NWS is the exclusive
distributor of the Seneca® brand, for sales on Indian reservation I lands located within the

I In Canada reserved tribal aboriginal lands tend to be called reserves. American legal authorities tend to
employ 'reservation lands' or 'Indian country', a defined legal term of art, the definition of which is set
forth in 18 U.S.c. § 1151. This opinion will employ the terms reservation, reserve, and Indian country
interchangeably to refer to recognized aboriginal lands held either directly by or in trust for aboriginal
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United States. Id. at ~ 23; and Witness Statement of Arthur Montour (July 10,2008), to
be attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11,2008).
Cigarettes manufactured by GRE are produced and sold in one of three ways: (1)
sales of their proprietary brands, through NWS, to Indians and Indian enterprises on
sovereign tribal lands located within the territorial limits of the United States ("on reserve
sales" or "tribal sales"), Particularized Statement of Claim ~~ 22, 26 (June 30, 2005); and
Witness Statement of Jerrv Montour (July 10, 2008), to be attached to Claimants'
Memorial on the

M(~rits

(July 11, 2008); (2) sales of their proprietary brands in selected

markets within the United States not located on tribal lands ("off reserves sales" or "off
reservation sales"), id.; and (3) the production of tobacco products bearing third party
brands under contract to third parties located off-reserve within the United States
("private label production"), Witness Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be
attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11, 2008). I understand that such
third party distributors do not purchase or sell Seneca® branded tobacco products, or
engage in any sales on Indian reservation lands located within the United States.
NWS served as the importer of record for all of its sales. Interviews with GRE
business staff and a review of a sampling of records demonstrate to my satisfaction that
all off-reserve and private label products manufactured by GRE were sold FOB from its
location on Haudenosaunee territory controlled by Canada. See Statement of Claimants'
Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share
Amendments

~~

33 (Nov.. 6, 2006). The only substantial difference between the way in

Indian tribes or First Nations. Insofar as the United States on reserve distribution of the tobacco products
involved in this dispute is concerned, all distribution took place within Indian country, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1151.
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which off-reserve sales of Seneca® branded products and private label sales were made
is that in the case of the former, ORE remained responsible for arranging for the actual
shipment of inventory into a Free Trade Zone located in the United States, for subsequent
removal from Tobaccoville, under its federally issued Tobacco license. It did so by
hiring a private trucking company to make the shipments. See Witness Statement of Jerry
Montour (July 10, 2(08), to be attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11,
2008).
The two measures at the core of the present dispute were adopted by a majority of
states and territories in the United States, including 46 states.

Neither of these two

measures, by their explicit terms, appear to apply directly to the consumers of the tobacco
products made and distributed by the Claimants. 2 Neither the governments imposing
these measures or

th{~

Respondent appears to consider them to be a tax. These measures

were imposed following the conclusion of settlement negotiations arising out of tobacco
litigation commenced! in the United States by 46 state attorneys general against a group of
the largest tobacco companies in the United States.

These states each subsequently

adopted the measures pursuant to their settlement agreement with these large tobacco
companies (the "Master Settlement Agreement" or "MSA"). Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction ~ 12 (July 20, 2006). These measures were not adopted by the United States
government and did not receive any endorsement or approval from Congress or the
Executive branch.
One type of measure - enacted by 46 states - purports to directly impose a
financial obligation upon a deemed "manufacturer" of tobacco products, which could be
2 However, I understand that under the MSA itself, participating states did purport to bind themselves to
consider "Indian Country or Indian Trust Land" as part of their geographic territory for purposes of
performance of the terms of the Agreement. See Transcript of Jurisdictional Hearing at pages 0604-0606.
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the actual manufacturer or an importer. Relevant state enforcement officials deem such
products to have been intended for sale in the United States. Id. This so-called "escrow
measure" requires deemed "manufacturers" to deposit large sums, measured in the
millions of dollars, into escrow accounts annually, to be held for 25 years. The amount
of such escrow deposits purports to be based upon tobacco products allegedly sold within
a state, apparently ignoring whether or not the location in which the sales were made
constituted Indian country. Id.

Under this escrow measure, a state court may be

petitioned to impose an injunction against sales or distribution of tobacco product brands
manufactured or imported by a defined "manufacturer," as well as monetary penalties in
addition to payment of escrow payments demanded. Id. at ~~ 13-14.
The escrow measures were amended by all but one of the 46 states, Missouri,
between 2004 and 2006. The amendments removed a mechanism contained within each
original escrow measure that permitted enterprises, such as the one established by the
Claimants, to receive a release (i.e. refund) of the portion of escrow payments made by
such enterprise, for states in which its products were not being sold. See Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 13 (July 20, 2006). The Claimants relied on the existence of
these release mechanisms to expand sales of the Seneca® brand off-reserve. See Witness
Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be attached to Claimants' Memorial on
the Merits (July 11, 2008).
Some escrow measures, including those of Oklahoma, Arizona and Colorado,
have been explicitly applied to sales to consumers on-reservation, Statement of
Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the
Allocable Share Amendments

~~

81-85; 95-96 (Nov. 6, 2006); while other escrow
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measures have been explicitly applied to off-reserve sales, id.
generally id.

~~

~~

78-80; 89-94. See

42-43.

The other measure at issue in this proceeding operates to prohibit distribution of
products made by a deemed "manufacturer" within any given state, by requiring all
manufacturers to

cl~rtify

their compliance with that state's escrow measure and

maintaining a public registry for purposes of identifying brands manufactured or
distributed in that state deemed not to be in compliance ("the contraband measure"). A
brand can be removed from this certification list (and thereby effectively banned from all
commerce in the

statl~)

when a State Attorney General (without any requirement of court

hearing or review) determines that its "manufacturer" has not made allegedly required
escrow payments or penalties demanded by that state under its escrow measure. See
Statement of Claimants'

Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and

Implementation ofthe Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 45-47 (Nov. 6,2006).
Claimants have provided me with copies of letters from various American
jurisdictions demanding that Native Wholesale Supply and Grand River Enterprises cease
selling cigarettes in those jurisdictions, as well as legal pleadings initiating enforcement
actions against the Claimants. E.g., Letter from Dennis Eckhart, Sf. Assistant Attorney
General, State of California, to Arthur Montour, Native Wholesale Supply (March 7,
2008); Judgment by Court after Default, People of the State of California v. Grand River
Enterprises/6 nations. Ltd., No. 05ASOl688 (Cal. Superior Ct., Oct 29, 2007); Subpoena
Duces Tecum to Native Wholesale Supply (Oklahoma Tax Commission, February 29,
2008).
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Finally, I note that some American Indian tribes actually sought to join in the
lawsuits brought against the major tobacco companies which eventually led to conclusion
of the Master Settlement Agreement between those companies and the states and
territories that sued them.

However, with the agreement of federal courts, the state

attorneys general refused to allow these sovereigns to participate. See Table Bluff

Reservation (Wiyot Tribe) v. Philip Morris, Inc., 256 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2001). It is ironic
that many of these states are now attempting to enforce the measures they designed to
implement MSA against American Indians and their businesses, after excluding tribal
governments from participating in the legal processes that led to its negotiation.

Questions Presented for Opinion:
1.

Whether, or to what extent, the Claimants' tobacco wholesale distribution
enterprise, operated through NWS on the Cattaraugus territory of the sovereign
Seneca Nation, appears to qualify as an activity that is deserving of protection
from the application of state government regulation under United States Federal
Indian Law?

2.

Assuming the on··reserve sales of the Claimants' Seneca® branded products are
being affected by application of the Escrow Statutes or Contraband Laws, what
would be the significance of such a state of affairs under United States Federal
Indian Law?

9
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Introduction

United States Federal Indian Law, the law that I am asked to interpret and apply
in the context of these facts, is an amalgamation of centuries of history, law, and policy,
much of which is conflicting and very confusing. It has developed over the course of time
and many, many tribal histories to stand for three simple propositions. First, Indian tribes
retain inherent powers of sovereignty unless expressly abrogated by the United States
Congress or through tribal consent in a properly ratified treaty or agreement. See FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942). Second, the United States
federal government retains the exclusive right and power to deal in Indian Affairs. See,

e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 23 U.S. 543 (1832). And third, state law has no force in Indian
Country, absent the express consent of Congress. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1831).
Arising out of these key foundational principles of federal Indian law is the
maxim that ambiguous terms and provisions in American Indian treaties must be
interpreted to the benefit of Indian tribes and Indians and, more importantly, Indian treaty
language is to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood it. E.g., Oneida

County v. Oneida Indian Nation ofNew York, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985).
The reason for this general rule is that American Indian law and policy is replete
with bad faith and broken promises. Consider the example of Seneca Indians of the
Allegheny Reservation in southwestern New York State. These Indians had signed the

Treaty of Canadaigua, in which the United States promised to leave these people
undisturbed forever. See In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1866). But in the
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,
late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States broke that promise by constructing the
Kinzua Dam, flooding one-third of the Reservation and forcing the evacuation of over
500 Senecas - all without the consent of the Seneca people. See generally JOY ANN
BILHARZ, THE ALLEGHENY SENECAS AND THE KINZUA DAM: FORCED RELOCATION
THROUGH Two GENERATIONS (1998).
This kind of bad faith was not an isolated incident, as virtually every American
Indian treaty has be{:ll modified or abrogated by Congress without tribal consent. Federal
Indian Law allows f,or Congress to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties, as it did with the
Allegheny Senecas, and the Michigan Anishinaabek (the elimination of permanent
reservations), the Fort Berthold Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations (the flooding of
their reservation), the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota Nations (the taking of the Black Hills),
the California Indians (failure to ratify eighteen treaties negotiated by the tribes in good
faith), and many other examples. However, Federal Indian Law also provides principles
for the defense of tribal rights, the compensation of property takings, and a defense from
the abrogation of tribal rights by individuals and state governments.
In this way, the New York Haudenoshaunee, as signatories to, and beneficiaries
of, several treaties including the Treaty of Canadaigua, have been remarkably successful
in preserving their tribal governmental powers, individual rights, and communal and
individual property rights through encroachments of the state and local governments.
New York Indian tribes were among the first tribes to bring land claims suits as a means
of restoring the tribal land base. E.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida

County, 414 U.S. 66]l (1974). New York Indian tribes were among the first to commence
on-reservation gaming enterprises for the purpose of raising government revenue. See
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........

Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. 1. LEGIS. 39,45
(2007). And, very relevant to this dispute, New York Indians and tribes were among the
first to establish that state and local taxation and regulation does not apply in their
homelands. See In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866).
Federal Indian Law assigns an important status to treaty signatories. Arising out
of the status of the New York Haudenoshaunee as treaty signatories are two fundamental
rules that are not subject to abrogation by state or local governments, and that are relevant
here. First, Indian tribes and Indian people - and their businesses - operating and residing
within Indian Country are not subject to state laws or taxation. Second, federal Indian
policy articulated by Congress protects and encourages Indian tribes and Indian people to
engage in economic development for the purpose of generating self-sufficiency and
moving away from dependence on the federal government. The kind of business
operation in which the Claimants engage is exactly the type of activity that Congress
encourages. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal

Indian Policy, 85 NEB. 1" REv. 121, 144-47 (2006) (describing Congressional policy on
tax immunities and tribal economic development); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of

Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L.
REV. 759, 774-84 (2004) (describing several kinds of tribal businesses).
There are many reasons for the development of this policy of protecting and
encouraging Indian businesses. First, Indian people generally are the poorest people in
the United States. Second, Federal Indian Law limits the authority of Indian tribes to tax
nonmembers, even within Indian Country, meaning that tribal governments often have
little capacity to provide governmental services to tribal citizens. Third, state and local
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governments have long been reticent to provide services to Indian people. On occasion,
this reticence it based in racial prejudice, but more often it is based on several often
incorrect presumptions. State and local governments often assume that Indian people are
ineligible for state and local services because of their tribal status, or that Indian people
are ineligible for services because many of them do not pay state or local taxes. Finally,
non-Indian businesses, paying the substantial taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco
products imposed by state and local governments, treat tobacco-related businesses as
economic competition.
In short, Federal Indian Law has historically served as a double-edged sword for
Indian tribes and Indian people, but the key actors in Federal Indian Law have always
been tribal and federal. States and local governments are excluded from these relations
absent an Act of Congress. Federal Indian Law is intended to prevent state and local
governments from undermining the structure of federal Indian law and policy established
by the federal government and Indian tribes. As the remainder of my analysis shows, the
MSA established by 46 states does exactly that, and should not be enforced against
American Indians and their businesses.
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Point 1.

Under United States Federal Indian Law, state governments do not

maintain the authority to regulate the on-reservation activities of Indian tribes and
Indian people either through the escrow measure and the listing measure.
The authority of state governments to regulate the on-reservation activities of
Indian tribes and Indian people is very limited. Ever since it rendered its Williams v. Lee
decision in 1959, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that state
authority to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians is all but nil:
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of regulating their
internal and social relations," United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
381-382 (1886), cited in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322
(1978). A tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has
never been doubted, and our cases establish that, "absent governing Acts
of Congress, 'a State may not act in a manner that infringe[s] on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. ,,,

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171-172
(1973), quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959). New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,332-33 (1983).
In short, the governing standard is that states are categorically prohibited from
regulating the on-reservation activities of Indians and Indian tribes, absent a governing
Act of Congress. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
6.03[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2005) ("A state ordinarily may not regulate the
property or conduct of tribes or tribal-member Indians in Indian country."). This
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categorical bar has been applied by state and federal courts numerous times to foreclose
state regulatory jurisdiction and authority in this and other contexts. E.g., Winer v. Penny
Enters., Inc., 674 N. W.2d 9 (N.D. 2004) (state court subject matter jurisdiction).
Each of the two measures that state governments have threatened to impose on the
operations of the Claimants' run up against this categorical bar. Any attempt to impose
the escrow measure or the complimentary listing measure on tribal sales is an attempt to
regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians. NWS is an on-reservation
wholesaler whose blllsiness is directly affected by the measures. NWS's tribal sales are
sales to Indian Country retailers and wholesalers; or in other words, on-reservation
activities of tribal Indians.
For example" from its location on the Cattaraugus territory, NWS sells tobacco
products to other tobacco wholesalers wholly owned by members of federally recognized
Indian tribes doing business in Indian Country. One typical transaction is instructive. 3
NWS sells the Seneca brand to Fat John's, a business located on the Allegheny
Reservation of the Seneca Nation ofIndians and wholly owned by a member or members
of the Seneca Nation of Indians. The transaction takes place in Indian Country (either in
the Cattaraugus or Allegheny territories) between Indians (the owners of NWS and fat
John's). Though it is not critically important here, it is worth noting that the value
generated by this business transaction originates and concludes inside Indian Country. Cf
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220 (1987). States are
categorically barred from regulating this activity.
3 Other customers that are similarly situated include without limitation: First American Tobacco (Irving,
NY); HCI Distribution (Winnebago, NE); Island Casino Resort (Harris, MI); Lac du Flambeau Asema
Wigamig (Lac du Flambeau, WI); MCN Tobacco Wholesale (Okmulgee, OK); Peace Pipe Smoke Shop
(Salamanca, NY); Penalty Box (Irving, NY); Sac & Fox Casino (Powhattan, KS); and Thunderbird
International (Hoopa, CA).
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Point 2.

Even assuming that states had some authority to regulate this kind of

on-reservation activity, the MSA states in this case have engaged in a pattern and
practice of discrimination against the Claimants' business activities, an independent
reason for finding that the states' measures could not be enforced against the
Claimants.
As stated by the United States Supreme COUlt, "Absent express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject
to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State."
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,148-49 (1973) (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined a state regulatory scheme
under this test in Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818 (10th Cir.
2007).4 In Wagnon, the State of Kansas sought to apply its rules relating to motor vehicle
registration, licensing, and titling to members of the Prairie Band who lived onreservation. See id. at 820. The State argued that its laws preempted similar regulations
promulgated by the Prairie Band. See id. at 820-21. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting
that, while Kansas refused to recognize Prairie Band license plates and registration, it had
recognized the license plates of every American jurisdiction, including those of
Oklahoma Indian tribes. See id. at 825-26 (citing State v. Wakole, 959 P.2d 982, 983
(Kan. 1998».
The measures complained of here smack of the same kind of impermissible
discrimination. Consider the following allegation made by the Claimants:

This case is distinguished from a parallel case between the same parties involving the application of state
motor fuels taxes and decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).

4
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The MSA States began to assert (and to this day still assert) that Grand
River must make escrow payments under the Escrow Statutes, even if it
was unrelated third parties had apparently purchased products from the
Claimants on sovereign aboriginal territory and subsequently resold them
to wholesalers or consumers in the territory of MSA states or on other
tribal lands. Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the
Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ,-r 42
(Nov. 6,2006).
Such conduct constitutes a direct form of discrimination against sovereign Indian
Nations because it purports to trump the regulatory authority of these Nations to regulate
the affairs of Native Americans lawfully conducting business within their territorial
jurisdiction.
As a result of these actions by state governments, the Claimants' businesses have
suffered significant and tangible losses. Claimant Arthur Montour has confirmed that on
reservation retailers located at the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in Michigan and at
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho have informed NWS that they will no longer be
able to do business with NWS as a result of pressure from MSA states. Moreover, the
ongoing enforcement actions by states against GRE and NWS, such as those in California
and Oklahoma, demonstrate the impact of the measures on the Claimants' businesses.
Because these measures involve discriminatory actions against tribal businesses, the
measures are invalid under Federal Indian Law.
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Point 3.

Principles of Federal Indian Taxation Law suggest that the MSA's

measures are unenforceable against Indian businesses.
While these measures are not taxes in that they are not specifically labeled "taxes"
in the various state laws, it may also be useful to consider their application under Federal
Indian Law's Indian taxation doctrine. The United States Supreme Court recently held
that a similar categorical bar precludes states from taxing Indian lands and Indian people
who are engaged in on-reservation activities. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 457-59 (1995); County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,258 (1992). In Chickasaw
Nation, the State of Oklahoma sought to impose its motor fuel taxes on a tribal motor

fuels retailer operating within Indian Country, as that is defined under Federal Indian
Law. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 452-53. The Supreme Court noted that in the
context of state taxation, it has "held unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal
incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian Country." See id. at 458
(citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (state personal property tax);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state income tax)).

Of interest, the Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that the Court should engage
its interest-balancing test more nonnally applied to state regulation of the on-reservation
conduct of nonmembers, largely because the vehicles that tribal members drove would
likely leave the reservation at some point and use state roads, implicating a state interest.
See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 457. This the Court refused to do, noting factors such

as the "lead role" that Congress plays in federal Indian policy; the need for bright-line
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rules to generate "predictability" in business and tax policy; and the problems for the
Court in conducting complex interest-balancing of "economic realities." Id. at 459-60.
These factors, relevant to some extent to the present dispute, convinced the Court to
reject a balancing

tf~St

approach when the legal incidence of the tax approach was much

easier for the Court to administer.
The prototypical example of the import of this categorical bar is the case of Moe
v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). In Moe, the State of
Montana sought to collect cigarette and personal property taxes to reservation Indians
who purchases cigarettes from an on-reservation "smoke shop," owned and operated by
tribal members. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 467-68. The Court noted that the question of
whether state authoriity to tax the on-reservation activities of reservation Indians had been
"la[id] to rest any doubt" in the negative by the Court's decision in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)." Moe, 425 U.S. at 476 (quoting
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973».

The intent and operation of the escrow and listing measures demonstrates that the
burden of the regulation (and the legal incidence, if the measures were taxes) is on the
Claimants' business operations. The amendments made to the escrow measures have
resulted in substantial impairment of their off-reserve markets in the MSA States. See
Statement of Claimants'

Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and

Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ,-r 26 (Nov. 6, 2006); see also id.

,-r,r

23-25. The intent of the MSA States in enacting, and later amending, the escrow
measures, relevant to determining the legal incidence or burden of the regulation, was to
burden Claimants' business operations and businesses that are similarly situated. See
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Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461 (noting that the express intent of the state's

legislature as to the legal incidence test is "dispositive"). In the words of the Tribunal,
the MSA States intended the escrow provisions to operate as "[t]he MSA's primary
means to limit [Claimants' and other similarly situated businesses'] ability to wrest
market share from [participating manufacturers] ...." Id ~ 12. There can be no doubt that
the MSA States intended both the original escrow measures and their subsequent
amendments to them to burden Claimants. As such, the legal incidence of these
regulations is placed directly on Claimants, rendering the measures invalid under Federal
Indian Law.
In short, there is no authority for state governments to regulate or tax the on
reservation activity of Indian people.

20
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Point 4.

Wimrlms v. Lee categorically bars the imposition of the MSA measures

against the Claimaults.
Under the categorical bar described

III

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),

Indian Country actiivities of reservation Indians are Immune and exempt from state
regulation. However, these cases and their progeny (also discussed above) all analyze fact
patterns in which reservation Indians engage in activities on the same reservation. There
is some question as to whether the categorical bar would apply in this situation, in which
a tribal seller located on one reservation engages in activities with a tribal purchaser on a
different reservation. However, in the context of state taxation, there is one important

precedent for the proposition that the categorical bar would apply.
In Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Kan.
2007), a federal district court concluded that the State of Kansas could not tax the
importation of motor fuels by an Indian tribal corporation located in the State of
Nebraska for sale on various Indian reservations located within the State of Kansas. See
id. at 1185-86 (citing Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,

459 (1995), the origin of the categorical bar to state taxation). The district court had
certified questions of state law relating to the legal incidence of the state motor fuels tax
to the Kansas Supreme Court. 5 See Winnebago Tribe ofNebraska v. Kline, No. 02-4070,
2005 WL 1683970 (D. Kan., June 30, 2005). The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the
Kansas motor fuel tax as placing the legal burden of the tax on the "distributor of first

5 In many American jurisdictions, federal courts may "certify" questions of state law to a state supreme
court. What this means is that, in cases where an important state law question of first impression arises, a
federal court might choose to seek the opinion of the relevant state supreme court on this question. E.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3201 (2007).
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,--
receipt," that is, the tribal corporation located in Nebraska. See Winnebago Tribe of
Nebraska v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892, 900-02 (Kan. 2007) (discussing Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. at 458, and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(b), as well as other authorities).6 Under this
precedent, the

Fedl~ral

Indian Law categorical bars would apply to the activities of

reservation Indians benveen reservations.
In this context, we would apply the Williams v. Lee categorical bar, which states
that state regulation is invalid under Federal Indian Law where the state regulation
purportedly applies to the on-reservation activities of Indian tribes or reservation Indians.
See Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-21. It is clear from the facts and representations made by
the states that the

lc~gal

burden of the two measures is on ORE, the wholesaler. ORE,

doing business in Indian Country, and selling to tribal purchasers in Indian Country,
would be immune and exempt from these twin measures that the states seek to impose in
the context of tribal sales.

6 The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately held that the Kansas tax did not apply under state law because the
state statute did not include "importers" in its definition of "distributors of first receipt." See Winnebago
Tribe a/Nebraska, 150 P.3d at 903-05.
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Conclusion

Given the foregoing, in my expert opinion, the answers to the two questions posed
above are as follows:
1.

The Claimants' tobacco wholesale distribution enterprise, operated through NWS

on the Cattaraugus Reservation of the Seneca Nation of Indians, qualifies as an aciivity
that is deserving of protection from the application of state government regulation under
United States Federal Indian Law.
2.

Since on-reservation sales of the Claimants' Seneca® branded products are being

affected by application of the Escrow Statutes and/or Contraband Lands, those laws
should be preempted by operation of United States Federal Indian Law.

23
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Matthew L.M. Fletch
Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law
Directorl Indigenous Law and Policy Center

July 10, 2008
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COMMISSION,
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
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Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: SS.
County of Ada
)

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE being first duly sworn do hereby state the following under oath:
1.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant Native Wholesale Supply

Company in this matter and as such have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENT MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION -1
57032-1I00189163.000.DOC
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are excerpts from a hearing transcript in which the

State of Idaho addresses litigation in which Idaho's tobacco settlement statutes' enforceability on
Indian Country will be addressed.
Further your affiant sayeth not.

muel A. Diddle
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Attorney General
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Brettt T. DeLange
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Boise, Idaho 83702-0010
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX36
Boise, Idaho 83720-()410

[ ] U.S. Mail
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[ ] Electronic Court Transmission
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] Electronic Court Transmission
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NAFTA/UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES PROCEEDING
- - - - x

In the matter of the Arbitration
between:
GRAND RIVER ENTERPRISES SIX NATIONS LTD.,
et al.,
claimants/Investors,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent/party.

- x Volume 4

HEARING ON THE MERITS
Thursday, February 4, 2010
The world Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
MC Building
Conference Room 4-800
washi ngton, D. C.
The Hearing in the above-entitled matter came
on, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. before:
MR. FALl S. NARIMAN, President
PROF. JAMES ANAYA, Arbitrator

o

MR. JOHN R. COOK, Arbitrator
1039
Also present:
MS. KATIA YANNACA-SMALL,
Secretary to the Tribunal

Court Reporters:
MR. JOHN PHELPS
Registered professional Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
B&B Reporters
529 14th Street, S.E.
washington, D.C. 20003
+1 (202) 544-1903
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529 14th Street, S.E.
washington, D.C. 20003
+1 (202) 544-1903
~lR.

o

1040
APPEARANCES:
On behalf of the claimants/Investors:
MR. TODD WEILER
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canada
(613) 686-3636
MR. ROBERT LUDDY
windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP
156 west 56th Street
New York, New York 10019
(212) 237-1114
MR. LEONARD VIOLI
Law offices of Leonard violi, LLC
910 East Boston post Road
Mamaroneck, New York 1053
(914) 698-6200
MS. CHANTELL MACINNES MONTOUR
MS. CATHERINE MCINNES
Inch Hammond Professional corporation
1 King Street, west suite 500
Hamilton, Ontario L8p 4xp
(905) 525-4481
On behalf of the wahta Mohawks:
PROF. MATTHEW FLETCHER
1041
APPEARANCES: (continued)
On behalf of the Respondent/party:
MR. HAROLD HONGJU KOH
Legal Adviser
MR. JEFFREY D. KOVAR
Assistant Legal Adviser
MR. MARK E. FELDMAN
chief, NAFTA/CAFTA-DR Arbitration
Division
office of International claims and
Investment Disputes
MS. ALICIA L. CATE
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Office of International claims and
Investment Disputes
Office of the Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State
suite 203, South Building
2430 E Street, N.W.
washington, D.C. 20037-2800
(202) 776-8443
IJ
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ALSO PRESENT:
On behalf of the united Mexican States:
SR. JOSE LUIS PAZ,
Head of Trade and NAFTA office
SR. SALVADOR BEHAR,
Legal counsel for International Trade
SRA. LAURA MARTINEZ
Embassy of Mexico
secretaria de Economia
Trade and NAFTA Office
1911 pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 728-1707
On behalf of canada:
MS. CHRISTINA BEHARRY
Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, Canada
Trade Law Bureau (JLT)
Lester B. pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
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Canada
(613) 944-0027

o

MR. SEAN CLARK
Embassy of canada
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Recross Examination
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ARTHUR MONTOUR
Direct Examination
Cross-Examination
Redirect Examination
Recross Examination

1136
1141
1175
1189

BRETT DELANGE
1356
1359
1425

Direct Examination
Cross-Examination
Recross Examination
CONFIDENTIAL PORTIONS
NUMBER

PAGE
1056-1132
1200-1240
1247-1343

l.
2.
3.

o

1044
1
2
3
4

PRO C E E DIN G S
PRESIDENT NARIMAN:

what are we doing

today, Mr. Luddy?
MR. LUDDY:

We're starting with

5

Professor Gruber, who's witness for Respondent.

6

Then I believe we take Arthur Montour out of turn

7

because we're joined here today with his counsel

8

in the seattle matter who will appear in the

9

matter, and Mr. Calfo has to be back in Seattle

09:04:33 10
11
12

for a court appearance tomorrow so we want to get
him on his flight.
Then after that, Mr. Delange, who is

13

New Mexico's Assistant AG, will be cross-examined.

14

And then I don't really know where that will leave

15

us at the end of the day.

16

PRESIDENT NARIMAN:

So can we begin?

17

Mr. Feldman, can we begin?

18

MR. FELDMAN:

19

MR. LUDDY: Housekeeping.
page 4

Yes.
I've already
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18

everything and we tell them what we think they're

19

doing wrong.

17:23:02 20

o

You know, they have their own

selfish interests obviously.

we have laws to

21

enforce and MSA agreement to uphold.

22

we hear from all sides.

so, you know

we hear from SPMs, we
1407

1

hear from NPMs, we hear from OPMS.

2

hear from tobacco distributors, we hear from

3

consumers all expressing their views we listen to

4

therna-Il.

5

things from any of them, and we just try to figure

6

out what we ought to be doing under our laws, what

7

the legislature intended for us to do and go

8

forth.

9
17:23:41 10

Q.

All --and we

sometimes you can learn some about

well

I

are you -- didn't you commence an

action against philip Morris and the other major

11

tobacco companies addressing, among other things,

12

the very issue of whether or not Idaho's refusal

13

to collect excise tax with respect to the very

14

sales -- the very type of sales that are subject

15

of your NWS complaint, constituted failure of due

16

diligence under the -- or diligent enforcement

17

under your Escrow Statute?

18
19
17:24:19 20

A.

I wouldn't characterize it that way.

We did file an action in 2006 because R.J.
Reynolds and Lorillard withheld a portion of their

21

MSA payment.

They had a claimant, their claim is

22

the NPM adjustment, which is a very complicated

0

1408
1

adjustment, but in essence this adjustment applied
page 275
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and they didn't have to pay the states.

3

action is the declaration that we're entitled to

4

that money.

5

of dollars as a result of their withholding it

6

from the state of Idaho.

And our

we're out right now several millions

7

So, we did file an action.

8

think this brief, this is probably -- yeah, this

9

is the brief we filed in connection with that

17:24:56 10
11

motion for court to declare our rights and declare
that we're entitled to that money.

12
13

I actually

And so, we're in some deep litigation
arbitration actually as it turns out, with 50

14

tobacco companies -- or maybe it's 45 tobacco

15

companies -- about this matter right now.

16
17
18

Q.

sO, that suit was essentially bounced

to arbitration; correct?
A.

Yes.

The district court ruled under

19

the Master settlement Agreement, the arbitration

17:25:27 20

clause in there should govern our entitlement to

21

those payments and their argument that their

22

entitled to an NPM adjustment.

So, we're now

0

1409
1
2

moving toward that arbitration.
Q.

And one of the things that tobacco

3

companies were claiming in that suit and now

4

presumably in the arbitration, is that Idaho's

5

failure or refusal as the case may be to collect

6

excise tax on on-Reservation sales constituted a

7

failure to diligently enforce Idaho's Escrow

8

Statute; right?

9

A.

NO, they haven't been that specific
Page 276
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I mean, they've argued the states -- their

11

argument to date has been much broader -- you

12

didn't diligently enforce your statute; you

13

haven't done enough and so we're entitled to the

14

NPM adjustment.

15

arguments over time -- everything we've done has

16

been wrong, and we disagree with that, of course,

17

and we think we've done exactly what we're

18

supposed to do.

19
17:26:34 20
21

Q.

I think, you know, their

But you fully anticipate that they're

going to make that argument in the arbitration
proceeding, don't you?
A.

22

probably.

They're going to make every

D

1410
1

single last argument out there, I suppose.

2
3

ARBITRATOR CROOK:

Mr. Luddy can I ask

the witness a question?

4

MR. LUDDY:

5

ARBITRATOR CROOK:

Absolutely.
Mr. Delange, can you

6

clarify the procedural situation in this

7

arb-j trati on.

8

THE WITNESS:

9

ARBITRATOR CROOK:

17: 26: 54 10

Yes.
IS it a single

arbitration with all of the states and all of the

11

concerned tobacco companies or are there lots of

12

different arbitrations or similar paths?

13

it work procedurally?
THE WITNESS:

14

How does

It's going to be one

15

arbitration, you're going to have 52 states

16

settling states because the territories are part

17

of it.

You're going to have 50 tobacco companies
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This Court has asked for supplemental briefing concerning the holdings of the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Maybee, No. 35200, 2010 WL 143459 (Id. S. Ct., Jan. 15,2010), as
they relate to the present case. The Court in Maybee decided a number of issues, several of
which are applicable to this case. Specifically, the Maybee Court held that:
(I) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement

Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act) "regulates cigarettes, as defined
by the [Idaho Master Settlement Agreement Act], not merely 'units sold.'" Maybee, at
*5. This holding contradicts that which Native Wholesale Supply Company (NWS) has
argued here.

See Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, p. 8.
(2) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "is intended to
govern interstate as well as intrastate sales of cigarettes to consumers in the state of
Idaho," Maybee, at *5, and because it is triggered by the sale of noncompliant cigarettes
to consumers in Idaho, it does not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.

Maybel~,

at *9-11. This holding contradicts that which NWS has argued

here. See Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, p. 10.
(3) The purpose of the Complementary Act is "to prevent the cigarettes of
Noncompliant Manufilcturers from being sold to Idaho consumers," Maybee, at *9, and
where title to the cigarettes at issue passes is irrelevant to that determination. Jd. This
holding contradicts that which NWS has argued here.

See Defendant's Reply

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Personal Jurisdiction
Grounds, pp. 4-5, 8-1 n.

PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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(4) The Complementary Act does not regulate the on-reservation activity of
the tribal member Internet cigarette seller in that case, but rather his "introduction of
Noncompliant Cigarettes into Idaho," Maybee, at *9 (emphasis added), and because this
constitutes conduct going off his reservation, pursuant to applicable federal Indian law
precedent, the tribal member Internet cigarette seller is properly subject to the
Complementary Acfs provisions.

Id at

* 13-14,

citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v.

Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). This holding contradicts that which NWS has
argued here. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction, p. 8.
In short, the Maybee case stands for the proposition that selling cigarettes which are
destined for Idaho but are non-compliant under the Complementary Act is an act that gives Idaho
Courts jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of that Act. Maybee's membership in the Seneca
Tribe did not protect him from application of Idaho's laws to activity that involved selling
cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Likewise, the Native American status ofNWS's owner does not
somehow protect NWS

h~:re.

Likewise, the nature of the customer is of no moment because as a

non-member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, NWS has no special status on the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation.

See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US

134, 161 (1980) ("[nlon-member [Indians] are not constituents of the governing Tribe. . .
.[T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation.") For this
reason, NWS's position is no different from Maybee's and the holdings in the Maybee case are
dispositive of the issues in this case.
NWS gives short shrift to Maybee in its memo, opting instead to cite at length to two
professors in an unrelated arbitration proceeding and misrepresenting the holdings of two other

PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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cases. This is perhaps not surprising given Maybee's relevance and applicability to this case and
the support it provides the State and the Tax Commission. In Maybee, as noted, the defendant is
a member of the Seneca Nation of Indians, located on the Seneca Reservation in New York, who
sold cigarettes to purchasers in Idaho. NWS is a corporation owned by a member of the Seneca
Nation of Indians and is also located on the same Seneca Reservation in New York.

Both

Maybee's and NWS's cigarette sales are to Idaho purchasers located in Idaho, and the cigarettes
that Maybee and NWS have sold are not listed on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families. As a result both have violated Idaho Code Section
39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act. Maybee made many of the same arguments NWS makes
here and, as set forth above, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected them all.
NWS ' s response is to attempt to distinguish Maybee on one ground, and it is that the
Idaho purchaser of NWS' s cigarettes is located in Indian country, whereas the purchasers of
Maybee's products resid<:: throughout Idaho. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law
(Defs Supp. Memo), p. 6.'
recipient of NWS's

This is a distinction without a difference.

cigan~ttes-Warpath,Inc.-is

The fact is that the

not a member of an Indian tribe but is instead

a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,
474-75 (2003) (corporations have identities separate from that of their owners); Baraga Prods.,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (incorporated business entity not an
enrolled member of an Indian tribe simply because its sole shareholder is); id. at 298 ("a
corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from the application of state law). As
an Idaho corporation, Warpath, Inc. is an Idaho resident, standing in the same shoes as the Idaho

I "Indian Country" is specifically defined by federal statute essentially to be "all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government." 18 U.S.c. § 1151. While
the terms of Section 1151 literally only apply to crimes, federal courts have used this section in civil
matters. See. e.g. Alaska v. Native ViII. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
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purchasers of Maybee's cigarettes. Caremark Therapeutic Servs. v. Leavitt, 405 F. Supp.2d 454,
458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (corporation a resident of the State of its incorporation). Thus, the fact that
Warpath, Inc. is located within Indian country does not change the Maybee Court's analysis that
an out-of-state tribal seller's introduction of noncompliant cigarettes into Idaho subjects that
seller to the Complementary Act.
Even if Warpath, Inc. were somehow deemed a member of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe, there is
nothing in the Indian law that decrees the result thereof to be dismissal here. Rather, the analysis
of the matter simply changes to that of a balancing of federal, state, and tribal interests as set
forth in White Mountain.APache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).2 Applying that test
here, enforcement of the Complementary Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws would be upheld.
Concerning the federal interest "the federal government has been generally supportive of
state regulation of cigarette sales." Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188,204 (W.D.N.Y.
2003).

NWS certainly identifies no contrary congressional directive with respect to Idaho's

Complementary Act and administration of its cigarette tax laws. Indeed, federal law supports
state cigarette tax efforts. The fact is that federal common law, see, infra pp. 5-6 & nn. 3 and 4,
2 Bracker involved the qUl~stion whether Arizona could impose motor carrier license and use fuel taxes
on a nontribal firm with respect to on-reservation timber hauling undertaken pursuant to a contract with
the resident tribe and sets forth the following test for when a State may regulate commercial transactions
between tribes and nonmembers that occur on reservation:

In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms
of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed
from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or
absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into
the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific <:ontext, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.
448 U.S. at 144-45.

As the ~aybee Court noted, Bracker's balancing test applies only where regulated conduct falls on a
'''nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with tribes or tribal members, on the reservation. '" Maybee, at
*14, quoting Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). Because that is not
what Maybee was doing, the Court ruled that Bracker did not apply. Maybee, at * 14.
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recognizes the legitimacy of state taxes imposed on reservation cigarette sales to individuals not
members of the resident tribe and federal statutory law facilitates enforcement of State tax
provisions and other tobacco related regulation. For example, a provision of federal law known
as the "Jenkins Act," codified at 15 U.S.c. § 376, mandates that out-of-state cigarette retailers
report monthly to a State:'s tax or revenue commission all sales made to residents of the tax
commission's state.
Concerning the State's interest, Idaho's interest in regulating tobacco is self evident. As
noted previously, the Legislature has found that smoking presents serious public health concerns
to Idaho and its citizens. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a) of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement Act (MSA Act). This strong interest was expressly recognized by the Maybee Court.
Maybee, at *7, * 10. The Legislature further determined that the financial burdens imposed on
the State by smoking should be borne by tobacco companies, rather than by the State, to the
extent that such companies either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the State or
are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-7801 (d) of the MSA Act. The State's
interest in regulating the sale of this dangerous product cannot be gainsaid. Idaho also has an
interest in the effective and efficient administration of its cigarette tax laws. It cannot administer
these laws if wholesalers, with impunity, can ignore the requirement that they obtain a permit
from the Tax Commission. In short, the State's interests implicated presently are significant and
NWS says nothing to

und(~rcut

them.

The final consideration-the relevant tribal interest-is not helpful to NWS. The burden
upon the Seneca Nation's tribal interests in NWS (a business incorporated under a different
tribe's corporate code) complying with Idaho law with respect to its cigarette sales to Idaho
businesses is not apparent. It is far less intrusive on NWS's time and resources than the record-

PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 5

000777

keeping and tax collection duties approved in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463 (1976),3 and Colville.

4

In short, even if the Bracker balancing test were employed

because of Warpath, Inc. 's status as a Native American-owned Idaho corporation located on the
Coeur d' Alene Reservation, application of the test would support the State and Tax Commission
here and would not be grounds for dismissing this matter.
NWS spends significant time quoting the opinions of two professors involved in an
arbitration brought under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Putting aside
the lack of relevance that proceeding has on this case, even a cursory review of the opinions
quoted shows fundamental Haws of understanding both factually and legally.

For example,

Professor Fletcher states that federal law prohibits state regulation that applies to the onreservation activities of Indian tribes or reservation Indians. Defs Supp. Memo, p. 3. He then
applies that principle to Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (GRE), calling it a
"wholesaler" that is "doing business in Indian Country." Id. These statements are flat out wrong.
GRE is a tobacco product manufacturer located in Canada. And as the Second Circuit has held
in a case the Professor does not cite "Grand River itself operates only on land that is outside the
United States.

Thus the activities of Grand River in Canada are [to be considered] off-

reservation activities ...." !3rand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 174

3 Moe involved a challenge to Montana's method for assessment and collection of personal property
taxes as applied to reservation Indians. Moe contains four holdings, one of which is of relevance here and
which is that Montana could require tribal retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non
Indians with respect to reservation sales. 425 U.S. at 480-81,483. As to this holding, the Supreme Court
stated that requiring an Indian tribal seller to collect a tax validly imposed on a non-member of the Tribe
is a minimal burden that do(:s not frustrate tribal self-government and is not prohibited by congressional
enactment. ld. at 483.
4 In Colville, the Supreme Court, in addition to upholding Washington's sales and cigarettes taxes on
on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the Tribe, also upheld Washington's authority to impose
robust regulatory obligations on tribal retailers with respect to nonmember cigarette sales-i.e.,
maintaining "detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to simply precollecting the tax."
447 U.S. at 151. It reasoned that "[t]he simple collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax
on tribal smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection burden upheld in Moe." ld.
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(2 nd Cir. 2005). In short, the Professor's opinion, not tethered to fact, does not undercut or refute
the Maybee Court's conclusion, supported by the Maine Supreme Court's decision involving the
same retailer, that when a tribal member or tribal member-owned entity goes off reservation and
introduces its cigarettes into Idaho it is subject to the Complementary Act. Maybee, at

* 14;

accord Department of Health and Human Service v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 56-57 (Me. 2009).
Professor Fletcher is equally wrong on the facts. He describes the state laws discussed in
the NAFTA arbitration as the "direct regulation of Indian manufacturers," Def's Supp. Memo, p.
4, a claim, of course, in error on its face: GRE is not a Native American. Rather, as noted
above, it is a Canadian corporation that manufactures cigarettes in Canada, not in Indian country.
Thus when he opines that "state law has no force in Indian Country," Defs Supp. Memo, p. 4,
the Professor has merely constructed a straw man because that is not what either GRE or NWS
are doing as a result of manufacturing the cigarettes in Canada and introducing those cigarettes
into Idaho.

Thus, this Professor's opinion here also does not refute the Maybee Court's

conclusion that when a tribal member or tribal member-owned entity goes off reservation and
introduces its cigarettes into Idaho it is subject to the Complementary Act. Maybee, at * 14.
NWS cites to two Kansas cases-Winnebago Tribes v. Morrison, 512 F.Supp.2d 1182
(DKan. 2007) and Winnebago Tribes v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2007)-for the proposition
that there is a "categorical bar" to "activities of reservation Indians between reservations." Def s
Supp. Memo, p. 7 (emphasis in original). The cases stand for no such thing.
The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska owns a gasoline distributor. It sold gasoline to tribes
in Kansas for on-reservation retail sale. The Kansas Department of Revenue asserted that the
Winnebago's gasoline distributor owed Kansas fuel taxes and because such taxes were not paid,
it seized various property of the distributor. The Winnebago Tribe sued Kansas alleging that
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Kansas was attempting to tax a transaction occurring in Indian country. Winnebago Tribes v.
Morrison, 512 F.Supp.2d at 1184-85. The federal district court certified to the Kansas Supreme
Court questions related to the application of Kansas's fuel tax laws and in Winnebago Tribes v.
Kline, 150 P.3d at 904-05, the Kansas Supreme Court, applying Kansas tax law, concluded that
the Winnebago Tribe bore no tax liability since, under relevant state statutes, such liability
attaches only to the "distributor of first receipt" and not importers to whom "no transfer of
possession" of the fuel in Kansas occurs.

The cases did not declare or announce some sort of

federal law preemption for inter-reservational activity and NWS is in error to so intimate.
Finally, NWS citl;:s anew to State v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1980), and
Martinez v. Superior Court, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), to argue that Idaho does not
have "minimum contacts" with NWS. Deft's Supp. Memo, p. 9. Neither case is apposite here.
As previously discussed, in flammond the court ruled that it had neither subject matter nor
personal jurisdiction over a child support action against a father who is an enrolled member of
the Blackfoot Tribe and who was residing on the Blackfoot Reservation. The father married the
mother in California and the couple separated in California. Later the father moved back to the
Blackfoot Reservation. Id. at 472. Two points about this case bear mentioning. First, finding
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction is dicta.
Second, the facts surrounding this case are not close to that before this Court. Here, as discussed
in the prior briefing, NWS does not reside on the Coeur d' Alene Reservation; it is not a member
of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe; and it has significant, sizable, and purposeful contacts with Idaho by
virtue of its selling, shipping and causing to be imported to an Idaho corporation millions of
noncompliant cigarettes. In short, the facts of this case do not fit into Flammond's child support
framework involving an action against a member of a tribe residing on his Tribe's reservation.
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Martinez v. Superior Court, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), closely parallels
Flammond. A non-Indian wife filed for divorce in Arizona state court. The Indian husband
objected. The court note'd that the parties lived on the reservation of the tribe to which the
husband belonged, that the marriage occurred and fell apart on the reservation, that the children
to the marriage were conceived on the reservation, and that the tribe had its own divorce code
and tribal court to handle family-law matters. Id at 1246. The court thus ruled that under such
circumstance it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Indian father. It is plain that
Martinez's personal jurisdiction holding was predicated on Indian-law preemption principles, not
Due Process Clause-based "minimum contacts" jurisprudence; it is no less plain that Martinez's
facts are too far afield of this case to be instructive. The State and the Tax Commission are not
suing Warpath. Inc. for selling non-compliant cigarettes on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.
Rather, they are suing NWS for selling, shipping, and causing to be imported into Idaho non
compliant cigarettes.
In the end, NWS's multiple and repeated violations of Idaho law are not immunized by
federal law. That which the State and the Tax Commission argued to the Court when they filed
the present motion for a preliminary injunction, as well as their opposition to NWS's motion to
dismiss, is still correct with one development, which is that with respect to a number of issues
raised to this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court has now entered rulings and in each instance in a
manner upholding the State and the Tax Commission here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the State and the Tax Commission respectfully request
that this Court deny NWS's motion to dismiss on personal and subject matter jurisdiction
grounds and grant the

Statl~

and Tax Commission's motion for a preliminary injunction.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
Ys.

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,

Case No. CV OC 0815228

DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
AND IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits its
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintifls'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

In State ofIdaho v. Maybee the Idaho Supreme Court applied the Master Settlement Agreement
and the Complimentary Act to the sales of cigarettes by an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation 10
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Idaho citizens who are not enrolled members of any tribe and who are not residing on Indian Country. In
deciding whether or not application of the statute was in conflict with the Indian Commerce Clause, the
Court noted among other things, "it is critical to determine as a preliminary inquiry: (I) whether the
regulated conduct occurs on or off reservation ...." The Idaho Supreme Court then held in Maybee that
the Complimentary Act and the Master Settlement Agreement Act could be applied to Maybee's sales
because he was involved in "selling and offering for sale non-compliant cigarettes in Idaho" which were
"off reservation activities." The site of the transaction was critical to the Court's analysis. Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical
component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption
inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh
in determining whether state authority has exceeded permissible limits." Bracker, 448 U.S. at
151.

The State does not directly address the fact that the present case involves no sales to
Idaho residents who are not located on Indian Country. The State engages in misdirection and
claims that because Warpath is a corporation Idaho may regulate NWS' sales to it. This is not
true. The State ignores Idaho Administrative Rule 35.01.10.014.01 which specifically provides
that cigarette wholesalers may deliver cigarettes without Idaho stamps to Indian Country when:
a. The purchaser is an enrolled member of an Idaho Indian tribe;
b. The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and
operated by an enrolled member or members of an Idaho Indian
tribe; and
c. The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and
operated by an Idaho Indian tribe.
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IDAPA 35.01.10.014.01. For the purpose of cigarette sales, Idaho treats Native Americans and
entities owned exclusivelly by members of an enrolled tribe the same. As has previously been
established, Warpath is exclusively owned by enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.
Further, Tribal sovereignty claims are not limited to cases in which an Indian tribe is a party.
Instead, there is substantial case law that tribally-chartered corporations have the same
supremacy clause-protected status as tribes. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land and Cattle Co., No. CIV. 05-3002, 2006 WL 2055880 (D.S.D. July. 17,2006).

The authority cited by the State, Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 971 F.Supp. 294 (W.D.Mich.
1997), has also been subject to rejection and criticism. See Flat Center Farms, Inc. v. Montana, 310
Mont. 209,49 PJd 578 (!vlont. 2002). In Flat Center Farms, the Montana Supreme Court held that a
corporate license tax could not be imposed on an Indian owned corporation that did business entirely
within the reservation. The court rejected Baraga Products, stating: "in fact we have in the past given
greater weight to the situs of the taxable income than the status of the income earner." Id at 581. See
also Courier v. South Dakota Department ofRevenue, 658 N.W.2d 395 (S.Dak. 2003):

Tbe Department claims that Muddy Creek cannot meet the threshold
requirement of being either the Tribe or an enrolled member ofthe Tribe
because as a corporation, it cannot have the racial identity necessary to

fall within the Chickasaw rule. In support of this argument, the
Department relies on Baraga Products, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 971 F.Supp. 294, 296-297 (W.D.Mich. 1997). Baraga held
that a corporation formed under state law and owned by an enrolled
member such as Muddy Creek was not an enrolled member of the tribe
as required by Chickasaw. We disagree and hold that a corporation
owned by the tribe or an enrolled tribal member residing on the Indian
reservation and doing business on the reservation for the benefit of
reservation Indians is an enrolled member for the purpose of protecting
tax immunity.

Id. at 403 - 04.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly prohibited civil regulation of transactions between
Indians on Indian Country. "Indian nations ... long have been distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n
v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).

The "presumption against state taxing

authority applies to all Indian Country ...." Id. at 126. The court must "analyze the relevant
treaties and federal statutes against the backdrop of Indian sovereignty" in considering the
activity to be regulated. Id.
"In light of the unique sovereign status of Indian tribes located in [Idaho]," it is clear that
the state "cannot tax cigarettes sold on an Indian reservation to tribal members for their own use,
unless authorized to do so by Congress." Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 477 F.3d
881, 883 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 546 U.S. 95
(2005). "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations
with Indian tribes ..., and in recognition of sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals are generally exempt from state
taxation within their own territory." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,
455 (1995) (quoting Montana v. Blaclifeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,764 (1985». Where, as here, the
tax scheme has some effect on an Indian tribe, "[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question ..
. is who bears the legal incidence of[the] tax." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99 ("States are categorically
barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax on a tribe or on tribal members for sales
made inside Indian country") (citations omitted).
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), an offreservation enterprise owned by a non-member sold farm equipment to a tribe, and the sales were
solicited on the reservation, contracted on the reservation, and payment and delivery of the
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equipment took place on the reservation. !d. at 161. The State sought to tax these transactions
by imposing a "privilege of doing business in the state" tax on the non-member seller. !d. The
state pointed out that the seller was located off the reservation and was not a licensed Indian
trader, and therefore these distinguishing factors permitted the state to impose its tax. ld. The
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, expressly finding that that it was "irrelevant that the
sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself." Id.
The State also argues that a Bracker balancing test should apply. Bracker does not apply.
Bracker only applies to transactions involving non-tribal entities occurring on reservation. Here, that is

not the case. Even if a Bracker balancing test were applied, clearly the statutes are not applicable to
NWS' sales to Warpath.
The State may have an interest in regulating sales and transactions between Warpath and Idaho
citizens who are not enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe or residing on the Coeur d' Alene
Reservation. However, the State has chosen instead to focus upon NWS' sales to Warpath. This tribalto-tribal transaction occurring only on Indian Country may not be regulated by the State.
As the Supreme Court observed in Maybee, regulation of tribal conduct "may unlawfully
infringe 'on the right of resf:rvation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. '" Maybee at p.
16.

When on-n~servation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, State
law is generally inapplicable, because the State's regulatory interest is
likely to minimal and the federal interest of encouraging self
government is at its strongest.
ld., citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.

On the other hand, the strong federal interest in promoting tribal self-government, economic
development and self-sufficiency weighs overwhelmingly against application of the statutes to NWS'
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sales to Warpath. See, e.g.. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. laPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14, 107 S.Ct. 971,94 L.Ed.2d
10 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's
longstanding policy of em;ouraging tribal self-government"). These federal interests are reflected in
various Acts of Congress, Executive Branch policies, and judicial opinions. See generally Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.c. § § 2701-2721 (2000); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.c.
§ § 461-479 (2000); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.c. 450

(2000); see also Presidential Proclamation 7500, 66 Fed.Reg.57641 (Nov. 12,2001) ("We will protect
and honor tribal sovereignty and help to stimulate economic development in reservation communities.");

Exec. Order 13175, 65 Feel.Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) ("[We] recognize [] the right of Indian tribes to
self-government and support[] tribal sovereignty and self-determination."); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143, 100
S.Ct. 2578 (there is "a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofColville, 447 U.S. 134, 155, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65
L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (noting that federal statutes evidence "varying degrees [of] congressional concem
with fostering tribal self-government and economic development"). "Here, the tribal interests are

,ill

outgrowth of the federal policy toward self-determination, self-sufficiency and self-government." Queets
Band. 765 F.2d at 1407 n.6.

Further, as Professor Fletcher observed in his expert opinion previously submitted to this Court:
Federal Indian policy articulated by Congress protects and encourages
Indian tribes and Indian people to engage in economic development for
the purpose of generating self-sufficiency and moving away from
dependence on the federal government. The kind of business operation
in which the Claimants engage is exactly the type of activity that
Congress encourages. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The
Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb.L.Rev. 121, 144-47
(2006) (describing Congressional policy on tax immunities and tribal
economic development); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal
economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80
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"-'
N.D.L.Rev. 759, 774-84 (2004) (describing several kinds of tribal
businesses).
There are many reasons for the development ofthis policy ofprotecting
and encouraging Indian businesses. First, Indian people generally are the
poorest people in the United States. Second, Federal Indian Law limits
the authority ofIndian tribes to tax nonmembers, even within Indian
Country, meaning that tribal governments often have little capacity to
provide governmental services to tribal citizens. Third, state and local
governments have long been reticent to provide services to Indian
people. On occasion, this reticence it based in racial prejudice, but more
often it is based on several often incorrect presumptions. State and local
governments onen assume that Indian people are ineligible for state and
local services because oftheir tribal status, or that Indian people are
ineligible for services because many ofthem do not pay state or local
taxes. Finally, non-Indian businesses, paying the substantial taxes on
cigarettes and other tobacco products imposed by state and local
governments, treat tobacco-related businesses as economic competition.
In short, Federal Indian Law has historically served as a double-edged
sword for Indian tribes and Indian people, but the key actors in Federal
Indian Law have always been tribal and federal. States and local
governments are excluded from these relations absent an Act of
Congress. Federal Indian Law is intended to prevent state and local
governments from undermining the structure of federal Indian law and
policy established by the federal government and Indian tribes. As the
remainder ofmy analysis shows, the MSA established by 46 states does
exactly that, and should not be enforced against American Indians and
their businesses.

See Opinion ofMatthew Fletcher at pp. 12-13, Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated

March 4, 2010.
The State has failed to show why the Maybee decision would in any way be controlling and
support application ofthe MSA or Complimentary Act to NWS' sales to Warpath. In addition to the fact
that the substantive holding in Maybee supports NWS' position, the procedural differences in the cases
also mandate a different result. The State has not established and cannot establish any minimum contacts
with the State ofIdaho by NWS. The only contacts by NWS that may exist are contacts with a tribal
entity on Indian Country. TIlose contacts will not constitute contacts with the forum state, Idaho.
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For the reasons stated herein, NWS reiterates its request that the Court deny the State's motion
for preliminary injilllction and grant its motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction.

DATED this

_LL day of March, 2010.
, KADING, TURNBOW
N, CHARTERED

a u A. Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2

:lrY5 ~~.

3
4
5

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

_

MAY 20 2010
J. ~\Il,U:HlIA~

Ely_--Ll~~~4=:::"'-_

6

Plaintiffs,

7

8

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

9

10
11

12

Case No. CV OC 0815228

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

13

14

This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes allegedly in violatio
15

of the Idaho Complementary Act, I.C. 39-8401, et seq., and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C.

16

48-601, et seq. On August 14,2008, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commissio

17

filed their Verified Complaint seeking injunctive and other relief as to Defendant Native Wholesal

18

Supply Company, also hereinafter Native Wholesale. Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Ta

19

Commission's Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed on April 9, 2009. On May 6, 2009
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction and

20

related allegation of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The extensiv

21

procedural history of this case was addressed by the Court in its September 15,2009, Order and wil

22

not be repeated here. However, the Court does incorporate that order into this order by reference.

23

Hearing was held on these motions on July 2, 2009. Supplemental authority was submitted to th
Court for review on August 26, 2009, and the Court requested further briefing from the parties in th

24

aforementioned Order of September 15, 2009. Further hearing on these motions was held Decembe
25
26

17,2009. In February 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on a matter directly related to the issue
before the Court in Idaho v. Maybee (Docket No. 35200 Opinion No.2 November 2009 tem1 File
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January 15,2010). The Court requested further briefing from the parties based upon this additiona
1

supplemental authority. On February 22, 2010, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law i
2

Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction wa

3

filed. On that same date, Defendant filed its Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle in Support

4

Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff

5

0

Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On March 4, 2010, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho Stat
Tax Commission's Third Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion t

6

Dismiss was filed. On March 11,2010, Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support
7

0

its Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed.

8

Thereafter, on March 18, 2010, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission'

9

Notice of Supplemental Authority was filed citing the Court to the case of Muscogee Nation v. Henry,

10

CIV 10-0 19-JHP, recently decided in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

0

Oklahoma. No response has been filed by the Defendants to this final supplemental authority. Th
11

Court now considers the matter fully submitted for decision.
12

On or about January I, 2004, Defendant began importing two cigarette brands, Seneca an

13

Opal, for sale and distribution in Idaho. Both brands of cigarettes are not listed on the Idah

14

Directory. See Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Persona

15

Jurisdiction filed on May 6, 2009, hereinafter Montour Affidavit, p.2

~3.

Defendant purchases an

imports the cigarettes and holds them in the Southern Nevada Foreign Trade Zone in Las Vegas
16

Nevada. Montour Affidavit p. 2
17

~4.

Native Wholesale has a contract to sell Seneca and Opal brand

of cigarettes to Warpath, ][nc., hereinafter Warpath, an Idaho corporation located in Plummer, Idaho

18

on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. See Affidavit of Beth A. Kittlemann filed on April 9, 2009

19

hereinafter Kittlemann Affidavit, Exhibits E-H. Warpath in tum sells the cigarettes to the public

20

including persons who arl;: not Native American. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman filed on June 23
2009, hereinafter Ausman Affidavit, pp.1-2, ~~2-5

21

Seneca and Opal cigarettes are manufactured by Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd.,
22

hereinafter Grand River. K-ittelmann Affidavit p.2

23

against Grand River prohibiting Grand River from selling cigarettes in Idaho either directly

24

through an intermediary. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3

25

~3.

On September 5, 2002, an injunction issue

~6.

0

The injunction was issued due to Gran

River's noncompliance with I.C. §39-8403(3) which regulates what type of cigarettes can be sold i
Idaho, and remains in effect at this time. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3

~7.

In February 2008, the Idah

26

Attorney General learned that Grand River cigarettes were still being brought into Idaho throug
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'Defendant. Kittelmann Affidavit p. 3

~8.

On June 13, 2008, 1,460,000 Seneca and Opal bran

1

cigarettes were imported into Idaho and on July 21, 2008, 1,634,000 Seneca and Opal bran
2
3

4

5

cigarettes were brought into Idaho. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3

~9.

Native Wholesale has also neve

applied for a cigarette permit required by I.C. §63-2503. See Kittlemann Affidavit p.2 ~4.
Pursuant to Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission's Motion
Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Native Wholesale Supply Company "and itsl
employees, agents, successors, assigns, affiliates, distributors and all other persons acting in concert:

6

with Native Wholesale" firom directly or indirectly "transporting, importing or causing to be
7

importe~

cigarettes that are not included on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product ManufacturerJ

8

and Brand Families (the 'Idaho Directory')" pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreemeni

9

Complementary Act ("Complementary Act"), I.C. §39-8403(3), and the Idaho Consumer Protectiod

I

10

Act, I.C. §48-601, et seq. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Defendant "from selling cigarettes

a~

wholesale without first applying for and possessing a cigarette permit as required by Idaho Code
11

Section 63-2503(1 )."
12

The Court will first address the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matte

13

and Personal Jurisdiction and then, if appropriate, tum its attention to the Plaintiffs' preliminar

14

injunction motion. As has previously been noted, Defendant, seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' complain
I

15

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

16
17

i

to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). These various grounds for dismissal are all related to Defendant's status as ~
Native American business.

18

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when the action at

19

issue falls within Idaho's longarm statute if the constitutional standards of due process are met.

20

Blimka v. MyWeb Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007); Smalley v.
Kaiser, 130 Idaho 909, 950 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1997). Minimum contacts with the forum state ar

21

required in order to comply with traditional notions of fair play. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 32
22

U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed 95 (1945). A corporation must "purposefully ... [avail] itself 0

23

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits an

24

protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184

25

85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985); Western States Equipment Co. v. American Annex, Inc. 125 Idaho 155,
158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). The defendant must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court i

26

the forum state." Western States Equipment Co. 125 Idaho at 158 citing World-Wide Volkswago
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Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287, 100 S. Ct. 559, 562, 62 L.Ed 490 (1980). Furthermore if th
1

corporation receives a dir,ect benefit from the interstate activities located in the forum jurisdiction th
2

defendant can expect to be haled into court. Schneider v. Scerdsten Logging Co., 104 Idaho 210, 213

3

657 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1983); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 11

4

(1987).

5

Native Wholesale has sold over 92 million Seneca and Opal cigarettes to Warpath, Inc., i
Idaho. See Verified Complaint pp.5-7

~28-30.

Native Wholesale's gross income from Idaho sale

6

totals more than $4.4 miIlion. See Second Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann filed on June 23, 2009,
7

hereinafter Second Kittelmann Affidavit, p.6

~17.

Defendant directly contracts for the sale

0

8

cigarettes with Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation. Id. The amount of business conducted between

9

Defendant and Warpath, Inc., indicates Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

10

engaging in business in Idaho and has, therefore, subjected itself to Idaho law and the personal
jurisdiction of this Court satisfying due process standards and traditional notions of fair play.

11

Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the Complementary Act and, specifically,
12

I.e. §63

2503(1), do not apply to its activities because the transactions between Warpath and Nativ

13

Wholesale are strictly tribal to tribal events and the Court, therefore, lacks both personal and subjec

14

matter jurisdiction. An incorporated business cannot argue that it should be considered an enrolle

15

member of a tribe because its sole shareholder is a member. See Baraga Prds., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971
F.Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Michigan 1977); see also Ariz. Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Cosntr. Co., 52

16

U.S. 32, 34 (1999)). "[A] corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from th
17

application of state law. Baraga Prds., Inc., 971 F.Supp. at 298. Tribes do not have "super sovereig

18

authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v.

19

Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 466, (1995). Native American immunity from state taxation extend

20

to commerce within a tribe, not among tribes. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983). In fact,
state can require a tribal retailer to obtain a state license for any sales to "all non-Indians and all

21

Indians who are not members of the particular tribe." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of th
22

Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-161 (1980) (upholding the State's power to make offIndia

23

country seizures of unstamped contraband product). See also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686-8

24

(1990) (immunity "does not apply to taxation of inter-tribal commerce"). "Activity of tribal member

25

that takes place within the reservation but has an impact outside the reservation may be regulated b
the states. . . [when] state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States may regulate th

26

activities even of tribe members on tribal land." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.353, 362-66 (2001).
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"Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been subject to non-discriminatory stat
1

laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
2

145, 148-49 (1973). Where a non-Indian is engaging in activities on a reservation; the court employ

3

a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquir

4

designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violat

5

federal law." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
Defendant contends the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity applies to the case at ba

6

because the president and owner of Native Wholesale is a Native American and a member of th
7

Seneca Nation. Native Wholesale is a cigarette wholesaler incorporated by the Sac and Fox tribe i

8

Oklahoma with its principal place of business on the Seneca Nation reservation in upstate New York.

9

However the Complementary Act and I.C. §63-2503(1) are not attempting to regulate activities takin

10

place on that reservation, but rather off-reservation activities of 1) selling and offering for sale.
noncompliant cigarettes and 2) selling, and offering for sale, tobacco products without first havin

11

obtained a tobacco permit. As recently determined by the Supreme Court of Idaho, whether Nativ
12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19

Wholesale
delivers noncompliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers personally, or through a
common carrier, this conduct is ultimately traceable to ... [Native Wholesale]. Idaho
Code §39-8403(3) is concerned with the introduction of noncompliant cigarettes into
Idaho, and I.C. §39-5704(1) is concerned with the introduction of any tobacco
products into Idaho by anyone not first obtaining a tobacco permit. There is no
conflicting federal law that would prevent the State of Idaho from regulating how
tobacco may be sold or offered for sale in Idaho. . . Here, the regulated conduct
occurred off-reservation, and so the Bracker balancing test does not apply.
State v. Maybee (Docket No. 35200 Opinion No.2 November 2009 term Filed January
15,201O)pp.17-18.
Furthermore the cigarettes in question are ultimately sold in the state of Idaho for purposes

0

20

the Complementary Act. The contracts between Native Wholesale and Warpath list F.O.B. as Senec

21

Nation. See Second Kittelmann Affidavit p.7

22

~20,

Exhibit 1. However, the sale of the cigarette

occurs in Idaho regardless of the term FOB Seneca Nation on the contract. Title cannot pass prior t
identification of the goods in the contract. I.C. §28-2-40 1(1). Goods are identified in contracts fo

23

future sale at the time the goods are shipped or otherwise designated. I.C. §28-2-501(b). If th

24

contract requires delivery of the goods then title passes at the place of delivery. I.C. §28-2-401(2)(b).

25

If the contract does not require delivery but requires "or authorizes the seller to send the goods to th

26

buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time an
place of shipment." I.C. §28-2-401(2)(a). Native Wholesale sells cigarettes to Warpath and has th
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Foreign Trade Zone in N(~vada to locate and prepare the cigarettes purchased from Native Wholesal
1

for shipment. See Second Kittelmann Affidavit p.7 ,-[20, Exhibit 1. The invoices show Warpath i
2

billed for the shipment of the cigarettes from the Southern Nevada Foreign Trade Zone. Secon

3

Kittelmann Affidavit p.7 '20. Defendant argues that, as a result, Warpath is responsible for th

4

importation of these

5

ciga[l~ttes

into Idaho and not Native Wholesale. However these cigarettes may b

transported into Idaho, ultimately that conduct is traceable to Defendant. See State v. Maybee, supra.
Idaho tax laws are implicated at the time the cigarettes are introduced into the state through selling,

6

importing or causing importation of cigarettes into Idaho. Therefore, the provisions of th
7

Complementary Act apply to Defendant. See again State v. Maybee, supra.

8

The Court finds the statutes involved are non-discriminatory and regulate off-reservatio

9

conduct of a Native American owned corporation. The Complementary Act also contains an expres

10

legislative direction that sales, such as Native Wholesale'S, to Idaho retailers, such as Warpath
comply with its certification requirement. Therefore, the Court is satisfied it has jurisdiction over th

11

subject matter of this
12
13
14
15

caSI~

and Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter as well a

personal jurisdiction is therefore denied.
Defendant also asserts Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although the Court feels this argument is merely an extension of Defendant's motion to dismiss fo
lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it will briefly address it nonetheless. Because th
Court has not excluded the various affidavits and other documents submitted on this issue, it ha

16

treated Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted a
17

one for summary judgment. See LR.C.P. 12(b). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith i

18

the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that ther

19

is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

20

0

law." LR.C.P. 56(c). "'Motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution.' Bailey v.
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497,. 707 P.2d 900, 902 (1982); Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 528, 406 P.2

21

805,808 (1965)." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). There do not appea
22

to be any significant issues of material fact related to Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure t

23

state a claim. In fact, as has been previously noted, Defendant's dismissal motion is primarily base

24

upon the argument that Idaho law does not apply to the actions of Native Wholesale and, therefore,

25

the Court lacks the authority to proceed. However, the Court has already held that the actions

0

Native Wholesale in the case at bar are not protected by the Indian Commerce Clause and are subjec
26

to the Complementary Act of Idaho and LC. §63-2503(1). Plaintiffs have properly asserted a clai
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for relief for Defendant's violation of the statutes and, therefore, Defendant's dismissal motion

0

1

that basis is also denied.
2

Having determined it has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and th

3

case at bar, the Court will now consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In pertinen

4

part, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e) specifies the following grounds for issuing a preliminar

5
6
7

8

injunction:
1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and suc
relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some ac
during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff.

9

10

3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about t
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights,
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

11

12

Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.
Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 517, 681 P. 2d 988, 992 (1984). A preliminary injunction "i

13

granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury wil

14

flow from its refusal." Id. At 518, 681 P.2d at 993 (citing Evans v. District Court ofthe Fifth Judicia

15

Dist., 47 Idaho 276, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 (1929)). However, "it is not necessary that a case should b

16

made out that would entitle complainant to relief at all events on the final hearing. If complainant ha

17

made out a prima facie case or if from the pleadings and the conflicting affidavits it appears to th
court that a case is presented proper for its investigation on a final hearing, a preliminary injunctio

18

may issue to maintain the status quo." Rowland v Kellog Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 225, 233

19

P.869 (1925). The Idaho Supreme Court has held "that a preliminary injunction to preserve th

20

property in status quo pending final judgment is proper. .. since the owner is entitled to the protectio

21

of his property in specie. ld. (citing Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Con. Min. Co., 2 Idaho 696, 23 P. 547

22

1014 (1890); Staples v. Rossi, 7 Idaho 618, 65 P.67 (1901).
The Complaint properly asserts that Native Wholesale is in violation of the Complementar

23

Act and I.C. §63-2503(l) by causing unlawful cigarettes to be sold, offered for sale, or imported int

24

Idaho and doing so without first obtaining a tobacco permit. I.C. §63-2502(a) authorizes the ldah

25

State Tax Commission to seek injunctive relief against anyone engaged in the tobacco business as

26

wholesaler acting without a permit. The invoices attached as exhibits to the first and second affidavit
of Beth Kittelmann indicate the cigarette brands being sold, the importation of which was enjoined i
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another case, are not listed on the Idaho Directory and have generated a substantial amount

0

1

revenue for Native Wholesale from Idaho consumers. See Kittlemann Affidavit, Exhibits I an
2

Exhibits E-H. Plaintiffs have cited I.C. §39-7801 (a)-(b) whereby the state of Idaho is obligated t

I.e.

3

provide medical assistance to eligible persons for heath conditions related to smoking. See also

4

§39-7801(c). The financial burden imposed on the State from smoking-related illness was the impetu

5

for the state of Idaho to place restrictions on the tobacco industry. State v. Philip Morris et al. Cas
No. CV-OC-9703239D, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County (December 3, 1998) (Eismann, DJ.

6

This prompted the adoption of the Complementary Act which also implicates the Idaho Consume
7

Protection Act because any violation of the Complementary Act is considered deceptive or an unfai

I.e. §48-601. The invoices and contracts for the sale of th

8

trade practice. I.C. §39-8406(5); see

9

cigarettes sold by Native Wholesale have not ceased and are ongoing from the year 2004. Therefore,

10

the Court finds the unlawful actions of Native Wholesale are likely to continue and a preliminar
injunction shall issue as a result.

11

This Court has considered the various cases cited by Plaintiffs and Defendant in support
12

0 .

their respective positions.. In particular, it has followed guidance of the Supreme Court of Idaho i

13

State v. Maybee, supra. In reliance on that opinion and the foregoing analysis, Defendant's Motion t

14

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction is hereby denied. Plaintiffs State

15

0 .

Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby granted.
Plaintiffs are directed to prepare an appropriate order and preliminary injunction consistent with thi

16

decision for the Court's signature.
17
18

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

~

day of May, 2010.

19
20
21

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

22
23
24
25
26
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2
3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, on this JC~day of May, 2010, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

4

5
6
7

8
9

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-0010

10
11

12
13

THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR.,
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
800 PARK BOULEVARD
P.O. BOX 36
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0J 50

14

15
16

17
18
19

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
P.O. BOX 1368
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
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JUN 0 ; 2010

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344··8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344··8542

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
By PATRICIA AOWONel'1
OI!PLm'

Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0815228

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
PRELIMINARY INJUNTION
ORDER

vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants..

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company (''NWS''), by and through its
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and hereby lodges this
objection to the proposed Preliminary Injunction Order submitted by the Plaintiffs in this matter.
The Plaintiffs' proposed injunction sets forth two requested preliminary injunctions.

The

requested injunctions are distinct from the relief requested in the complaint. While similar, the added

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - 1
57032-1/00193940.000

000801

........
language is objectionable and not contained within the pleadings and should not be included in the
Order. Language consistent with Plaintiffs' Complaint would state the following:
1. Defendant is preliminarily enjoined from any future violation of
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(c) ofthe Complementary Act
pursuant to Code § 48-606(1)(b) ofthe Consumer Protection
Act.
2. Defendant is preliminarily enjoined from any future violation
of Idaho Code § 63-25(3)(1), pursuant to Idaho Code § 63
2519.
The above-stated language tracks the relief requested in the Complaint. Any expansion
upon the relief requested in a Complaint is improper.
NWS objects to the Order to the extent it establishes sanctions for potential future
violations. This relief is 110t requested in the Complaint, it is not addressed in any briefing, and it
is not appropriately included in the proposed Order. Sanctions for any potential violation of an
Order should be addressed in a hearing after proper notice.

The language set forth in the

proposed Order is premature and inappropriate.
NWS also objects to the entry of any order because on June 3, 2010, NWS filed a Motion
for a Stay of the Court's May 20, 2010 Memorandum, Decision and Order pending NWS's
appeal.
DATED this 4th day ofJune, 2010.

EBERLE,BERL , KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLV
,CHARTERED

BY-~<........>o,;+-"-':.J£l.,.4--.I.".£...--==O~-'L..:.~"L.--+-_
S
el. Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - 2
57032-1100193940.000

000802

......
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 4th day of June, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Brettt T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
PO Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010
William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
POBOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410

LKl U.S. Mail

1'] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax (208)334-4151
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission

[XI U.S. Mail
[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-7844
] Electronic Court Transmission
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NO.
A.M

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAl..
STATE OF IDAHO

FIL~~tg2~

[

JUN 2 ~ 2Gl0

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney G4meral
954 W. Jefferson, St., Se4:ond Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho 'Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

)
)

) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

000804
ORIGINAL

=

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs the State of Idaho,
by and through Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, and the Idaho Tax Commission, move
the court for summary judgment against Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company because
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
This motion is based upon all of the pleadings, motions, and other documents filed in the
above-captioned matter, including the Court's May 20, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order
Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the First and Second Affidavits of Beth Kittelmann.
the Affidavit of Don AndeTson, and the Affidavit of Mark Ausman, all of which were previously
filed in this matter. The motion is also based on the Third Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann and the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, both filed
contemporaneously with this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24 th day of June, 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

By~~h
BRETT T. DELANGE
Deputy Attorney General

IDAHO TAX COMMISSION

By: -:::t""'~:::::=:"..::J::::::.~~===-..,~----lAM VON TAGE
Attorney General

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

000805

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24 th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

Ii(! U.S. Mail

o Hand Delivery

D
D
D

Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Deputy Attorney General

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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NO·-----:::
.•.-.:::;'-
F1:"':=LED::--;a7.'=71j'.-::
j
M - - -  P.M. L?-- 1
A.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

JUN 2 ~ 20m

BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney Genend
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 West Jefferson, 2nd Ifloor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)

) THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A.
) KITTELMANN

)
)
)
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
)
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
)
through 20,
)
)
Defendant.
._----)

vs.

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. KITTELMANN -1

()JJ\

I

000807
ORIGINAL

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

Beth A. Kittelmann, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am a Paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho

Attorney General. One of my duties is to oversee and maintain records received and compiled
by the Office of the Attorney General that relate to the matters set forth in this Affidavit. I have
personal knowledge and information of the facts set forth herein, as well as their accuracy. I also
have personal knowledge of the records referred to in this Affidavit.
2.

The Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes are manufactured by Grand River

Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (GRE), a foreign cigarette manufacturer located in Ohseweken,
Ontario, Canada.
3.

The Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, GRE, have never

been listed on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brands
(Directory) and thus have never been approved for sale in Idaho.
4.

Attached as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the webpages from

www.smartsmoker.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and
Seneca cigarette brands
5.

an~,

respectively $28.99 and $26.99.

Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the webpages from

www.intemetsmokes.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and
Seneca cigarette brands are, respectively $23.10 and $21.80.
6.

Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the webpages from

www.smokes-spirits.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and
Seneca cigarette brands are, respectively $24.49 and $24.99.

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. KITTELMANN - 2

000808

7.

Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a June 23, 2010 e-mail that

Steve Kenyon, clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court, sent to deputy attorney general Brett DeLange,
stating that the median time for an appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court for the past 12 months
is 536 days.

12 rd

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of June, 2010.

....................
..IENNIFER L. BITHELL
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IIDAHO

J

+....."""..,.·.. ,,"'''',,1.',.·'·,.'''"'1»+

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OIr BETH A. KITTELMANN - 3
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-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~'4ay of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Stret:t, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

~ U.S. Mail

o Hand Delivery

D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile

~\L~/

BRETT T. DELANGE
Deputy Attorney General

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OJ1 BETH A. KITTELMANN - 4
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al!

I accessories I
I shop

value C!Cjdrettes

tf)atured Cigarettes

I

!Jy I!st

SMARTSMOKER.COM

JUMP T'O YOUR BRAND

Where Smart Smokers Shop.

Select

About Us

i

OUI

Philosophy I My Account I Shopping Cart'

Help I Horne

Registered Users

Opal

~mlj1oW

not registered?

A longer, slimmer 120 that offers an upscale taste for th
discriminating smoker.

Shopping Cart
Your Cart is empty

Popular Choices
Warrior Filtered Cigars $1.00
PremiumQne $4.99
Ariva $9.99

Price: $28

g
gi nal$U.49
Jjarum $29.99

Full Flavor 120s Box - $28.99
• ·.1arlbOJo Snus $19.99
4 Aces $15.49
SmartSmoker also recommends ...

Lariat $18.99

Eve

Wrang 1er$12.99

Scncca

Yankee ~Lend$12. 49

Ariva

~
EIift~
SC).C)C)

Park Hawk Pipe Iobacco $1J.99
couture $31.99

•

welD~

S26.99

onlnne

@2010 SmartSmoker.com
All rights reserved. You must be 21 to purchase
our cigarettes and tobacco products. Orders
Require Adult Signature
Opal from smartsmoker.com. Tobacco products at discount prices
from our online store. We carryall major brands. Premium brands
include cheap Kool, Salem, Newport, Camel, Winston and Marlboro
cigarettes

Surgeon General's Warning: QUitting Smoking
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your
Health.
Buyer responsible for payment of applicable
taxes.

EXHIBIT
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viet...- all

I

I featured
I shop by !Ist

accessories

value uqarettes

cigarettes

I

JUMP T'O YOUR BRAND

SMARTSMOKER.COM

Select
About Us I Our Plillosophy

I

~1y

Where Smart Smokers Shop.
Account

Shoppinq Cart

I

Help

Horne

I

Registered Users

Seneca

~ffl_now

no tregistered?

Seneca is blended from the finest tobacco resulting in an
unparalleled taste. For those who look for smoothness a
full-bodied flavor, we recommend Seneca.

Shopping Cart
Your Cart is empty

Popular Choices
Warrior Filtered .Qg~00

Price: $26

gremi uJn One $4.99
'\riva $9.99

Full Flavor laOs Box - $26.99
• -jJgnaL$23.49

Marlboro Snus$19.99

SmartSmoker also recommends ...

Skydancer

Warrior
Filtered
Cigars

Opal

' (~J('!

S25-49

•

Sl1.99

Lariat

I

nkeeBlend$1249
;J'rk Hawk PipeTobacco$JL99

$18.99

828.99

•

welD~
Seneca from smartsmoker.com. Tobacco products at discount prices
from our online store. We carryall major brands. Premium brands
include cheap Kool, Salem, Newport, Camel, Winston and Marlboro
cigarettes

onlnne

@2010 SmartSmoker.com
All rights reserved. You must be 21 to purchase
our cigarettes and tobacco products. Orders
Require Adult Signature
Surgeon General's Warning: QUlttlr1g Smoking
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your
Health.
Buyer responsible for payment of applicable
taxes.
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Tel Enterprises, Inc.
• Pay Securely Online With Echeck.
• Delivered in 3 to 6 Business Days··.
ALL BRANDS ON SALE!
Cigarettes .. Cigars - Loose / Pipe Tobacco - Snus - Other Products
~Due

to the large ,Imount of orders that have been placed, additional time may be required for delivery.
Important Update: Pleane place your final order by June 21st to ensure delivery. Note: (30 carton limit I per order)

Match All Words
Home I Edit My AccoLlnt

I

[ Search I

Order History I View Shopping Cart

MQJnJ3hoQ I American Spirit I 6
One I Berkley I Bishop I Boston I BridgePort I Bronco I Buffalo I Carnival I Cobra I Double
DiC3mond I I;XC3ct I Exac:tl;lite I G<:lrni I Gr<:loc:iPrix I Heron I Kentucky's Best I K.iC:k lK.ing
Mountain Il<:lkes I Lewiston I Market I MC3vecic:k I Miss [)iC3mond Brands I Native I NY
NY I Niagara's I Opal 120s I palermo I Pinnacle I Pride I Roger I Seneca I Seneca 72 I Seneca
120s I SeneC:C3Chili I SkYc!Clnl~eJ I Smokin Joes1 QQ%NClJLlrc:lIS I SmokinJoes Qrigin<:lls I SDJokinJoes
Premiums I Sonoma I Tucson I USA Gold I Yukon I Black & MildCigars I BogarCigars I Buffalo Little
CigClCS I DClrkH<:l-,,~k_Cig<:lIS I DjClIum Filtered_CLove Cigars I EXC3c:taCigC3IS I NoJ..imitCigaIS I Re_dBuck
Cigars I RichwoodCigClrs I Senec:Cl Sweets I Smoker's Best Cigars I Srnokin Joes Filtered
Cigars I Smokin Joes Little Cigars I Warrior Cigars I Dissolvable Tobacco I Loose Tobacco I Pipe
Tobc:lC:~o I C_ClllJelSDLlS I Disc:reeLSnusl Norgic: lc:e_Snqs I AciV<:l1 Cigc:lIetteJ301IingMClc_oine I Red
Man I Skoal I Stonewall I Warrior Snuff

Opal 120s :

1Opal 120s
Price:

Opal 120s
Price:
$23.10 a Carton*

$23.10

Styles:

Opal 120s .. Full Flavor Box

Quantity:

[ Add to Cart

1

.. Additive Free.
.. All Natural Quality
Tobacco.
.. Native Made
.. Ultra Slim Style
Design, in Box.

Customers say they
love their Opals;!
To make a
Selection:

StyIE~

Click on the styles drop
down menu (Right)
'PRICE REFLECTS:
- FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
INCREASE ON APRIL 1ST, 2009
ALL PACKS ARE
INDIVIDUALLY TAX STAMPED.

l~~fee SECURE:i

EXHIBIT

TESTED D.AJL'f 1 S-JUNE

I
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Licensed Native American Shipper:
TCl Enterprises
12723 Route 438
Irving, NY 14081
Contact us:
orders@internetsmokes.com
Customer 10 Fax Line: 1-716-562-7098
Order Securely Online: Fast and Easy with Echeck
For Mail Orders:
Place Order Online, Print off, and Mail

10 Policy Requirement:
You Must be 21 years of age or older to purchase Cigarettes and/or Tobacco Products Online or by Mail Order,
SURGEON GENERALS WARNING:
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health,
All Brands/Packs Sold Are SNI Tax Stamped.
All Natural and/or Additive Free Does NOT mean a Safer Cigarette,
Sale of Products Sold From This Site are For Personal Use Only.

Delivered Fast and Fresh b), USPS Priority Mail!

Also Available: blu Premiere Electronic Cigs.
For more infonnation or to purch,ase directly, click on the banner below.
(A new window will open. Your current order will NOT be lost. Thank you, Internet Smokes)

• VAPOR IS THE NEW SMOKE.

,bIY'

PRfMlERf ELECTRONK:

THANK YOU SHOPPING WITH US
"If you like our service, please tell your family and friends!"

Copyright A,A©201 0 TCl Enterprises, Inc. - All Rights Reserved

EXHIBIT
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TCl Enterprises, Inc.
• Pay Securely Online With Echeck,
- Delivered in 3 to 6 Business Days··,
ALL BRANDS ON SALE!
Cigarettes - Cigars - Loose I Pipe Tobacco - Snus - Other Products
-Due to the large ;~mount of orders that have been placed, additional time may be required for delivery.
Important Update: Plene place your final order by June 21st to ensure delivery. Note: (30 carton limit I per order)

Match All Words
Home

I

Edit My Account

I

Order History

[ Search

I

I

View Shopping Cart

, 8mericcwSpirit I 8
One I Berkm I Bishop I Bost1m I BridgePort I Bronco I Buffalo I ~arniv~J I Cobrg I Qou1>le
DiamOOd I I;xact I I;xactl;Jite I Gami I GraOdPrix I HerOD I Kentucky's Best I Kick I King
Mountain I Lakes I Lewiston I Market I Maverick I Miss Diamond Brands I Native I NY
NY I Niagara's I Opal 120s I palermo I Pinnacle I Pride I Roger I Seneca I Sel1eca 72 'Seneca
120s I senec~ChiJII Skydao<;er I SmOkin JOes1.QQO/oNatu rals I SmokinJoes Qriginals I Smokin Joes
Premiums I Sonoma I Tucson I USA Gold I Yukon I Black & Mild Cigars I Bogar Cigars I Buffalo Little
Cigars I Dark Hawk Cigars I Djarum EilteredCloveCigaJs I Exac:taCigars I No I..LmitCig a rs I Red Buck
Cigars I Richwood Cigars I Seneca Sweets I Smoker's Best Cigars I SmokinJoes Filtered
Cigars, Smokin Joes Little Cigars I Warrior Cigars' Dissolvable Tobacco I Loose Tobacco I Pipe
Tobacc:o I C~meJ SOus I Disc:reetSous I NordicJc:e.SOus I Ariva I Cig,arette ROlling Mac:hioe I Red
r..,-tan , Skoal I Stonewall I Warrior Snuff
Seneca:
M~l[LSbQQ

Seneca

CigarE~ttes

Price:

Seneca
Price:
$21.80 a

Styles:
Quantity:

Carton'~

$21.80
Seneca Full Flavor 100s - Soft Pack
[ Add to Cart

1

"BIG Flavor, small
price!"
- All Natural SenE~cas
- 100% Pure Tobacco
- "Additive Free Tobacco"
- Premium Native Brand
- All Seneca StyIE~S Are In
Stock.
"Seneca's are all natural,
additive
free, with a robust
tobacco taste!"
To make a Style
Selection:
Click on the styles drop down
menu (Right)
'PRICE REFLECTS:
- FEDERAL EXCISE TAX INCREASE ON
APRIL 1st, 2009
ALL PACKS ARE INDIVIDlJALLY
STAMPED.

EXHIBIT
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Seneca Cigarettes.:
A Product of The Mohawk Indian
Nation.
Seneca brand cigarettes are
manufactured by
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations.
Made under the Authority of Tobaccoville
USA,lnc.
Made in Canada

I~McAfee'SECURE:1
TESTED DAlLY IS-JUNE

Licensed Native American Shipper:
TCl Enterprises
12723 Route 438
Irving, NY 14081
Contact us:
orden~@internetsr:nol<es.com

Customer 10 Fax Line: 1-716-562·-7098
Order Securely Online: Fast and IEasy with Echeck
For Mail Orders:
Place Order Online, Print off, and Mail
10 Policy Requirement:
You Must be 21 years of age or older to purchase Cigarettes and/or Tobacco Products Online or by Mail Order.

SURGEON GENERALS WARNING:
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
All Brands/Packs Sold Are SNI Tax Stamped.
All Natural and/or Additive Free Does NOT mean a Safer Cigarette.
Sale of Products Sold From This Site are For Personal Use Only.

Delivered Fast and Fresh by USPS Priority Mail!

Also Available: blu Premiere Electronic Cigs.
For more information or to purchase directly, click on the banner below.
(A new window will open. Your current order will NOT be lost. Thank you, Internet Smokes)

'9

bl~

VAPOR IS THE NEW SMOKE.
PREMIERE ELECTRONIC
ClGAI~ErrES

THANK YOU SHOPPING WITH US
"If you like our service, please tell your family and friends'"
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ORal Light Super Tb.i.n.L11J).

Opal Full Flo·tor Super Thins 120

\-!

.,l~ · .'.·

~

Blowout Specials
Cigarette Deals
Cigarette Samplers

!'

Cigarette rax Videos

,

c'>.

Discount Cigarettes
Electronic Cigarettes
Genenc Cigarettes
Imported/Speci alty
Cigarettes
Inventory Reduction
Sales
PremIum Cigarettes
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;

$24.49

$24.49
~
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Njoy Npro Duo Refill
Cartridges With Vaporizers 
Ultra Light - S Cartridges

2.

Njoy Npro Duo Refill
Cartridges With Vaporizers 
Full Flavor - 5 Cartndges

.!:1Q!J:'.

® OUT 0' STOCK

Expected On 06/18/2010
~
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NJoy Npro DuO Refill
Cartridges WIth Vaporizers 
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Njoy Npro Duo Refill
Cartridges WIth Vaporizers 
Menthol No Nicotine - 5
Cartridges
NJoy Npro Duo Refill
Cartridges With Vaporizers 
Menthol Ultra Light - S
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Qty
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Value Cigarettes
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•
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• Email ttlfS
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Smokcs-SIJ/rils, com
,
"

I

II

Home

Ci9ar~ II Slllobl~U Accessorit~S

Cigarettes

II

Gifts

robacco

'l

Candy

Snacks

II

Gourmet foods

II

Home (,,(}ods

II

Shlre Ooliars

!

for seneca

hiday, AIllI"! 18, 1010

Order By Phone 1-866-247-2447
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Cigarettes
DI$C(i/mr ('II1<1rNTl!,"i,
Cif1,~r(l:f{>'S.
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Page

I
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3

~

1

Next> >

I

Sort

By Product Name

29 products we,,-e found. To see a specific product, please search using specific keywol-d.
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Seneca Full Fla¥.Q[

'''w::h ,,,;>,n

Blowout Specials

I

Cigarette Deals
Cigarette Samplers
Cigarette Tax Videos
Discount Cigarettes
Electronic Cigarettes
ThiS item is on currently on backorder,
You may order this item now but be
advised that it may take a few days to
arrive in our warehouse.

Generic Cigarettes
1m ported/Specia Ity
Cigarettes
Inventory Reduction
Sales
Premium Cigarettes

CI{1(Jr:>

"1'."'.
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Delange, Brett
From:

Steve Kenyon [SKenyon@idcourts.net]

Sent:

Wednesday, June

To:

Delange, Brett

2~1,

2010 9:07 AM

Subject: FW: Median time

From: Steve Kenyon

sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2010 2:04 PM
To: bdelange@ag.idaho.gov
Subject: Median time
Brett,
As of May 2010 the median number of days it took a case to go from notice of appeal to opinion was 536 days.
Hope this helps

Stephen Kenyon
Clerk of the Courts
Idaho Supreme Court / Court of Appeals
208-334-2210

The information contained in this email and any attachments is confidential and may be subject to
copyright or other intellectual property protection. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not
authorized to use or disclose this information, and we request that you notify us by reply mail or
telephone and delete the original message from your mail system.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

JUN 2 ~ 2010

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney Genera~
Idaho Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)

._----)
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ORIGINAL

INTRODUCTION
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. Defendant Native Wholesale Supply
Company (NWS) has unlawfully sold cigarettes to Idaho retailers, without the required cigarette
wholesaler permit, and despite being warned in writing of its violations of Idaho's cigarette tax
laws, NWS continues to unlawfully sell such cigarettes.
NWS's violations fall into two specific categories. With respect to both categories, the
facts are not in dispute. First, the cigarette brands NWS has sold (and continues to sell) to Idaho
retailers are of brands manufactured by a tobacco manufacturer that was not (and today is not) on
the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (the Idaho
Directory) at the time of the sale. None of the cigarette brands at issue have ever been on the
Idaho Directory either.

Such sales violate the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement

Complementary Act (Complementary Act), codified at title 39, chapter 84, Idaho Code.
Second, NWS has sold cigarettes (and continues to sell cigarettes) at wholesale to Idaho
retailers without obtaining a cigarette wholesaler permit required by Idaho Code 63-2503(1).
NWS's unlawful actions undermine the Legislature's public policies and concerns with
respect to cigarette sales and use and the cigarette tax laws it has enacted. Also of serious
concern, NWS' s illegal sales continued even after NWS was advised of the requirements of
Idaho's applicable tobacco laws. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact with
respect to either category of violations, this Court should grant the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and assess a civil penalty of $2,000,000 to address the illegal sales of over
one hundred million cigarettes. Plaintiffs also seek an award of attorney fees and costs.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

In 1999, the Legislature found that cigarette smoking presents serious public health
concerns to Idaho and its eitizens. See Idaho Code § 39-780l(a). Noting that the United States
Surgeon General has determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other
serious diseases, the LegisIature found that cigarette smoking presents serious financial concerns
for Idaho. Under certain health-care programs like Medicaid, Idaho may have a legal obligation
to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette
smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. See
Idaho Code § 39-7801(a)-(b). Under these programs, the Legislature has found, the State pays
millions of dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions
associated with cigarette smoking. See Idaho Code § 39-7801 (c).
The Legislature further determined that the financial burdens imposed on the State by
cigarette smoking should be borne by tobacco product manufacturers, rather than by the State, to
the extent that such manufacturers either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the
State or are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-780 1(d).
On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with Idaho.

The

Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers:
(I) to pay substantial sums to the State;
(2) to fund a national foundation devoted to the pursuit of public health interests; and
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(3) to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing practices and
corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking. See Idaho Code § 39
7801(e).l
Promptly thereafter, the Legislature declared that it would be contrary to the policy of the
State if a tobacco product manufacturer could decide not to enter into such a settlement
agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) and thereby use the resulting cost
advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise, without ensuring that the
State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted
culpably.

This legislative determination was driven, in part, by the fact that many diseases

caused by tobacco use often do not appear until many years after the affected individual begins
smoking. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a) & (t).
The Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State to require that
nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of
compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term profits and then
becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise.

See Idaho Code § 39-780 I (t).

Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Legislature passed
the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act). The Idaho MSA Act
requires tobacco product manufacturers to either:
(I) join the Master Settlement Agreement or
(2) place into a qualified escrow fund the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39
7803(b)(1) of the Idaho MSA Act.

I

The MSA has been described by the United States Supreme Court as a "landmark" public health agreement,

Lori/lard Tobacco Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001), that addresses "one of the most troubling public health
problems facing the Nation today." Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
125 (2000). The MSA is a lengthy public document. The Idaho Attorney General has made the MSA electronically
available at: http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumer/tobacco/MSA.pdf.
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In 2003, the Legislature determined that violations of the Idaho MSA Act by various non
participating manufacturers threatened not only the integrity of the MSA, but also the fiscal
soundness of the State and public health and responded with provisions to help prevent such
violations through adoption of the Complementary Act. See Idaho Code § 39-8401. Relevant to
this case, Section 39-8403 of the Complementary Act establishes the Idaho Directory of
Compliant Tobacco Manufacturers and Brand Families (Idaho Directory) and makes it unlawful
for any person to sell, ofter or possess for sale in Idaho, or import or cause to be imported for
sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included on the
Idaho Directory.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
NWS is a tobacco wholesaler, licensed by the Sac and Fox Nation and operating on the
Seneca Reservation in New York State. Since at least January 1,2004, NWS has acquired, held,
owned, possessed, transported, imported, and/or caused to be imported for sale and distribution
in Idaho two cigarette brands - Seneca and Opal - that are manufactured by Canadian-based
tobacco manufacturer Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (Grand River).2 NWS's sales
and shipments into Idaho have totaled over 100 million cigarettes. 3 None of the Seneca and Opal
brand cigarettes NWS has sold has ever been listed on the Idaho Directory and approved for
sale.

4

On or about September 5, 2002, an Idaho district court issued an injunction (2002
injunction) against Grand River, prohibiting it from selling any cigarettes in Idaho "whether

Affidavit of Beth A. Kitlelmann Affidavit (hereinafter Kittelmann Affidavit), filed April 9, 2009, at p.
2, ~ 3.
3 Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 4, para. 12.
4 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 2, ~ 4.
2
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directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or intermediaries."s The 2002
injunction was based on Grand River's refusal to comply with the Idaho MSA Act (discussed in
detail below). Because Grand River has yet to establish a qualified escrow fund, failed to certify
its cigarettes to the Attorney General in compliance with Idaho's tobacco sales laws, and has not
obeyed the district court's injunction, Grand River remains enjoined from selling cigarettes in
Idaho. 6
In February of 2008, the Attorney General obtained information indicating that, despite
the district court's 2002 injunction, Grand River cigarettes were continuing to be sold into Idaho
by NWS.

Accordingly, on June 5, 2008, the Attorney General notified NWS of the 2002

injunction, and informed NWS that its cigarette sales violated the Complementary Act. 7 In his
letter, the Attorney General instructed NWS to cease its unlawful selling and shipping of Grand
River cigarettes to Idaho retailers.

8

Ignoring the Attorney General's June 5, 2008, letter, NWS continued to ship Seneca and
Opal cigarette brands into Idaho.

On June 13, 2008, NWS imported and/or caused to be

imported into Idaho 1,460,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. 9 On July 21, 2008, NWS
imported and/or caused to be imported into Idaho 1,634,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. I 0
On August 21, 2008, two days after NWS was served with the summons and complaint in this
case, NWS sold over 600,000 more cigarettes, at wholesale, to an Idaho retailer. II

In 2009,

Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3 ~ 6.
Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 7.
7 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8.
8 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8.
9 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 9.
10 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 9.
II Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, '110.
5

6
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NWS sold and shipped 2,508,000 more cigarettes, at wholesale, to an Idaho retailer.

12

None of

these cigarettes are legal to be sold in Idaho.

In total, since January 2004, NWS has imported and sold into Idaho over 100 million
Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. 13 Because these cigarettes have never been listed on the Idaho
Directory, NWS has violated and continues to violate the Complementary Act. Additionally,
NWS has never applied for nor received a cigarette tax permit required by Idaho Code Section
63-2503. 14

Yet all of its 100 million plus cigarette sales have been at wholesale. IS

NWS

continues to violate Idaho's cigarette tax laws by importing cigarettes into Idaho and selling
them at wholesale without the required cigarette tax permit required by Idaho's cigarette tax
laws. 16
ARGUMENT
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is (mtitled to judgment as matter of law." Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. It is true
that this Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Thompson v.
Pike~

125 Idaho 897, 899., 876 P.2d 595, 597 (1994). The opposing party's case, however, must

be based on more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact. Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994).
The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of material facts. See Wick v. Eismann,
12

13

14
15

16

Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 11.
Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 4, ~ 12.
Affidavit of Don Anderson (hereinafter "Anderson Affidavit"), filed April 9, 2009, at p. 2, ~ 4.
Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ~I~ 5-6.
Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ~~ 5-6.
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122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992).

The non moving party, however, may not rest on its

pleadings but must offer affidavits or other admissible evidentiary materials which demonstrate
that an issue of fact remains. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 803, 41 P.3d 228, 231
(200 I). The parties' affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence. Id.

II.

NWS HAS VIOLATED THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT

NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and the remedy for them are straight
forward. As previously noted, the Complementary Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (I)
selling, offering, or possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for
distribution or sale in Idaho "cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not
included in the directory" Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). The undisputed fact is that since
at least January 2004, NWS has sold at wholesale, and/or imported or caused to be imported for
sale or distribution in Idaho, over 100 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers for which neither the
cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand River, were ever on the Idaho Directory. It is also
an undisputed fact that NWS makes wholesale sales to Idaho retailers without first obtaining a
cigarette wholesaler permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1).
The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3)
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides:
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39
8403 (3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
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Applying Section 39-8406(1) is straight-forward and clear:

the Complementary Act

states that each cigarette sold in violation of the Act shalI constitute a separate violation.
Section 39-8406 authorizes the court to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000
per violation, or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes.
NWS has sold over 100 milIion cigarettes. A $2,000,000 civil penalty would equal $0.02
per illegal cigarette sold. 17 100 million cigarettes also equates to 5,000,000 illegalIy sold packs
of cigarettes. IS

A $2,000,000 civil penalty would thus equal $.40 per pack of cigarettes. 19

100,000,000 cigarettes also equates to 500,000 illegalIy sold cartons of cigarettes. 2o

A

$2,000,000 civil penalty would equal $4.00 per carton of cigarettes. 21 In short, a civil penalty of
$2,000,000 falls into the statutorily authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the
Complementary Act.
Alternatively, as shown in the folIowing paragraphs, utilizing the Complementary Act's
"not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold cigarettes penalty calculation,
$2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily alIowable. The Seneca and
Opal cigarette brands that NWS has illegalIy sold are currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale
(pre-tax) at www.smartsmoker.com at the following per carton prices: 22

Brand
Seneca FulI Flavor 1OOs box
Opal Full Flavor 120s box

\7
\8
19
20

21
22

Manufacturer
Grand River Enterprises
Grand River Enterprises

Retail price
$26.99
$28.99

$2,000,000 divided by 100,000,000 equals $.02.
A package of cigarettes contains 20 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 20 equals 5,000,000.
$2,000,000 divided by 5,000,000 equals $.40.
A carton of cigarettes contains 200 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 500,000.
$2,000,000 divided by 500,000 equals $4.00.
Third Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann (Third Kittelmann Affidavit), p. 2, para. 4.
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These same cigarette brands are also currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale (pre-tax) at
www.internetsmokes.com at the following per carton prices: 23

I

Brand
Seneca Full Flavor 100s box
Opal Full Flavor 120s box

Manufacturer
Grand River Enterprises
Grand River Enterprises

l

Retail price
$21.80
$23.10

-

These same cigarette brands are also currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale (pre-tax) at

. II owmg
. per carton pnces:
.
24
..
www.smo kes-spmts.com
at the .10
Brand
Seneca Full Flavor 100s box
Opal Full Flavor 120s box

Manufacturer
Grand River Enterprises
Grand River Enterprises

Retail price
$24.99
$24.49

--

The average of each of the retailers' lower-priced product equals $24.42. 25 Utilizing this
figure as the retail price of illegally sold cigarettes and multiplying it by 500,000 illegally sold
cartons of cigarettes equals $12,210,000. 26

500% of the retail price of the illegally sold

cigarettes would equal $61,050,000. 27 In short, and alternatively utilizing a conservative average
retail value formula for evaluating the State's requested civil penalty, the amount of $2,000,000
falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail value of the illegally
sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act.
Even if the Court focuses only on NWS's illegal cigarette sales after the Office of the
Attorney General expressly advised NWS ofthe provisions of Idaho's Complementary Act, a $2
million penalty is more than justified. As set forth above, after NWS was advised in writing of
the Complementary Act, NWS proceeded illegally, on multiple occasions, to sell, collectively,
over six million more cigarettes. Six million cigarettes equates to 30,000 cartons. That sum
23

24

25
26
27

Third Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, para. 5.
Third Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, para. 6.
The sum of $26.99 plus $21.80 plus $24.49, divided by 3 equals $24.42.
$24.42 multiplied by 500,000 equals $12,210,000.
$12,210,000 mu Itiplied by 500% equals $61,050,000.
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multiplied by $24.42 equals $732,600. That sum multiplied by 500% equals $3,663,000. $2
million is still only 55% of the statutory amount the Legislature has authorized this Court to
assess, and that is if the Court only considers NWS's repeated, defiant illegal sales after having
been advised of the Complementary Act's provisions.
A separate comparison of that which District Court Judge Kathryn Sticklen did at the trial
court level in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010) indicates the reasonableness
of the requested civil penalties here.

In Maybee, Judge Sticklen assessed a $163,225 civil

penalty, which the defendant in that case, Scott Maybee, did not appeal, for 2,500,000 cigarettes
sold in violation of the Complementary Act. Id., 148 Idaho at 526-27, 224 P.3d at 1115-16.
Maybee's 2.5 million illegal cigarette sales are approximately three percent ofNWS's sales. The
civil penalty assessed against him, however, is 8 percent of Plaintiffs' proposed $2,000,000
penalty. In other words, Maybee's penalty, proportionately, is more than twice the size of that
being proposed here.
Civil penalties are a proper tool to implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex
rei Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio App. 1981).

Civil penalties deter future

unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated.

Kimmelman v. Henkels &

McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to compensate society at

large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the government
for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Gaffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn. App.
1996). Applying these principles here, civil penalties are called for, authorized by, and should be
imposed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act.
Injunctive relief is also called for in this case. This Court has already granted the State a
preliminary injunction.

There is no basis to argue why this injunction ought not be made
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permanent. The Complementary Act also states that "a person who violates section 39-8403(3),
Idaho Code, engages in an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of the Idaho consumer
protection act, chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code."

Idaho Code § 39-8406(5).

The State is

authorized, under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, in part, to seek permanent injunctive relief
for violations of that Act. See Idaho Code § 48-606(1 )(b). Thus, the State is also authorized to
seek a permanent injunction in this case.

It is important to note that "when a statute grants a specific injunctive remedy ... the
party requesting the injunction 'need not aver and show, as under ordinary rules in equity, that
great or irreparable injury is about to be done for which he has no adequate remedy at law ... :"

Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ohio 1978), quoting
Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527, 536 (Ohio 1875). Indeed, "[w]hen it is determined that the
statute is being violated, it is within the province of the district court to restrain it. The doctrine
of balancing of equities has no application to this statutorily authorized injunctive relief." Stale

v. Texas Pel Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800,805 (Tx. 1979). Moreover, "when the acts sought to
be enjoined are unlawful, the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm or a balance
of the hardship in his favor." I.E. Services, Inc. v. State Lottery Commission of Indiana, 646
N.E.2d 334, 349 (Ind.App. 1995); Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners v. Hyder, 562 P.2d
717,719 (Az. 1977).
The Court should also impose injunctive relief here, enforceable by contempt
proceedings, to enjoin NWS from selling cigarette brands that are not listed on the Idaho
Directory. The facts reveal that NWS, despite knowledge of Idaho law and its provisions, will
continue to violate those provisions. Only express Court order will stop NWS from making a
charade of Idaho law.
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III.

NWS HAS VIOLATED IDAHO'S CIGARETTE TAX LAWS

No factual dispute exists under the State's cigarette tax laws either. NWS has never held
a cigarette wholesaler permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503( I), and has never even
applied for one. 28 Idaho's cigarette tax laws require wholesalers who sell cigarettes to Idaho
retailers to obtain a cigarette tax pennit. Specifically, Idaho Code Section 63-2503( I) provides:
It shall be unlawful for a person to act as a wholesaler of cigarettes without a
permit. The pennit shall be obtained by application to the tax commission upon a
fonn furnished by it, accompanied by a fee of fifty dollars ($50.00). The
wholesaler permit shall be nonassignable and shall continue in force until
surrendered or canceled.

A "wholesaler" is defined in Idaho Code Section 63-2502(a) as "every person who purchases,
sells or distributes cigarettes to other wholesalers or to retailers for the purpose of resale."
Idaho Code Section 63-2519 of the cigarette tax laws expressly authorizes the Tax
Commission to seek injunctive relief against any person engaged in the cigarette business as a
wholesaler without holding a valid cigarette tax pennit. This authority is a separate, independent
basis for the Plaintiffs to request, and this Court to grant, summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION
No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether NWS violated the Complementary
Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws. NWS has sold over one hundred million non-compliant
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary Act. NWS also sells these non
compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers without the wholesaler pennit required by the Idaho Code
Section 63-2503(1) and the State's cigarette tax laws.

28

Only a significant civil penalty and

Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ,-r,-r 4-6.
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injunctive relief will stop NWS from continuing to violate Idaho law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs
request that their motion for summary judgment be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24 th day of June, 2010.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
A TTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

BY:B~~~
Deputy Attorney General

IDAHO TAX COMMISSION
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I hereby certify that on the 24 th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 8370 I

~ U.S. Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested

D Overnight Mail

D

Facsimile

~Jb~~
BRETT T. DELANGE
Deputy Attorney General
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Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0815228

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its
attorneys of record,

Eberl~:,

Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this response

to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this response, the Defendants rely upon the
Affidavit of Arthur Montour dated May 6, 2009 and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30,
2009 and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle filed contemporaneously herewith.

I. THE STATE HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY COMPETENT

EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL SALE OR DELIVERY IN IDAHO
For the purpose of summary judgment, the Court must determine that there is no material
dispute of fact on each essential element of the Plaintiffs' case. While this Court has entered a
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•,
preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act,
the State is not entitled to summary judgment establishing that actual sales or delivery in
violation of the Complementary Act have occurred. The State has failed to submit proper proof
of sales into the State of Idaho. First, the affidavits of Beth Kittelmann simply do not present any
evidence of the actual sale or receipt of any cigarettes in the State of Idaho. Ms. Kittelmann's
affidavit attached invoices to a Native American company, War Path, but provided no proof of
actual receipt or delivery into Idaho. Further, Exhibit I to Ms. Kittelmann's April 9, 2009
affidavit is completely lacking in foundation and entirely unsubstantiated. For the purposes of
summary judgment, the: State needs to show more.

The State's affidavits and its various

attachments offer evidence of transactions but do not present any proof of the actual delivery or
receipt of any cigarettes sold by NWS in Idaho.
II. THE STATE MAY NOT REGULATE NWS'S SALES
Even if NWS sold cigarettes to Warpath the State may not regulate those sales. "Indian
tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."

White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Tribal members retain their status

"as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far
not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided ...."
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973). Accordingly, "there is no

rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an
Indian reservation or to tribal members." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142. The Supreme Court has
enunciated "two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority
over tribal reservations and members." Id. "First, the exercise of such authority may be pre
empted by federal law." Id., citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm 'n, 380 U.S.
685 (1965). "Second, [the assertion of state regulatory authority] may unlawfully infringe on the
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right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id.; see also Williams

v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220. (1959)
As an initial matter, "[w]hen on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue,
state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." Bracker, 448 U.S.
at 144. Conversely, "where, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians
engaging in activity on the reservation," then "more difficult questions arise."

Id.

These

questions are answered by examining "the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in
terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have
developed from historical traditions of tribal independence." Id. at 144-45.
As to the first barrier to state regulatory authority, "[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty
must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by
operation of federal law."

Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.

"[T]his tradition is reflected and

encouraged in a number of congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Id.

The congressional declarations

of policy in the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §1451 et seq., and in the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.c. §450 et seq., are particularly significant:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of congress . . . to help develop and utilize
Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management oftheir own resources and
where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts
comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.
25 U.S.c. §1451.
In addition, "the Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the federal
government's unique and <continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through the
establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will pennit an orderly transition
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from federal domination of

programs for and servIces to Indians to effective and meaningful

participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and
services." 25 US.c. §450(a)(b). Accordingly, in order to find that state regulation is preempted by
operation of federal law in the field of federal Indian law, an express congressional statement to
that effect is not required.

Bracker, 448 US. at 143.

The foregoing analysis requires a

"particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine, whether in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would
violate federal law." Id. at 145.
The first step is to examine the federal statutes and regulations which govern the specific
activity targeted for state regulation, and determine whether federal regulation is pervasive. The
second step is to examine the state interest served by the statute sought to be imposed on
reservation activity. Generalized interests are insufficient to support state regulation, when the
tribe and its members have a strong interest in economic development and self-sufficiency via
on-reservation economic transactions.
"The Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component
to tribal sovereignty, a c:omponent which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry;
though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in
determining whether statl;: authority has exceeded permissible limits." Bracker, 448 US. at 151.
"Indian nations . . . long have been distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Sac and Fox

Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993). The "presumption against state taxing authority applies to all
Indian Country ...." Id. at 126.
"In light of the unique sovereign status ofIndian tribes located in [Idaho]," it is clear that
the state "cannot tax cigarettes sold on an Indian reservation to tribal members for their own use,
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unless authorized to do so by Congress." Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 477 F.3d
881, 883 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 546 U.S. 95
(2005). "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations
with Indian tribes ..., and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state
taxation within their own territory." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,
455 (1995) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)). Where, as here, the
tax scheme has some

effl~ct

on an Indian tribe, "[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question ..

. is who bears the legal incidence of [the] tax." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99 ("States are categorically
barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax on a tribe or on tribal members for sales
made inside Indian country") (citations omitted).

Accordingly, "the who and where of the

challenged tax have significant consequences." Id.
Here, the State of Idaho's argument that it may apply the Complementary Act to NWS,
thereby requiring it to pay a fee to sell to tribal members on a reservation, proceeds from a false
premise regarding the "who" and the "where" concerning the imposition of the fee. PlaintiffS
repeatedly state that the transaction at issue occurs "in Idaho," relying on this as dispositive of the
issue of "where" the transaction occurred. These statements are contradicted by the evidence in
the record, which shows that the sale by NWS occurs on an F.O.B. basis with title and risk of
loss occurring outside Idaho, to an Indian-owned business located within the bounds of the
enrolled member's reservation. See Affidavit of Arthur Montour at ~~ 4-6. We are not here
dealing with sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers. We are dealing strictly with the
commerce solely among Indians at the wholesale or supply level- a circumstance that no court
has ever permitted to be regulated by the State of Idaho. The evidentiary record also contradicts
Plaintiffs' assertions concerning the "who," to the extent it characterizes the transaction as one
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between a non-member and a member of an Indian reservation in Idaho, since NWS is owned by
a member of the Tribe which occupies the reservation on which the sales are made, and is selling
its products to an Indian owned business located within the reservation bounds of the emolled
member that owns the business. See the Affidavit of Arthur Montour at ~ 7 and the Affidavit of
Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30, 2009 at Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
Turning to the "where" of the transaction at issue, courts have held that where an entity
situated on a reservation in one state ships goods to an entity situated in another state, the
delivery does not occur in either state crossed by the agent transferring the goods. In Winnebago
Tribe ofNebraska v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2007), the State of Kansas tried to impose its fuel

distributor tax on a tribally owned entity which shipped fuel to tribal retailers located on a
reservation within the state.

The tribal entity was located on a reservation in the state of

Nebraska and shipped its fuel to the tribal retailer located on a reservation in the state of Kansas.
On these facts, the State asserted that delivery of the fuel took place in the state the moment the
transport agent traveled into Kansas. The court, however, rejected this argument, holding that
"receipt is to be given its ordinary meaning." Id. at 904. Therefore, "[t]here was no delivery or
receipt when HeI's fuel truck crossed the Kansas state line. Delivery and receipt of the fuel
occurred later at the tribal gas station," which was situated on the reservation. Id.
However, even if this Court accepts Plaintiffs' premise that the sale occurs on the
reservation in Idaho with the tribally owned entity, Warpath, Inc., the State's arguments still fail
because then the Supreme Court's decisions concerning sales by non-member wholesalers to
members on the reservation are dispositive of the issues before the Court.
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), an offreservation enterprise owned by a non-member sold farm equipment to a tribe, wherein the sales
were solicited on the reservation, contracted on the reservation, and payment and delivery of the
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equipment took place on the reservation. Id. at 161. The State sought to tax these transactions
by imposing a "privilege of doing business" in the state tax on the non-member seller. Id. The
state pointed out that the seller was located off the reservation and was not a licensed Indian
trader, and therefore these distinguishing factors permitted the state to impose its tax. Id. The
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, expressly finding that that it was "irrelevant that the
sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself." Id. The Court concluded that
the preemptive force of the Indian trader statues applied to a "nonresident person who sells"
goods to Indians on a reservation and therefore, the tax was preempted. Id.
The Court later revisited this issue in Dept. of Taxation & Finance of NY v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994), and confirmed that the State may not impose a tax directly on

sellers of goods that trade with Tribes or tribal enterprises situated on reservations by noting that
"[t]he specific kind of state tax obligation that New York's regulations are designed to enforcewhich falls on non-Indian purchasers of goods that are merely retailed on reservation-stands on a
markedly different footing from a tax imposed directly on Indian traders . ..." Id. at 73. The

Court confirmed that a tax "directly imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians" is
impermissible. Id. at 74, citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm 'n, 380

u.s.

685,

691 (1965). Here, the tax sought to be imposed on NWS falls directly on it as a wholesaler, and
is not designed to collect lawful state taxes which non-Indians owe off reservation. Idaho's
regulatory scheme which expressly exempts tribal enterprises like Warpath, Inc. from collecting
any tax, the incidence of which would fall on non-Indians off the reservation, confirms that a
seller like NWS bears the incidence of the fee imposed by Idaho's Complementary Act. See
Idaho Admin. Code § 35.01.10, subdivision 014.01.b. ("Cigarette wholesalers may deliver
cigarettes which do not have Idaho stamps fixed to Idaho Indian reservations when . . . the
purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and operated by an enrolled member or
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members of an Idaho Indian tribe"). Such a tax is simply impermissible and may not be imposed
on NWS absent congressional authorization. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384
F.3d 674,688 (9th Cir. 2004).
In addition, the specific transaction sought to be taxed by the State of Idaho involves
value created on the reservation since NWS is an Indian-owned entity situated on the reservation,
which purchases

cigarettl~s

made by another Indian-owned entity situated on another reservation,

which is subsequently sold to a member-owned entity situated on a third reservation. In seeking
to impose the incidence of the tax on NWS, the State ofldaho is seeking to burden a transaction,
the value of which is created exclusively on reservation lands. Milhelm, 512 U.S. at 73 (noting
that tax may not be directly imposed on "value generated on the reservation by activities
involving the Tribes") (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57). Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions,
this transaction here is not one between a member and a non-member, but rather, is one between
a member of one tribe :md a member of another tribe, with all activity occurring within the
exclusive territorial and geographic jurisdiction of their respective nations. Therefore, any efforts
by the State of Idaho to tax this transaction "infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."
In addition, even if this Court concludes that (l) NWS is like any other non-member or
non-Indian wholesaler selling to reservation Indians; and (2) the incidence of the tax imposed by
the Complementary Act falls primarily on the non-Indian consumer off the reservation, the tax is
still invalid, as applied to NWS, because it imposes significant burdens on the transaction and is
not "reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians." Milhelm, 512 U.S. at
73.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Milhelm, the instant statute is an invalid tax on
NWS since: (l) it contains no provisions which carve out an exception for cigarettes sold by
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NWS to Warpath, Inc. which are destined for sales to tribal members; (2) it improperly imposes
an unreasonable and significant burden on NWS's sales to Warpath, Inc., a tribal enterprise
owned by tribal members; and (3) it improperly imposes an unreasonable and significant burden
on Warpath Inc.'s concededly lawful receipt of cigarettes for resale to tribal members on the
reservation.
In Milhelm, the Court expressly approved of New York's regulation of wholesalers' sales
to reservation Indians bt:cause they remained "free to sell to Indian tribes and retailers as many
cigarettes as they wish, of any kind and at whatever price." Id. at 75. In addition, the regulatory
scheme adequately assured that "tax-immune Indians will not have to pay New York cigarette
taxes and neither wholesalers nor retailers will have to precollect taxes on cigarettes destined for
their consumption." Id. Here, the Complementary and Directory statute provisions both demand
payment of the tax, regardless of whether they are sold to tax-immune Indians or Tribes, or to
non-Indians residing off the reservation. The state is precluded from burdening, in any way,
whether characterized as a tax or not, sales to tribal members and Tribes, where that sale occurs
exclusively on an Indian reservation. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411

u.s.

145, 148

(1973) ("in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation").l
Because the Complementary and Directory statutes apply to sales to tax-exempt tribal
members and tribes, it is undisputed that general prohibition of those sales, absent payment of the

Plaintiff s have submitted no evidence that the Tribe in this case has ceded taxation jurisdiction to the State
or that there is a federal statute that permits Idaho to apply the fees required by the Complementary Act to
unstamped cigarettes which are destined for resale to tribal members situated on the reservation. In short,
Plaintiffs' repeated characterization of Warpath, Inc. as an "Idaho business" subject to regulation by the
Complementary and Directory statute is simply belied by both the facts and the law.
I
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state tax, represents an unreasonable burden on NWS, the tribe, and its members, and therefore
the statutes are not reasonably tailored to collect valid taxes from non-Indians. 2
The states are precluded from directly taxing reservation lands or reservation Indians. See

County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 257; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995). The Supreme Court has invalidated state taxation on non-Indian contractors doing
business with tribes on reservations. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 691
(invalidating a state gross proceeds tax imposed on reservation store owned by a non-Indian
because the vast majority of the store's customers were Navajo Indians); Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980) (invalidating a state motor carrier registration and fuel tax imposed on non-Indian
company that hauled timber on reservation roads that had been cut from tribal lands); Ramah

Navajo, 458 U.S. at 838 (striking down a State tax on the profits made by a non-Indian
construction company that built a school on a reservation for the tribe, stating that "ambiguities
in federal law should be construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to those
situations where Congress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state activity.");

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that federal law
preempts the imposition of the California timber yield tax on the harvest by non-Indian
purchasers of timber owned by the tribe, preempting taxes on "goods produced on the
reservation."); Central Alachinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980)
(finding state could not impose "transaction privilege tax" on the sale of farm equipment where
the sale took place on the reservation, the contract was signed on the reservation and payment
occurred thereon, notwithstanding that the seller did not reside on the reservation, was not

The state also has other means at its disposal to address the concerns at issue in this litigation as to sales to
non-Indians off the reservation, including entering into a government to government agreement which
assures that the burden of its tax is imposed downstream ofthe tribe and its members, or seeking recourse in
2
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licensed to trade with the Indians and the Court found it was irrelevant that the sale was made to
a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself or that the seller did not maintain a permanent
place of business on the reservation).

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
APPLIES TO OFF-RESERVATION COMlVIERCIAL
ACTIVITIES OF TRIBES OR TRIBAL ENTITIES

The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that Indian tribes possess "the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v.

Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has stated that this common-law
immunity "is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance." Three Affiliated Tribes of

the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476, U.S. 877, 890 (1986). Absent a clear and
unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity, Indian tribes are not subject to civil suit in any
state, federal, or arbitral tribunal. C & L Enter. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.
532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001). Sovereign immunity presents a jurisdictional question and absent a
waiver, presents an absolute bar to suits against tribes. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech, Inc., 523 U.S.
75 L 754 (1998); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. Of Equalization, 757 F.2d

1047, 1052-53 (9 th Cir. 1985).
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that tribal sovereign immunity applies
to tribal commercial activities involving non-Indians as well as traditional governmental
functions. Kiowa Tribe, 523 Us. at 754-55; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Citizen Band

Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (reaffirming tribal immunity from suit
arising from state's attempt to impose taxation over cigarette sales). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has made clear that tribal sovereign immunity applies to commercial activities undertaken

the appropriate tribal forum which does have civil regulatory jurisdiction over sales between tribally owned
entities on the reservation.
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both on and offthe reservation. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755 ("[t]hough respondent asks us to
confine immunity from suit to transactions on reservations and to governmental activities, our
precedents have not drawn these distinctions."). This includes actions by a state to enforce state
law.
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977), the State of
Washington obtained an order commanding an Indian Tribe to provide information about tribal
members' off-reservation fishing activities in an effort to enforce state fishing regulations. The
Tribe appealed, arguing that the order infringed on the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The United
States Supreme Court agreed with the Tribe, stating 'the Tribe has attacked [the] order as an
infringement on its

sov~~reign

immunity .... The attack is well founded. Absent an effective

waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized
Indian Tribe." Jd. at 172.
In addition, tribal entities organized under tribal law are considered to be part of the Tribe
and enjoy the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. E.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d 1044, 1046 (9 th Cir. 2006); Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corporation, 147 P.3d
1275, 1279 (Wash. 2006); see Barker v. Menominee Nation Casino 897 Supp. 389 (E.D. Wis.
1995) ("commission" that was issued a corporate charter under tribal law was an arm of the Tribe
and thus suit against it was a suit against the Tribe itself). Sovereign immunity from suit does
not "tum on the particular form in which the Tribe chooses to conduct its business." Mescalero

Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 158 n.13 (1973). See also Redding Rancheria v. Superior
Court, 898 Cal.App.4th 384,387 (2001) (tribal entity treated as Tribe for immunity purposes).
IV.

EVEN IF NWS WERE NOT CONSIDERED A TRIBAL ENTITY, IT IS
NOT SUBJECT TO IDAHO'S REGULATORY POWER

In 1832, the United States Supreme Court held that the regulatory power of the state, even when
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it involved regulation of a non-Indian, did not extend into Indian country. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515, 561 (1932). The court stated that Georgia's legislative power stopped at the reservation boundary
and could not cross it to regulate the behavior of the people within the Cherokee Nation. One hundred

fifty years later, the United States Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411
U.S. 164, 173 (1973), reiiterated this point. The Court discussed "reservation Indians" and by this
reference meant to include Indians who were within Indian country whether or not they were members of
the reservation tribe. When the Court "concluded that the state power to tax did not extend to on
reservation activities of 'reservation Indians,' [it] clearly meant Indians who were members ofa tribe and
also those Indians who were members of other tribes." Scott Taylor "The Unending Onslaught on
Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation ofNon-Member Indians," 91 Marquette Law Review 917,

958 (Summer 2008).
Indeed, the Idaho legislature has recognized that Indians who live on a different tribe's
reservation are still "Indians" and enjoy immunity from taxation. Idaho Code §63-3026A(4)(b)(iv) refers
to "income earned within the original exterior boundaries of any federally created Indian reservation by
an enrolled Indian in a federally recognized Indian tribe on a federally recognized Indian reservation ...
." Thus, it is apparent the Idaho legislature does not discriminate between enrolled members of Idaho
tribes and other Indians, as long as that Indian is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe in the United
States.
Tribal sovereignty claims are not limited to cases in which an Indian tribe is a party.
Instead, there is substantial case law that tribally-chartered corporations have the same
supremacy clause-protected status as tribes. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land and Cattle Co., No. CIV. 05-3002, 2006 WL 2055880 (D.S.D. JuL 17, 2006).
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States have

som~~

power to exercise jurisdiction over Indian territory in some cases or if

they reach an agreement with the tribe. 25 U.S.C. §1322. In this case, there is no agreement
between the state and the Coeur d' Alene tribe, and Idaho has not acted to assume jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Idaho Administrative Rules specifically provide that cigarette wholesalers
may deliver cigarettes without Idaho stamps to Indian reservations when:
a. The purchaser is an enrolled member of an Idaho Indian tribe;
b. The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and
operated by an enrolled member or members of an Idaho Indian
tribe; and
c. The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and
operated by an Idaho Indian tribe.
IDAPA 35.01.10.014.01
Warpath,

Inc.'s Articles of Incorporation specifically provide that "all

shareholders of this corporation shall be and are enrolled members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe,
State ofIdaho." See, Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle filed on June 30, 2009.
Finally, the plain language of the statute simply precludes the sale of unlisted cigarettes in
Idaho. Nothing in the statute states that it applies to wholesale distribution to Indians on their
reservation.

V.

STATE J': MAYBEE IS NOT CONTROLLING.

To the extent the State relies upon Idaho v. Maybee, that case was factually and procedurally
distinct. However, the legal analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court supports the position of NWS. The
opinion in Maybee reflects, and the State ofIdaho has agreed to stipulate, that the record before the Idaho
Supreme Court in Maybee established Maybee's sale of cigarettes to Idaho residents who were not
enrolled members of a fedc:rally recognized Native American Tribe and who were not residing on land

within the borders of a federally recognized Tribe's reservation land (hereinafter referred to as "Indian
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Countly"). In stark contrast, in this case, the only sales that exist are sales by NWS to an entity owned
exclusively by enrolled members ofthe Coeur d'Alene Tribe and operating within the boundaries of the
Coeur d'Alene Reservation. In Maybee, the Idaho Supreme Court observed:
However, contrary to Maybee's contentions, the Acts do not regulate
Maybee's on-reservation activities, but rather his off-reservation conduct
of: (1) selling, and offering for sale Non-Compliant Cigarettes of Idaho

Here, the regulated conduct occurred off-reservation and so the Bracker
balancing test does not apply.
The Supreme Court correctly observed when "on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is
at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." See State v. Maybee, p. 17
(citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)). In this case, the State of
Idaho is asking this Court to do something that the United States Supreme Court has never permitted and
has repeatedly rejected, that is, authorizing civil regulation of commercial conduct between tribal
members occurring in Indian Countly.
The United States Supreme Court applied a categorical bar to civil regulation of tribal
commercial activity on Indian Country in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425

u.s.

463 (1976). In Moe, the State of Montana sought to collect cigarette and personal property taxes from
reservation Indians who pW'cha~ed cigarettes from an on-reservation "smoke shop" owned and operated
by tribal members. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 467-68. The Court noted that the question whether states had
authority to tax the on-resenlation activities of reservation Indians had been "la[iclJ to rest" in the negative
by the Court's decision in lIfcClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). Moe,
425 U.S. at 476 (quoting M'escalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). The Supreme
Court also refused to allow the State to charge vendor fees to on-reservation Indian vendors.
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The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental principle that
states may not regulate tribal commercial activity occurring inside Indian Country. In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 113 S.Ct. 1985, the United States Supreme Court
held that Oklahoma could not impose income taxes or motor vehicle taxes on tribal members who lived
in Indian Country. The Court stated in part:
But when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe
or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians,
we have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, "a more
categorical approach: '[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other
federal statutes permitting it,' we have held, a State is without
power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." Count}! of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 258, 112 S.Ct. 683, 688, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992)
(citation omitted).
The Idaho statute the State seeks to apply to NWS sales is categorically barred. In State v.
Maybee, the regulation was permitted because the sales were not to Indians and not on Indian Country.
Any attempt to impose the escrow measure or the complementary listing measure on tribal sales is an
attempt to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians. NWS is an on-reservation wholesaler
whose business is directly affected by the measures. NWS's tribal sales are sales to an Indian Country
retailer or in other words, on--reservation activities of tribal Indians.

The United States Supreme Court held that a similar categorical bar precludes states from taxing
Indian lands and Indian people who are engaged in on-reservation activities. See Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,457-59 (1995).
A number of federal district courts have correctly followed the Supreme Court's prohibition of
state regulation of tribal commercial activities on Indian Country. In Winnebago Tribe ofNebraska v.
Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.Kan. 2007). Under this precedent, the Federal Indian Law's
categorical bar would apply to the activities ofreservation Indians between reservations.
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Another federal district court decision clearly and accurately applied the Supreme Court
precedent to regulation of tribal cigarette sales. In Ward v. The State ofNew York, 291 F.Supp.2d 188
(W.D. N.Y. 2003), the district court reviewed the applicability of a New York statute which banned the
direct shipment and transportation of certain cigarettes to New York consumers. Id at 193. The district
court evaluated three types oftransactions:
Based upon the current record, this Court finds that the Statute
implicates tribal sovereignty in so far as it restricts or prohibits the
following transactions: (a) shipment or transportation of cigarettes
by a tribe member from the reservation to a non-tribe member, (b)
shipment or transportation of cigarettes by a tribe member from the
reservation to another tribe member on the reservation, (c)
shipment or transportation of cigarettes from an individual (who
mayor may not be a tribe member) located off of the reservation to
a tribe member located on the reservation.
Id

The court held that tribal sovereignty would not preclude application of the statute to shipment or
transportation by a tribe member from the reservation to a non-tribe member. However, with respect to
shipment or transportation of cigarettes by a tribe member from the reservation to another tribe member
on the reservation, the COUlt found that the statute could not be applied. The court also held that in the
third scenario, shipment by a person located off the reservation to a tribe member located on the
reservation, the statute could not be applied. Id The District Court held:
A different question is presented with respect to transactions
between tribe members on the reservation. It is well-settled that
"[w]hen on··reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue,
state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest
is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal
self-government is at its strongest." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362. 121
S.Ct. 2304 (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. 100 S.Ct. 2578).
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has generally upheld
state regulation of on-reservation commerce between tribe
members and non-tribe members. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at
150-59. 100 S.Ct. 2069; Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-83. 96 S.Ct. 1634.
However, the Court has been reluctant to allow state regulation of
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on-reservation commerce between tribe members. See Moe, 425
U.S. at 475-79, 96 S.O. 1634 (holding that Montana could not
collect cigarette sales taxes with respect to on-reservation sales by
tribe members to tribe members); see also Colville, 447 U.S. at
162-64, 100 S.O. 2069 (ruling that Washington's motor vehicle tax
could not be imposed on vehicles owned by tribe members inter
alia because tax was not "tailored ... to the amount of actual off
. use ... ") .
reservatIOn
Id.
The United States Supreme Court and other courts following its rulings have repeatedly refused
to allow state regulation of tribal commercial conduct occurring on Indian Country. In State v. Maybee,
the Idaho Supreme Court allowed regulation of tribal commercial conduct because it occurred off
reservation. Clearly, that is not the case here.
VI. THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REGARDING THE PROPOSED FINE
The Court can take judicial notice that, according to an article in the Idaho Statesman
dated June 25, 20 10, Idaho spends about $2.3 million per year on tobacco prevention - less than
a quarter of the amount recommended by the Centers for Disease Control. The rest of the
tobacco money received by the State under the MSA goes to the General Fund. In the present
case, the State is trying to raise additional revenue through an unfair and grossly excessive
penalty.

A.

Assessmenlt of the Penalty is Improper on Summary Judgment.

Even assuming that the issue of liability under the Idaho tobacco laws is proper for
determination on a summary judgment, certainly the issue of any civil penalty, much less the $2
million proposed penalty, is wholly unsuitable for summary decision. Imposition of a penalty,
particularly a penalty this large, calls for reasoned determination after a full examination of the
relevant evidence.
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The statute on which the State relies, Idaho Code § 39-8406(1), states that the district
court "may impose" civil penalties.

The statute therefore, allows the court discretion.

Discretion, however, must be exercised based on reason which in tum requires knowledge.
There has been no evidence presented by the State that would provide this knowledge to the
Court.
The entire thrust of the parties' efforts has been directed toward the legal issues
concerning the question of whether the cigarette laws have been violated and whether the State of
Idaho has jurisdiction over a non-resident Indian company. There has been no evidence adduced
on any issues that would allow the Court to make a reasoned decision on any amount of any
penalty.

The Court has little or no information regarding the Defendant Native Wholesale

Supply Company or its owner. It has little or no information regarding the ability ofNWS to pay
such a huge fine. It has no information on what the State intends to do with this requested fine.
The Court cannot exercise its discretion properly. Further, the State has admitted that it does not
collect excise tax on any cigarettes bought by War Path from NWS when later resold by War
Path. See Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30, 2009. The State also
would therefore, not collect escrow as a result of these sales under the Directory Statute. Thus,

the State has lost no revenue as a result of the conduct it claims justifies a $2,000,000 fine.
To pick a number out of thin air, as the State suggests, and use that as the amount of the
penalty is the very essence of arbitrary action in violation of due process. There is no evidence in
the record that would support the Court's adoption of the $2 million penalty suggested by the
State.
Moreover, NWS is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of the imposition of this civil
penalty. This situation is very similar to the question presented to the Texas Supreme Court in

State of Texas v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tx. 1975).

The Court
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considered whether the Texas Constitution gives a right to trial by jury when a suit for civil
penalty is brought pursuant to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by the State of Texas.
The statute under which the State brought the action allowed for civil penalties for each
violation, as does the statute upon which the State of Idaho relies. The Texas Supreme Court
noted the provision in the Texas Constitution providing for trial by jury and held that that
constitutional right extended to suits for civil penalties. It noted a United States Supreme Court
opinion that the right to a trial by jury exists when "the action involves rights and remedies of the
sort typically enforced in an action at law. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39
L.Ed.2d 260 (1974); see also 5 Moore's Federal Practice, § 38.11 (7), 128 (2d.Ed 1974)." 530
S.W.2d at 292. The Texas Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial to
determine the amount of civil penalties which should be assessed against it.
In United States v. Nordbrock, 941 F.2d 947 (9th Cif. 1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine liability in a
government action seeking civil penalties, citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417-25,107
S.Ct. 1831, 1835-40,95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (the Seventh Amendment guarantees jury trial for
determination of liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act). Id. at 949. In a similar
case, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded in Idaho Dept. ofLaw Enforcement v. Free, 126 Idaho
422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994), that the right to a jury trial existed in a civil forfeiture proceeding.
The Court noted that the right to a jury trial in such civil proceedings existed at common law
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted.

The Idaho Constitution, Article One, Section 7,

provides that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." NWS accordingly has a right to
trial by jury on the issue of the imposition of civil penalties. That right cannot be denied merely
because the Court in its equitable powers has issued an injunction finding a violation of the
statute.
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·.
B.

The Imposition of a $2 Million Penalty Would Violate Due Process and
Constitutional Protection.

The concept of due process prohibits arbitrary and capricious government action and
requires notice and the opportunity to be heard before a person is deprived of property. If NWS
were not entitled to a jury trial, which it is as explained above, it would certainly be entitled to an
opportunity to present its case before the factfinder.

Choosing an arbitrary number like $2

million for a penalty does not comply with the due process clause. The Court has no guides to
the proper amount to be assessed.
The State will note that Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act allows the
imposition of a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the greater of 500% of the retail value of
the cigarettes or $5,000 upon the determination of a violation of Section 39-8403(3), Idaho Code,
or any rule adopted pursuant thereto. The State asserts that each of the 100 million cigarettes
which NWS has allegedly sold constitutes a violation permitting the Court to assess a penalty.
That is, the State is claiming the Court has the discretion to award some $61,050,000 in penalties
utilizing the 500% of the retail price measurement or, presumably, $500,000,000,000 using the
$5,000 per violation of each of the 100 million cigarettes. Any statute that would allow a court
to impose a $500 billion fine is unconstitutional on its face.

A $2 million fine is grossly

exceSSIve; the possibility of a $500 billion fine is absurd and reveals the statute to be
unconstitutional on its face.
Indeed, under the State's interpretation of the statute, bringing in one package of
cigarettes (20 cigarettes) would allow the Court to impose a $100,000 penalty. Bringing in one
carton of cigarettes (200 cigarettes) would allow the imposition of a $1 million penalty. This is
absurd. It reemphasizes the arbitrary and capricious nature of the statute and the unbounded
discretion the Legislature aillegedly would allow under the interpretation advanced by the State.
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While the statute purports to authorize a "civil" penalty, in light of the harsh potential
results and the reason behind the statute, the issue is whether this is a civil penalty or in reality a
criminal penalty. The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some
constitutional import. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636. 65 L.Ed.2d 742
(1980). The protections under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution of a
speedy and public trial by jury apply to criminal proceedings. So do the protections under the
Eighth Amendment against excessive fines.
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a
matter of statutory construction. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. The United States Supreme Court in
Ward utilized a two-part test to determine the nature of the penalty. The first step is to determine

whether the legislative body, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. [d. A "civil" label is not always dispositive.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361,117 S.Ct. 2072,138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). It is clear in

this context that the Idaho Legislature intended a severe penalty more criminal than civil.
The second step is to determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate any legislative body's intention to create a civil penalty. Ward
The question is whether the Idaho Legislature, even if its manifest intent was to create a "civil"
mechanism, nevertheless provided for sanctions so punitive as to "transform what was clearly
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Ward, 448 U.S. at 294 (quoting Rex Trailer
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956)).

Allowing

imposition of a $1 million fine for importing a single carton of cigarettes is obviously so punitive
as to transform the Complementary Act remedies into criminal penalties. Allowing the Court to
impose a $500 billion penalty, as the State in this case appears to acknowledge, can only be
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thought of as criminal in nature. Accordingly, NWS is entitled to a trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment and is protected against excessive fines by the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, the State sought injunctive relief against NWS. Thus, it requested the Court to
sit in equity, rather than law. A court sitting in equity cannot impose civil penalties. Tull v.

United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424, 107 S.Ct. 1831 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). This "civil penalty"
the State is requesting is "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief," and may only be
imposed in a legal proceeding after appropriate safeguards have been provided. Chauffeurs.

Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, et at., 494 U.S. 558, 571, 110 S.Ct.1339, 108
L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 412.)
C.

The Court Cannot Stack Penalties.

The State has claimed that NWS has violated the Complementary Act by making
improper sales of cigarettes. The State has also claimed that NWS has caused to be imported
cigarettes to Idaho retailers.

It is not alleged that NWS has improperly affixed stamps for

possessed cigarettes in violation of Section 39-8403(3). Accordingly, the only penalty that can
be assessed is a single penalty for an allegedly improper bulk sale of cigarettes. Section 39-8406
provides that "each sale or offer to sell" shall constitute a separate violation. It does not state that
each individual cigarette sold within a carton or within the packs in a carton constitutes a
violation.

Accordingly, it is clear that the Legislature intended in this situation to restrict

penalties to the number of sales, not the number of cigarettes. The State has not proven the
number of sales that occurred and thus the State cannot seek imposition of any penalties. It does
not matter that the State was able to manufacture an affidavit asserting the number of cigarettes
allegedly sold; what matte:rs is that the State has not defined for the Court the number of sales
alleged and therefore the Court has no basis on which to impose penalties.
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The State should also not be able to assert penalties for the sales made before the State
gave notice to NWS of the State's claim that an Indian corporation cannot sell cigarettes to
Native American corporations on reservations within Idaho without violating the State's
interpretation of the Tobacco Act. The State alleges that after the notice went out, NWS made
some sales amounting to 6 million cigarettes. Since the State has not provided any information
on the number of sales, the Court has no basis to impose penalties under Section 39-8406. Even
if the Court concludes at least one sale was made, it should only impose a single $5,000 penalty.

D.

The State's Requested Penalty is Disproportionate to Previous Penalties.

The State is attempting to punish NWS simply because it has sought a resolution of this
complicated question of tribal sovereignty. The State in resolving other alleged violations has
agreed to substantially lower fines.

Attached to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated

September 30, 2010 are true and accurate copies of Complaints filed against companies allegedly
violating the Complementary Act and Consent Decrees or Final Judgments agreed upon by the
State ofIdaho. They reflect the following agreed upon fines:
Blacksheep Distributing

Number of cigarettes sold: 11,576,000
Consent Decree: $25,000 ($30,000 in settlement and $5,000
waived if Blacksheep complies with terms.

Carolina Tobacco:

Number of cigarettes sold: 29,362,600
Judgment: Deposit escrow.
Sought $3,993.50 in attorney fees

Changde Cigarette Factory:

Number of cigarettes sold: 3,635,200
Consent Decree: $27,000 in attorney fees and costs.

Smokin Joes:

Number of cigarettes sold: 1,836,000
Consent Decree: $7,500 as settlement; $3,750 waived if they
comply with terms.

Yakima Distributors:

Number of cigarettes sold: 2,967,000
Consent Decree: $22,000
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It is apparent that because NWS is simply exercising its right to have these issues

addressed by the Court, the State is seeking to punish NWS for exercising that right by seeking
the grossly excessive and disproportionately high $2,000,000 fine. This is overreaching and
arbitrary and capricious conduct on behalf of the State.
Even the State's argument shows that it is seeking a disproportionately high fine. As
stated in the State's brief" District Judge Sticklen assessed a $163,225 civil penalty in the State v.
Maybee case based on

illl~gal

sales of2.5 million cigarettes. (State's Memorandum at 11.) The

State is claiming that NWS sold some six million cigarettes after the State notified it of the
State's claim that future sales would be violations of the cigarette laws. Six million cigarettes is
2.4 times the 2.5 million eigarettes sold by Maybee. 2.4 times the penalty assessed by Judge
Sticklen would equate to $391,740. That is a far cry from the $2 million penalty the State is
seeking in this case. But even that $391,740 is greatly excessive and not justified under the
relevant statute discussed above. Certainly it would be inappropriate at this juncture of the
proceedings, as the Court has no basis to compare the culpability ofNWS to the culpability of
Maybee. The State has not presented any relevant facts and this summary proceeding has not
allowed NWS to produce witnesses or evidence.

DATED this 30 th day of September, 2010.

By--r-----t~q---~-----'LJ..L-----=:::....:...L.---S
A. DIddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 30 th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorn~~y General
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
Boise, Idaho 83702-001_0
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83720-·0410

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-4151
'-1-------------1

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delive
[ ] Overnight
[ ] Fax (20

Sa
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344··8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344··8542
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SEP 302010
J. DAVID NAVARRO

BYJ. RANDA. ,C'erk
DEPuTY '"'4.L

Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0815228

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A.
DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
SAMUEL A. DIJDDLE being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant Native Wholesale Supply

Company in this matter and as such have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUE:L A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
57032-100197965.000
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified

Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, ef
at. v. Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0616719.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree

filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v.
Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0616719.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified

Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et
al. v. Carolina Tobacco Company, Case No.: CV OC 03044510.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and accurate copy of the Final Judgment

filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v.
Carolina Tobacco Company, Case No.: CV OC 03044510.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified

Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et
al. v. Changde Cigarette Factory, et al., Case No.: CV OC 0206277D.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree

filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et at. v.
Changde Cigarette Factory, et al., Case No.: CV OC 0206277D.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified

Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et
al. v. Joseph Anderson dba Smokin Joes, Case No.: CV OC 0714037.
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9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "H" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree

filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v.
Joseph Anderson dba Smokin Joes, Case No.: CV OC 0714037.

10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified

Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et
al. v. Yakima Distributing Company, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0303684D

11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "1" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree

filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v.
Yakima Distributing Company, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0303684D

Further, your affiant sayeth not.
DATED this 30 th day of September, 2010.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of September, 2010.

~~)
'--~
Residing: Nampa,ID
My Commission Expires: 1/25/12

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUI~L A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 30th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
Boise, Idaho 83702··0010
Theodore V. Spangh~r, Jr.
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-4151
U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax (208) 3 4-7844

Sa.m1lt(~

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
57032-100197965.000
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COpy·
.... ;.~. . . .

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
AITORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

'to...

NO.----.:;~:c;n-

A.M

. BREIT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Depoty Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of the Attome, General
Len·B. Jordan Building
650 W. State St., Lower Level
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

_

FlLE
-t3.u·

--
SEP 082006

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByJ BLACK
DEPlTTY

Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATEOF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and throogh
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney

0016719

General
Plaintiff,

vs.

VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

BLACKSBEEP DISTRIBUTING, INC.
a Washington corporation,

DefendanL
BACKGROUND
1. In 1999, the Idaho Legislatw'e. in enacting the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement

Agreement Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq., found that cigarette smoking presents serious
public health concerns to tile state of Idaho and to Idaho citizens. Indeed, the Surgeon General
determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, and that
there are hundreds of thousands of tobacco-related deaths in the United States each year. These
dis~es

most often do not appear until many years after the person in question begins smoking.

2. The Idaho Legislature further found that cigarette smoking also presents serious
fInancial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under certain health-care programs, the state may have
a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 1
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associated with. cigarette smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive
such medical assistance.
3. Under these programs, the Legislature found, the State of Idaho pays millions of
dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with
cigarette smoking.
4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded that it would be the policy of the State of Idaho
that rmancial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette smoking be borne by tobacco product
manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either determine to
enter into settlement agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts.
5. On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement,• with the State of Idaho.
The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial sums to the
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to the pursuit
of public health interests; and to make substantial· changes in their advertising and marketing
practices and corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking.
6. The Idaho Legislature declared that it would be contrary to the policy of the State of
Idaho if tobacco product manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement
agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) could use a resulting cost advantage

to derive large, short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without ensuring that the
state will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are ·proven to have acted
culpably. The Legislature thus detennined that it is in the interest of the State of Idaho to require
that nonparticipating tob8'::CO product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a
source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term
profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise.
7. Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho
Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (the Act). In essence,
the Act requires "tobacco product manufacturers" to either: (1) "[b]ecome a participating

VERIFIED COMPLAINT· 2
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manufacturer (as that tenn is defined in Section II(jj) of the Master Settlement Agreement) and
generally perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement," or (2) place
into a qualified escrow fund the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) of the Act.
8.

In 2003. the: Idaho Legislature decided that violations of the Act threaten the

integrity of Idaho's Master Settlement Agreement, the fiscal soundness of the state and public
health and enacted procedural enhancements to help prevent violations of the Act by adopting
the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Complementary Act)•
.codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho

C~.

Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the

Complementary Act make.') it unlawful for any person to sell, offer or posses for sale in Idaho
cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in Idaho's Directory of
Compliant Tobacco Produc:t Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory).

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
9. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter for the relevant time period
that is the subject of this complaint pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
Complementary Act.
10.
(D~fendant).

Based upon information and belief, Defendant Blacksheep Distributing, Inc.
is a Washington corporation and has its principal place of business at 2914 East

Boone Street, Spokane, WA 99202.

11.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and the Complementary Act, this Comt has

personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because it is a licensed "Stamping Agent," as that term
is defIned at Idaho Code Section 39-8402(8). and has-·-acquired, held, owned. possessed,
transported, imported. or caused to be imported cigarettes that are not on Idaho's Directory.

Defendant knew or should have known that these cigarettes were intended for distribution or sale
in Idaho.
12.

Because the Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Idaho venue is proper in

this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT .. 3
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
13.

The Defendant sells, offers or possesses cigarettes that are distributed for sale in

Idaho. Defendant is licensed to do business in Idaho.
14.

From 2003 to April 2006, Defendant sold a variety of unstamped cigarettes in

Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturers that manufacture them were not
included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
15.

Specifically, in July to September 2003, Defendant had 2,129,800 unstamped

Sixty-OneIMove brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product .
manufacturer that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
16.

In April to June 2004, Defendant had 409,200 unstamped Trackerlfucson brand

family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
17.

In April to June 2004, Defendant had 1,600 unstamped Sixty-OneIMove brand

family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
18.

In July to September 2004, DefendaIit had 684,200 unstamped Trackerlfucson

brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
19.

In October to December 2004, Defendant had 768,600 unstamped TrackerfI'ucson

brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacttirer
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
20.

In January to March 2005, Defendant had 1,115,600 unstamped TrackerlTucson

brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT· 4
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.
21.

In April to June 2005, Defendant had 1,477,000 unstamped TrackerlI'ucson brand

family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
22.

In April to Jwte 2005, Defendant had 48,000 unstamped Sabre brand family

cigarettes sold in "Idaho.

These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that

manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
23.

In July to September 2005, Defendant had 715!000 unstamped Sabre brand family

cigarettes sold in Idaho..

These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that

manufactures them were Dl:)t included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
24.

In July to September 2005, Defendant had 1,932,000 unstamped TrackerlflICSon

brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
25.

In October to December 2005, Defendant had 261,000 unstamped Sabre brand

family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
26.

In Octobe:r to December 2005, Defendant had 1,572,000 unstamped

Trackerlfucson brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product
manufacturer that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.

27.

In January to March 2006, Defendant had 1,462,000 unstamped Track:erffucson

brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer
that manufactures them wc~ not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
28.

In each instance, Defendant acquired, held, owned, possessed, transported,

imported, or caused to bc~ imported the cigarettes identified above, knowing, or acting under
circumstances where Defendant should have known, that these cigarettes were intended for

distribution or sale in Idaho.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 5
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29.

In short, all of these cigarettes were manufactured by tobacco product

manufacturers not in compliance with Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act and
Complementary Act and V\;ere not listed on the Directory.
30.

Accordingly, the Defendant has violated the Complementary Act by selling,

offering or possessing for sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand
family not included on the Directory.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
31.

The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 30 hf~in.
32.

The Defendant was notified in writing of its responsibilities as a Stamping Agent

under the Complementary Act pursuant to various notices sent by the Office of the Attorney
General. Defendant knew of its duties under the Complementary Act and of the law limiting it to
only sell, offer or possess for sale in Idaho cigarettes of tobacco product manufacturers or brand
families included in the Directory and, nevet1heless, Defendant proceeded to violate the
Complementary Act's provisions by possessing for sale the various cigarette brand families
. identified above, all of which were not included on the Directory at the relevant time.
33.

Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states that each sale or offer

to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) constitutes a

separate violation and provides that each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in
violation of Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation,
the Comt may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the greater of five hundred
percent (500%) of the retw value of the cigarettes or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a
determination of violation of Idaho Code § 39-8403(3).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Attorney Gener.al respectfully asks that this Court:

VERIFIED CO:MPLAINT • 6
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1. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary

Act by selling or offering for sale in Idaho cigarettes of tobacco product manufacturers or brand
families not included in the Directory.

2. Fmd that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the

Complementary Act by possessing for sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product
manufacturers or brand families not included in the Directory.
3. Fmd that the Defendant's multiple violations of Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement

Agreement Complementary Act constitute separate violations thereof; and award judgment
against the Defendant for civil penalties in the amount of five hWldred percent (500%) of the
retail value of the cigarettes unlawfully sold, offered for sale or possessed for sale or five
thousand dollars ($5,000) per violatio~ whichever is greater.
4. Award judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho Code § 39
7804(c) of the Act and by Idaho Code § 39-8407(5) of the Complementary Act.
5. Award the Attorney General such other, furth.eJ", or different relief, as the Court

considers appropriate.

DATED this

~
~_, of

s" p~
I

tV\

btA

J

, 2006.

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATfORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

(L~L

By

--;Ui'nREPn=;;FIR1'l1,"iTW'....
DeLAN:-w-'T"'ItTG]::I"I'RE - - 

Deputy Attorney General

Consumer Protection Unit
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County ofAda

)

) ss.
SYDNEY DONAHOE, being first duly sworn on oat:h, deposes and says that she is a
Tobacco Compliance Specialist in the Civil Litigation Division of the Office of the Attorney
General, that she has read the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are 1rUe to the
best ofher knowledge, infbnnation, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisl--_ day of'~~~~~~ 2006.

NO ARY

Residence: ~ I ~
Commission Expires: ~~
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,·-COpy
LAWHENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

NO--.._ _-:::....:-:::

_

FIJ,.ED
A.M, _ _--JP.M,

_

SEP 0 81005_
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney GeDeral
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of the Attome, (;eneral
Len B. Jordan BuildlDg
6SO W. State St., LoweI' Level
P. o. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

ByJ BLACK
DEPUTY

Attomeys for the State of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIcr OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
GeDenl

Case No.

c·v

0 C 06167 1 9

Plaintiff,

vs.

CONSENT
DECREE

BLACKSHEEP DISTRIBUTING, INC.,
a Washington corporation,
Defendant.
Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden
(Attorney General), and defendant Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., a Washington corporation,
have consented. to the entry of this Consent Decree, pursuant to the terms and conditions
contained herein.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows:

JURISDIcrION AND VENUE
1.

This Court. has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act.
CONSENT DECREE - 1

The Court also has personal
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jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho
Code § 5-404.
PARTIES

2.

The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The

Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
Complementary Act, to bring this action and settle it on behalf ofthe State of Idaho.
DEFINITIONS

3.

Unless otherwise specified, the following shall apply:

A.
Brand Family means all styles of Cigarettes sold under the same
trademark and differentiated from one another by means of additional modifiers or
descriptors including, but not limited to, "menthol," "lights," "kings," and "1 OOs,"
and includes any brand name (alone or in conjunction with any other word)
trademark, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable pattern of colors, or
any other indicia ofproduct identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with,
a previously known brand of Cigarettes.
B.
Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be
burned or heated Wider ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (l)
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is fimctional in the product, which, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of
tobacco wrapped in any substance containing tobacco which, because of its
appearance, the ~~ of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered 10, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause
(1) of this definition. The tenn "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any
tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as tobacco for making
cigarettes). For pmposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your
own'~ tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette."

c.

Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended.

CONSENT DECREE - 2
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D.
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complemenmry Act
(Complementary Act) means that act codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code,
as amended.

E.

Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and

related documents) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers.

F.
Nonparticipating manufacturer means any Tobacco Product
Manufacturer that is not a member ofthe Master Settlement Agreement.
G.
Tobacco Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of
enactment of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (1)
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the
United States, including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through
an importer (except where such importer is an original participating man~r (as
that teon is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master
Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first
purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured
anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3)
Becomes a successor ofan entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection.
The tenn "tobacco l,roduct manufacturertl shall not include an affiliate of a Tobacco
Product Manufactw~r unless such affiliate itself falls within any of paragraphs (I)
through (3) of this subsection.
H
Stamping agent means a person that is authorized or required to affix
tax stamps to packages or other containers of Cigarettes under Title 63, Chapter 25,
Idaho Code.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Blacksbeep Distributing. (hereafter referred to

as BJacksheep) shall:
A
Not possess, transport to, acquire for sale, sell or offer for sale to
locations in Idaho or affix or cause to be affIXed Idaho excise tax stamps to

CONSENT DECREE - 3
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Cigarettes of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless the Tobacco Product
Manufacturer is Ji~1ed on the Attorney General's Directory of Compliant Tobacco
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory). The Directory is located at:
http://www2.state.iduslag/consumer/tobacco/directorv index.h1m

B.
Be!,7Uming July I, 2006, provide the Attorney General with quarterly
reports of Cigarette sales on fonns provided by the Attorney General. All necessary
forms are located at:
http://www2.state.id.uslagiconsumer/tobacco/nonparticipating.htm#Forms
C.
Within 30 days of execution of this Consent Decree, provide the
Attorney General a list, updated as necessary, of each Brand Family manufactured
by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Blacksheep intends to possess, transport
to, or acquire for :sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax
stamps.
D.
For a period of two years after execution of this Consent Decree,
provide the Attorney General at least 15 days notice prior to possessing,
transporting, acquiring for sale in Idaho or affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho
excise tax. stamps to a Brand Family manufactured by a Non-Participating
ManUfacturer that Blacksheep has not previously advised the Attorney General that
it intends to possess, transport to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be
affixed Idaho excise tax stamps.

BLACKSHEEP PAYMENT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL
4.

Blacksheep shall pay Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), payable to "Office of

Attorney General, Consumer Protection Unit," for settlement of all d.iSputed issues concerning its

duties under the Complementary Act with respect to Cigarettes for the time period of 2002
through the end of July 2006; provided, however, that Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) of this
amount shall be waived WId not payable so long as Blacksheep complies with all of the terms of
this Consent Decree. Thus, within ten (l0) days after both parties sign this Consent Decree,
Blacksheep shall make its payment to the Office ofthe Attorney General. Blacksheep's payment
shall be by cashier's check.
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REPORTING
5.

For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Blacksheep shall

make available to the Attorney General upon 21 days notice all reasonable documents and

records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be
provided at Blacksheep's expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any
three-month period, in which case the reasonable expense of copies for additional requests shall
be borne by the Attorney (J·eneral.

NON-WAIVER PROVISIONS
6.

Nothing ill this Consent Decree shall preclude the Attorney General from

exercising any administrative, legal, or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the
provisions of this Consent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that
Blacksheep violates any provision of this Consent Decree or any other laws ofthe State of Idaho.
7.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Blacksheep's duty

to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, rules, or pennits.

8.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful

powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho, including. the power to request, demand or
compel production of documents or the testimony of witnesses.
SEVERABILITY

9

The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any

provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other
provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect
APPLICATION
10.

This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Blacksheep and shall apply to

Blacksheep, its agents, employees, representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and severally,
while acting personally or through any corporation, other business entity, or person whose acts,
practices, or policies are directed., formulated, or controlled by Blacksheep.

CONSENT DECREE - 5
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DISTRICT COURT APPROVAL
11.

This Consent Decree shall be filed concurrently with the accompanying

Complaint and shall be subject to the approval of the District Court ofAda County, Idaho.
SERVICE
12.

Blacksheep agrees to accept service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree

by prepaid first class mail sent to Blacksheep's corporate office. Blacksheep expressly waives
personal service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint
after they have been filed with the Court.

REOPENING OF TInS MAITER
13.

Matters set forth in this Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attomey General

for further proceedings if Blacksheep violates any term of this Consent Decree. The Attorney
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law. If the
Court finds that Blacksheep has violated any term of this Consent Decree, the Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000) presently waived in paragraph four shall be due and owing and shall be in
ad~ition to

and not in any replacement for any financial penalty the Court determines to impose

upon Blacksbeep as a consequence of its violations of the Consent Decree.
NOTICE
14.

All notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows:

For the Attorney General:
Office of the Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attention: Blacksheep Distributing
Consent Decree

For Blacksheep:
Blacksheep Distributing, Inc.
Attn: Brian T. Donohue, President
2914 E. Boone Avenue
Spokane, WA 99202

David Groesbeck, PS
422 Legion Building
108 N. Washington St.
Spokane, WA 99201

IDAG139769
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AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THIS STIPULATION
15.

Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants

that he or she is duly authorized to do so.

MISCELLANEOUS

16.

This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attomey General.

17.

This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Blacksheep that any of

its acts and practices violates

Idaho~s

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act or Idaho's

Complementary Act.

18.

This Court retains jurisdiction over this

matter

for the purpose of enabling the

parties to apply for such ftnther order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate.
19.

This Consent Decree becomes effective upon execution by the parties and entry

by the Court.

WE CONSENT:

~~

1'=

DATED this i~ day of Aapst, 2006.
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

By:

--==~~l~t=----:_
BRETI' T. DeLANGE

Deputy Attorney General

Civil Litigation Division
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DATED this ~_ day of September, 2006.

'

BLACKSBEEP DISTRIBUTING

Name:

~ ~A'" i)t .... A'""'~
(printed)

Signature:

Title:
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
STATE OF IDAHO

t
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BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney Generaf
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of the Attornel General
Len B. Jordan BuUdmg
650 W. State St., Lower Level

JUN 112003
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P. '0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424'
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and throngh
. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General

Case No.

CV OC 03011 451 0

Plaintiff,

vs.

VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY, a
Virginia corporation,

DefendanL
---:.;;....~---))
BACKGROUND
1. The Idaho Legislature, in enacting the Idaho Tobacco Master Settl~ent Agreement
Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq., found that cigarette smoking presents serious public health

concerns to the state ofIdaho and to Idaho citizens. Indeed, the Surgeon General has determined
that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, and that there are

.

hundreds ofthousands of tobacco-related deaths in the United States each year. These diseases
most often do not.appear until many years after the person in question
begins smoking.
.
2. The Idaho Legislature further found that cigarette smoking also' presents serious
financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under certain health-care progrmns, the State may
have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions
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smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive

such medical assistance.
3. Under these programs, the Legislature found, the State of Idaho pays millions of
dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with
cigarette smoking.
4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded that it would be the policy of the State of Idaho
that financial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette smoking be borne by tobacco product

manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either detennine to
enter into settlement agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts.
5. On November 23, 1998. leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with the: State ofIdabo.
The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial sums to the
.

.

State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation deyoted to the pursuit
of public health interests; and·to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing
.practices and corporate culture, with the intention ofreducing underage smoking.

6. The Idaho Legislature decreed that it would be contrary to the policy of the State of
Idaho if tobacco· product manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement
agreement could use a resulting cost advantage to derive large, short-term profits in the years
before liability may arise without ensuring that the State will have an eventual source of recovery

from them iftbeYare proven to have acted culpably. The Legislature thus determined that it is in
the interest oftbe State to require that such manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a
source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving

iarge.

short-term

profits and then becoming judgment-proofbefore liability may arise.
7. Accordingly, shortly after

th~

Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho

Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, (the "Actj. effective
July 1, 1999.

Iri essence, the Act requires "tobacco product manufacturen" to either: (l)

"[b]ecome a participating manufacturer (as that tenn is defined in Section IT(jj) of the Master
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Settlement Agreement) and generally perform its financial

•

Oblig~ons

l.der the Master

Settlement Agreement," or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund by April 15 of the year
following the year in question, the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) of the Act.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
8. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized
to bring this civil action to enforce the tobacco manufacturer escrow requirements of the Act.
9. Based upon information and belief, Defendant Carolina Tobacco Company
("Carolina Tobacco") is incorporated in Virginia and headquartered in Portland, Oregon at 5620

S'W Dover Lane, Portland, Oregon 97225.
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, this Court
has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because it contracted to sell, sold, and profited from
the sale of cigarettes through intermediaries to consumers in Idaho, thereby transacting business

within this State and availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the State.
Upon information and belief; these sales continue to occur in the State ofIdaho.
11. Because the Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Idaho, venue is proper in this
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
12. The Defendant has certified and represented itself to the Attomey General as a
"tobacco prod~ manufacturer" as defined by Idaho Code §. 39-7802(i) of the Act
13. During the period January 1,2002 to December 31,2002, the Defendant contracted to
sell, sold, or profited froIIl the sale of cigarettes to consumers

in the State of Idaho through

intermediaries. Specifically for the time period Janumy 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002, the
pefendant contracted to sell, sold, or profited from the sale of at least 29,362,600 cigarettes into
Idaho, as measured by excise taxes collected by the Idaho State Tax Commission on cigarette
packages bearing the excise tax stamp ofthe State ofIdaho.
14. The Defendant has not fulfilled its obligations under the Act beca~e it has neither
become a participating manufacturer by signing the Master Settlement Agreement and generally
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performing its financial obligations under the Agreement, nor has it placed into a qualified
.

.
,

.

escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in question, the atnounts required by

Idaho Code § 39-7803(bXl) of the Act.
15. Because the Defendant has not signed the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho Code

§ 39-7803(b)(l) of the Act requires the Defendant to place in escrow $.0136125 per cigarette
sold in Idaho, as adjusted for inflation. The adjusted for inflation amount for 2002 sales is
$.0153785 per cigarette. For the year 2002, this amount totals $451,552.74.
16. The Defendant was notified in writing of the obligations to place money on behalf of
the State of Idaho into a qualified escrow account pursuant to the Act by notice and letters dated

March 14,2003 and May 28,2003.
17. The Defendant knew of its obligations to place money on behalf Qf the State of Idaho
into a qualified escrow account because it had previously placed money into escrow for sales

made in the years 2000 and 2001.
18. By infonnation and belief, the Defendant has been informed of similar escrow

obligations by other states that have adopted virtually identical statutes to the Act

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
19. The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations ·contained m
paragraphs 1 through 18 herein.

20. The Defendant

kn~

of the law requiring it to place money into. a qualified escrow

account as alleged herein.
21. The Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or deposit the

required funds in a qualified escrow account as :required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of the Act is a
knowing violation of the Act.
22. For a knowing violation of the Act, the civil penalty to be assessed against the
Defendmt, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B), should be an amount not to exceed 15%
of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount
not to exceed 300% of the original amount improperly withheld from escrow. At the rate of 15%
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4

.....

IDA

"G0 6 ')1,."

£1.153

000885

I

per day the civil penalty for the total amount Carolina Tobacco improperly withheld each day
from April IS, 2003 exceeds 300%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the
amount of300%, or $1,354,658.22 for the Defendant's knowing violation oftie statute.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACI10N
23. The Attorney General incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through
22 herein.

'

24. Alternatively, the Defendant's failure to join the ,Master Settlement Agreement or
deposit the required funds in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of
the Act is a non-knowing; violation of the Act.

25. For a non-knoVving violation of the Act, the civil penalty

as~sed

against the

Defendant should be an amount not to exceed 5% of the amount improperly withheld from
escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to exceed 100% of tle original amount
improperly withheld from escrow for the Defendant's yiolation of the Act. Atthe rate of5% per
day the civil penalty for the total amount Carolina Tobacco improperly withheld each day from
April 15, 2003 exceeds 100%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amount
of 100%, or $451,552.74 for the Defendant's non-knowing violation of the statute.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Court:
1. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) ofthe Act by failing

to deposit the reqUired funds into a qualified escrow account on behalf of the State of Idaho for
cigarettes sold within thc~ State of Idaho for the time period of January: 1, 2002 :'through
December 31, 2002.
2. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(h)(3) ofthe Act by failing
to certify its compliance with the Attorney General of its escrow obligations.
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3. Order the DefendaDt, within fifteen days 'of entry of judgIrient, to place $451,552.74

in a qualified escrow fund in order to bring the Defendant into compliance with Idaho Code §
39~ 7803(b)(1)

ofthe Act, and to certify its compliance to the Attorney General.

4. Order the D~fendant, within :fift~n days of entry of Judgment, to provide Plaintiff
With a list of the rianies of all cigarette brands manufactured by Carolina Tobacco, as well as
cigarette sales infonnation and supporting documentation for sales in Idaho in 2002.
5. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 'ordering that the Defendant be
prohibited from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State. of Idaho, whether directly or
through a distributor, ~etailer, or similar intermediary or intermediaries,' until the Defendant
establishes a qualified escrow fund as defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f) of the Act and
. certifies their compliance ~o the Attorney General.
6. Find that the Defendant's violations of Idaho Code' § 39-7803(b)(l) constitute
knowing violations, for purposes of Idaho Code § 39..7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, and award
judgment against the Defendant for civil peD.a1ties in the amount of300% oftbe es'crow amounts
improperly withheld, for a total of$I,354,658.22.
.

.

.7. Tn ~e alternative, if the Court finds that the Defendant's violations were not knowing
violations, award judgment against the D~fendant for civil penalties in the amount of 100% of
the. escrow amounts improperlywitbheld, for a total of$451,55~.?4.
8. Award judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho. Code § 39
7803 (b)(4).
.

9. Award- the Attomey General such other, further, or different reliet: as the Court

. ~nsiders appropriate.
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DATED this

.'-"

t(~

day of June, 2003.
LAwRENCEG. WASDEN
ATI'OR.~YGENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

BY:'_~~~~~"I"C'DeLrTA'1tTi"N'-""I:'E-~~,
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit

--- ---- ----------'
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STATE OF IDAHO

VERIFICATION
)
) 55. .

County ofAda

)

MELODY R WIDGAM, being .first duly swom on oath, deposes and says that she is an
Investigator in the CivilUtigation Division of the Office of the Attorney General, that she bas read
the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best: of her knowledge,
informatio~

and belief

tI\

.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this..u:.:.\ day of 3ofl.l It. .2003.

~~~~

Residence: -~...;:=F;.="'~="------'-~""""7""--_
Commission Expires:
'r<:J./tif. !g(JXJ'I
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

•

OCT 14 2003

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State St., Lower Level
P. o. BOI 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
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Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN,
Attorney General,

~

Case No. CV OC 0304ilSlD

Plaintiff,
FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY,
a Virginia corporation,
Defendant.

Pursuant to this Court's October 3,2003, Memorandum Decision of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment,

THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

This Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant Carolina

Tobacco Company (Carolina Tobacco).
2.

Defendant Carolina Tobacco has violated the Idaho Tobacco

~aster

Settlement

Agreement Act, codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code.
3.

Because Carolina Tobacco has now deposited into escrow the ~ount of money

requested by the State, this item of relief is now moot.

EXHIBIT
FINAL JUDGMENT - 1
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4.

Defendant Carolina Tobacco shall not be required to pay civil penalties as a result

I

of its violation.
5.

All issues relating to the award, if any, of reasonable attomer fees and costs

awardable to the State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(4), shall be reserved for·

later decision by the Court. The amount of attorney fees and costs, if any, that is awarded shall
automatically be deemed to be included within this judgment without further action and without

the entry ofa new judgment by the Court.
6.

This Final Judgment shall take effect immediately upon entry beteaf.

DATED this

--J!:J- day of_~C~1

~bpy;..x;.....JI~

' 2003.

th::;..;.·

MJCHAEl McLAUGHUN
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN
District Judge'

'.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of ~ 2903, I caused to be
seIVed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by placing a copy thereof it the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
:

--il.

Brett T. Delange
Deputy Attorney General
Conswner Protection Unit
Idaho Attorney General's Office
STATEHOUSE MAIL
Scott Hess
Jones Gledhill Hess
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

KRISTIN M. B
Deputy Clerk
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BREIT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of tbe Attorney General
Len B. Jordan BuDding
650 W. State St., Lower Level
P. O. BOI 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
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Attorneys for the State of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN,
Attorney General,

Case No. CV OC 03044510

Plaintiff,
FINAL JUDGMENT
AS TO EXPENSES AND FEES

VS.

CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY,
a Virginia corporation,
Defendant.

I

-------------- )

Pursuant to this Court's December 10, 2003 Memorandum Decisian on the State's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Carolina Tobacco

'5

Motion for Reconsideration,

THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The State of Idaho is the prevailing party in this action.

2.

Defendant Carolina Tobacco _Company shall remit to the Office of the Attorney

General the sum of three thousand nin~ himdred ninety-three dollars and fifty cents ($3,993.50).
3.

This Final Judgment shall take effect immediately upon entry hereof.

-- ---
IDAG066992
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DATED~s_m-daYOf ~~

,2003.

MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN
District Judge

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO EXPENSES AND FEES- 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~day

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of . \
,
3, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the~ing by placing a copy thereof' the United States
Mail~ postage prepaid, addressed to:

Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Idaho Attorney General's Office

STATEHOUSE MAIL

_ 1 ..._ .

.. _. . . Scott Hess
Jones Gledhill Hess

P.O. Box 1097
Boise, In 83701

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

J. o..A,VH:- NA,V.A.P.RO
JEN.NY BEAN

By:
Deputy Clerk

FIN~.u JUDGMENT

AS TO EXPENSES AND FEES- 3

000895
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ALAN G. LANCE

ATTORNEY GENERAL
)=:1 STATE OF IDAHO

Wlfll1..4 ZOOt

~

BRETT T..DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy At..torD~Y General
.
::-' ...... , Consumer Protection Unit
_".~~.' Office of the Attorney General
---': LeD B. Jor:dan Building
~! ~ 650 \V. State Sf., Lower Level
~., P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720..0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
:- ~':':"=

Attorneys for the State of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICL~ DlSTRICT OF
. 1lIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through

ALAN G. LANCE, Attorney General
CaseNoGV

Plaintiff,

DC 02062770

VS.

VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

CIlANGmt CIGARETIE FACTORY
also knowll as CHANGDE JUAN YAN

CHANG, a foreign corporation,
DereDdant

)
PARTIES, JURISDICfiON, AND VENUE

1. Pl,lrSUant to Idaho' Code § 39-7803(3) of the Tobacco Master Settlement Act, Idaho

Code § 39-780I, et seq., the Attorney General is authorized to bring this civil action to enforce
the tobacco manufacturer escrow requirements ofthe Act.
2.

~ed ,upon information and belief,

as Changde

~uan

Defendant Changde Cigarette Factory also known

Yan Chang (UChangdej is a Chinese corporation .whose addreSS'is HuNan

Sheng ChangDe ShiDong TingXi. Lu415000, People's Republic of China.
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code, § 5-514 and Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, this Court

has personal jmisdiction over the Defendant because it contracted to sell, sold, and profited from
the sale of cigarettes

eith~r

directly or through distributors, retailers, or similar intennediaries

EXHIBIT
VEJUFIED COMPLAINT - 1

I~

IDAG052942000896

• -,

•

within the ~tate of Idaho, thereby transacting business within this State and availing itself of the
privilege of. conducting activities within the State. Upon information and belief, these sales
continue to .occur in the State ofIdaho.
4. Because the .Defendant is a non-resident of the State ofIdaho, venue is proper in this
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Upon information and belie,4 the Defendant is a "tobacco product manufacturer" as
defined by tdaho Code § 39-7802(i) of the Act because it manufactures cigarettes that it intends

to be sold ill the United States and/or because it is a first purchaser anywhere for resale in the
United Stat~ of ci~ettes that it intends to be sold in the United States.

6. The Act requires "tobacco product manufacturers" to either: (1) u[b]ecnme a

participatin& manufactW'er (as that term is defined in section n(ij) of the Master Settlement
Agreement) and generally perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlement
Agreement,'~.or

(2) place into a qualified escrow fund by April15 of the year following the year

in question, the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(I) oithe Act

7. During the period January 1,2001 to December 31,2001, the Defendant contracted to
selI, sold, or"profi1edftom the sale ofcigarettes to consumers in the State ofIdaho. either directly
or through gistributors, retailers) or similar intennediaries. Specifically for the time period
JanuaIY 1. 2001 to December 31,,2001, the Defendant contracted to sell, sold, or profited from
the sale of ~t least 3,635,220 cigarettes (brand Ideal) into Idaho, as measured by excise taxes
collected by the Idaho State Tax Commission on cigarette pac;kages bearing the excise tax stamp
ofthe State Qfldaho.
8. The Defendant has not. fulfilled its obligations under the Act because it has neither
become a p~cipating manufacturer by signing the Master Settlement Agreement and generally
perfonning i:fs financial obligations under the Agreement, nor has it placed into a qualified
escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in question, the amounts required by
Idaho Code §39-7803(b)(1) ofthe Act
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2
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9. B.ecause the Defendant b,as not signed the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho Code
§ 39-7803(b)(1) of the Act requires the Defendant to place in escrow $.0136125 per cigarette

sold in Idaho, as adjusted for inflation. For the year 2001, this amount totals $54,276.02.
10. TPe Defendant .was notified. in writing of the obligations to place money on behalf of
the State ofIdaho into a qualified escrow account pursuant to the Act by notice and letters dateq
December 7,-2001, January 8, 2002, March 20,2002 and June 11,2002.
11. By information and belie.£: the Defendant has been informed of its escrow obligations
by one or more of its agents (cigarette importers and distributors). and has been informed of

similar escrow obligations by other states that have adopt~d virtually identical statutes to the Act

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
12. The Attorney General incolporates by reference the allegations contained

In

- paragraphs 1. through 11 herein.
13. The Defendant knew of the law requiring it to place mqney into a qualified escrow

account as alleged herein.
14. The Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or deposit the

required fundS in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of the Act is a

knowing violation ofthe Act.
15. For a knowing violation of the Act, the civil penalty to be assessed against the
Defendant. pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B), should be an amount not to exceed 15%
of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount
not to exceed300% of the C?riginal amount improperly withheld from escrow. At the rate of 15%
per day the civil penalty for the total amount Changde improperly withheld each day from April·
15,2002 exceeds 300%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amo.unt of
300%, or $162,828.06 for the Defendant's knowing violation of the statute.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
16. The Attorney General incozporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through
15 herein.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 3
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17. bltematively, the Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or
deposit the required funds in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of
the Act is a ~on-knowing violation ofthe Act
18. ~or a non-knowin1~ violation of the Act, the civil penalty assessed against the

Defendant

~hou1d

be an amount not to exceed 5% of the amount improperly withheld from

escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to exceed 100% of the original amount
improperly withheld from escrow for the Defendant's violation ofthe Act At the rate of 5% per
day the civiT"penalty for the total amount Changde improperly withheld each day from April 15.
2002 exceeds 100%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amount of 100%.

or $54,276.02 for the Defendant's non-knowing violation ofthe statute.

REQUEST FOR REIJEF

The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Comt:
1. Find that the Defendant has "iolated 14aho Code §39-7803(b)(1) of the Act by failing

to establish a qualified escrow ftmd on belfa.lf of the State of ~daho for cigarettes sold within the
State ofIdaho for the time period oflanumy 1, 2001 through December 31,2001.
2. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3) of the Act by failing
to certify its compliance with the Attorney General ofits escrow obligations.
3. Order the Defendant, within fifteen days of entry ofjudgment, to place $54,276.02 in

a qualified eScrow fund in order to bring the Defendant into compliance .with Idaho Code § 39
7803(b)(1) of the Act, and to certify its compliance to the Attorney General.

4. Order the Defendant, within fifteen days of entry of judgment, to provide Plaintiff
with a list of the

n~es

of all cigarette brands manufactured by Changde, as well as cigarette

sales information and supporting documentation for sales in Idaho in 2001.
5. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief ordering that the Defendant be
prohibited from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho, whether directly or
through a distributor, retailer, or similar intermediary or intermediaries, until the. Defendant
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4
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establishes a qualified escrow fund as defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f) of the Act and
certifies their compliance to the Attorney General

.

6. Find that the Defendant's violations of Idaho" Code §

39~7.803(b)(1)

constitute

knowing violations, for pUIpOses of Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, and award
judgment against the Defendant for civil penalties in the amount of300% ofthe escrow amounts
improperly withheld, for a total ofS162,828.06.
7. I:p. the alternative, if the Court finds that the Defendant's violatio~ were not knowing

violations, !ward judgment against the DefendaIlt for civil p"enalties in the amount of 100% of
the escrow amounts improperly withheld, for a total of$54,276.02.

8.

~ward

judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attomey General's reasonable

costs, expeI1!.es, and attomey's fees in bringing this action,

~

authorized by Idaho Code § 39

7803 (b)(4).

9. Award

~

Attorney General such other,

further~'

or different

reIicf~_as

the Court

considers appropriate.

_

DA~~ this

('(fJ-

day.of

;4- v ~

,2002.

ALAN G•.LANCE

AITORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF IDAHO

By:rz~bT.De
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) S8.

County ofAda

)

:MELODY R. WHIGAM, being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says that she is an
Investigator in the Civil Litigation Division of the Office ofthe Attorney General, that she has read
the foregoini Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best.of her knowledge.
information. and belief.

- SUBSCRIBED AND SWQRN ~o.before me this ~ day of[1 I~(;t 2002.

66:,JVU.~ t1 ~
t

A

~
Residence~h.Si . J :;1...
'O'"""'r----
Co~ssi~nExpires: Q);( Q 00'\"
NOTARY
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DEC Z42003

~.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
~ITORNEY GENERAL

:.
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NO.!"-.............,P1!!1':i.ao!lll>"""""--
--._ ~

OFFICE OF 11-lE

STATE OF IDAHO
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B. Jor~ BuDding
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P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

Attorneys for the State ofIda.ho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FOVRm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO b)' and through
LA WREN~E G. WASDEN,
Attorney General,

Case No. CV OC 0206277D

Plaf~ifJ,

FINAL JUDGMENT

VS.

CHANGDE. CIGARETIE FACTORY
also known-as CHANGDE JUAN YAN
CHANG, a foreign corporation,
Defendant.

~

----)
P~t to

this Cowt's December 18, 2003, Order to Show Cause hearing,

THIS: COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

- This Comt has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant Changde

Cigarette Factory (Changde).
2.

.. Defendant Changde has violated the terms of its Consent Decree with the State of

Idaho, which this Court approved. on October 9,2003. It is, accordingly, in contempt, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 7-601(5).

FINAL JUDGMENT - 1
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3.

~

Defendant Changde shall deposit into a qualified escrow

fun~

as that tenn is

defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f), the amount of $54)76.02 (Fifty-Four Thousand, Two
Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and Two Cents).

4.

Defendant Changde shall remit to the State of Idaho, as civil penalties, the amount

of $1 62,828J)6 (One Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand, Eight Hundred Twenty-Eight Dollars and
Six Cents).

S.

. All issues relating to the award, if any, of reasonable attorney fees and costs

awardable to the State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(4), shall be reserved for
later decision by the Court. The amount of attorney fees and costs, if any, that is awarded. shall
automatically be deemed to be included within this judgment without fiu1:her action and without
the entry ofa_new judgment by the Court.
6.
7.

_ Post-judgment interest shall accrue as provided by law.
This Final Judgme'Jlt shall take effect immediately upon entry hereof.

DArED this

z:z-day of _ _D----=t;....;;c_~;;....:..:.M~.h::::.J~"'~~~
__...~----~. 2003.
JOEL D. HORTON
JOEL D. HORTON
Judge

.~trict
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I.HE&S3YCERIIFYthatonthis

2---~ayof

Ge.e

I

,2003, I caused to be

seIVed a true" and correct copy of the foregoing by placing a copy thereof in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Idaho Attorney General's Office
STATEHOUSE MAIL
Changde Cigarette Factory
HUl;lan Sheng,
Changdeshi

Dongting Xilu 199
People's Republic ofChina
Postal Code 415000

CLERK OF TIlE DISTRICT COURT

M~L4Nllt GAGNEPAfN

.. By:
Deputy Clerk
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LA ~ [iENeE G. WASDEN

OCT 09 21m

AlTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan BuRdiDg
650 W. State St., Lower l.eve)

P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

Attorneys for the State of Idaho

lNTIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUliTH JUDICIAL D1511O(;1 OF
- THE STATE OF' IDAHO, IN Al''D Jo'OR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney

Case No. CV OC 0206277D

General
Plaintiff,
-

vs.

CONSENT DECREE

CHAN'GDE CIGARETTE FACTORY
also known as CHANGDE JUAN YAN
CIIAN"G, a fordgn eorporabcn,
_ _----.De.;;.:fi=en=d=a=n=l

)

~

Plaintiff State of Idaho. by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden

(Attorney General). defendant Changde Cigarette Factory also known as Cbangde loan Yan
Chang (collectively "Changdej, a foreign

cotpOratio~

has consented to the entry of this

Consent Decree. pursuant to tbe tenns and conditions contained herein.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as foHows:

CONSENT DECREE - 1

EXHIBIT
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IDAGO52898

000905

"

"'--..'"

JURlsnlcnoN AND VENUE
I.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 1-705; and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

PARTIES
2.

The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The

Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7804(c), to bring this action and

......

settle it 'on behalfof the State of Idaho.

.'

DEFINITIONS
j.

Unless otherwise specified. the following shall apply:

A.
Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be
burned or heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (I)
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or
(2) tobacco, in any fOIm, that is functional in the product, which, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered to,. or purchasecJ by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of
tobacco wrapped in any substance cOi!taining tobacco wbicn, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause
(I) of this defmition. The teIIIl "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any
tobacco whi~ because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as tobacco for making
cigarettes). For purposes of this defInition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your
own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette."

B.
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended.
C.
Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and
related documents) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers.

CONSENT DECREE - 2
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·e
D.
Tobac;co Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of
enacUDent of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (I)
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the
United States. including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through
importer (except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer (as
that term is defIned in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master
'Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first
p.urchaser anyw'here for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured
.mywht:re tlUlt the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3)
Becomes a successor ofan entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection.
The tenn "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a
Tobacco Product Manufacturer unless such affiliate itself falls within any of
P-!iragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection.

an

INJUNCTIVE REI.IEF
4.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Changde shall:

Within. 15 days of the execution of this Consent Decree, or in a
different amount of time as agreed to in writing by the parties, establil;h a "qualified
escrow fund," as that term is dermed by Idaho. Code § 39-7802(f), and deposit all
amounts due for the units ofthe Ideal brand sold in Idaho in the calendar year 2001.
Upon making such deposits, Changde shall certify its compliance with the Idaho
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act for sales in the calendar year 2001.
_

A.

B.
Comply with the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement and
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Acts.

CHANGDEC1GARETTEFACTORYPAYMENTTOTHE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
5.
of

time~- as

Within 15 days of the execution of this Consent Decree, or in a different amount
agreed to in writing by the parties. Changde shall pay Twenty-Seven Thousand

.. Dollars ($21,000.00), as reimbursement of the legal costs and expenses incurred by the Attorney

CONSENT DECREE - 3

000907

,,~"

General in connection with this action. Such payment shall be made by a certi1ied check.

cashier's check or money order made payable to "Office of Attorney General, Consumer
Protection Unit."

REPORTING
6.

For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Changde shall

make available to the. Attorney General upon 30 days notice all reasonable documents and
records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be
provided at Changde's expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any
three-month period. in which case the reasonable expense of copies for additional requests shall
be borne by the Attorney General.
NO~W~RPRO~~ONS

7.

Nothing in firis Consent Decree shall preclude the Attorney General from

exereis-QJg any administrative. legal. or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the
provisions of this CO'1sent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that
Changde violates any provision ofthis Consent Decree or any other laws of the State of Idaho.
8.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Changde's duty to

comply with all applicable federal. state. and local laws, regulations, rules. or pennits.
9.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful

powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho. including the power to request, demand or
compel production ofdocuments or the testimony of witnesses.

CONSENT DECREE - 4
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SEVERABILITY
-10.

The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any

provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other
provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect.

APPLICAnON
1 I.

This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Changde and shall apply to Changde,

its agents, employees, representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, while acting
pcrsonaUy or through any corporation, othc: business entity, or pCrsO:l whose bets, practices, or
policies.are dir(.'Cted, formulated, or controlled by Changde.

DISTRICT COURT APPROVAL
12.

This Consent Decree shall be filed with and subject to the approval of the District

Court of Ada County, Idaho, which has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39
7804 and personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514.

SEk\tICE
-

J3.

Changde agrees to accept service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree by

prepaid f11'St class mail sent to Changde's counsel Changde expressly waives personal service of
a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint after they have been
fiJed with the Court.

REOPENING OF THIS MATTER
14.

Matters set forth in this. Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attorney General

for further proceedings if Changde violates any tenn of this Consent Decree. The Attorney
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law.

CONSENT DECREE - 5
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Spccifkally, should Changde. as de(em1ined by (he Court, fail to comply in any respect with the

Act in the future:
Upon detennination by the Court, Changde shall pay the amount
improperly withheld from the qualified escrow fund, plus a penalty in the amount of
300 percent of the amount originally withheld from the qualified escrow fund; and
A.

B.
Such non-compliance shall be deemed a second knowing violation,
entitling the State. by and through the Attorney General. to an injunction prohibiting
Changde from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho for a period
not to exceed two years.

NOTICE
15.

Al.l notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows:

For the Attorney General:
"Office oftbe Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division
~.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attention: Changde Consent Decree

For Cbangde:
DeHeng Chen Chan, LLC
Attention: Michael M. Yi
225 Broadway, Suile 1910
New York, New York 10007

AUTHORlZATION TO SIGNTHIS STIPULATION

16.

Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants

that he or she is duly authorized to do so.

MISCELLANEOUS

17.

This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attorney General. .

.18.

This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Changde that any of its

acts anapractices violates Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act.

19.

This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enabling the

parties to apply for such further order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate.

CONSENT DECREE - 6
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..

-,.
20.

This Consent Decree becomes effective upon ext:cution "by the parties and entry

by the Court.

\VE CONSENT:

0 c-\-b~
_. DATED this ~_ day or-Septembe.r:,. 2003.
TL

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

~LL-

By:. ~=:=:::'=-:~-=--~=BRETT T. DeLANGE
Deputy Attorney General
Civil Litigation Division

_

~ATED thl'£_d.YOf~::~.

APPROVED AND SO ORDERED.

JOEL D. HORTON
District Court Judge

CONSENT DECREE - 7
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KATHRYN A. snCKLEN
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

NO.

~---

A.M.

.....P.M..

Fll.£O

AUG 0 3 2007
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clem
ByABBYTER
OEf'lJ'rY

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State 8t, Lower Level
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Teleph~ne: (208) 334-2424
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073
breftdelange@ae.idaho.gov
Attorneys for the State of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General

)

Case No.

C¥

oc

0714037

Plaintiff,
VERIFIED
COl\1PLAINT

vs.
JOSEPH ANDERSON, d/b/a
SMOKIN JOES,

_ _---=D....::.e~fe;.=:n=d:.::;;;an;::.;t.=---

)
BACKGROUND

1.

In 1999, the Idaho Legislature found that cigarette smoking presents serious

public health concerns to the State of Idaho and to Idaho citizens. Idaho Code § 39-7801(a).
Indeed, the Legislature has detennined that "[t]obacco is the number one killer in Idaho causing
more deaths by far than alcohol, illegal drugs, car crashes, homicides, suicides, fires and AIDS
combined," and that tobacco usage is "the single most preventable cause of death and disability

in Idaho." Idaho Code § 39-5701.
EXHIBIT
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2.

Noting that the Surgeon General of the United States has also detennined that

smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease and other serious diseases, the Idaho Legislature
found that cigarette smoking presents serious financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under
certain health-care programs, the State may have a legal obligation to provide medic~ assistance
to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons
may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (a) and

(b). Under these programs, the Legislature found. the State pays millions of dollars each year to
provide medical assistance to perSons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking.
Idaho Code § 39-7801 (c).
3.

The Idaho Legislature has also concluded that the financial burdens imposed on

the State by cigarette smoking should be borne by tobacco product manufacturers, rather than by
the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either detenrune to enter into settlement
. agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (d).
4.

On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers

entered into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement, II with the State
of Idaho. The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial
sums to the State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to
the pursuit of public health interests; and to make substantial changes in their advertising and
marketing practices and corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking.
Idaho Code § 39-7801(e).
5.

Promptly thereafter, the Idaho Legislature declared that it would be contrary to

the policy of the State of Idaho if a tobacco product manufacturers could detennine not to enter
into such a settlement agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) and thereby
use the resulting cost advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise,
without ensuring that the State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are
proven to have acted culpably. This legislative detennination was driven. in part, by the fact that

'VERIFIED
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many diseases caused by tobacco usage often do not appear until many years after the affected
individual begins smoking. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (a) and (£).
The Idaho Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State of

6.

Idaho to require that nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to
guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large,
short-tenn profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise. Idaho Code §

39-7801(£).
7.

Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho

Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (the Master Settlement
Agreement Act). In essence, the Master Settlement Agreement Act requires ''tobacco product
manufacturers" to either: (l) "[b]ecome a par:ncipating manufacturer (as that term is defmed in
Section

lIuD

of the Master Settlement Agreement) and generally perfonn its fmancial

obligations under the Ma\1er Settlement Agreement," or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund
the amounts required by Idaho Code § 3 9-7803(b)(1) of the Master Settlement Agreement Act.
8.

In 2003, the Idaho Legislature decided that violations of the Master Settlement

Agreement Act

threatem~

not only the integrity of Idaho's agreement with the tobacco

companies, but also the fiscal soundness of the state and public health and responded with
procedural enhancements to help prevent such violations through adoption of the Idaho Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Complementary Act), codified at Title

39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code.

Idaho Code § 39-8401.

Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the

Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to sell, offer or possess for sale in Idaho
cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included on Idaho's Directory
of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and. Brand Families (Idaho Tobacco Directory).
9.

This lawsuit is being filed because Defendant Joseph Anderson has been advised

of these provisions of Idaho law relating to the sale of tobacco products, but has nevertheless
violated them. His unIa"i~ actions, spelled out below, undermine and undercut the Idaho
Legislature's stated goals and concerns with respect to tobacco sales and usage. Specifically,
\'~RIFIED
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Defendant has sold over one million eight hundred thousand cigarettes of a brand family that is
not and has never been on the Idaho Tobacco Directory.

JUlUSDICTION, PARTIES, AND VENUE
10. This Court bas subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and this matter for the
relevant time period that is the subject ofthis Verified Complaint pursuant to the Complementary
Act

11.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and the Complementary

Ac~

this Court has

personal jurisdiction over Defendant Joseph Anderson. Specifically, for purposes of Section 5
514, Defendant has transacted business within Idaho. For purposes of the Complementary Act,
Defendant is a person who has sold or offered for sale in Idaho over one million cigarettes of a
brand family not included on the Idaho Tobacco Directory.

Furthermore, Defendant has

expressly, and in writing, consented "to be sued in Idaho District Court for the purposes of the
State of Idaho enforcing any provisions of .. Jdaho Code § 39-8401 et seq...."
12.
authoriz~

Lawrence G. Wasden is the Attorney General of the State of Idaho.

He is

and has the duty, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 39-8406, and 39-8407 (Supp.) of the

Complementary Act, to investigate and prosecute violations of the Act on behalf of the State of
Idaho.
13.

Defendant is an out-of-state individual doing business as Smokin Joes. Defendant

both manufacturers and sells cigarettes.
14.

Because Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Idaho venue is proper in this

Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
15.

Defendant Joseph Anderson sells, offers for sale, and ships cigarettes to Idaho

consumers, including retailers located in Idaho.
16.

Defendant's principal place of business is located at 4900 Indian Hill Road,

Le'wiston, New York, 14092-9721.
17.

Defendant also manufacturers a variety of cigarette brand families.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4
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18.

According to reports Defendant has provided, for the time period 2005 through

2006 he sold 1,836.000 Buffalo cigarettes to Idaho conswners. including Idaho retailers.
19.

During the time period of 2005 through 2006 the Buffalo cigarette brand family

has not and is not on the Idaho Tobacco Directory. Even today the Buffalo cigarette brand is not
on the Directory.

-CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO COMPLE:MENTARY ACT

20.

The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs.

21.

Defendant Joseph Anderson has been notified in writing of his responsibilities as

a manufacturer and seller of tobacco products under the Complementary Act.

Specifically.

Defendant has been advised, in part. that the Complementary Act prohibits selling and offering
to sell cigarettes of brand families that are not included on the Idaho Tobacco Directory.

22.

Despite receiving such notice. Defendant violates the Complementary Act's

provisions by selling the Buffalo cigarette brand family, which is not listed on the Idaho Tobacco
Directory. Defendant's sales of cigarettes of a brand family that is not included on the Idaho
Tobacco Directory violates Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) ofthe Complementary Act.

23.

Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states, in Part. that each sale

or offer to sell of a cigarette in violation of Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of that Act
constitutes a separate violation. For each violation, the Court may impose a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed the greater of five hundred percent (5000.10) of the retail value of the
cigarettes or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a detennination of violation of Section 39

8403(3).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Court:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 5
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1. Find that Defendant Joseph Anderson has violated Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the
Complementary Act by selling or offering for sale cigarettes of a brand family not included in
the Idaho Tobacco Directory.
2. Find that Defendant's multiple violations of the Complementary Act constitute
separate violations thereof and award judgment against Defendant for civil penalties in the
amount of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes unlawfully sold, or
five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation, whichever is greater.
3. Award judgment ag$lst Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable costs,
expenses, and attorney's fe.e5 in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho Code § 39-8407(5) of
the Complementary Act.
4. Award the Attorney General such other, further, or different relief, as the Court
considers appropriate.

DATED this

-rei
.;,.
of August, 2007.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATIORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

IDAG142762
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County ofAda

)

) ss.

BElli A. KlTTELMANN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that she is a
Paralegal in the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General, that she has
read the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best of her
knowledge, information, and belief.

~~
BETH A. KITTELMANN
.
Office of the Attorney General

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3,-d-day of

@~

,2007.

~&:6Idf?

NOTARY
,
Residence: trltJu diaA , z:I)
Commission Expires:
1(- 30 . .-1) 7
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RECEIVEr

AUG 0..3 2(}f''!
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN Ada CountY Clal;
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

AUG

a ?ZfJJlJ

J. U/I,'·!IO NAVARRO, Clerk

BRE'IT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
.
Consumer Protection Division
. Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State St, Lower Level
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

ByJ KENNEDY
DEPUTY

Attomeys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General
Plaintiff,
CONSENT
DECREE

vs.
JOSEPH ANDERSON, d/b/a
SMOKIN JOES,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden
(Attorney General), and defendant Joseph Anderson, doing business as Smokin Ioes, have
consented to the entry of this Consent Decree, pursuant to the terms and conditions contained
herein.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act.

The Court also has personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho
Code § 5-404.
EXHIBIT
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE .
I.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho

Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act.

The Court also has personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho
Code § 5-404.
PARTffiS
2.

The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The

Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
Complementary Act, to bring this action and settle it on behalf of the State ofIdaho.
DEFINITIONS
3.

Unless otherwise specified, the following shall apply:

A.
Brand Family means all styles of Cigarettes sold under the same
trademark and differentiated from one another by means of additional modifiers or
descriptors including, but not limited to, Itmenthol, n "lights, n "ldngs," and "100s,'
and includes any brand Dame (alone or in conjunction with any other word)
trademark, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable pattern of colors, or
any other indicia of product identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with,
a previously known brand ofCigarettes.

B.
Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be
b\lIIled or heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1)
any roll of tcffiacco Wrapped "iii paper"or'ili aily su15stmee- riot coritairiiiig" tooacco; .or
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is functional in the product~ which, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of
tobacco wrapped in any substance· containing tobacco which, because of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause
(1) of this definition. The term "cigarettell includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any
tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, "consumers as tobacco for making
cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your
own" tobacco shall c:onstitute one (1) individual tlcigarette.r'
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C.
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended.

D.
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act
(Complementary Act) means that act codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code,
as amended.
E.
Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and
related documentc;) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers.
F.
M~ufacturer

Nonparticipating manufacturer means any Tobacco Product
that is not a member of the Master Settlement Agreement.

G.
Tobacco Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of
enactment of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (1)
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the
United' States, including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through
an importer (except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer (as
that term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master
Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first
purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured
anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3)
Becomes -3 ,successor·afan entity deseribed-in paragraph (1) Of- (2} af.this subsection.
The term "tobaccoproduct manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a Tobacco
Product Manufacturer unless such affiliate itself faIls within any of paragraphs (1)
through (3) oftbis subsection.
H
Stamping agent means a person that is authorized or required to affix
tax stamps to packages or other containers of Cigarettes under Title 63, Chapter 25,
Idaho Code.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Joseph Anderson, doing business as Smolcin

Joes (hereafter referred to as Smokin Ioes), shall:
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Not possess, transport to, acquire for sale, sell or offer for sale to
locations in Idaho or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to
Cigarettes of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless the Tobacco Product
Manufacturer is listed on the Attorney General's Directory of Compliant Tobacco
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory). The Directory is located at:
A.

http://www2.st:dte.id.us/aglconsumerltobacco/directoryindex.htm
B.
Provide the Attorney General with quarterly reports of Cigarette
sales on fonns provided by the Attorney General. All necessary foons are located
at:

http://www2.state.id.us/aglconsumer/tobacco/nonparticipating.htm#Forms
C.
Within 30 days of execution of this Consent Decree, provide the
Attorney General a list, updated as necessary, of each Brand Family manufactured
by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Smokin Joes intends to possess, transport
to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax
stamps.
. D.

For a period of two years after execution of this Consent Decree,
provide the Attorney General at least 15 days notice prior to
possessing,. transporting, acquiring for sale in Idaho or affixing or
causing to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to a Brand Family
manufactured by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Smokin
Jaes-has-net-pre'ViG1:ls1y-adv-ised-the-Attemey--Gener-al-that-it-i-atenElss---
to possess, transport to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or
cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps.

SMOKIN JOES PAYMENT TO THE AITORNEY GENERAL
4.

Smokin

JOf~

shall pay Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00),

payable to "Office of Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division," for settlement of all
disputed issues concerning its duties under the Complementary Act with respect to Cigarettes for
the time period of 2005 through the date this Consent Decree is executed; provided, however.

that Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($3,750) of this amount shall be waived and
not payable so long as Smokin loes complies with all of the terms of this Consent Decree.
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Smokin 10es shall remit the above-referenced $3,750 in two payments. The first payment
of One Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,875) shall be due within ten (10) days
of the execution of this Consent Decree. The second payment of One Thousand Eight Hundred
Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,875) shall be due within sixty (60) days of the execution of this
Consent Decree. Both checks shall be in the fonn of a cashier's check and sent to the notice
address provided in paragraph 14 below.
If, after a period of five (5) years from the date of the execution of this Consent Decree,
Smokin Joes has continued to comply with all of its tenns, this Three Thousand Seven Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($3,750) shall be permanently waived.

REPORTING
5.

For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Smokin Joes

shall make available to the Attorney General upon 21 days' notice all reasonable d~cuments and
records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be
provided at Smokin Joes' expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any
three-month period, in which case the reasonable expense of copies for additional requests shall
be borne by the Attorney General.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--NON-WAJYER.:eRO'V-ISIONS

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall preclude the Attomey General from
. ,
exercising any administrative, legal, or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the
6.

.

provisions of this Consent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that
Smokin Joes violates any provision of this Consent Decree or any other laws of the State of
Idaho.
7.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Smokin Ioes' duty

to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, rules, or pennits.
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8.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful

powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho, including the power to request, demand or
compel production of documents or the testimony ofwitnesses.
SEVERABILITY
9

The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any

provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other
provisions ofthis Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect.
APPLICATION
10.

This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Smokin loes and shall apply to

Smokin Joes and Smokin Joes' agents, employees,

r~presentatives,

successors and assigns,

jointly and severally, while acting personally or through any corporation, other business entity,
or person whose acts, practices, or policies are directed, formulated, or controlled by Smokin
loes.
DISTRlCf COURT APPROVAL
11.

This Consent Decree shall be filed concurrently with the accompanying

Complaint and shall be subject to the approval of the District Court of Ada County, Idaho.

SERTICE
12.

Bmokin Joes agrees to accept service of a confonned copy of this Consent Decree

by prepaid' fiiSt 'ClaSs mail seritto Sinoldri. Joes' corporate office. Smokin' loes'expressl:f waives
personal service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint
after they have been filed with the Court.
REOPENING OF TIUS MATTER
13.

Matters set forth in this Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attorney General

for further proceedings if Smokin Joes violates any term of this Consent Decree. The At1;orney
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law. If the
Court finds that Smokin Joes has violated any tenn of this Consent Decree, for a period of five
(5) years from the date of execution of this Consent Decree, the Three Thousand Seven Hundred
CONSENT DECREE - 6
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Fifty Dollars ($3,750) presently waived in paragraph four shall be due and owing and shall be in
addition to and not in any replacement for any financial penalty the Court determines to impose
upon Smolcin Ioes as a consequence of its violations of the Consent Decree.

NOTICE
14.
All notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows:
For the Attorney General:
For Smokin Joes :
Office of the Attorney General
Smokin Joes
Consumer Protection Division
4900 Indian Hill Road
Lewiston, NY 14092-9721
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attention: Smoldn loes Consent Decree
Paige S. Fitzgerald
Troutman Sanders LLP
1001 Haxall Point
Richmond, VA 23219

AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THIS STIPULATION
15.

Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants

that he or she is duly authorized to do so.

MISCELLANEOUS
16.

This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attomey General.

17.

This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Smokin Ioes that any of

-----------_.---------------------:------------......;"....--
its acts and practices violates Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act or Idaho's
ComplementaryAot.
18.

This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enabling the

parties to apply for such further order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate.
19.

This Consent Decree becomes effective upon execution by the parties and entry

by the Court.

IDAG142370
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WE CONSENT:
DATED this:>

day

of~ilooljLAWRENCE G. WASDEN
AlTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

L

By:

BREIT T. DeLANGE
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division

DATED this

aD

day

of July, 2007.

Anderson, doing business as Smokin Joes

. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -..
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DATED this Ji.~_ day Of--l~lL!I!!!:.:pt::==.....+--.:..--

--"

2007.

~cP.fIt~

DISTRICTGE

Fourth Judicial District

.
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,...

,c-..
"

.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by placing
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

2007, r caused to be
copy thereof in the United States

Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office ofthe Attorney General
STATEHOUSE MAIL
Smokin Joes
4900 Indian Hill Road
Lewiston, NY 14092 9721
w

Paige S. Fitzgerald
Troutman Sanders LLP
1001 Haxall Point
Richmond, VA 23219

_._._----------_._-----------~
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KAni~ STIC EN
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

,\i,.{,__

r'

_;:.M.

.

_

AY 1 320111

BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
Office of.the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State St., Lower Level
P. O. BOI 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

J. D.!.V!· ~JAV.t\RAO, Cfer'1C
9!" i( F.i:!r~ Mt'll'JGaLJ
OE?UTY

Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
URTH JUDICIAL D STRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OR THE COUNTY F ADA
)

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General

~

aseNo.

)

DC 030 684D

~

Plaintiff,

~

n.

YAKIMA DISTRIBUTING COMPANY )
INC., a Washington corporation,
~
Defendant.

)

1. In 1999, the Idaho Legislature, in en

'ng the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement

Agreement Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq.,

d that cigarette smoki g presents serious

public health concerns to the state of Idaho and to

aho citizens. Indeed,

has determined that smoking causes lung cancer,
that there are hundreds of thousands of tobacco-r
These diseases most often do not appear until m

e Surgeon General

disease, and other s .OllS diseases, and
~

ted deaths in the Unite States each year.

years after the person 'n question begins

smoking.
2. The Idaho Legislature further found

presents serious

financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under c

'n health-care programs, the state may have

EXHIBIT
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c..,
a legal obligation to provide medical assistan

to eligIble persons:fi

associated with cigarette smoking, and those

health conditions
itlement to receive

such medical assistance.
3. Under these programs, the Legisla

0

dollars each year to provide medical assistance t

pays millions of

ersons for health condit ns associated with

cigarette smoking.
it would be the policy f the State of Idaho

4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded
that financial burdens imposed on the State by c·

tte smoking be borne y tobacco product

manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the ext

that such manufac

enter into settlement agreements with the State or

found culpable by the

S. On November 23, 1998, leading Unite

either determine to

ufacturers entered

into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master S
The Master Sett1e~ent Agreement obligates thes

anufacturers to pay sub tantial sums to the

State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fun a national foundation de oted to the pursuit

hanges in their adverti ing and marketing

of public health interests; and to make substanti
, practices and corporate culture with the intention 0
6. The Idaho Legislature declared that it
Idaho if tobacco product manufacturers who de

.ne not to enter into such a settlement

agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product man:

turers) could use a resul ing cost advantage

to derive large, short-term profits in the years befo

liability may arise witho t ensuring that the

state will have an eventual source of r~overy

them if they are pli en to have acted

'.

f Idaho to require

culpably. The Legislature thus detemrined that it .
that nonparticipating tobacco product manufactu

establish a reserve

source of compensation and to prevent such m

d to guarantee a
large, short-tenn

profits and then becoming judgment-proofbefore Ii
7. Accordingly, shortly after the Master

lement Agreement was signed, the Idaho
nt Agreement Act (the' ct"). In essence,

Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settle
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2
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the Act requires ''tobacco product manufac

Of

to either:

manufacturer (as that term is defined in Section

..) of the Master Settle

generally perform its financial obligations under

Master Settlement A

me a participating

ment:' or (2) place

into a qualified escrow fund the amounts requir
8. In 2002, the Idaho Legislature fo
product manufacturers are not complying with

.cipating tobacco
e provisions of Idaho's Act (non-compliant

tobacco product manufacturers). Finding that co
State of Idaho, the Legislature detemrined that r

d stamping agents

only to affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho e .ise tax stamps to cigar es made or sold by
tobacco product manufacturers that are either si

IDries to the Master Settl

are complying with Idaho's Act would significan

improve compliance wi the Act

9. Thus, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature
or stamping agents from affixing or causing to be

ent Agreement or

ded the Act to prohibit +garette distributors
xed Idaho excise tax stJrnps to cigarettes of

non-compliant tobacco product manufacturers.

PARTIES, JURISDIC
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7804(c) 0

N, AND VENUE
e Act, the Attorney Oeo rat is authorized to

bring this civil action to enforce the Act
II. Based upon information and belief,

endant Yakima Distrib ing Company Inc.
principal place of bus ess at 521 S. 2nd

("Yakima") is a Washington corporation and has
Avenue, Yakima, Washington 98902-3537.
12. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and I

0

Code § 39-7804(c) of e!.Act, this Court

has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant becau it is a licensed distributo
caused to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to
cigarettes for sale in Idaho, thereby transacting bus

. gly distributed
S5 within

this state and

ailing itself of the

privilege ofconducting activities within the state.
13. Because the Defendant is a non-residen fthe State of Idaho, ven e is proper in this
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.
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14. The Defendant affixes or causes to b
which are then distributed for sale in Idaho, and i
15. According to tax reports filed by

fendant with the Idab

Tax Commission,

Defendant affixed or caused to be affixed Idaho

cise tax stamps to 2,96 000 cigarettes from

July to November 2002. All of these cigarettes

ere manufactured by no -compliant tobacco

product manufacturers.
16. Accordingly, the Defendant has violat

llSing to be affixed

the Act by affixing or

Idaho excise tax stamps to cigarettes of these non- mpliant tobacco product anufacturers.
17. The Defendant was notified in wri .
stamping agent under Idaho Code § 39-7804 of

of its responsibilities

a distributor and

Act, pursuant to lette!s

ted May 20, 2002,

July 9, 2002, September 20, 2002 and October 2,

Act and nevertheless proceeded to violate the Act'

FIRST CAUSE
18. The Attorney General incorporates

reference the

m

paragraphs 1 through 17 herein.

it only to affixing or c

19. The Defendant knew of the law limiti
Idaho excise tax stamps 1.0 cigarettes of tobacco pr

"ng to be affixed

ct manufacturers compl .ng 'with the Act.

20.1be Defendant's affixing or causing

be affixed Idaho ex 'se tax stamps to

2,967,000 cigarettes from July to November 2002

of non-compliant

tobacco product manufacturers, are knowing viola:

of the Act.

'.

21. Idaho Code § 39-7804(c) of the Act s
stamps to cigarettes f a non-compliant

agent that affixes or causes to be affixed Idaho exc"

tax

tobacco product manufacturer is subject to the s

liability provisions that a tobacco product

manufacturer faces for violating Section 39-78

) of the Act, purs

Section 39
i

7803 (b)(3).

I
-.

.11

r-···-·· . . --·
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22. For a knowing violation of the Act»

civil penalty to be as essed against the

Defendant, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(

) of the Act, should b

exceed 15% of the amount improperly withheld ft

.olation and in a

total amount not to exceed 300% of the amount im

w. At the rate of

15% per day, the civil penalty for the total amount' properly withheld fro
to November 2002 exceeds 300%. Therefore»
Defendant in the amount of 300% ofthe amount im
23. The amount improperly withheld fro

o

7803(b)(l) oftbe Act, is $45,628.01 (2,967,000 cig

Code § 39

penalty of300%

is $136,884.03 ($45,628.01 times 3.00), which this

urt should assess agains the Defendant for

I

its knowing violations of the Act.

,

SECOND CAUSE FACTION
-

~ome-y-Gener:al·-inGOIpeFates-I:ll·.e-aJ:egatiGns-set-f.grth..in- p

graphs. 1- tbrQugh

23 herein.

25. Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(C) of th

ct provides that in the case of a second

knowing violation, a tobacco product manufac

er shall also be prohi ited from selling

cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho fi

a period not to exceed

any cigarette distributor or stampmg agent may be

ohibited from stamping

d/or distributing

26. The Defendant has committed two kno ng violations of the Ac

Specifically» the

cigarettes in Idaho for a period not to exceed 2 ye

.

~

ping and distributing

August, September, October and November 2002,

d did so after separate

Defendant has knowingly violated the Act by

'.

Act's applicability to distributors and stamping ag

..

fDAG084535
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'"

egations set forth in p agraphs 1 through

27. The Attorney General incoIporates th
26 herein.
28. Alternatively, Defendant's violations

I

daho Code § 39-7804(c of the Act are non

knowing violations ofthe Act.

29. For a non-knowing violation of the

ct, the civil penalty

sessed against the

Defendant, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b) I (A) of the Act, should e an amount not to
exceed 5% of the amount improperly withheld fro

escrow per day ofthe vi lation and in a total

amount not to exceed 100% of the amount impro

ly withheld from escro

At the rate of 5%

per day, the civil penalty for the total amount'
November 2002 exceeds 100%.

crow from July to

Therefore, thi

ourt should impose a civil penalty upon

Defendant in the amount of 100% ofthe amount i
30. 'The amount improperly withheld

escrow, pursuant to dalio Code § 39

i

7803(b)(1) of the Act, is $45,628.01. A l?enalty 0 ,00% is $45,628.01 ($45 28.01 times 1.00),
tions of the Act.

which this Court should assess against the Defend

REQUESTFO
The Attorney General respectfully asks that
1. Find that the Defendant has violated I
stamps to cigarettes ofnon-compliant manufacture

a Code § 39·7804 of

from July to November 002.

2. Find that the Defendant's violations a I abo Code § 39-7804
two separate violations thereof; and that these vio

e Act by affixing

ions are, for purposes

0

the Act constitute

0

Idaho Cod~ § 39
'.

7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, knowing violations; an award judgment against the Defendant for

civil penalties in the amount of 300% of the escro

eld, for a total of

$136,884.03.
itionallyenjoin and pro Obit the Defendant

3. Upon finding two knowing violations,

from stamping and distributing cigarettes within

State of Idaho for the,

two years.

ID
~GO
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were not knowing

4. In the alternative, if the Court finds

t of 100% of the

violations, award judgment against Defendant fo

escrow amounts improperly withheld, for a total $
5. Award judgment against the Defendan or all of the Attorney

action, as authorized

costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing
7804(c) ofthe Act
6. Award the Attorney General such
considers appropriate.

,further, or different

0

rc-

DATED this (:3 day of May, 2003.

I
AWRENCE G. WA
ITORNEY GENE
TATE OF IDAHO

y-~==-:=~,....-:;<'-1:-:;~;::;:-----

BREITT. e

GE

Deputy Attome General
Consumer Prot dian Unit
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VERIF1
STATE OF IDAHO
County ofAda

TJON

)
) ss.
)

MELODY R. WHIGAM. being first duly

om on oath, deposes d says that she is an
Ice of the Attorney Gen
that she has read
therein are true to the b st of her knowledge,

Investigator in the Civil Litigation Division ofthe
the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the f1
information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before m

-4-L-->::>..Io"'T7"1-----"

~"-
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_ _ ..:t

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

N~,

COpy
flfH)

A~.1._._->f.M.

- BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit
.' Office of the Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
'" ... > 650 W. State St., Lower Level
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424

MAY 14200]
~. D~MD NAVAF..RO, C!edt
B~ L.VNOA M&eKINNON
OfJ"'i'TY

Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fe ~lURTH JUDICIAL DI1STRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND fOR THE COUNTY 0 F ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by: and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General
Plaintiff,

~ONSENT

trECREE

VS.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through i is Attorney General, Lawence G. Wasden

(Attorney General), defendant Yakima Distributinl Company Inc., ,a WashiI gton corporation,
has consented to the entry of this Consent Decree, p ~~uant to the tenns and co ditions contained

herein.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJl II GED, AND DECREED, as follows:

JURISDICTION A Nil VENUE

1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the p II'ties and this matter pursu mt to Idaho Code
I

§ 1-705, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

EXHIBIT
CONSEl\T'f DECREE - 1

_

I~

IDAG084523
000937

L
PAR
2.

The parties to this Consent Decre , are as set forth in the bove caption. The

Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to Idah

ode § 39-7804(c), to b

g this action and

settle it on behalf ofthe State ofIdaho.

3.

Unless otherwise specified, the folIo

Cigarette means any product t at contains nicotine, is i tended to be
A.
burned or heated under ordinary conditions f use, and consists of 0 contains (1)
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in
substance not containin tobacco; or
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is functiona
the product, which, b ause of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the lier, or its packaging an labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, co
ers as a cigarette; or ( ) any roll of
tobacco wrapped in any substance cont . g tobacco which, be ause of its
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the ller, or its packaging an labeling, is
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, co
ers as a cigarette descri ed in clause
(1) of this defInition. The term "cigarett" includes 'Iroll-your-o II (i.e., any
,packaging, or labeling i suitable for
tobacco which, because of its appearance,
use and likely to be offered to, or purchase 'y, consumers as tobacc for making
cigarettes). For purposes of this definition 0 cigarette," 0.09 ounces f "roll-your
own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individ
Ilcigarette."

. B.

Idaho Tobacco Master Settl
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code,

ent Agreement Act m
amended.

s that act

C.
Master Settlement Agreemen eans the settlement a
related documents) entered into on Novemb r 23, 1998, by the State
leading United States Tobacco Product Manu turers.

To~acco

D.
Product Manufactur
enactment of tllis act directly (and not
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such
United States, including Cigarettes intended
an importer (except where such importer is
that term is defined in the Master Settlement
the payments under the Master Settlement A
as a result of the provisions of subsectio

Imeans an entily that aile

the date of
·Iusively through any
lliate) (1)
ufacturer intends to b sold in the
! be sold in the United St tes through
. 'ginal participating man aeturer (as
eement) that will be re onsible for
ment with respect to sue Cigarettes
s ll(mm) of the Master Settlement

-~~~~~~~2~
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Agreement and that pays the taxes speci d in subsection II(z) 0 the Master
Settlement Agreement, and provided that
manufacturer of such C' arettes does
not market or advertise such Cigarettes' the United States); (2 Is the first
the Uni e States of Cigarettes anufactured
purchaser anywhere for resale
anywhere that the manufacturer does not int
to be sold in the United. tates; or (3)
Becomes a successor of an entity described' aragraph (1) or (2) ofth s subsection.
Hate of a
The tenn flTobacco Product Manufacture ' shall not include an
affiliate itself falls
any of
Tobacco Prpduct Manufacturer unless su
paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection.
I

m

1thin

INJUNCTIVE

3.

LIEF

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

at Yakima Distributin

Company Inc.

(hereinafter Yaldma Distributing) shall:
A.
Not affix or cause to be affiX Idaho excise tax stamps 0 Cigarettes
of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless e Tobacco Product Ma ufacturer is
eement or is expressly dentified by
either a signatory to the Master Settlement
the Attorney General, in writing or purs . t to an Internet po . g, as being
compliant with Idaho's Tobacco Master Settl ent Agreement Act.
I

B.

vide the Attorney Ge eral with a
Beginning June 1, 2003,
complete list of each brand of Cigarette th t has affixed or caused 0 be affixed
; tho Included in the Ii ing of each
Idaho excise tax stamps for the previous
brand of Cigarette, Yakima Distributing sh identify the number of igarettes of
each brand listed that it has affixed or cause o be affixed Idaho exc' tax stamps
for that month. Yakima Distributing shal e deemed in complian e with this
I tax reports to the Id 0 State Tax
paragraph upon providing the monthly CG
Commission.
C.
Provide the Attorney General
or causing to be affixed Idaho excise tax st
that Yakima Distributing has not previously
affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho excise
YAKIMA DISTRIBUTING PAYMENT
4.

Yakima Distributing shall pay T

payable to "Office of Attorney General, Cons
disputed issues concerning a stamping agent's duti

least 15 days notice pri r to affixing
s to a brand or brands f Cigarettes
vised the Attorney Oen ral that it is
stamps.
THE ATTORNEY G NERAL
ty- Two Thousand Dol ars ($22,000.00),

r Protection Unit," for settlement of all

1

and the fixing of Idaho. xcise tax stamps
".

'-.

.
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.,

on cigarettes by Yakima Distributing for the tim

eriod of July, August, eptember, October

and November 2002. This amount shall be due te

10) days after both parti s sign this Consent

Decree and will

5.

b~

made by cashier's check.

For a period of three years from

of this Conse

Decree, Yakima

eneral, upon 30 days no .ce, all reasonable

Distributing shall make available to the Attorney
documents and records to assess compliance wi

.s Consent Decree. Th se documents and

records shall be provided at Yakima Distributing

expense unless the req est is made more

frequently than once in any three·month period, in

hich case the reasonabl expense of copies

for additional requests shall be borne by the Attorn

NON·WAIVERP

6.

Nothing in this Consent Decree

all preclude the Atto ey General from

exercising any administrative, legal, or equitabl : emedies a.vailable to
provisions of this ConSent Decree, or to enforce th

aws of the State of Idah ,in the event that

Yakima Distributing violates any provision of this

nsent Decree or any oth r laws of the State

of Idaho.

7.

hall be construed as elieving Yakima

Nothing in. this Consent Decree

Distributing's duty to comply with all applicable fe ral, state, and local laws,' regulations, rules,
or permits.

8.

e construed to limit or

Nothing in this Consent Decree sh

powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idah

odify any lawful

including the power to :r quest, demand or

compel production of documents or the testimony 0

9.

be severable and should any

The provisions of this Consent

provision be declared by a court of competent

.sdiction to be unenfo eable, the other

provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment sh 1remain in full force and
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APPLICA1: IN
10.

This Consent Decree shall be bindin upon Yakima Distributi g and shall apply

to Yakima Distributing, its agents, employees, repfesentatives, successors

d assigns, jointly

and severally, while acting personally or through lilly corporation, other b iness entity, or
person whose acts, practices, or policies are dire :ted, formulated, or con

lIed by Yakima

Distributing.
DISTmCTCOURT~PPROVAL

11.

This Consent Decree shall be fi e~ concurrently with

Complaint and shall be su~ject to the approval of the District Court of Ada Co
has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho

e accompanying
ty, Idaho, which

ode § 39-7804 and per onal jurisdiction,

pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514.

SERVIC

12.

Yakima Distributing agrees to accept

~rvice of a conformed co y of this Consent

Yakima

Decree by prepaid first class mail sent to Yakim

Distributing's corporate office.

Distributing expressly waives personal service of a

nformed copy of this C nsent Decree and

the accompanying Complaint after they have been fi

l with the Court.

REOPENING OF Tl SMATTER
13.

Matters set fi)rth in this Consent Dec ~l may be reopened by the Attorney General

for further proceedings if Yakirna Distributing viol ~tes any term of this Co ent Decree. The
Attorney General may seek all rem.edies available to Ili m, both statutory and in

e common law.

NOne] :

14.

All notices under this Consent Decree Shall be sent as follows:

Civil Litigation Division

For Yakima Distri uting:
Bill Vernon
521 S. 2nd Avenue

P.O. Box 83720

Yakima, WA 9890 -3537

For the Attorney General:
Office of the Attorney General

Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attention: Yakima Distributing Consent Dec ~c e

IDAG084527
000941
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AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN
15.

Each person who signs this Consent

cree in a representative apacity warrants

that he or she is duly authorized to do so.

us

MISCELL
16.

This Consent Decree shall be enforce

e only by the Attorney

17.

This Consent Decree does not cons

te an admission by Y .. a Distributing

that any of its acts and practices violate Idaho's Tob

18.

0

Master Settlement Agr ement Act.
of enabling the

This Court retains jurisdiction over

parties to apply for such further order or direptives a
19.

This Consent Decree becomes effect

upon execution by the parties and entry

by the Court.
WE CONSENT:
DATED this

(1) 17-.day of May, 2003.
WASDEN
LAWRENCE
ATTORNEY
NERAL
STATE OF T~I"';ITTO

BY:~~"
BRETT T. De
Deputy Atto
Civil Litigatio

.......
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DATED this

-L- day of May, 2002.
YAKIMADI

Name:

--I!+-----I~Io.J;__;~~'---X,;~-----

Signature: --fI+--~IlQ..-_~--+------

Title: _ _

-#+_---..;.~_ft.._~_5_~

f__---
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.

'

•.

~

APPROVED AND SO ORDERED.

DATED:

_--z.::J!1AY 1 4 1111

-

---~"''''''J ~ ~~..,
District ourt Judge

!

.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney G(~neral
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Facsimile: (208) 334-4151
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-75:30
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

---------------

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
) PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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ORIGINAL

INTRODUCTION
Nothing has changl;:d factually or legally since the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax
Commission (Plaintiffs) filed their motion for summary judgment in this case. The material facts
are still not in dispute. The relevant, applicable law has not changed. The analysis employed by
this Court in granting the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is still valid and
availing.

These facts, the relevant law, and the applicable analysis establish that Defendant

Native Wholesale Supply Company (NWS) has unlawfully sold and imported into Idaho
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, and has done so despite being warned in writing of its violations of
Idaho's applicable tobacco laws.
NWS's violations fall into two specific categories. With respect to both categories, the
facts are not in dispute.
First, the cigarette brands NWS has sold to Idaho retailers are of brands manufactured by
a tobacco manufacturer that was not on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product
Manufacturers and Brand Families (the Idaho Directory) at the time of the sale. In fact, none of
the cigarette brands at issue has ever been on the Idaho Directory. Such sales violate the Idaho
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act), codified at
title 39, chapter 84, Idaho Code.

Second, NWS has sold these cigarettes at wholesale to Idaho retailers without obtaining a
cigarette wholesaler permit required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1). NWS has never even
applied for a permit.
NWS's response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is unpersuasive. It opposes
Plaintiffs by asserting arguments (I) already rejected by this Court; (2) not relevant to this case;
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and (3) not recognized by the Idaho or United States Supreme Court. Specifically, NWS argues
that because it is owned by a tribal member and, in its view, conducts its business on the tribal
member's reservation, it m:ed not comply with Idaho's laws relating to tobacco sales, including
the Complementary Act and the Idaho Cigarette and Tobacco Products Tax Act, because the
purchaser of its cigarettes is located on a separate Indian Reservation in Idaho. Finally, NWS
does not think it ought to pay ci viI penalties for the 100 million plus illegal cigarettes it has sold
into Idaho.
NWS's arguments do not withstand analysis, run counter to the Legislature's intent, and
are not supported constitutionally.

Indeed, these arguments, if adopted, would gut the

Legislature's public policil;:s and concerns with respect to tobacco sales and use, as discussed in
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3 - 5. They also
would tum Indian law principles on their head. Because there are no genuine issues of material
fact, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the relief requested
therein.

ARGUMENT
By way of quick background, NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and the
remedy for them are straight forward. The Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (l) selling,
offering, or possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for distribution or sale
in Idaho "cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the
directory." Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). Civil penalties and injunctive relief may be
imposed for violations of the Act. Idaho Code § 39-8406.
The undisputed fact is that since at least January 2004, NWS has sold at wholesale,
and/or imported or caused to be imported for sale or distribution in Idaho, over 100 million
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cigarettes to Idaho retailers for which neither the cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd (Grand River), were ever on the Idaho Directory.) And the
further undisputed fact is that NWS continued to engage in such sales after being advised by the
State of Idaho that such sales violated Idaho law. NWS makes various arguments in opposition,
none of which is availing.

I.

PLAINTIF'FS MAY REGULATE AND ADDRESS NWS'S ILLEGAL
CIGARETTE SALES

NWS first argues that it may, with impunity, sell and import or cause to be imported into
Idaho millions of cigarettes, regardless that Idaho law prohibits such sales.

Defendant's

Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment (Defendant's Memo.), pp. 2 - 10. NWS's
argument is essentially, if not verbatim, the very same contention that it raised previously in its
failed motion to dismiss and in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction,
which the Court granted.

In essence, it is that because NWS is owned by a member of the

Seneca Nation and is located on Seneca Nation land, it may with impunity sell its illegal
cigarettes in this case because the purchaser of these cigarettes, Warpath, Inc., is owned by a
member of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe and is located on the Coeur d' Alene Reservation in Idaho.
These arguments were rejected by this Court in its May 20, 2010 Memorandum Decision
and Order (Court Order), pp. 4 - 6. The Court's reasoning for doing so is still correct today for
several reasons.

I
After Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment, NWS finally provided Plaintiffs NWS's
sales invoices for its cigarette sales to Idaho retailers pursuant to Plaintiffs' longstanding discovery
requests. NWS's own documents establish even more unlawful sales than that previously reported by
Plaintiffs in their motion for summary judgment papers, which relied upon documents obtained from the
Las Vegas Foreign Trade Zone. NWS's own records establish that NWS imported or caused to be
imported into Idaho over 115 million cigarettes "of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not
included in the directory." Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). See Fourth Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann
(Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit), filed contemporaneously with this Reply Memorandum.
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First, the fact is that the recipient ofNWS's cigarettes-Warpath, Inc.-is not a member
of an Indian tribe but is instead a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. See Dole Food Co.
v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,474-75 (2003) (corporations have identities separate from that of
their owners); Baraga Prods., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
(incorporated business entity not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe simply because its sole
shareholder is); id. at 298 ("a corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from the
application of state law). This Court recognized this point in its Court Order at page 4.
As an Idaho corporation, Warpath is a nonmember of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. It has no
special status on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.

See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of

Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 161 (1980) ("[n]on-member [Indians] are not
constituents of the governing Tribe.

. [T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-

Indians resident on the reservation.") NWS's preemption arguments based upon the recipient of
its cigarettes are thus of no avail. Accord Court Order, p. 4. 2
NWS's preemption inquiry is equally unsuccessful if we look at the ultimate destination
of its cigarettes, a city located on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho. This is so because the
Supreme Court has "recognized the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to
exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on reservation
lands." County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 257-58 (1992). Tribal nonmembers, in other words, enjoy no special dispensation from
NWS contends that "[w]e are not here dealing with sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers,"
Defendant's Memo., p. 5, and that the characterization of Warpath as an "Idaho business" is "belied by
both the facts and the law." Jd. at p. 9, n. 1. The undisputed fact is that Warpath is an Idaho corporation.
See Second Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann, filed June 23, 2009, pp. 2 - 7, ,-r,-r 3 - 20. It is not a member of
the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. Further, the evidence is that Warpath sells its cigarettes, in part, to members of
the general public, including persons who are not Native Americans. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman,
filed June 23, 2009, pp. 1 .. 2, ,-r,-r 2 .. 5. It is thus incontrovertible that NWS is selling cigarettes to
nonmembers of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe who are in tum selling cigarettes to other nonmembers of the
Tribe.
2
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state law with respect to transactions with other nonmembers, regardless of where those
transactions occur.
NWS's argument that state law cannot apply to sales that originate on one reservation and
terminate on another reservation has not been accepted by the Courts.

In fact, it has been

rejected. As this Court noted in its May 20,2010 Court Order, p. 4, the Supreme Court has ruled
that Native American tribes do not have "supersovereign authority to interfere with another
jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax" activities within its borders. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,466 (1995); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983)
("'Congress did not intend to make tribal members 'super citizens' who could trade in a
traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed regulations.") Time and time
again the Supreme Court has emphasized that Indian law preemption focuses on commerce
within a tribe, not among tribes. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 & n. 7. Thus, as this Court also correctly
noted in its May 20, 2010 Court Order, p. 4, the State, for example, can require a tribal retailer to
obtain a state license for any sales to '''all non-Indians and all Indians who are not members of
the particular tribe.'" Quoting Colville. 447 U.S. at 160-61. 3
The words of the federal district court in Oklahoma are directly applicable to this case:
What [NWS] ultimately seeks in this case is something that no other
sovereign has-the ability of a Tribe to immunize goods made within its borders

J NWS cites to Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) as support for its
position here. The case does not uphold NWS. Moe contains four holdings: (I) Montana's personal
property tax could not be imposed on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on reservation:
(2) Montana's cigarette tax could not be imposed on Indian-to-Indian reservation sales; (3) Montana's
cigarette vendor license fee could not be charged to tribal retailers; and (4) Montana could require tribal
retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non-Indians with respect to reservation sales.
425 U.S. at 480-81,483. The Supreme Court did not announce any holdings immunizing from state law
anything remotely close to what NWS seeks here. As a side note, subsequently in Colville, the Supreme
Court made clear that with respect to Moe's second holding, a State is only precluded from taxing
cigarette sales made to a member of the governing reservation. Nonmembers of the reservation, even if
Native American, are subject to state taxation. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161.
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from taxation and regulation by other sovereigns once those goods leave its
boundaries. Just as China or New York State may not decree that their products
are immune from Oklahoma taxation when those goods enter this State, neither
maya Native American tribe claim such special treatment.
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Henry, No. CIV 10-019-JHP, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3
(E.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (internal citations omitted)
In summary, there is no such thing in the law as "reservation-to-reservation" or "supersovereignty" preemption that immunizes NWS from its tens of millions of illegal cigarette sales
and importation thereof into Idaho. It is as responsible to comply with Idaho law as any other
business that seeks to sell or ship cigarettes into Idaho.

II.

4

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT PROTECT NWS FROM
ITS ILLEGAL CIGARETTE SALES

NWS cites to

cas(~s

for the unremarkable proposition that federally recognized tribes

enjoy immunity from suit It further argues that such tribal immunity should apply to it. For
several reasons, such immunity is not available here. Defendant's Memo., pp. 11 - 14.
There is precedent that an enterprise may be clothed with a tribe's sovereign immunity
from suit if it operates as an extension of the tribe. See, e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d 1044, 1046 (9

th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1231 (2007). Determining whether an

entity acts as an arm of the tribe, however, rests on several factors, including incorporation under
tribal law, whether the business is managed by tribal official and operated to fulfill the tribe's
governmental objectives, and whether the business is owned by the tribe. State of Oklahoma v.
Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3d 199,210 (Okla. 2010).

~ Repeatedly in its discussion of Indian law, NWS contends that Plaintiffs may not require NWS to pay
a fee under the Complementary Act. See, e.g., Defendant's Memo., pp. 5, 7, 9. NWS also discusses "the
incidence of the tax imposed by the Complementary Act." Id., pp. 8, 9. NWS is seriously misguided.
The Complementary Act imposes no fees or taxes and the Plaintiffs have never made such an assertion.
NWS's decision to argue the point is therefore off-base and unhelpful, even as it is in error too.
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Here the facts do not support applying tribal sovereignty to NWS. While incorporated
under Sac and Fox tribal law, NWS operates out of a totally separate reservation, the Seneca
Nation. s There is no evidence that it is managed or owned by either tribe. Likewise, there is no
evidence that it is operated to further either tribe's governmental objectives. 6 NWS operates
solely as a private busine:ss for the personal profit of its owner who happens to be a Native
American belonging to the Seneca Nation. Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3 rd at
210-11. It is for these reasons, no doubt, that when NWS made these identical arguments to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Court rejected them. Id. The Court should reject them here anew
as it has done already. See Court Order, p. 5. 7

III.

NWS'S EFFORTS
UNPERSUASIVE

TO

DISTINGUISH STATE

V.

MAYBEE

ARE

NWS contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho
520,224 P.3d 1109 (2010), cert. denied 79 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010) (No. 09-1471), is
not applicable to this case. Defendant's Memo., pp. 14 - 18. NWS errs.
The Court in Maybee decided a number of issues, several of which are applicable to this
case. Specifically, the Maybee Court held that:

Court Order, p. 5.
Indeed, according to the President of the Seneca Nation, Barry E. Snyder Sr., the Seneca Nation has no
role whatsoever with Seneca brand cigarettes. "Snyder Vows Probe of Seneca Cigarettes," The Buffalo
News, March 10, 2009, accessed at http://www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/story/602680.htm! (last
viewed July 10,2009).
7 NWS cites to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), for the proposition that state law does not
"extend into Indian country." Defendant's Memo., p. 13. This rule was long ago discarded. As the
United States Supreme Court stated over 30 years ago, it was the rule even then that "[I]ong ago the Court
departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view that 'the laws of [a State] can have no force' within
reservation boundaries." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980), quoting
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. NWS's citation to Worcester is decades too late.
5
6
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(1) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "regulates
cigarettes, as defined by the [Idaho Master Settlement Agreement Act], not merely
'units sold. '" Maybee, 148 Idaho at _' 224 P.3d at 1116.
(2) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "is intended to
govern interstate as well as intrastate sales of cigarettes to consumers in the state of
Idaho," id., and because it is triggered by the sale of noncompliant cigarettes to
consumers in Idaho, it does not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. ld., 148 Idaho at

, 224 P.3d at 1120-21.

(3) The purpose of the Complementary Act is "to prevent the cigarettes of
Noncompliant Manufacturers from being sold to Idaho consumers," ld., 148 Idaho at_,
224 P.3d at 1120, and where title to the cigarettes at issue passes is irrelevant to that
determination. ld.
(4) The Complementary Act does not regulate the on-reservation activity of the
tribal member Internet cigarette seller in that case, but rather his "introduction of
Noncompliant Cigarettes into Idaho," ld. (emphasis added), and because this constitutes
conduct going off his reservation, pursuant to applicable federal Indian law precedent,
the tribal member Internet cigarette seller is properly subject to the Complementary
Act's provisions. ld. at ]48 Idaho at _,224 P.3d at 1122-24, citing Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,148-49 (1973).
In short, the Maybee case stands for the proposition that selling cigarettes which are
destined for Idaho but are non-compliant under the Complementary Act is an act that gives Idaho
Courts jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of that Act. Maybee's membership in the Seneca
Tribe did not protect him from application of Idaho's laws to activity that involved selling
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cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Likewise, the Native American status ofNWS's owner does not
somehow protect NWS here.
NWS's response is to attempt to distinguish Maybee on one ground, and it is that the
Idaho purchaser of NWS's cigarettes, Warpath, Inc., is located on a reservation, whereas the
purchasers of Maybee's products reside throughout Idaho. Defendant's Memo., p. 14. This is a
distinction without a difference. The fact is that Warpath, Inc. is not a member of an Indian tribe
but is instead a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. Because it is a nonmember of the
Coeur d' Alene Tribe, it has, as noted above, no special status on the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation. See

Colvilh~,

447 US at 161 ("[n]on-member [Indians] are not constituents of the

governing Tribe. . .. [T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the
reservation.") Thus, as far as Indian law is concerned, NWS's sales to Warpath are no different
than Maybee's sales to a consumer in Boise. In short, the Maybee case is dispositive here. 8

IV.

CIVIL PENALTIES MAY BE APPROPRIATELY ASSESSED HERE

NWS objects to the assessment of a civil penalty. It contends there is no evidence to
allow the Court to assess such a penalty, that the amount sought is excessive, and that the matter
can only be decided by a jury. Defendant's Memo., pp. 19 - 25. None of these arguments are
sustainable.

8 NWS cites to Ward v. State of New York, 291 F.Supp.2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) as support for its
position. Defendant's Memo., pp. 17 - 18. The case does not support NWS. The controversy there
involved enforcement of a New York statute prohibiting the direct shipment of cigarettes to consumers,
with a limited exception not applicable here. 291 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n. 3. The court there considered a
facial preemption challenge to the statute in several scenarios, including direct shipment from an on
reservation tribal business to a nonmember. It declined in that context to grant a preliminary injunction.
291 F. Supp. 2d at 203-05. That is the same scenario before the Court here. The fact that the court did
enjoin the statute from applying to transactions "from a tribe member on the reservation to another tribe
member on the reservation," id., 207, is of no relevance here, because that is not the case here. This case
is about New York-based NWS introducing into Idaho to an Idaho corporation millions of cigarettes
unlawful to be sold and imported into this State. It is not about NWS's cigarette sales to Seneca Nation
members on the Seneca Nation.
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A.

The Incontrovertible Evidence In This Case Establishes That NWS
Unlawfully Sold And Introduced Into Idaho Over 100 Million Cigarettes

NWS claims that there is no evidence supporting the assessment of a civil penalty. This
belies the undisputed facts of the case, which are that since January 2004, NWS has imported
and sold into Idaho over 100 million Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. 9 Because these cigarettes
have never been listed on the Idaho Directory, NWS has violated the Complementary Act.
Also undisputed, the Office of the Attorney General wrote NWS on June 5, 2008.
notifying NWS that its cigarette sales violated the Complementary Act and requested that NWS
cease its unlawful selling and shipping of Grand River cigarettes to Idaho retailers. 1O NWS
ignored the Attorney

Gem~ral

Office's letter and continued to sell and ship the unlawful Seneca

and Opal cigarette brands into Idaho.

In fact, since the Idaho Attorney General's Notice of

Violation letter was sent to NWS on June 8, 2008, NWS has sold and imported or caused to be
imported into Idaho 14,272,000 unlawful cigarettes. J J Since August 20, 2010, when NWS was
served with the Summons and Complaint in this action, NWS sold or imported or caused to be
imported into Idaho 8,850,000 unlawful cigarettes. 12
Equally clear is the law related to violations of the Complementary Act. As previously
noted, the Complementary Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (l) selling, offering, or
possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for distribution or sale in Idaho
"cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory"
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). That is precisely what the undisputed evidence here shows
NWS has done.
Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann (Kittelmann Affidavit) filed April 9, 2009, at p. 4, ~ 12; see also
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, ~ 4, which documents from NWS's own records, recently received
from NWS, 115 million unlawful cigarette sales.
10 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8.
II Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 5.
12 Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 6.
9
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The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3)
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides:
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
Applying Section 39-8406(1) is thus straightforward and clear, namely that the Court is
statutorily authorized to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000 per violation,
or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. 13
B.

The Plaintiffs' Request For A Two Million Dollar Penalty Is Authorized By
Law

As stated above, the Legislature entrusted to the sound discretion of this Court the
amount of civil penalties to assess for violations of the Complementary Act. Exercising that
discretion here, Plaintiffs have respectfully requested that NWS be assessed civil penalties and,
given the record in this case, suggested that $2,000,000 is an appropriate amount of penalties. It
certainly falls within the range of penalties the Legislature has authorized this Court to assess.
But if the Court determines, in its discretion, based upon the record in this case, to assess a
different amount, it clearly has the authority to do so.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs' civil penalty request falls well within that allowed for by
the Complementary Act. NWS has sold and imported or caused to be imported into Idaho over

13 NWS's claim that it is (~ntitled to a jury trial on the issue of civil penalties misses the mark. Any
matter, whether subject to trial by jury or not, may be resolved pursuant to a motion for summary
judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, I.R.C.P. where there is no genuine issue of material fact, as is the case
here. E.g., G & M Farms v. Funk In. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). In any event, Section
39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act expressly states that it is the "district court" which may assess a
civil penalty.
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100 million illegal cigarettes. It sold them in cartons of 200 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes
equates to 500,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes. 14 A $2,000,000 civil penalty would equal
$4.00 per carton of cigarettes. 15 In short, a civil penalty of $2,000,000 falls into the statutorily
authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the Complementary Act.
Alternatively, as also explained in Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers, utilizing the
Complementary Act's alternative "not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold
cigarettes penalty calculation, a $2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily
allowable. 16 Shortly before Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment papers, the average retail
value of the Seneca and Opal cigarette brands that NWS has illegally sold equals $24.42. 17
Utilizing this figure as the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes and multiplying it by
500,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes equals $12,210,000. 18

In short, and alternatively

utilizing an average retail value formula for evaluating Plaintiffs' requested civil penalty, the
amount of $2,000,000 falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail
value of the illegally sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act. 19
NWS nevertheless argues that the Plaintiffs have acted capriciously

In

seeking civil

penalties here because all NWS has done is "simply exercise[e] its right to have these issues
addressed by the Court," and that what Plaintiffs are doing in response "is seeking to punish
NWS for exercising that right ...." Defendant's Memo., p. 25. NWS does not cite any support
for the proposition that a tobacco seller can continue to violate specific Idaho law and avoid
consequence for such lawbreaking so long as the case addressing the violations is ongoing. The

16

100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 500,000.
$2,000,000 divided by 500,000 equals $4.00.
See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9 - 11.

17

Id.

14

15

$24.42 multiplied by 500,000 cartons equals $12,210,000.
500% of the retail pric~: of the illegally sold cigarettes would equal $61,050.000.
multiplied by 500% equals $61,050,000)
18

19

($12,210,00
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record reflects that regardless of the warning letter received and regardless of the filing of this
litigation, NWS did not stop selling and importing cigarettes into Idaho in violation of Idaho law.
Rather, NWS opted to continue to sell millions and millions of cigarettes that were and are today
illegal to be sold in Idaho under the Complementary Act. These are not facts of good faith and
innocent mistake. They are facts indicative of a business determined to sell as many cigarettes as
possible for as long as possible until judicially stopped. They are facts indicative of the need for
the deterring effect of civil penalties. 2o Indeed, it is the rule that a defendant's refusal to cease
the illegal conduct is a reason to support the imposition of civil penalties. See, e.g., City and
County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (Cal. Ct.App. 2000) (Defendant's failure
to cease its unlawful conduct when notified the conduct was illegal is one reason for upholding
the penalty) and People ex reI. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 (Cal.
Ct.App. 2002) ($2.5 million civil penalty upheld, the court observing that the defendant
continued to sell policies after it had been notified by the Department of Insurance that the policy
language was deceptive). In short, NWS has not acted reasonably. Its conduct does not justify
an award of zero or de minimus civil penalties.

Rather, it justifies the imposition of civil

penalties reflective of the violations in this case.
C.

The Plaintiffs' Request is Constitutional

NWS claims that an award of $2,000,000 in civil penalties would be unconstitutionaL
both as violations of due process and the Eighth Amendment. Defendant's Memo., PI'. 21 - 22.
It also argues that any penalty assessed would be criminal in nature affording protections under
20 As Plaintiffs pointed out in its summary judgment papers, civil penalties are a proper tool to
implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex reI. Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio
App. 1981). Civil penalties deter future unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated.
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to
compensate society at large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the
government for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Goffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn.
Ct.App. 1996).
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the Sixth Amendment. Id., p. 22. None of these arguments is persuasive.
Preliminarily, NWS argues that the civil penalty provisions of the Complementary Act
are "unconstitutional on its face." Defendant's Memo., at p. 21. A facial challenge to a statute
or rule is "purely a question of law." State v. Cobb. 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246
(1998). To succeed on a facial constitutional challenge, the party must demonstrate that the law
is unconstitutional in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3 rd 126,
132 (2003). In other words, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the [law] would be valid." Id.

NWS has not and cannot do that here because

clearly there are circumstances in which a civil penalty could be assessed that even NWS would
agree is not excessive (the Court could determine to impose no penalties for example). Thus,
NWS is left with an "as applied" challenge, in which the party challenging the statute must show
that, "as applied to the defendant's conduct, the statute is unconstitutional." Id.

In that regard.

NWS does not show how a $2 million civil penalty is unconstitutional given NWS's 100 million
plus illegal cigarette sales.
1.

NWS's Due Process Rights Have Not Been Violated

In deciding whethe:r due process has been denied, courts engage in a two-step analysis.
First, they determine what interest of the aggrieved party is in play and then whether the interest
claimed is constitutionally protected.

This is a threshold question:

"Only after finding the

deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State's procedures comport with due
process." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).

A protected

interest exists "where there is a legitimate claim or entitlement to the asserted benefit under
either state or federal law." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63,72,28 P.3d 1006,
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1015 (2001). The court must examine relevant statutes to determine whether the interest in
question is protected. Jd., 136 Idaho at 73,28 P.3d at 1016.
Second, if a protected interest is found, courts determine what process is due.
(internal citation omitted).

Jd.,

It will look to both statutory and constitutional procedural

protections. "(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
a.

NWS Has No Constitutionally Protected Interest Violated Under Due
Process

NWS does not identify a constitutionally protected right which Plaintiffs have violated
under due process.

Then~

certainly is no right to violate relevant state law and not face the

consequences of such conduct. More generally, even the assertion of the right to engage in
business fails because there is no such constitutionally cognizable property interest. The United
States Supreme Court has held that "business in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the
activity of making a protH is not property" protected by due process. College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) (emphasis in
original). In short, NWS has not identified a constitutionally protected right for which its due
process rights have been violated.
b.

Even if NWS Had A Right Due Process Protects, It Has Been Afforded
Adequate Notice And An Opportunity To Be Heard

Even if NWS were found to possess a protected interest either constitutionally or under
state law, procedural due process requires that it be "provided with notice and an opportunity to
be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.
v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal citations omitted). NWS does
not explain how these requirements have not been satisfied here and indeed NWS cannot. The
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fact is NWS has been notified of Plaintiffs' request for civil penalties, the size of the penalties,
and the basis for the assessment of such penalties.

And NWS has further been granted an

opportunity to be heard and has done so. In short, NWS cannot seriously argue that it has been
denied adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard concerning Plaintiffs' request for civil
penalties.
2.

The Civil Penalties Plaintiffs Seek Do Not Violate the Eighth Amendment

Concerning NWS' s claim that Plaintiffs' requested civil penalties are unconstitutionally
excessive under the Eighth Amendment, where there is an allegation that a civil penalty is
unconstitutional, "[t]he burden of demonstrating a violation of the Eighth Amendment is on the
person asserting the constitutional violation." Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese,
142 Idaho 893, 899, 136 P.3d 364, 370 (CLApp. 2006). What must be shown is that the civil
penalty is "grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant's offense." Id.

This is a

difficult standard for NWS to meet here, given two fundamental principles:
First, "judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first

instance to the legislature." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
Second, courts have consistently held that civil penalty awards in which the amount of

the award is less than the statutory maximum do not run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.
See Balice v. USDA, 203 F.3d 684, 699 (9 th Cir. 2000) ($225,000 fine did not violate Eighth

Amendment where the maximum fine was $528,000); Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors, 135 F.3d
148, 156 (C.A.D.C. Cir. 1998) ($37 million did not violate Excessive Fines Clause since "the
penalty [was] proportional to [the] violation and well below the statutory maximum [of $111.5
million]"); United States v. Emerson, 107 F.3d 77,79 (1

st

Cir. 1997) (holding that "a fine one-

half the size of that permitted by the relevant statute, ... though substantial, is constitutionally

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17

000961

permissible."); see also United States v. Eghbal, 475 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (C.D.Cal 2007); U.S.
v. Mackby, 221 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1110 (N.D.Cal. 2002).
NWS has not met its burden of proof and persuasion here. The fact is that the size of the
requested penalty, $2,000,000, is a function of the 100 million plus illegal cigarettes it sold and
imported into the State.

The size and totality of NWS' s violation are breathtaking and

unprecedented. As noted, the average retail value of 100 million illegally sold and imported
cigarettes is $12,210,000. A civil penalty of $2,000,000 is thus less than one-sixth the average
retail value of these cigarettes. This is not an amount so "grossly disproportionate to the gravity
of the defendant's offense," Nez Perce County Prosecuting Att'y, 142 Idaho at 899, 136 P.3d at
370, as to sustain NWS' s burden that such an award or one like it is unconstitutional. Compare
Mayers v. USDHHS, 806 F.2d 995, 999 (11 th Cir. 1986) (Civil penalty seventy times the amount
of money defendant improperly collected from government not unconstitutional); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore. 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (holding punitive damages should not exceed a 10
.) 2\
to 1 ratIO.
NWS notes that the State has settled cases with various tobacco related entities for
amounts less than that requested here.

This is true.

Plaintiffs support and seek amicable

resolution and the various settlements are proof of the reasonableness of the State in seeking to
resolve disputes under Idaho's tobacco related laws. That has not been the case here to date
where NWS has insisted on selling its illegal cigarettes throughout this case.
The closest case to the present one is the State v. Maybee case, which NWS discusses,
but errantly. In the Maybee case, the district court assessed a $163,225 civil penalty against the
defendant in that case, S,:ott Maybee, for his 2,500,000 cigarettes sold in violation of the
21 It is important to note that actual damages are not required for imposition of a civil penalty. U.S. ex
reI. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9 th Cir. 1991); State v. Geise, 656
N.W.2d 30, 40 (S.D. 2002).
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Complementary Act. Jd., 148 Idaho at _,224 P.3d at 1115-16. Maybee's 2.5 million illegal
cigarette sales are approximately 2.5 percent of NWS's 100 million illegal cigarette sales here.
The civil penalty assessed against him, however, is 8 percent of Plaintiffs' proposed $2,000,000
penalty in this case. In other words, Maybee's penalty, proportionately, is more than three times
the size of that being proposed here. If anything, Maybee suggests that Plaintiffs would have
been correct to seek even greater civil penalties here.

22

3. The Assessm(~nt Of A Civil Penalty Here Does Not Implicate the Sixth
Amendment
NWS argues that because it is hypothetically possible that this Court could assess a very
large civil penalty, this transforms any such award into a criminal one for which the Sixth
Amendment applies. Defendant's Memo., p. 22. This is in error.
NWS does not cite to one case holding that civil penalties like those under the
Complementary Act are actually criminal in nature. When the issue has been raised in similar
contexts, courts have rejected Sixth Amendment applicability. For example, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has statt:d the following in reviewing civil penalty claims under the Federal
Trade Commission Act:
(W)hen Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and the only
consequence of a judgment for the Government is a money penalty, the courts have
taken Congress at its word. . . . In the face of a long line of contrary authority,
appellants have not directed our attention to any civil penalty provision that has been
held sufficiently 'criminal' in nature to invoke the protections of the Sixth
Amendment.

22
NWS's discussion of the Maybee case is also confused. NWS acknowledges that Maybee was
assessed a civil penalty of $163,225 based upon his illegal sales of 2.5 million cigarettes. Defendant's
Memo., p. 25. It inexplicably compares, however, that figure to the six million (which is actually 14
million) cigarettes NWS asse,rts it illegally sold and imported into Idaho after the State notified it of
NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and complains that a two million dollar penalty on six
million illegal cigarettes is far greater than a $163,225 dollar penalty for 2.5 million cigarettes. Jd. NWS
is comparing apples to oranges. The correct comparison is $163,255 for 2.5 million cigarettes to
$2,000,000 for 100 million illt:gal cigarettes.
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United States v. 1. B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974).
NWS nevertheless urges the Court to overlook the Legislature's express characterization
of the penalties imposed :in this case as "civil," see Idaho Code § 39-8406(1), and to hold that
whatever might be imposed in this case must be criminal because the size of the penalties
assessed in this case could potentially be large. And because a potentially large civil penalty
would allegedly serve no legitimate civil purpose, in NWS's view, the penalty must be criminal
in the first instance. The argument goes much too far. A hypothetically excessive penalty is not
grounds for ruling that any penalty is criminal in nature and subject to Sixth Amendment
applicability.
discretion.

Rather, the argument is more fittingly addressed to the Court's exercise of its
And as demonstrated herein a two million dollar civil penalty is not, in fact,

excessive or too large,

givt~n

NWS's massive illegal cigarette sales and would be well within the

Court's discretion. In short, there is no basis to conclude that the Sixth Amendment applies or
that the assessment of civil penalties in this case is criminal in nature.
D.

Civil Penalties Are Warranted And Should Be Assessed Against NWS

It is important to note that absolving NWS of any civil penalty, or imposing one that is

not commensurate with the unlawful conduct involved in this case, will produce negative results
for at least two reasons. First, it will send a message to tobacco companies disobeying Idaho law
that it makes more financial sense to litigate and not settle: Why settle when, even if you are
found to have violated Idaho law, there will be no or trivial financial consequence for continued
illegal cigarettes sales?
Second, absolving NWS punishes the companies who were willing to be accountable for
their conduct and amicably and promptly resolve those problems. In short, absolving NWS here
will reduce other future settlements and cause the Court to have to deal with significantly more

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 20

000964

tobacco related litigation.

CONCLUSION
No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether NWS violated the Complementary
Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws. NWS has sold over one hundred million non-compliant
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary Act. NWS also sells these non
compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers without the wholesaler permit required by the Idaho Code
Section 63-2503(1) and the State's cigarette tax laws. Only an appropriate civil penalty and
permanent injunctive relief will stop NWS from continuing to violate Idaho law. Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs request that their motion for summary judgment be granted.
th

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19 day of October, 2010.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
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Deputy Attorney General
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I hereby certify that on the 19 day of October, 2010, I caused to be served, by the
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

~U.S. Mail

o Hand Delivery

D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAl..
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney Gcmeral
954 West Jefferson, 2nd F'loor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Attorneys for the State oJ Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,

) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)

) FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF BETH
) A. KITTELMANN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-----)

FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. KITTELMANN-l

ORIGINAL
000967

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Beth A. Kittelmaml, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
I.

I am a Paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho

Attorney General. One of my duties is to oversee and maintain records received and compiled
by the Office of the Attorney General that relate to the matters set forth in this Affidavit. I have
personal knowledge and information of the facts set forth herein, as well as their accuracy. I also
have personal knowledge of the records referred to in this Affidavit.
2.

I prepared the Excel spreadsheet attached to my April 9, 2009 Affidavit as Exhibit

I, from records received from the Nevada Foreign Trade Zone and the various shipping
companies used by Native Wholesale Supply (NWS), pursuant to Civil Investigative Demands
served upon them by the Idaho Attorney General's Office.
3.

After this case was filed, Plaintiffs served discovery requests upon NWS.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' discovery requests.

On

September 20,2010, NWS answered Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Attached to this affidavit as
Exhibit B is a true and con'ect copy of the discovery responses received from NWS.
4.

The records produced by NWS show new and additional sales of Opal and Seneca

cigarettes into Idaho. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit C is a revised Excel spreadsheet I have
prepared based upon the records produced by NWS. Attached as Exhibit D are true and correct
copies of the invoices produced by NWS and referenced in the spreadsheet. This shows that to
date, NWS has sold, imported and/or caused to be imported into Idaho at least 115,998,000
cigarettes.
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5.

Since the Idaho Attorney General's Notice of Violation letter was sent to NWS on

June 8, 2008, NWS has sold, imported and/or caused to be imported 14,272,000 cigarettes into
Idaho.
6.

Since August 20,2010, when NWS was served with the Summons and Complaint

in this action, NWS sold, imported and/or caused to be imported 8,850,000 cigarettes into Idaho,

~~.",~~~
BETH A. KITTELMANN

'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of October, 2010.

tw ,! Itlih.....~......iiulAAl
t .JENNIFER L. BITHELL
'"

~:

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OIF IDAHO

+~~~,~~~~i~~~~"~):~

Notary Publi or aho,
Residing at: fntJuckAA, J2j
My Commission Expires: 11- 30-(3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the 19th day of October, 2010, I caused to be served, by the
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McK1veen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

[gJ U.S. Mail

o Hand Delivery
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
o Overnight Mail
o

Facsimile
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

)
)
~ Case No. CV OC 0815228

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO AND THE
IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION'S FIRST
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

)

NATIVE WHOLESALI~ SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,

)
)
~

_ _--=D:...;e=~..::.;en=_d=.:a=n:::...::t:.:.....

)

The State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, and the
Idaho State Tax Commission (collectively "State of Idaho" or "Idaho"), pursuant to Rules 33(a),
34(a), and 36(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, propounds the following Interrogatories,
Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions ("Discovery Requests") to Defendant
Native Wholesale Supply Company ("Native Wholesale").

I.
INSTRUCTIONS
A.

Deadline to Respond. Pursuant to Rules 33(a)(2), 34(b)(2), and 36(a) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, the information, documents, and responses requested herein must be
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received by the State of Idaho on or before thirty (30) days after Native Wholesale's
receipt of these Disc:overy Requests.
B.

Reasonable InquirY:, In answering these Discovery Requests, Native Wholesale shall
provide all infonnation and documents that are available to it or subject to its reasonable
inquiry, including documents available to it, but in possession of its employees,
representatives, or other agents.

C.

Complete Answers Required. If a specific Discovery Request has subparts, Native
Wholesale shall answer each part separately and fully. If Native Wholesale cannot
answer a Discovery Request fully, it shall answer to the extent possible, specify the
reason for his inability to answer the remainder, and provide whatever information and
knowledge it has regarding the unanswered portion.

D.

Document Protection; Copies Authorized. The State of Idaho requests that you permit
counsel for the Stat,e to inspect and copy the documents and things requested herein on
the 18 th day of May, 2009, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at the Office of the Attorney
General, Consumer Protection Division, 954 W. Jefferson Street, Second Floor, Boise,
Idaho, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree upon in writing.
Concerning documents and other materials that Native Wholesale is requested to
produce, as an alternative, accurate, legible, and complete copies may be attached to its
answers and responses and served within the same 30-day period.

E.

Electronic Copies Authorized. Concerning documents and other materials that Native
Wholesale is requested to produce, also as an alternative, accurate, legible, and complete
copies may also be scanned onto a CD in Adobe Acrobat® PDF fonnat and served within
the same 3D-day period.

F.

Privilege Claims. If Native Wholesale makes a claim of privilege to any question, it
must state the basis for its claim and describe the claimed privileged item in reasonable
and sufficient detail so that the State of Idaho can decide whether the claim of privilege is
valid.

G.

Supplementation. If additional infonnation becomes available to Native Wholesale
after the State ofIdaho receives Native Wholesale's complete and accurate responses to
these Discovery Requests, Native Wholesale shall supplement its answers and responses.
II.

DEFINITIONS
Unless otherwise de:fined, specified, or indicated, the following definitions shall be
applicable to these Discovery Requests:

STATE OF IDAHO AND THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S FIRST
DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2

000972
IDAG 165312

(~

A.

"And" and "or" are terms of inclusion and not of exclusion and shall be construed so as
to bring within the scope of these Discovery Requests any document or information that
might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. For ease of readability, neither
word will be bo1ded as follows.

B.

"Any" means one or more. For ease of readability, the word will not be bolded as
follows.

C.

"Cigarette" means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be burned or heated
under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1) any roll of tobacco
wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or (2) tobacco, in any form,
that is functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco
used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by,
consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any substance containing
tobacco which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its
packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a
cigarette described in clause (1) of this definition. The term "cigarette" includes "roll
your-own" (i.e., any tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or
labeling is suitable for use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as
tobacco for making cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces
of "roll-your-own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette."

D.

"Communication" means any contact or act by which any information is transmitted or
conveyed, including written contact by such means as e-mail, letters, invoices, sales
receipts, bills, correspondence, memoranda, telegrams, telexes, telecopies, facsimile, or
by any document, any oral contact such as face-to-face meetings or conversations, and
telephone or any other electronically-transmitted communications or conversations.

E.

"Complaint" means the Verified Complaint filed by the State against Native Wholesale
in this case on or about August 14,2008.

F.

"Concerning," "rt!lating to," or "related to," any subject matter means any
documents, communication, or any other tangible item that discusses, describes, refers
to, reflects, contains, analyzes, studies, reports on, comments on, evidences, constitutes,
sets forth, considers, recommends, or pertains to, in whole or in part in any manner to the
subject.

G.

"Document(s)" means any written, recorded, or graphic matters, however produced or
reproduced, pertaining in any way to the subject matter of these Discovery Requests,
including any originals, copies, or drafts of any of the following: records, notes,
summaries, organizational documents, financial statements, taxing authority filings,
contracts, agreemen1ts, advertising, promotional materials, brochures, pamphlets, flyers,
newsletters, magazines, drawings, plans, patent or copyright applications, scientific or
other test results, peer reviews, scientific journal articles, invoices, purchase orders,
checks, manuals, policies, rules, reports, forecasts, appraisals, memoranda of
understanding, telephone logs, letters, telegrams, telexes, cables, tapes, transcripts,
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audio/video recordings, emails, web pages, photographs, pictures, films, computer
programs, or other graphics, symbols, and recorded or written materials of any nature
whatsoever. Any document that contains a comment, notation, addition, insertion, or
marking of any kind that is not part of another document is to be considered as a separate
document.
H.

"Each" means each and every. For ease of readability, the word will not be bolded as
follows.

I.

"Grand River Enterprises" means (i) Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd.,
(referred to as "Grand River" in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24, 2008, and filed in Case
No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District ofIdaho)), and any of its principals,
owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants,
or attorneys, past and present; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act on their
behalf or under their direction, authorization or control; and (iii) any predecessors,
successors, subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing.

J.

"In Idaho," within Idaho," "to Idaho," and "in the State of Idaho," mean within the
exterior limits of the: State of Idaho and includes all territory within these limits owned by
or ceded to the United States of America, including Indian Country as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 1151.

K.

Where asked to "identify" or describe a "document," the description should include, but
not be limited to, the following:
a.

The name, address, telephone number, occupation, and job title of the present
custodian of the record, and, if applicable, the employer of the present custodian
of the document;

b.

The date the document was made or entered into and the name, address, telephone
number, occupation, job title, and employer of each person whose testimony
could be uSI~d to authenticate such document and lay the foundation for its
introduction into evidence;

c.

The name, address, telephone number, occupation, job title, and employer of the
author(s) or person(s) who prepared the document;

d.

The identity of the person(s) to whom the document was addressed, and who
received each and every copy of the document;

e

A description of the nature and contents of the documents in such a manner that
the custodian of the document would be able to locate it in response to a subpoena
or request for production; and
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f.

The identity and location of the file(s) where the original and each and every copy
of the document is located.

L.

Where asked to "identify" a "person" who is a natural born individual, or where an
answer refers to such a person, please state his or her name, last known address,
occupation, last known business address, and last known personal and business telephone
numbers.

M.

Where asked to "id€mtify" a business entity or federal or state government agency, please
give its correct name, and if it is a business entity, state whether it is a corporation,
limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship, or unincorporated association
and describe the nature of its business. If the business entity is a partnership or sole
proprietorship, identify the person or persons who are its partners or owners and give the
address and telephone number ofthe entity's principal office.

N.

"Including" means including but not limited to.

O.

"Lake Erie Tobacco Company" means Lake Erie Tobacco Company, and any of its
principals, owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives,
consultants, or attorneys past or present; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act
on their behalf or under their direction, authorization, or control; and (iii) any
predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing.
Upon information and belief of the State, Lake Erie Tobacco Company is or has been
located at 6564 or 6558 Route 417, Kill Buck, New York.

P.

"NITCO" means the Nevada International Trade Corporation, also known as Foreign
Trade Zone #89 and as the Southern Nevada Trade Zone.

Q.

"Person" means any natural person, corporate entity, partnership, association, joint
venture, government entity or trust, and any other business operation or legal entity.

R.

"Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse" means the "bonded warehouse on the Seneca
Cattaraugus Indian Territory" referred to in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support
of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24, 2008, and
filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District ofIdaho).

S.

"Warpath" means Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation, currently located at North 165,
Highway 95, Plummer, Idaho.

T.

"Western New York FTZ" means the Western New York Foreign Trade Zone in
Lackawanna, New York, referred to in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24,2008, and filed
in Case No.1 :08-cv·-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District of Idaho).

U.

"You," "your," "Native Wholesale Supply Company," "Native Wholesale," and
NWS means (i) Native Wholesale Supply Company, and any of its principals, owners,
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officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants, or
attorneys past or pn:sent; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act on their behalf
or under their direction, authorization, or control; and (iii) any predecessors, successors,
subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing.

III.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. Identify each business entity that you in whole or in part
own, control, contract with, associate with, or that is a subsidiary, successor, or predecessor in
interest of Native Wholesale.

INTERROGATORY NO.2. Identify each person who may have information about
the sale of Seneca or Opal brand cigarettes in Idaho and provide an explanation of what
information each person may have.

INTERROGATORY NO.3. If you deny in whole or in part any of the Requests for
Admission in these Discovery Requests, identify each fact, each person who has knowledge of
each fact, and each document evidencing each fact, which supports the basis for your denial.

INTERROGATORY NO.4. Identify each communication or document between
NWS and any person located in Idaho relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership,
possession, shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes.
IV.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR :PRODUCTION NO. 1.

Produce any documents relating to

shipments or releases to or from NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca

Territory Bonded Warehouse, of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any person located
in Idaho, including (a) invoices; (b) orders; (c) bills of lading; and (d) documents relating to
compliance with U.S. Customs requirements. Please note: " any person located in Idaho "
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limits and describes the "cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS" referenced in the request; it is
not meant to limit or describe to whom or where the "shipments or releases" referred to in the
request are directed.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2.

Produce any documents relating to

communications between NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory
Bonded Warehouse and NWS relating to the storage, handling, or shipment of cigarettes,
including (a) contracts and (b) agreements.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3.

Produce any communications between

NITCO and NWS relating to cigarettes shipped from NITCO or released by NITCO from
January 1,2004 to present.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4.

Produce any communications between

NWS and any common or private carriers, including (a) Con-Way Freight, Inc., (b) APT
Transportation, Inc., and (c) Leader Express relating to shipments or transportation into or

within Idaho of cigarettes sold, imported, or distributed by NWS, including cigarettes shipped
from or released by NITCO.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5. Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices,
bills, or communications between NWS and Grand River Enterprises relating to the sale,
offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation,
distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or
recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6. Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices,
bills, or communications between NWS and Grand River Enterprises relating to the sale,
offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation,
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distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, and where a purchaser or
recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than Warpath.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7.

Produce any contracts, agreements, or

communications between NWS and Warpath, or any other person located in Idaho relating
to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation,
distribution, or delivery of cigarettes.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8. Produce any financial documents, including
invoices, sales receipts, bank statements showing the transfer 'of funds, statements of accounts
receivable and accounts payable, profit and loss statements, and other financial statements,
relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation,
importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a
purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes from NWS was Warpath, or any other person located
in Idaho.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9. Produce any documents relating to your
sale of any cigarettes to any person located in Idaho that state the location of the sale, that the
sale is on an F.O.B. Seneca Nation basis, and/or that title and risk of loss transfer to the
purchaser at the time of sale on the Seneca Cattaraugus Indian Territory. (See Affidavit of Arthur
Montour in Support of Motilon to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24,
2008, and filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District of Idaho)).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10. Produce any documents relating to NWS's
corporate organization, including charters, constitutions, articles of incorporation, applications
and filings submitted to any governing authority, including documents showing its officers and
directors from Jan. 1,2000 to present.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11.

Produce any contracts, agreements, or

communications' between NWS and Gene Mack or any other customs broker, relating to the

purchase, importation, sale, shipment, or release from Customs of cigarettes sold or distributed
by NWS to any person located in Idaho, including Warpath.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12. Produce any documents relating to the

importation to, or shipment from, any person other than NITCO, the Western New York FTZ,
or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any
person located in the state of Idaho.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13. Produce any documents relating to travel
to or within Idaho by any ofNWS's principals, owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents,

employees, representatives, consultants, or attorneys.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14. Produce any documents identified in your

response to Interrogatory No.4.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15.

Produce any contracts, agreements,

invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake Erie Tobacco Company relating
to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation,

distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or
recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16.

Produce any contracts, agreements,

invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake Erie Tobacco Company relating
to the sale, offer for sale, pmchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation,

distribution, or delivery of c:igarettes anywhere in the United States, and where a purchaser or
recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than Warpath.
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V.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1. Please admit that you transported, imported or
caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho Seneca brand family cigarettes
manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2. Please admit that you transported, imported or
caused to be imported Dor sale and distribution in Idaho Opal brand family cigarettes
manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3. Please admit that in 2004 you transported,
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least
24,650,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4. Please admit that in 2005 you transported,
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least
21,406,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5. Please admit that in 2006 you transported,
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least
22,830,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6.

Please admit that in 2007 you transported,

imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least
24,442,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR iffiMISSION NO.7. Please admit that in 2008 you transported,
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least
14,152,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8.

Please admit that in January 2009 you

transported, imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho
retailers at least 2,508,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9. Please admit that (a) on June 5, 2008, the Idaho
Attorney General's Office mailed a letter, certified mail, return receipt requested, to the president
of Native Wholesale, Arthur Montour, Jr.; and (b) the letter was sent to Native Wholesale's
mailing and street addresses.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10. Please admit that the document attached hereto
as Exhibit A (Bates Numbers IDAG 150677 - IDAG 150678, inclusive) is a true and correct
copy of the letter referenced in Request for Admission No.9, and of the return receipts (IDAG
150810 - IDAG 150811), signed on June 9, and 10,2008 for this letter.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11. Please admit that after June 10, 2008, you
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho at least 11,620,000 Seneca
and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12. Please admit that Grand River is not listed on
the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the dates you
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. Please admit that the Seneca cigarette brand is
not listed on the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the
dates you imported or caused it to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14. Please admit that the Opal cigarette brand is
not listed on the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the
dates you imported or caused it to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15.

Please admit that Arthur Montour is the

President and sole owner of Native Wholesale.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16.

Please admit that Arthur Montour as the

President and sole owner of Native Wholesale, has knowledge of, directs, or controls Native
Wholesale's importing and causing to be imported Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes for sale and
distribution in Idaho.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17. Please admit that Native Wholesale does not
now and had never possessed a cigarette permit, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 63-2503.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. Please admit that Native Wholesale never
applied for a cigarette permit, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 63-2503.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2009.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

By

$

A

~«};~-'~

BRETT T:"DELANGE
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION

By

~~
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE AlTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

June 5, 2008

VIA CERTIFIED MAlL; RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Arthur Montour, Jr.
Native Wholesale Supply Company
10955 Logan Road
Perrysburg, NY 14129
P.O Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070

Re:

Notice of Apparent Liability Under Idaho law-Violations of Idaho's Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act)

Dear Mr. Montour:
It has come to our attention that Seneca brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (Grand River Enterprises), imported by your company and held at
the Nevada International Trade Corporation, Foreign Trade Zone #89, in Las Vegas, Nevada,
have been sold and shipped at your company's direction from that location to at least one
purchaser in the ~tate ofIdlaho, namely War Path, North 165 Hwy 95, Plummer, ID 83851.

Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to
sell, offer for sale, possess, acquire, hold, own, import, or cause to import for sale or distribution
in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not on the Idaho Directory
of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Idaho's Directory). Neither
Seneca brand cigarettes nor Grand River Enterprises are listed on Idaho's Directory.
Additionally, sale in Idaho of cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises, including
Seneca, have been enjoine:d by order dated September 5, 2002, of the Fourth Judicial Court, in
and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, in the case entitled State of Idaho, by and through
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, v. Grand River Enterprises, Case No. CV DC 0205249M.

EXHIBIT
Consumer Protection Division
Len B. J()rdan Building, Lower Level, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424, FAX: (208) 334-4151
(800) 432-3545, Toll Free in Idaho; TOO Accessible
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Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Case No. CV OC 0815228

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY'S FIRST
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its attorneys of
record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, hereby supplements its
responses to Plaintiffs' First Discovery Requests ("Requests"), as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek infonnation that is neither relev<l..TJ.t

nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with respect to claims
and defenses in this action.
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2.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they purport to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

NWS objects to producing any documents that contain NWS' confidential, proprietary,

and business-sensitive information until the Court enters an appropriate Protective Order, as a
means of protecting against the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of such information.
4.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek documents protected by the attomey

client privilege, the work··product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or rule.
5.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek documents that are publicly

available, and to which the Plaintiffs have access and may obtain for themselves.
6.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek information, documents, or things

that are already in Plaintiffs' possession, custody, or control, or which are not reasonably or
readily available to NWS.
7.

NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they fail to specify the information,

documents, or things requested with reasonable particularity; to the extent they are vague,
ambiguous, unreasonably repetitive, cumulative or duplicative, overbroad, unduly burdensome,
oppressive, or propounded for the improper purpose of annoying, harassing, oppressing, or
unduly burdening NWS; or to the extent they require NWS to make a legal conclusion.
8.

To the extent NWS provides or produces any information, documents, or things in

response to Requests to which it has specifically or generally objected, such production is
without waiver of any such objection.
9.

NWS objects to thle Requests on the ground that they do not contain any limitation as to

time, and therefore, they are overbroad and unduly burdensome as they are not limited to the
time period and events rele~vant to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint.
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10.

These General Objections apply to each Response below, whether specifically stated in

the Response or not.
OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS
1.

NWS objects to Instructions "B" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

NWS objects to Instruction "C" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

NWS objects to Instruction "D" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

NWS objects to Instruction "E" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

NWS objects to Instruction "F" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

NWS objects to Instruction "G" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond

those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS
1.

NWS objects to the definition of "Communication" to the extent it purports to impose

obligations beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2.

NWS objects to the definition of "Document" to the extent it purports to impose

obligations beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3.

NWS objects to the definition of "Each" on the grounds it is vague, ambiguous and
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confusing.
4.

NWS objects to the definition of "Grand River Enterprises" on the grounds it is overly

broad, burdensome and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms "predecessors" and
"successors," as utilized in the defmition, are vague and ambiguous.
5.

NWS objects to the defmitions of "In Idaho," "within Idaho," ''to Idaho" and "in the State

ofIdaho" on the grounds they are vague, ambiguous and confusing.
6.

NWS objects to the defmitions and instructions set forth in Defmition K on the grounds

they are overly broad and burdensome, and to the extent they purport to impose obligations
beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
7.

NWS objects to the: definitions and instructions set forth in Definition L to the extent they

purport to require the disclosure of confidential information without the Court entering an
appropriate Protective Order. NWS further objects on the ground the phrase "natural born
individual" is vague, ambiguous and confusing.
8.

NWS objects to the: definitions and instructions set forth in Definition "M" to the extent

they purport to require the disclosure of confidential, proprietary and/or sensitive business
information without the Court entering an appropriate Protective Order, and to the extent they
purport to require the production of information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in
this action.
9.

NWS objects to the definition of "Lake Erie Tobacco Company" on the grounds it is

overly broad, burdensome and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms
"predecessors" and "successors," as utilized in the definition, are vague and ambiguous.
10.

NWS objects to the defmitions of the "You," "your," "Native Wholesale Supply
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Company," "Native Wholesale," and "NWS" on the grounds they are overly broad, burdensome
and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms "predecessors" and "successors," as
utilized in the definition, are vague and ambiguous.

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST NO.1
Produce any documents relating to shipments or releases to or from NITCO, the Western New
York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse, of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS
to any person located in Idaho, including (a) invoices; (b) orders; (c) bills oflading; and (d)
documents relating to compliance with U.S. Customs requirements. Please note: "any person
located in Idaho" limits and describes the "cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS" referenced in
the request; it is not meant to limit or describe to whom or where the "shipments or releases"
referred to in the request are directed.
Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, further objects to this Request on the ground that the phrase
"documents relating to compliance with u.S. Customs requirements" requires NWS to make a
legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the ground that the second sentence of the
Interrogatory is confusing. NWS also objects on the ground the Request has no limitation as to
time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement.
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REQUEST NO.4
Produce any communications between NWS and any common or private carriers, including (a)
Con-Way Freight, Inc., (b) APT Transportation, Inc., and (c) Leader Express relating to
shipments or transportation into or within Idaho of cigarettes sold, imported, or distributed by
NWS, including cigarettes shipped from or released by NITCO.
Response

In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the ground it contains no
limitation as to time.

Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will

produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which
relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement.
REQUEST NO.5
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Grand
River Enterprises relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment,
transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States,

where a purchaser or recipic~nt of such cigarettes was Warpath.
Response

In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, :NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS
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to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale,"
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the
Request contains no limit.ation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.

Supplemental Response
No such documents exist.
REQUEST NO.6

Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Grand
River Enterprises relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment,
transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States,
and where a purchaser or recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than
Warpath.

Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale,"
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the
Request contains no limitation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.
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Supplemental Response
No such documents exist.
REQUEST NO.7
Produce any contracts, agreements, or communications between NWS and Warpath, or any other
person located in Idaho relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession,
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes.
Response

In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to DefInitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the time period that is n:ferenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the
grounds the tenus "offer for sale," "ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous.
Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any
responsive documents are liocated, NWS shall supplement.
REQUEST NO.8
Produce any financial documents, including invoices, sales receipts, bank. statements showing the
transfer of funds, statements of accounts receivable and accounts payable, profit and loss
statements, . and other financial statements, relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase,
ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of
cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes from
NWS was Warpath, or any other person located in Idaho.
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Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the
grounds the terms "offer for sale," "ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous.
NWS further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks the production of confidential,
proprietary and/or sensitive business infonnation without the entry of an appropriate Protective
Order. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.

Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, NWS has been unable to locate any documents that are
responsive to Request for Production No.8. Efforts to locate responsive documents are ongoing
and NWS will supplement to the extent responsive documents are located.
REQUEST NO. 9
Produce any documents relating to your sale of any cigarettes to any person located in Idaho that
state the location of the sale, that the sale is on an F.O.B. Seneca Nation basis, and/or that title
and risk of loss transfer to the purchaser at the time of sale on the Seneca Cattaraugus Indian
Territory. (See Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, dated September 24,2008, and filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District
Court, District of Idaho)).

Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
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to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. Subject to these Objections and
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the
Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response

After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement.
REQUEST NO. 10
Produce any documents relating to NWS's corporate organization, including charters,
constitutions, articles of incorporation, applications and filings submitted to any governing
authority, including documc~nts showing its officers and directors from Jan. 1,2000 to present.
Response

In addition to the: foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Interrogatory on the ground that it seeks
information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence with respect to the claims and defenses in this action. Subject to these
Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce a copy of its Certificate of
Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation and Amended Articles of Incorporation, to the extent
such documents are in its possession, custody or control.
Supplemental Response

After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS
000001- NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that
any responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement.
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REQUEST NO. 11
Produce any contracts, agreements, or communications between NWs and Gene Mack or any
other customs broker, relating to the purchase, importation, sale, shipment, or release from
Customs of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any person located in Idaho, including
Warpath.
Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Defmitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. Subject to these Objections and
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the
Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, NWS has been unable to locate documents responsive to
Request for Production No. 11. Efforts to locate responsive records are ongoing and to the
extent any such records are found, NWS will supplement.
REQUEST NO. 12

Produce any documents relating to the importation to, or shipment from, any person other than
NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse of cigarettes
sold or distributed by NWS to any person located in the state of Idaho.
Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request
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to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. Subject to these Objections and
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the
Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry, no records responsive to this request have been located.
REQUEST NO. 13
Produce any documents relating to travel to or within Idaho by any ofNWS's principals, owners,
officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants, or attorneys.
Response

In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
. to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to the Request
to the extent it seeks documents relating to travel to Idaho by the referenced individuals that are
unrelated to the sale of cigarettes in Idaho or the shipment of cigarettes to Idaho. Subject to these
Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that
are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in
the Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
No such documents exist.
REQUEST NO. 15
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake
Erie Tobacco Company relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession,
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the
United States, where a purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath.
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Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and
Objections to Deflnitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
to the subj ect matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the
State of Idaho, and instea.d seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale,"
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the
Request contains no limitation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of
same, NWS Will produce: responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.
Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry NWS was unable to locate documents responsive to this request.
Efforts to locate documents responsive to this request are ongoing to the extent such records are
located, NWS will supplement.
REQUEST NO. 16
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake
Erie Tobacco Company relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession,
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the
United States, and where a purchaser or recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in
Idaho other than Warpath"
Response
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and

Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited
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to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes
anywhere in the United St.ates. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale,"
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the
Request contains no limit:ttion as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint.

Supplemental Response
After reasonable inquiry NWS was unable to locate documents responsive to this request.
Efforts to locate documents responsive to this request are ongoing to the extent such records are
found, NWS will supplement.
DATED this 17th day of September, 2010.

EBERLE, BERLIN

~

lNG, TURNBOW,

/~TdERE~D; ;
V".

~

By

e

"
\

!

S
i. Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY'S FIRST
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
DISCOVERY REQUESTS -Page 14

IDAG 001000
172217

-'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 17th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:

lYJ U.S. Mail

Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
PO Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010
(208) 334-2424

[ J Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax (208) 334-4151

Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410
(208) 334-7530

S
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
YEAR

MONTH

INVOICEflf

2004

12-Feb

4876

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

5-Apr

24-May

13-Jul

9-Auq

5-0ct

24-Nov

3'I-Dec

4995

5140

5234

5302

5425

5533

5599

BRAND

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICE AMT

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

40
160
95

240,000
1,600,000
1,140,000

2,980,000

$109,105.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

45
200
100

270,000
2,000,000
1,200,000

3,470,000

$127,002.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

30
180
105

180,000
1,800,000
1,260,000

3,240,000

$118,260.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

55
170
90

330,000
1,700,000
1,080,000

3,110,000

$114,222.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
145
155

0
1,450,000
1,860,000

3,310,000

$119,987.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

40
160
140

240,000
1,600,000
1,680,000

3,520,000

$128,680.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

25
122
100

150,000
1,220,000
1,200,000

2,570,000

$93,837.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

5
110
110

30,000
1,100,000
1,320,000

2,450,000

$88,947.50

24,650,000

$900,042.50

2004 TOTAL

I

EXHIBIT
Page 1

L.

Revised 10/5/10
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
YEAR

MONTH

2005

11-Feb

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

3-Mar

11-Apr

25-May

28-Jun

28-Jul

15-Sep

12-0ct

14-0ct

7-Dec

BRAND

5641

5663

5756

5905

5972

6051

6174

6232

6237

6360

OPAL 30

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICE AMT

0

0

SENECA 50
SENECA 60

129
130

1,290,000
1,560,000

2,850,000

$110,437.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

85
0
0

510,000
0
0

510,000

$22,057.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

19
70
235

114,000
700,000
2,820,000

3,634,000

$141,330.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

30
35
130

180,000
350,000
1,560,000

2,090,000

$81,797.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

5
61
179

30,000
610,000
2,148,000

2,788,000

$108,170.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

28
50
220

168,000
500,000
2,640,000

3,308,000

$125,016.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

43
0
245

258,000
0
2,940,000

3,198,000

$123,007.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

50
0
230

300,000
0
2,760,000

3,060,000

$120,075.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
20

0
0
240,000

240,000

$9,300.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

55
0
185

330,000
0
2,220,000

2,550,000

$100,462.50

24,228,000

$941,654.00

2005 TOTAL

Page 2

Revised 10/5/10

001003

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPL'( COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
YEAR

MONTH

2006

17-Jan

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

17-Jan

13-Mar

16-May

20-Jul

9-Aug

22-Aug

22-Aug

9-0ct

6-Nov

BRAND
6452

6454

6593

6764

7011

7096

7141

7142

7374

7509

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICEAMT

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
100

0
0
1,200,000

1,200,000

$45,600.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

35
0
185

210,000
0
2,220,000

2,430,000

$93,547.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

40
0
305

240,000
0
3,660,000

3,900,000

$149,580.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

60
0
240

360,000
0
2,880,000

3,240,000

$125,190.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
230

0
0
2,760,000

2,760,000

$104,880.00

OPAL 30
SEt\IECA 50
SENECA 60

75
0
0

450,000
0
0

450,000

$19,687.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
275

0
0
3,300,000

3,300,000

$125,400.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

0
0
0
30

0
0
0
180,000

180,000

$7,875.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

45
0
145

270,000
0
1,740,000

2,010,000

$77,932.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

40
0
245

240,000
0
2,940,000

3,180,000

$122,220.00

22,650,000

$871,912.50

2006 TOTAL

Page 3

Revised 10/5/10

001004

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
YEAR

MONTH

2007

2-Jan

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

27-Feb

11-Apr

5-Jun

28-Jun

27-Jul

31-Jul

11-Sep

2-0ct

19-0ct

6-Dec

BRAND

7708

7933

8128

8359

8471

8614

70731

8853

8945

9026

9222

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICE AMT

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

30
0
270

180,000
0
3,240,000

3,420,000

$130,995.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

60
0
230

360,000
0
2,760,000

3,120,000

$120,630.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

30
0
280

180,000
0
3,360,000

3,540,000

$135,555.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

50
0
116

300,000
0
1,392,000

1,692,000

$64,281.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

25
0
165

150,000
0
1,980,000

2,130,000

$81,802.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

45
0
260

270,000
0
3,120,000

3,390,000

$130,372.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
10

0
0
120,000

120,000

$4,410.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

0
0
185

0
0
2,220,000

2,220,000

$84,360.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

35
0
10

210,000
0
120,000

330,000

$13,747.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60

15
0
220

90,000
0
2,640,000

2,730,000

$104,257.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

10
0
148
35

60,000
0
1,776,000
210,000

2,046,000

$79,300.50

24,738,000

$949,711. 50

2007 TOTAL

Page 4
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Revised 10/5/10
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
YEAR

MONTH

2008

12-Feb

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

11-Mar

12-Mar

7-Apr

9-May

12-Jun

18-Jul

18-Aug

16-Sep

6-Nov

BRAND
9459

9590

9598

9721

9907

10114

10368

10552

10709

11003

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICE AMT

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

0
0
89
18

0
0
1,068,000
108,000

1,176,000

$45,309.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SEI\IECA60
SENECA 120

0
0
112
0

0
0
1,344,000
0

1,344,000

$51,072.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

20
0

120,000
0

17

102,000

222,000

$9,712.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

17
0
80
0

102,000
0
960,000
0

1,062,000

$40,942.50

OPAL 30
SEI\IECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

16
0
130
0

96,000
0
1,560,000
0

1,656,000

$63,480.00

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

35
0
125
0

210,000
0
1,500,000
0

1,710,000

$66,187.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SEt\IECA 120

49
0
134
0

294,000
0
1,608,000
0

1,902,000

$73,966.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

5
0
178
0

30,000
0
1,780,000
0

1,810,000

$93,310.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

31
0
227
10

186,000
0
2,724,000
60,000

2,970,000

$129,124.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

50
0
220
0

300,000
0
2,640,000
0

2,940,000

$128,145.00

16,792,000

$701,250.00

2008 TOTAL TO DATE

Page 5

Revised 10/5/10

001006

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA

YEAR
2009

2009

BRAND

MONTH
9-Jan

26-Jan

11264

11315

CASES

UNITS

TOTAL UNITS

INVOICE AMT

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

37
0
86
0

222,000
0
1,032,000
0

1,254,000

$53,908.50

OPAL 30
SENECA 50
SENECA 60
SENECA 120

21
0
130
0

126,000
0
1,560,000
0

1,686,000

$71,272.50

2,940,000

$125,181.00

115,998,000

$4,489,751.50

14,272,000

$615,915.00

2009 TOTAL TO DATE

TOTAL SHIPPED TO DATE
TOTAL SHIPPED SINCE 6/8/08 VIOLATION LETTER

Page 6

Revised 10/5/10

001007

NA"rJVE NATION

INVOICEUBILL Of LAr''JG

""""

12-Feb-04

Dale OfSillo

.....,
Sold To
Purchaser;

Native Wholesale Supply

Siller:

PO Box 214

Place of
eale:

INVOICE #
Shipped Oate:

War Path
North 165 Highway 95

Gowanda. N.Y. 14070

Plummer 10 63851

Seneca Nation Territory

at Seneca Nation Territory

Native Wholesale Supply

Billed To:

11037 Old Logan Rd

War Path
North 165 Highway 95

Perrysburg, NY 14129

VIA

o

Selleea NatlC)n TerrItory

4876

Plummer 10 83851

ShippIng Charges Pending

DESCRrPTION OF GOODS

3133

Item:
OPAL Menthollt
H/Lid
._, .. '..
. . - . 120'5
" .. _. --. 
OPAL
Menthol
H/Lid
120'5
.. --------- ..........•.. _-_ .. - - ."

3132

OPAL Ullra
Lt H/Ud 120
.
.. -----_ ..... "'--

Item Code:

3134

_,

-2348
.. __ .

... 2347
.....
"

_~

,"

1070
106B·

\

..

~

.

_

~

_

1067
.... _..
".

30
- ._-..

--~_

1066 -_
....

2065
.. _._--

••..

-

•. _ .

"

. ....

50

. _ . • _ . . . - -• • • _ _ •• '

'_'_0'

~_~~~.f~.U~~tH/U~_tO_~! . _

_ .. _.~9_...

SEt'J.r~~A.~~!B~v~'r H/L!d J. Q9'~.
SENECA MentholLt SIP 100

.

_._--_.-,

A

••

SENECA
UUra It SiP
1OO'.s
.. _.- - ._._---_..
.
,-

,

_-.~._--_

••

.~

~E~ECAUg~~ S!r:>100 _.._..

' "'_' '__ __" __.

60

. " . _ . __ ••• _

.60
-....

.--

_',

..

SENECA Full Flavor SIP 100

SE~.§.~~!'I~~. F.i!l.~!.~!!-l~ing

.....

~P_...

.

.... "

~Q __..

2054

~E~~9~.full ~Iave.~.~!?ft Kln~ ... _._.~Q_

50

---:---~_

$244.50

.. . ..J! .2.2.?..:..5q.

.

~?~~~.~:p_~ . .

$244.50

~~,~6~:.~Q.

35,

.~~~~~~__ .

$,1_2,~.~.Z:~Q

15-

$362.50

_._~~!43~:..~9

~~~~_....
~~_3_~:~ ..._.....

15-

$435.00

35

~~~~:~_........

15_~ .....
-----_35
_._--- -

.. 25 ~..._._

Pagel D/3

__.

_$}.?,225.:~9. __ . __

10
. --_.-.... '--

._.~_._

_

$1.~ ..~~!.~~

... _$4.35.~

_0 __ . . __.

.... _--

SENECA, ..Full Flavor H/Lid --."-"--King

_

Extension:

$2,445.00

15 -

35 ,

••••

60

~

••••

Price Per Unit:

$244.50

~?~~:~9.._

..

§P .._. ...3.5 

__

.....2060
.. _..

5 _- -10
.... _..

__ ... _~o.__

SENECA MentholLt H/Lid 1oo's

2351

Quantity:
10-

30

q~~~_~i~~~)·UL~d 1.?2~~._._..

3131
.- ... _---

".-

~"

Case:
30

$~ •.~.?~.gQ

.

. _S6!.52E:QQ._. _' __'
~1~,?-?5 . QQ

.J362.5~.~~!':"~?:~._ ..._
~363~

$362.50

..

~.1?,~~!.. ?.Q..

.... _.. ~~2.5q .

._
.

EXHIBIT
NWS 000004

001008
IDAG 172222

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS
Item Code Item:
Total Quantity Delivered
Total Cartons Delivered
Total Packs Delivered
Total Sticks Delivered

Pack:
Quantity:
Add one extra handling u.l)jt to.
any fraction of the whole number.

295
14,900

~PerUnlt;

Sub Total $109,105.00
Shipping $2,065.00

149,000

Discounts $0,00

Units 9.8

2,980,000

TOTAL THIS ORDER $111,170.00

Total Weight (Lbs) 7788

CONDJTION OF SALE

Extension:

These goods have been sold to PurchasE!r at the Seneca Nation Territory. They are for delivery only at Seneca Nation Tertitory and may be
transported by Purchaser. only at Seneca Nation Territory or to the TerriIory of another native nation. The goods so sold and delivered are only for
transported resale to dlstr1buterS1Jt Senll1::a Nation Territory or such other Native Territory to which they are transported.

Purchaser's Signature

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEl.IVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE
Purchaser's signature below hereby acknowledge!, delivery and receipt Of lhe above described goods at SENECA NATioN
TERRITORY on this _ _day of

_P_U~~~~~~~'S Signature

.2004

X

BILL OF LADING:

:============~~~~~~==~~~~=~==~~=::==~:;:}_

[IProduct Class: 851IProduct:. Tobacco II Stackable II

TRANSPORT AUTHORIZATION

Purchaser's Transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter:
AR~NGE

War Path

Transporter Infonnation:
Volume Disc. Trackfl:
Roadway Pro#:
Web Address:
Please allow 5 to 7 days for shippIng

FOR SHIPPING

North 165 Highway 95
FOR SHIPPING
Plummer lD 83851

(208) 68f)·5427

(does not include holidays

Tracking Ph#

,he

or weekends)

Purchaser's signature below hereby authtlrizes and directs
.ransport~r 10 transport Pu!cllase(s goods. which have been purchased at Seneca
Nation Territosy, to Pu!cllaser's Transport Destination as eel forth above.
.

Purchaser's Signature

X

VERIFICATiON OF ARRIVAL ,"T PURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTINATION

Purcha.sel·s Transport Destination

Tribe

Date Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination

5tate

I

_

I

Signature of person who received at Purchaser's Transport Destination X

------------

NWS 000005

001009
IDAG 172223

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY

Invoice

P.O. Box 214
GowRndft, NY 14070
716.532.6136

DATE

INVOICE #

41512004

4995

SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 838S1

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho &3&S 1

P.O. NO.

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

3S Seneca Full Flavor SIP IOD's
35
15
JS
25
.5
5
25
5
15
JO

30
30
IS
10
15
]0
IS
15
S
10
345

PROJECT

AMOUNT

435.00
435.00
435.00
435.00
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50

Seneca Light SIP t OO's
Seneca Ultra Ll SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol SIP 100's
Seneca Full Fltavor Soft King
Seneca Ullra Lt Soft King
Seneca Menthol Soft King
SeneCll Full Flavor HlLid King .
Seneca Menthol H/Lid King
Seneca Non- Filtcr HlLid King
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt son 100'5
Seneca Full FII!vor HlLid l00's
Scueca Light H/Lid 100's
Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid 100's
Seneca Menthol HlLid 100's
Seneca Meilthe,1 U HlLid JOO's
Seneca Mentho" Ullre Ll HlLid 100's
Opal Full Flav(1I' HlLid 120'5
Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5
Opal Menthol fI/Lid 120'5
Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120'5
Shipping
Discounl-16000 Seneca ctns@$O.SO per ctn

15,225.00
15.225.00
6,.52.5.00
6,,525,00
9,062.50
J,812.50
1,812.50
9,062.50
1,812.50
5,437.50
3,625.00
10,875.00
10,875.00
5,437.50
3,62.5.00
5,437.50

362.50

36250
362.50
362.50

3,625.00

244.50
244.50
244.50
244..50
7.00
-8,000.00

3,667.50
3,661.50
1,22250
2,445.00
2,415.00

-8,000.00

Total

$121,417.50

----

Payments/Credits
Balance Due

so.oo
$121,417.50

NWS 000013

001010
IDAG 172231

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

5/1812004

5140

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY

.

SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Palh
North 1.65 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

War Path
North 165 HighwllY 9$ .
Plummer, IdAho 83851

TERMS

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY
70
20
IS
35
35

65
30
15
15
15
315

PROJECT

RATE

Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's
Seneca Lighl SiP l00's
Seneca UlIrll Lt SIP 100's
Seneca Full Flavor Soft King
Sencca Full Fhwor HJLid King
Seneca Full Flavor HlLid IDO's
Seneca Light I·I/Lid 100's
Seneca UIII1l Lt H/Lid 100's
Opal Lighl HlLid 120'$
Opal·U1lra LI H/Lid 120'5
Discount· 15,300 Seneca cartons@S.50Jcarton
Shipping ..

AMOUNT

435.00
435.00
435.00
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
244.50
2-14.50
·7,650.00
·7.00

30,450.00
8,700,00
6,525.00
12,687.50
12,687.50
23,562,50
10,875.00
5,437.50
3,667.50
3.667.50
-7,650.00
2,205.00 .

Total

$112,815.00

Payments/C red its

so.oo

•

Balance Due

SI12,815.00

NWS 000021

001011
IDAG 172239

IN\10ICE/BILL OF
Dale ofS.le

Seller:

lADI~,i

NATIVE NATION

......,

13.Jul·04

Sold To
Purchaser:

Native Wholesale Supply
PO Box214

INVOICE #
ShIpped 011.:

War Path
North 165 Highway 95

Gowanda. N. Y. 14070

PlummerlO 83851

Seneca Nation Territory

at Seneca Natlon Territory

Billed To:

War Path

Place of

NaUv8 Wholesale SUpply

sale:

11037 Old Logan Rd

North 165 Highway 95

Perrysburg, NY 14129

VIA

o

Seileca Nation Territory

- - - - - - - _..

Shipping Charges Pending

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS
Item Code: Item:
SENECA Full Flavor H/lid 100's
2347

1055

SENECA Li£}ht ~/P ~I~~

1066

SENECA
... .
.Full. Flavor SIP
-. -_ 100
.. - .. ".

1061

S~.N~~~ Li9h~ S/F.' .11~ ..

1069

SENECA
Menthol SIP 100
.
.

2060

S!=~.'~C.A Full F~l;Iv.~! ~!!:i~ Ki~~L ..

.

~

Case:
50

QuantIty:

Price Per Unit:

ExtensIon:

25

$362.50

$9,062.50

60

10

$435.00

$4,350.00

60

25

$435.00

$10.875.00

$435.00

$~!~~Q..Q0.

60

_

.

Plummer to 83851

_

. 20
. .. , ...

_~._

..

60

15
_... - - ... _.

$435.00

$.~,~?~:~9_

50

20......

$362.50

$7!25.0.0q
.$8,700.00 .

.-, .....

,

. 60

20

$435.00
.
. .. -.- ---_ ..

50

15

$362.50
... - .. _..- ...

30....
--_

15
......

50

30
-- -_ ..

50

50

50

20
. ... _---

- ._.

_

--_

1054

S.~~.~9.A FUII£:!~v~t~~~~~~~...

2065

SENE<;;A .N_c>~ F!l~~~.. ~.~~~~ .~~~$t.

3134

OPAL
Menthol
Lt H/lid
...
.
.. _ .. 120's
.. __ .. _.

2348
2349

SEN.~CA .~!Q~~ t-I!.~!d.. ~ Q~'S ..
SENECA
Ultra
Lt
, ....H/Lid
.... -100'8
.. .....

2351

SENECA
Menthol
IH/lid 100's
-.
.
_. - It
.- .. -_
_..

3130

OPAL Full- Flavor
Hflid 120's
._- --.-. ---,
--_.-

30

3131

ligh.t H/~!~..12.~:~ .
OPAL
Urtra
120.
'. Lt H/Lid
.

._ ..

30

15_-- -.-_._....

~2~~ ..?~_

."

30

10
.......

?~N ~~'."'- ~!~~~ !it~i-,!. ~~Jt . _

50

10

$24~:?~_. ,
$362.50
.

3132
2061 .

5234

-_

~._~

"

'

~

,

",.

OPAL

..

"

.

'"

.. _15
•..

..

_....

$5,437.50_.

. .. -_._----_ ..

$244.50
.... _- .. ,-_.-.

,

--.-.- - ....

-"'"

_._

.

..

.

$3,667.50
... _. - -- ..

$362.50
......... ---_.

$~9.'~?~:.og..

__..

$362.50
. _..... _. .

$1 ~,,1~.~.gl!

_._._
.

.... _.

... $7!?~QJ~9..

$362.50
- .. - ----_ _..
$244.50
. ,
_-- .

.

_-_

__ 

~~!.~!.:.~E

_. _

..

$2,445.00
- -'-.'

.
-

.$3,667.50
.. _-----_._

..... _...
.

-

.

$3,625.00
. .....
_.. _. - -. --
-~--_.-

PageJof2
ll.1\1I'C nnnn'?7

001012
IDAG 172245

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS
Item Code: Item:
315
Total Cases Delivered
15550
Total Cartons Delivered
15fi.500
Total Packs Delivered
3110000
Total Sticks Delivered

Ca.se:

Quantity:

Pri

Add one extra handling unit to
any fraction of the whole number.

.

Shipping $2,205.00
DIscounts $0.00

Units 1Q.4

TOTAL THIS ORDER $116,427.50

Total Weight (Lbs) 11340

CONDITION OF SALE

'er Unit
Extension:
......" _
---_._. __
_-, -_._--_ .. Sub Total $114,222.50

These goods have been sold to Pur~Sllr at the Seneca Nation Territory. They are for delivery only at Seneca Nation Territory plld may be
transported by Purchaser, only at Seneca Nation Tetrltory or to the Territory of another native nation. The gaoels 80 sold anel delivered are
only for transported resale to distributers at Seneca Nation TerritoI}' or aueh other Native Territory to which they are transported.

Purchaser's Signature

X

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DELIVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE
Purchaser's slgllature below hereby acknowledges defi"ery and receipt of the above described goods at SENECA
NATION TERRITORY on this _ _da)" of
,2004

Purchaser's

Signat~~re:"'-~X~============~~~~~==~~==~~~==;:;====~I

~~~~~~~~~:~RtzATION

'IPrOductC'a~s: 851IPrOduct: TObaccol!Stackablel}

Purchaser's transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter:

Transporter 'nformation:

War Path

ARRANGE FOR SHIPPING

Volume 01Sl;. Track':

FOR SHIPPING
Plummer 10 83851

Roadway Pro#:
Web Address:
Please allow 5 to 7 days for shipping

(208) 686-5427

(does not Include holidays or weekends

North 165 Highway 95

Purchaser's signature below hereby authorizes anel directs the transporter to transport Purchaser's goods. whIch have been purchased at
Seneca Nation Territory. to Purchaser's Transport Destination 8S set forth abDve.

Purchaser's Signature

X

VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL ArpURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTINATION

Purchaser's Transport Destination

- - - - - ..._----- State

Tribe

.pate Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination

I

---

I

Signature of person who recei"'ed at Purchaser's Transport Destination· x

-----------

Pt1Il~ 2011

NWS

OOOn?A

001013
IDAG 172246

DATE

INVOICE #

819/2004

5302

Invoice
P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Palh
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

Wac Palh
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idano 8385 I

TERMS

ITEM

NV·I1054
NV·11066
NV-1l067
NV·II068
NV-1J070
NV·22058
NV-22060
. NY-220M

NV·22065
NV·22347
NV-22348

NV-223S1
2

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

PROJECT

30 Seneca Full FlAvor SIP King
35 Seneca Full Flavor SIP loo's
30 Seneca Light SIP 100's
3D Seneca Ullra Ll SIP 1OD's
30 Seneca Menthol U SIP 100's
5 Seneca Menthol Lt Soft King
35 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King
S Senecll Menthol U HlLid King
15 Seneca Non· Filter HlLid King
30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid 100's
30 Seneca Light HJLid 100's -

AMOUNT

435.00
435.00
"435.00
435.00
435.00
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50

25 Seneca Menthol U HlLid JOO's

13,050.00
15,225.00
13,050.00
13,050.00
13,050.00
1,812.50
12,687.50
/,812.50
:5,437.50
10.875.00
10,875.00
9,062.50
2.100.00

7.00 "

300 Shipping

Total

$122,087.50

Payments/Cred its
Balance Due

$0.00
$122,087.50

NWS 000036

001014
IDAG 172254

INVOICE/BILL OF LADI
Date of Sale

Seller:

~

05-0ct-04

.1

5425

INvorCE #

NATIVE NATION

Shipped Date:

NBtive Wholesale Supply

Sold To
Purchaser:

PO 80)(214
Gowanda,N:V.14070

Warpath
NQrth 165 Highway 95
Plummer 10 83851

Toll Free: 1·877·628-4833
Place of
sale:

Billed To:

Nalive Wholesale Supply

War Path

10955 Logan Rd

North 165 Highway 95

Perrysburg, NY 14129

VIA

[J Shipping Charges Pending

Seneca NatIon Territory

Plummer 10 83851

-----------'--'---'--'

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS
Item Code:

Item:

Case:

Quantity:

Price Per'Unlt:

Eldension:

. . .50
_.....

75.

$362.50

$27,187.50
.
.

SENECA Full Flavor SIP 100

60

75

$435.00

$3.~,6?.~:O.o

~ENE~A Light SIP 1.00

60

15

$435.00 .

~~.5?-5.0Q

60 _.
._--

10

$435.00

$4,350.00

60

10

$435.00

$4,350.00

60

10

$435.00

$4,350.00
- . - ... - ...

2347

SENECA Full Flavor HlLid 100's

1066
1067
1068

.SENECA ............
Ultra Lt SIP --100's
-..

1070

SENECA Menthol Lt SIP 100

1071

..SENECA
.,
'.

..

Menthol
SIP 100
. . . .Ultra
.- "_. . Lt
... .. - .. - - . ..

"

... . .. .

~.

1054

S~NECA Full.F.'avor S/f.>.Ki~g

60

20

$3~.?~_o..
$435.00

2065

S~~I::CA .Non ~ilt~.r t1'/L.i~.K!~g

50

20

$3.6.~.~~

3134

OPAL Menthol Lt
120'5
.....HlLid
..... . _._--_._-,.,

30

5.

2348

SENECA Light H/Lid. ·I.(){).'.~

50

15

$~~~:~Q
$362.50
".- .. _."

2349

SENECA Ultra Lt H1Ud 1oo's

50

15

$.36?.~(). _. .

2351

~~~ECA M~~th.ol~t.t:!~~c:!.1.QQ:~_ .. __ ?~ ....

2352

SENECA

3131

OPAL Light H/Lid 1~l?'s

3132

OPAL
Lt H/Ud
- .. .. Ultra
.

2059

. ·3133·
2060

. ~~~E.CA. Me!lt~.'?J..':lJ~~~·.~~~~~~i.'."'.~_

.__ §.~ ...._..

Menthol Ultr,a Lt H/Lid 100'

'.'

1~~0 _.... .

OPAL Menthol
.. H/lid 120'5
-_
,

~.

.

-

"

Sf:~ECA Full F.lavor..I·Y~!~ Ki~~J.

.. _

5
...

...

-

-.~~.

.

-

...

10----_
~.

.

.

$~~~~ ?Q_.. __

30

15

$~~~:~Q._. ---- .

._-_

15

~~Q.

..

5-.
10

--_ .. 

._

$5,437.50
- ...' .

-"-'

~~~?. ~Q..

.

.

J1 . ~~~~~~

10
... - -_ ....

30
"-'---

$~,81~.~O..
$8,700.00 .
. . .. _.... _..... - ..

·$7~~~~:OQ __

_._

50

3D.._

.

$.?,~.~!:.?Q. ..'

..

.~~.~2~:Q.o.

... .~~~~?~~~..
~~~.'~~!~~~.

.

..
...

$~~~:~. .. . .. . . $.~.~~7:~.~_ .. "'"
. $244.50
. ~ti~2..?:~() __
.
~~6.?:~~.._._..

. ~.?.'~2~:Q~

'_'

I

i
I

I

Pogelo/2
NWS 000042

001015
IDAG 172260

I
!

I

DE!iCRIPTION OF GOODS
Item Code: Item:
340
Tota r Cases Delivered
17eOO
Total Cartons Delivered
176000
Total Packs Delivered
3520000
Total Sticks Delivered

........

Case:

Pri~rUn.lt:. . .....~~~~s.!~~;_.
Sub Total $128,680.00

Quantify:

Add one extra handling unit to
any fractlon of the whole number.

ShIpping $2,380.00
DlscoLJnts $0,00

Units 11.7

TOTAL THIS ORDER $131,060.00

Total Weight (Lbs) 12240

CONDITION OF SALE

These goods have been sold 10 Purchaser althe Seneca Nation Terrilory. They are for delivery only al Seneca Nalfon Territory and ms)' be
transported by Purchaser, only alSeneca Nation Territory or to the Territory of anaIller nalive nation. The goods so sold and delivered are
only for transported resale to dislributers at Seneca Nation Ternlory or such oloer Native Territory to which they are transported.

Purchaser's Signature

X

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DELIVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE
Purchaser's signature below hereby acknowledges delivery and receipt of the above described goods at SENECA
NATION TERRITORY on this _ _day IJf
.2004

Purchaser's Signature

X ..._

BILL OF LADING:

E~t Class: 8511 Product: To'b8ccolfstackableJl

TRANSPORT AUTHORIZATION

Purchaser's Transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter:
War Path

Transporter Information:

ARRANGE FOR.SHIPPING

Volume DIsc. Trackt:

North 165 Highway 95

Roadway Pro#:
Web Address:
Please allow 5 to 7 day. for shipping
(does not include holidays or weekends

FOR SHIPPING
Plummer 10 83851

(208) 686-5427

Purchaser's sllJnature below hereby authorizes and directs the transporter 10 transport Purchaser's goods. which have been purchased at
Seneca Nation Territory, 10 Purchaser's Tr~lnsport Destination as set forth above.
.

Purchaser's Signature

x

IERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AT PURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTlNA1'ION
Purchaser's Transport Destination

TrIbe

...._.._.

Date Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination

..

I

State

I

Signature of person who received at Purchaser's Transport Destination

·x - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Page2,,!Z'
NWS 000043

001016
IDAG 172261

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

1112412004

5533

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WIlT Path

W81'Path

North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho &38:51

North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

QUANTITY

30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
S; Seneca Light SIP King

NV·1I056
NV·IlQ66
NV·1l067

5 Seneca UllTO Light SIP King
25 Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's
25 Seneca Light SIP 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP 100's
30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLfd King
S Seneca Light HlLid King

~V·11070

NV·22060
NV·22061
NV-22062

RATE

DESCRIPTION

NV-I1054
NV-II055

TERMS

AMOUNT

435.00

13,OSO.OO

435.00
435.00
435.00
435.00
435.00
362.50
362.50
362.50
362.50

2,175.00
2,175.00

10,875.00
10,875.00
4,3S0.00
10,875.00
1,812.50
1,812.50
9.062.50

NV·22351
NV·33 130

5 Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid King
25 Seneca Full Flavor HlLidlOO's
2.S Seneca Light HlLid 100's
2S Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid 100's
7 Seneca Menthol UHlLid 100's
IS Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's

362.50
244.50

NV-33133
NV·33 134

Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
5 Opal Menthol Lt WLid 120's

24UO
244.50

3,667.50
1,222.50
1,222.50

7.00

1,729.00

NV-22347
NV-22348
NV-22349

2

.s

247 Shipping

362.50

9,062.50

362.50

9,062.50

Total

2,537:50

$95,566.50

Payments/Credits
Balance Due

$0.00
595,566.50

NWS 000051

001017
IDAG 172269

Invoice

DATE

INVOICEfI

12/3112004

5599

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 16S Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95 .
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.D.NO.

ITEM
NV-IIOS4
NV-IIOS6
NV-l10S8
NV-I.1066
NV-I1068
NV-l1070
NV·22060
NY-22063
NV·22065
NV·22348
NV·223S0
NV-22JSI
NV·33 134
2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

30 [Senea Full FJavor SIP King
5 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King
5 ,Seneca Menthol Light SIP King
30 Seneca Full "'Javor SIP !OD's
2S Seneca Ultra J.t SIP 100's
IS Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IDO's
30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King
5 Seneca Menthol HlLid King
20 Seneca Non- Filter HlLid King
2S Seneca Light HlLid IDO's
10 SenccllMenthol HJLld lOO's
20 'Seneca Menthol Lt IYLld 100's
5 Opal Menthol Lt· HlLid 120's
225 Shipping

AMOUNT

n,oso.OO

435.60
435.00
435.00
435.00
435.00
435.00
362.50
362.50
)62,50
362.50
362.50
362.50
244.50

2,175.00
2,175.00
13,050.00
10,875.00
6,525.00
10,875.00
1,812.50
7,250.00
9,062.50
3,625.00
7,250.00
1,222.50

7.00

1,575.00

Total

$90,522.50

Payments/Credits
Balance Due

$0.00

S90,522,SO
NWS 000059

001018
IDAG 172277

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

2fl1l2005

5641

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda. NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BilL TO

War Path

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer. Idaho 8385 I

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV·1I0S4
NV·IIOSS
NV·1/066
NV·II067
NV·1J068
NV-2~060

NY·22065
NV·22347
NV·22348
NY·22349
NV·22352
2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

AMOUNT

RATE
465.00

20 Seneca Full flavor SIP King
10 Seneca Light SIP King
SeneCll Full Flavor SIP IOD's
35 Seneca Light SIP 1OD's
~!5 Seneca UUra U SIP loo's
40 Seneca Full Flavor Hll..id King
IS Seneca Non- Filter HJLid King

387.50
387.50
387.50
387.50
387.50
387.50

9,300.00
4,650.00
18.600.00
16,275.00
11,625.00
15,500.00
5,812.50
15,500.00
1,937.50
9,687.50
1,550,00

7,<lO

1,813.00

465.00
465.00

.'0

465.00
465.00

40 Seneca Full Flavor H/Lid 100's
5 Seneca Light HlLid 10O's
25 Senecll Ultra Lt HlLid 100's
,4 Seneca Menthol Ullra u HlLid 100's

2S'!> Shipping

Total

$112,250.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$112,250.50

NWS 000066

001019
IDAG 172284

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

3/3/2005

5663

P.O. Box 214
Gowftndas NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
Norlh 16.5 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

War Palh
North 165 Highway 95

Plummer, Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-33130
NV·331)1
NV-33132

NY-33 133
NV-33134
2

QUANriTY

DESCRIPTION

RATE

2(. Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's
20 Opal Light HlLid 120's

AMOUNT

5,190.00
5,190.00
5,190.00
1,297.50
5,190.00
595.00

259.50
259.50
259.50
259.50
259.50
7.00

20 Opal Ultra U H!Lid 120's
~: Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
20 Opal Menthol Lt Hn...id 120's
85 Shipping

Tota"

$22,G5~.50

Payments/Credits
Balance Due·

$0.00
Sll,65l.S0
NWS 000073

001020
IDAG 172291

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

4/1112005

5756

P.o. Box214
GowandA, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WarPalh

WarPath

North 165 Highway 9S

North J6S HighwB)' 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

Plummer, Idaho &3851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV·11054
NV·l1057
NV-11066
N¥·11067
NV-I1068
N-11070

NY·IIO?!

QUANTITY

30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
.5 Seneca Menthol SIP King
50 SeneclI Full Flavor SIP 100's
30 Seneca Light SIP 100's
20 SeneclI U\l~ Lt SIP 100's
fO Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOD's
10 .Seneca Menlhol Ultra U SIP 100's

NY-I10n

10 Seneca Full Flavor BIL 100's

SO Seneca Light HIL I OD's

NV-2235I

NV-33J30
NY·33131
NV-33 133

2

RATE

DESCRIPTION

NY-f1073
NV·II074
NV·22060
NV·22061
NV·22062
NV-22065

TERMS

AMOUNT

465.00
465.00
465.00

465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00

20 Seneca Ultra Lighl HIl. 100's

46S.00
381.50
387.50

25 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King
15 Seneca Lighl HlLid King
S Seneca Ultra Ll HlLid King
10 Seneca Non- Filter (-{/Lid King
15 Senec..\ MenthOl Ll HlLid lOO's
10 Opal full FI~vor HII,id f20's
4 Opal Lighl HlLid 120's

23,250.00

13,950.00
9.300.00
4,650.00

4,650.00
4,650.00
23,250.00
9,300.00

387.50
387.50
259050

9,687.50
5,812.50
1,937.50
3,875.00
5,S1Z.S0
2,595.00

259.50

. 1,038.00

259•.50
7.00

1.297.50
2,26&.00

387.50

5 Opal Mcnrhol HlLid 120's
324 Shipping

13,950.00
2,325.00

Total

$143,598.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

SO.uO
$143.598.50

NWS 000080

001021
IDAG 172298

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

512512005

5911S

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532:6fj6

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WarPath
·Nonh HiS Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
·North 165 Highway 95
. Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

QUANTITY

3S
35
10
10
5
35
35
15
IS
195

NV-1l054
NY-I 1066
NV·I1067
NV·I1068
NV·11069
NV-II072
NV-22060
NV·33 131
NV-33 132
2

l.....

DESCRIPTION

....,..-

AMOUNT·

RATE

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor-SIP 100's
Seneca Light SIP 100's
Seneca Ultra Lt Sf? lOO's
Seneca Menthol Sf? 100'5
Seneca Full Flavor HIL lOO's
Seneca Full Flavor H1Lid King
Opal Light HlLid 120's
Opal Ultra LI H/Lid 120'5
Shipping

._.

TERMS

465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
387.50
259.50
259.50
7.00

-+

Total

16,275.00
16,275.00
4,650.00
4,650.00
2,325.00
16,275.00
13,562.50
3,892.50
3,892.50
1,365.00

$83,162.50

Payments/Credits
Balance Due
NWS 000093

001022
lOAG 172311

$0.00

~

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

6/28/2005

5972

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath

War Path
Nonh 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

North 165 Highwuy 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-II054
NV-I JOSS

NV·l1057
NV-11066

NV-IIOQ7
NV-11068
NV-II069

NV-II070
NV·llon
NV-f1075
NV·11076
NV-22060
NV-22061

NV·2206J
NV·22065
NV-33131
. 2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

3 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
10 Seneca Light SiP King
5 Seneca Menthol SIP King
45 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
16 Seneca Light SIP 100's
10 Seneca Ullra Lt SIP loo's
10 Sentea Menthol SIP 100's
15 St:neca Menthol Lt SIP LOO's
40 Seneca Full Flavor BIL 100's
10 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's
15 Seneca Menlhoi Light HIL IOD's
21 SeneclI Full Flavor H/Lid King
10 Seneca Light HlLid King
5 Seneca Menthol WLid King

25 SenecK Non- Filter !·IILid King
5 Opal Light HlLid 120's

AMOUNT

465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.0D

1.395.00
4,650.00
2,325.00
20,925.00

465.00
465.00
387.50
387.50
387.50

4,650.00

7,440.00
4,650.00

4,650.00
6,975.00
18,600.00
6,975.00
8,137.50
3.815.00
1,937.50

9,681.50
1,.297.50

387.:50
259.50
7.00

245 Shipping·

Totar

1,7 J 5.00

SI09,885.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00

$109,885.00

NWS 000096

001023
IDAG 172314

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

712812005

6051

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highwily 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPatll
North 165 Hig.hway 95

Plummer, Idaho 83851

P:O.NO.

ITEM

NV-IIOS4
NY-I 1055
NV-11066
NY-II 067
NY-I 1068
NY· 11 069
NY·11070

NY-lIOn
NY-I 1073
NY·l1074
NY. I 1075
NV·11076
NV·22060
NV-22061
NV·22065
NV-33 1_30
NY-33l31
NV·33132

NY-33 133
NV·33 134
2

QUANTIW

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION

30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
10 Seneca Light SIP King
30 Seneca -Fu II Flavor SIP lOG's
15 Seneca Light SIP IDO's
15 Sencca Ultra LI SIP 100's
10 SenecR Menthol SIP 100's
15 Seneca Menthol U SIP 100'5
30 Sencca Full Flavor HIL 100'5
30 Seneca Light HIL 100's
IS Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's
10 Seneca Menthol HIL fOO's
10 Seneca Menthol Light HIL IOD's
30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King
10 Seneca Light HlLid King
10 Seneca Non- Filter HlLid King
8 Qpal Full Flavor H/Lid 120'5
5 Opal Light HlLid f20's
5 Opal Ultra Ll HlLid 120's
5 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120's
5 Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's
298 Shipping

AMOUNT

450:00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
·450.00
450.00
450.00
450.00
375.00
375.00
375.00
259.50
259.50
259.50
259.50
259.50
7.00

Total

13,500.00
4,500.00
13,500.00
6,750.00
6,750.00
4,500.00
6,750.00
13,500.00
13,500.00
6,750.00
4,500.00
4,500.00
11,250.00
3,750.00
3,750.00
2,076.00
1,297.:50
1,297.50
1,297.50
1,297.50
2,086.00

S127,102.00

Payments/Credits
Balance Due

$0.00
$127,[02_00

NWS 000105

001024
IDAG 172323

-

•

Invoice

DATE

.INVOICE #

9JJ4/2005

6174

P.O. Box 214
Gowancla, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

Was Path

WluPlIlh
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idabo 8385 I

North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NY-I 1054
NY·11060
NY· 11066
NY-I 1067
NY-I 1068
'lY·11069
NY·1I070
NY·1I071
NY-lIOn
NY-llO?3
NY·[ 1074
NY·I1075
NY·II076
NY-33130
NY-3Jljl
NY-33 132
NY-33133
NY-33134
2

QUANTITY

25 Seneca Full flavor SfP King

20
10
9
14
. 5

5
:~88

AMOUNT

RATE

DESCRIPTION

25
30
25
15
10
20
5
20
25
IS
10

TERMS

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

Senecn Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's
Seneca Light SIP 100's
Seneca Ultra Ll SIP 100'5
Seneca Menthol SIP IDO's
Seneca Menthol U SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol Ultra U SIP 100's
Senccll.Full FlavorH!L 100's
Seneca Light HIL 100'5
Seneca Ultra Lt HIL 1M's
Seneca Menthol HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol U H!L I DO's
Opal Full Flavor H!Lid 120's
Opal Light HlLid 120's
Opal Ultra Lighl WLid PO's
Opal MCOlhol HlLid 120's
Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's
Shipping

11,400.00
11,400.00
13,680.00
11,400.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
9,120.00
2,280.00
9,120.00
11.400.00
6,840.00.
4,560.00
9,120.00
2,625.00
2,362.50
3,675.00

456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50

1.312.50

262.50

1,3/2.50
2,016.00

7.00

Total

$125.023.50

Payments/Credits
Balance Due

$0.00
1125,023,50

NWS 000114

001025
IDAG 172332

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

J011212005

6232

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
Bill TO

SHIP TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 838Sl

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-II054
NY·JJ060
NY-I 1061

NV·11065
NV·II066
NV.l1067
NV-lJ068
NY·lI012
NY-I 1013
NV-I1074
NV-33 130
NV·33 13 I
NV·33 132
NV-33134

2

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION
20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King

AMOUNT

465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465,00
465.00
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50
7.00

40 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
10 Seneca Light HIL King
10 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
40 Seneca Full Fillvor SIP 100's
20 Seneca Light SIP 100's
15 Seneca Uhrll Lt SIP 100's

40 Seneca Full Flavor HIL IDO's
20 Seneca Light HIL JOD's
IS Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's
IS Opal Full Flavor HlLirl 120's
IS Opal Light HlLld 120'5
15 Opal Uhl1l Lt HlLid 120'5
5 Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's
280 Shipping

9.300,00
18.600,00
4,650.00
4.650.00
18.600.00
9,300.00
6,975.00
18,600.00
9,300.00
6,975.00
3.937.50
3,937.50
3,937.50
1,312.50
1,960,00

-

Total

$122,035.00

Payments/Credjts

Balance Due

$0.00
$121,035.00

NWS 000117

001026
IDAG 172335

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

1011412005

6237

P.O. Box 214

Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 HighwllY 9S
Plununer, Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NY. I 1054
2

QUANTIlY

DESCRIPTION

RATE

20 Seneca Full flavor SIP King
20 Shipping

AMOUNT

465.00
1.00

Total

9,300.00
140.00

$9,440.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

SO.oo
$9,440.00

NWS 000121

001027
IDAG 172339

Invoice

DATE

INvorCE#

121712005

6360

P.O. Box 214
GowAnda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

Bill TO

WarPath

War Path

North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

. North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idallo 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NY. I 1054
NY-I 1055
NY-I 1060
NV·11061
NY·H065
NV·I1066
NY-I 1067
NY-lI06B
NV-II070
NY-I 1073
NV·11074
NV·11077
NV-33 130
NY-33 13 I
NV-33 132
2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

25 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
5 Seneca Light SIP King
25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
5 SenccR Light HIL King
10 SenecR Non-Filter HlLid King
3D Seneca full Flavor SIP 100's
15 Seneca Light SIP lOO's
20 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP lOO's
15 Seneca Light HII.. 10D's
:W Seneca Ultra Light HJL 100's
5 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL 100's
15 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's
:z.s Opal Light HlLid 120's
lS Opal Ultra Lt H/Lid 120's
240 Shipping

AMOUNT

11,625.00
2,325.00
11,625.00
2,325.00
4,650.00
13,950.00
6,975.00
9,300.00
4,650.00
6,975.00
9,300.00
2,325.00
3.937.50
6,562.50
3.937.50
1.680.00

465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.0D
465.00
465.00
465.00
465.00
262.50
262.50
262.50
7.00

Total

$102,142.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
SI02,142.50

NWS 000125

001028
IDAG 172343

~
~~ ~~.

Invoice

DATE
I - - __ _ --t_'N_VO_IC_E_#-i

--=-rO.-;:;2~

1/17/2006

6452
--.-.J

L . . -_ _- - - "

Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO
WarPath

War Path

North 165 Higltway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

North 165 Highway 95
Ptummor,ldano 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

1

ITEM

NY-Ilon
NY·I1073
NY·l1074
2

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

65
20
15
100

Seneca Full Flavor HIL 1OD's
Seneca Light HIL 1OD's
Seneca Ultra U HIL l00's
Shipping

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
7.00

Total

29,640.00
9.120.00
6,840.00
700.00

$46,:100.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00

$46,300.00
NWS 000132

001029
IDAG 172350

Invoice

DATE

JNVOrCE#

1/1712006

6454

·P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idllbo 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV·lIOS4
NV-II060
NV-11062
NV-l1063

NV·11066
NV-1I067
NV-1I068
NV-11070
NV-3313!
NV·33132
NV-33 133
NV-33134
2

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Ultra Light HJL King
Seneca Mentbol HIL King
Seneca Full Flavor Sfp 100's
20 Seneca Light SIP 100's
IS Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
15 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's
10 Opal Light HlLid 120'5
10 ' Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5
5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120'5
10 IOpal Menthol Lt H1Lid 120's
220 Shipping

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50

30
30
5
S
65

262.50

262.50
262.50
7.00

Total

13,680.00
13,680.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
29,640.00
9,120.00
6,840.00
6,840.00
2,625.00
2,625.00
1,312.50
2,625W

1,540.00

S95,OB7.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
595,087.50
NWS 000131

001030
IDAG 172349

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

3/13/2006

6593

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

W81 Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 8385 I

War Path
Noeth 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Jdaho 838~ I

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-II054
NV-IIOSS
NV-l1060
NV-II061
NV·1I06S
NV·II066
NV·II067
NV-II068
. NY·I1069
NV-I1070
NV-IIOn
NV·II073
NV-II074
NV·II075
NV-1I076
NV-3J130
NV-HI31

NV-33132
NV-33 133
NV-33 134
2

QUANTIIY

RATE

DESCRIPTION

2S Seneca Pull Flavor SIP King

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

10 Seneca Lighl SIP King
25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
10 Seneca Ught H/L King
IS Seneca Non·Filter Jl/Lid King
50 Sencca Full Flavor SIP 100's
20 Seneca Light SIP IDO's
15 Seneca Ullra Lt SIP lOO's
10 SeneclI Menthol SIP 100's
IS Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOO's
50 Seneca Full Flavor HIL IOD's
20 Seneca Light HlL I OD's
15 Seneca Ultra Light HII. 100's
10 g,eneclI Menlhol HIL 100's
15 Seneca Mcnthol Light HIt 100's
10 Opal Full Flayor H/Lid 120'5
10 Opal Light lilLid 120's
10 Oplll Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5
5 Opal Menthol H!Lid 120's
5 Opll Menthol Ll H/Lid 120's
345 Shipping

4~6.00

456.00
4.56.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
1\56.00

11.400.00
4,560.00
11,400.00
4.560.00
6,840.00
22,800.00
9,120.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
.6,840.00
22,800.00
9,120.00
6,840.00

4,560.00
6,840.00

262.50

2.625.00

262.50
26'2.50
262.50
262.50
7.00

2,625.00
2,625.00
1,312.50
1,312.50
2,415.00

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$15 I ,995.00
$0.00
$151,995.00
NWS 000136

001031
IDAG 172354

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

5/1612006

6764

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda. NY 14070

716.532.6136

:NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highwll)' 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WAr Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-1I054
NV-11055
NV-I1056
NY-IID57
NV-1I060
NV-II061
NV·11062
NV-II063
NY. 110M
NV·II06S
NV·1I067
NV·11068
NV-l1071
NV-Ilon
NY-1I073
NV-1I074
NV-It075

NV-II071
NV-33130
NV-33 13 I
NV-33132
NV-33133
NV-33134

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

RATE

20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King

10 Seneca Light SIP King
10 Seneca Ullra Light SIP King

TERMS

"

5 Seneca Menthol SIP King
25 Seneca Full flavor HIL King
10 Seneca Light HIL King
10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL King
5 Seneca Menthol HlI.. King
5 'Seneca Menthol Light HIL Killg
10 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
10 Seneca Light SIP 100's
10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100'5
10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP 100's
50 Sencca Full Flavor HIL lOO's
20 Seneca Light HIL 100's
JO Sellcca .Ultra I.ighl HIL 100's .
10 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's
10 Seneca Menlhol Ultra Lt HIL 100's
10 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5
15 Opal Light HlLid 120'5
10 Opal Ultra U HlLid 120's
10 Opal Menthol HfLid 120's
IS Opal Menlhol Lt HlLid ) 20's

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00 ,
4$6.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

9,120.00
4.560.00
4.560.00
2,280.00
11,400.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
22,800.00
9,120.00
4,560.00

456.00

4,560~{}O

456.00 '
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50

4,560.00
2,625.00
3,937.50
2,62.5.00
2,625.00
3,937.50

Total

$125,190.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00

$125,190.00

NWS 000141

001032
IDAG 172359

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

7120/2006

7011

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE· WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath

War Path

North 165 Highway 95

North 165 Highway 95

Plummer, Idaho 83851

Plummer, Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NY-I 1055
NV-ll0S8
NY·11060
NV·ll061
NV·1I062
NV·11063
NY·11065
NV·11066
NV·II061
NV·1l068
NY·1I069
NY-I 1070
NY·JlOn
NV-1I0"!3
N,V-l1074
NV-l1075
NV-11076
2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

RATE

20. Seneca Light SIP King
5 Seneca Menthol Light SIP King
30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
5 Seneca Light HIL King
5 Seoeca Ultra Light HtL King
5 Seneca Menthol HIL King
7 Seneca Non·Filler HlLid King
26 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 1DO's
10 Seneca Light SIP 100's
6 Seneca Ultra LI SIP IOO's
1 Seneca Menthol SIP 1000s
6 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's
30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's
30 -Scneca Light H1L 100's
20 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100',
6 Sencca Menthol HIL 100's
12 Seneca Menthol Light HlL I DO's
230 Shipping

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
1.00

9,120.00
2,280.00
13.680.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
3,192.00
11,856.00
4,560.00
2,136.00
3,192.00
2,136.00
13,680.00
13,680.00
9,120.00
2,736.00
5.472.00
1,610.00

Total

$106,490.00

Payments/Credits

so.oo

Balance Due

$106,490.00
NW~

UUU14tl

001033
IDAG 172366

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

8/912006

7096

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

N"ATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

. BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPnth

North 16S Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

TERMS

P.D.NO;

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

QUANTllY

NV·J3130

IS Opal FuJI Flavor H/Lid 120'5

NY·3313J
NV-33t32
NV·33m
NV·33J34

IS Opal Light I-lILid 120's
20 Opal Ultra Ll H!Lid 120's
10 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
15 Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's

2

75 Shipping

AMOUNT

RATE

262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50
7.00

Total

3,937.50
3,937.50
5,250.00
2,625.00
3,937.50
525.00

$20,212.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$20,212.50

NWS 000151

001034
IDAG 172369

Invoice

DATE

lNvorCE#

8/2212006

7141

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BilL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 High\\'IlY 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV·1I054
NV·II060
NV·II06S
NV-II066
NV-II061
NY. I 1068
NV-II069
NV·11070
NY.) !O72
NY. I 1073
NV·11074
NY. I1075
NV·ll076

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

40
40
15
30
15
20
10
10
40
15
20
I0
)0

RATE

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Scoecs Full Flavor HIL King
8encca Non·Filter H/l...id King
Seneca Full Flavor SfP IOD's
Seneca Light SIP 100's
Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol SIP I OO's
Seneca Menlhol Lt SIP 100's
Seneca Full Flavor HIL IDO's
Seneca Lig~t HIL 100's
Seneca Ultra Light HJL 100's
SenecB Menthol HIL 100's
SeneCR Mentholl_i~ltl HIt 1OD's

TERMS

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
4.56.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
4.56.00
4.56.00

Total

18.240.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
13,680.00
6,840.00
9,120.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
9,120.00
4,560.00
4,560.00

$125,400.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
SI25.!lJI_O.OO
nnn~ ... ,

"'1M"

001035
IDAG 172375

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

8122/.2006

7142

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95

War Path
North 16S Highway 95

Plummer, Idaho 83851

Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NY·33054
NY·33055
NY-33056
2

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

10 Seneca full Flavor HIL 120's
10 Seneca Light HIL 120'8
10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 120's
30 Shipping

AMOUNT

262.50
262.50
262.50
7.00

2,625.00
2,625.00
2,625.00
210.00

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

so.oo
$8.085.00
NWS 000156

001036
IDAG 172374

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

10/912006

7374

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE' WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WarPath

WarPath

North 16.5 Highway 9S

North 165 Highway 95

Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

Plummer. Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV·llOS4
NV·11060
NV-1l061
NV-1I065
NY·I1066
NV-1l067
NY-liOn
NV·11073
NV·11074
NV-IIOn
NY-33130
NV-J313J
-NV-33 132
NY·33134

QUANTITY

RATE

DESCRIPTION

10
25
10
10
20

10
30

IS
10
5
10
IS
5
15

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Light HIL King
Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
8enccB Light SIP 100's
Seneca Full Flavor HI!. 100's
Seneca Light HIL 100's
SeneCft Ultra Light HfL 100's
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL 100's '
Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5
Opal Light HlLjd 120'5
Opal Ultra Lt JllLid 120'5
Opal Menthol Lt 1-lfLid 120's

"

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
262.50
262.50
-262.50

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

4,560.00
11,400.00
4,560.00
4,S60.0q
9,120.00
4,560.00
13,680.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
2,625.00
3,937.50
1,3J2.50
3,937.50

$77,932.50
$0,00
$71,932.50
NWS 000162

001037
IDAG 172380

i
i

II

I
!

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

11/612006

7509

-

P.O. Box 214
Gowan(la, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-l1054
NV-II056
NV-II060
NV~II06l

NV-JI062
NV-l1063
NV-1106S
NV-ll066
NY-I 1068
NV-1I069
NY-1l070
NV-II072
NY-1I073
NY-11074

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

25
5
30
10

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Seneca Ultra Light SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Light HlL King
5 Seneca Ultra Light HIL King
5 Seneca MentholH/L King
10 I Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
.40 I Seneca Full Flavor SIP 1OD's
IS Seneca UUra Lt SIP 100's
10 Seneca Menthol SIP IOD's
10 Senecll Menthol Lt SIP 100's
40 Seneca Full Flavor WL loo's
IS SeneclI tight HIL 100's
15 Seneca UltrA Light HlL 100's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

11,400.00
2,280.00
13,680.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
2,2&0.00
4,560.00
18,240.00
'6,840.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
6;840.00

NY-JI07S

10 Seneca Menthol H/L. 100's

456.00

4,560.00

NV-33 130
NV·33l31
NV-33 132
NV-33133

10 Opal Full Plavor H/Lid 120's
10 Opal Light H/l..id 120's
IS Opal Ultra Lt H/l..id 120's
S Opal Menthol HlLid 120's

262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50

2,625.00
2,625.00
3,937.50
1,312.50

Total

$122,220.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

so.oo
$122,220.00
NWS 000169

001038
IDAG 172387

F~-~

Invoice

.....

JI~
~O.;;2~

DATE

INVOICE #

112/2007

7708

Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPath
North 165 Highw'lly 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-11055
NV-11056
NV-\lOW
NV-II061
NV-II062
NV·II067
NV-II068
NV-1l0n
NV-II073
NV·11074
NV·11075
NY· I 1076
NY· 11077
NY-33 131
NV·33132
NV-J3134

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY
10
5
50
15
5

30
10
60

Seneca Light SIP King
Seneca Ultra Light SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Light HIL King
Seneca Ultra Light H/L King
Seneca Light SIP IOD's
Seneca Ultra Lt SIP IOD's
Seneca Pull Flavor BIL I OD's
Seneca Light WI. 100's
Seneca Ultra Light I~ 100's
Seneca Menthol HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol pght HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL laO's

40
IS
5
IS
10
15 Opal Light HlLid 120's
5 Opal Ultra It HlLid 120's
10 0P1l1 Menthol Lt IJlJ-!id 120's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
262.50
262.50

..

Totar

4,560.00
' 2,280.00
22,800.00
6,840.00
2,280.00
13,680.00
4,560.00
27.360.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
2,280.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
3.937.50
1,312.50
2,625.00

$130,995.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due·
NWS 000175

$0.00

$130,995.00

001039
IDAG 172393

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

2/27/2007

7933

P.O. BOI 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

AMOUNT

456,00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
262.5()

NV-~3131

30 Seneca full Flavor SIP King
20 Seneca Full flavor HIL King
5 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
40 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
10 Seneca Light SIP laO's
15 Seneca Ultr8 Lt SIP 100's
5 Senecn Menthol SIP 100's
15 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's
40 Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's
10 Seneca light HlL 100's
15 Seneca Vllra Light H/L 100's
10 Seneca Menthol WL 1000s
15 Seneca Menthol Light HlL 100's
15 Opal Full Flavor I·I/Lid 120's
15 9pal Ligbt J-!"!Lid 120's

NV-33132
NV-33 133
NV·33I34

IS Opal Ullrn Ll HlLid 120'$

262.50

10 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
5 Opal Menthol Lt I-J/Lid 120's

262.50
262.50

NV~11054

NV·II060
NV·I1065
NV·1I066
NV·11067
NV·I1068
NV·11069
NV-11070
NV-l1072
NV·1I073
NV-! 1074
NV·I1075
NV·11076
NV-33 130

Total
-.-- ----_... __ ...
Payments/Credits

13,680,00
9,120.00
2,280.00
18,240.00
4,560.00
6,840.00
2,280,00
6,840.00
18,240.00
4,560.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
6,840.00
3,937.50
3.937.50
3.937.50
2,625.00
1,312.50

$ 120,630.00

"""""-~..,..---.--~.-..---

I

Balance Due

._--- .--
$0.00

S120,630.00

NWS 000179

001040
IDAG 172397

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

4/11/2007

8128

.P.O. Box 214
Gowanda. NY 14070
716:532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHfPTO

BILL TO
War Parh
Norrl! 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer,ldaho 83851

TERMS

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV·II054
NV·1I060
NV-II065
NV-II066
NV·l1067
NV-II069
NV-IIOn
NV-1107)
NV·11074
NV.11075
NV-11076
NV·l1077
NV·33130
NV·33l31
NV·33 132

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION
50
50
10
40
IS
5
60

20
15
5
5
. .5
10
10

10

RATE

Seneca FuU Flavor SIP King
Sencca filII Flavor HIL King
Sencca Non·Filter HlLid King
Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
Seneca Light SIP 1000s
Seneca Menthol SIP 100's
Seneca full Flavor HfL 100's
Seneca Light HIL 100's
Seneca Ultra Light HfL 100's
Seneca Menthol HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol Light HtL 100's
Seneca Menthol Ultra LI HJL 100's
Opal Full Flavor HfLid J20's
Opal Light HfLid 120's
Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262•.50
262.50
262.50

Total

22,800.00
22,800.00
4,560.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
2,280.00
27,360.00
9,120.00
6,840.00
2,280.00
2,280.00

2,280.00
2,625.00
2,625.00.
2,625.00

S135,555.oo

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

SO.OO
$135,555,00

NWS 0001R!l

001041
IDAG 172403

Invoice
P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

DATE

INVOICE #

615/2007

8359

,

·NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Higbway 95
. Plummer. Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

P,O.NO.

ITEM
NV·II060
NV.II061
NV·II062
NV·11063
NV· 11 068
NV-Jl070
NV-110n
NV·I1073
NV-II074
NV-11075
. NV·1t076
NV·33 130
NV·33 131
NY·33133
NV-33134

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION

/5 Seneca Pull Flavor I-IIL King
6 Seneca tight HlL King
5 Seneca Ullra Light HIL King
5 Seneca Menthol H/L King
10 Seneca Ultra L.t SIP 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP 100's
20 Senecn Full Flavor lIIl. 100's
IS Seneca Light Hit. 100's
15 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's
5 Seneca Menthol HJL 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Light H/L 100's
10 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's
25 Opal Light HlLid 120's
.5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
10 Opal Menthol Lt HI!-:id .120's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00

6,840.00
2,736.00

2,280.00

456.00

2,280.00
4.560.00

456.00
456.00

4,560.00
9,120.00

456.00
456.00
456.00

6,840.00
6,840.00
2,280.00

456.00
456.00

4,560.00

262.50

2,625.00

262.50
262.50

6,.562.50

262.50

2,625.00

Total

1,312.50

.$66,021.00

I--.--.----~---------I

PaymentsfCredits

Balance Due

$0.00
S66,021.00

NWS 000189

001042
IDAG 172407

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

6f21f2007

8471

P.O. Box 214
Gowamla, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plulnmer, Idaho 8385\

War Path
North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM·
NV-l1055
NV-11057
NV-l1060
NV~II061

NY·11063
NV-II065
NY-I 1066

NY-II06?
NY-I 1068
NV-IIOn
Ny·n073
NV·l1074
NV-11076
NV-33130

QUANrllY

RATE

DESCRIPTION

S Seneca Lighl SIP King
5 Seneca Menthol SIP King

5 Seneca Ligh! Hn. King

10

NV-3~ 131

.5
5

NV-33132

10

NV·33134

S

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
4.56.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
·262.50
262.50
262.50

30 Seneca full flavor HIL King.

5
10
IS
IS
10
;10
15
10

TERMS

Seneca Menthol HlL King
Seneca Non-Filler H/Lid King
Seneca Pull Flavor SIP lOD's
Seneea Light SIP 100's
Seneca Ullrn Lt SIP IDO's
Seneca Full Flavor HlL 100's
Seneca Light H/L IDO's
Seneca Ultra Light HIL IOO's
Scncea Menthol Ligh! HIL 100's
Opal Full Flavor Hn...id 120's
Opal Ligh! HlLid 120's
Opal Ul'ra Ll HlLid 120'$
Opal Menthol Lt HIlid 120'5

Total

2,280.00
2,2&0.00
13,680.00
2,280.00

2,280.00
4,560.00
6,840.00
6,840.00
4,560;00
13,680.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
1.312.50

1,312.50
2,625.00
1,312.50

$8 J ,1l0~ .50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00

$81,802.50
NWS 000195

001043
IDAG 172413

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

7127f2007

8614

P.O. Box 214
Gowflnda, NY i4070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

Bill TO
War Path
North 165 Highway 9.5
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.D.NO.

ITEM
NY-IIOS4
NY·IIOSS
NY-1l0S6
NY-I 1057
NY-\ JOS8
NY· 11060
NY·II061

NY-I 1062
NY· 11 063
NY·II066
NY-I 1067
NY-I 1068
NY·II069
NY·II072
NY·I/o13
NY·11074
NY·I1Q75

NY-I 1076
NY·33131
NY-33132
NY-33IH

2

QUANTllY

RATE

DESCRIPTION

10
9
5
J
.5
iS4

8
16
4
5
5
8
4
60
24
10

15
5
20
5
20
305

TERMS

Seneca Full flavor SIP King
Seneca Light SIP King
Seneca Ultra Light SIP King
Seneca Menthol SIP King
Seneca Menthol Lt SIP King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Light HlL King
Seneca Ullra Lt HIL King
Seneca Menthol HlL King
Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
Seneca Light SIP 100's
Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol SIP 100's
Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's
SCllCClI Light HIL 100's
Seneca UlIra U H/L JDO's
Seneca Menlhol HlL laO's
Seneca Menthol Ll HIL I DO's
Opal Light HlLid 120's
Opal Ultra Light HlLld 120's
Opal Menthol WLid 120's
Shipping

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
4S6.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

4,560.00
4,104.00
2,280.00
1,368.00
2,280.00
29,184.00
3,648.00
7,296.00
1,824.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
3,648.00
1,824.00
27,360.00
10,944.00

456.00

4,560.00

456.00
4.56.00
262.50
262.50
262..50
1.00

6,840.00

Total

2,280.00
~,250.00

1,312.50
5,250.00
2,135.00

$132,501.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$132,507.50

NWS 000200

001044
IDAG 172418

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

7/31/2007

070731

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, IdRho 83851

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NYO·II064
NYO-1107I
2

*REVlSED*

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION
5 Seneca Menthol Light HlLid King
5 Seneca Menthol Ultra Light Soft 100's
10 Shipping

AMOUNT
441.00
441.00
7.00

Total

2,205.00
2,205.00
70.00

$4,480.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due
NWS 000201

$0.00
.$4,480;00

001045
IDAG 172419

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

9/1112007

8853

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WaTPllth·
North 165 Highway 95
PlunulJcT, Idaho 83851

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
PlummeT, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV·ll054
NV-ll060
NV·11061
NV-11065
NV-11066
NV-ll067
NV-l1068
NV·l1070
NV-II071
NV·1I073
NV·l1074
NV·llOn
2

QUANTln'

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

'RATE

20 ·Senecll. Full Flavor SIP King

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
. 456.00

20 Seneca Pull flavor H/L. Klog
10 Seneca Light HIL King
15 Seneca Non-Filter Hltid King
40 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
IS Seneca Light SIP 100's
10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOD's
5 Seneca Menthol Ullra Lt SIP IOO's
15 Seneca Light HIt loo's
IS Seneca Ullra Light HIL 1DO's
10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt H/L. 100's
185 Shipping

9,120.00
9,120.00
4,560.00
6,840.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
6,840.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
1,295.00

7.00

Total

$85,655.00

PaymenlsJC redits

SO.oo

Balance Due

$85,655.00

001046

NWS 000205

IDAG 172423

Invoice

-DATE

INVOICE #

1012120078945

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda. NY 14070

716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
S~IPTO

BILL TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

War Path
North 16~ Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-II076
NY-33130
NY-33 132
2

QUANTITY

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

456.00

10 Senecll Menthol Light HIL lOO's
IS Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's
20 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120's
27.S Shipping

4,560.00
3,931.50

26250
262.50
7.00

Total

5,250.00
192.50

$13,940.00

1-'----------------
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

·$0.00

S13,940.00
NWS 000211

001047
IDAG 172429

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

10/19/2007

9026

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6U6

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath

WarPath

North 165 Highway 95

North 165 Highway 95
Plummer,Idaho 83851

PIUnl111er, Idaho 8385 I

P.C.NO.

ITEM

NV-11054
NV-II060
NV-! 1061
NV-11062
NV-II063
NV-II066
NV·II067
NV·II068
NV-II069
NV·llon
NV· 11 OJJ
NV-IID74
NY-1107S
NV-11076
NV·33132

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
40 Seneca Full Flavor WL King

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00

10 Seneca Light HIL King
Seneca Ultrli Light HlL King
5 Seneca Menthol HIL King
10 Seneca Full flavor SIP 100's
.5 Seneca Light SIP 100's
10 Seneca Ultra U-SIP laO's
5 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's
40 Seneca Fu I[ Flavor HIL 100's
25 Seneca Ughl HII. 100's
20 Seneca Ultra Light HIL lOD's
15 Seneca Menthol I-YL 10D's
10 Seneca Menthol Light HlL IOD's 
IS Opal Ultra LI I·llLid 120's
15

4,560.00
18.240.00
4.560.00
6,840.00
2,280.00
4,560.00
2.280.00
4.560.00
2,280.00
18.240.00
11,400.00
9,120.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
3,937.50

456.00

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

456.00
456.00

262.50

..

Total

SI 04,257.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due
NWS 000216

001048
IDAG 172434

$0.00

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

12/6/2007

9222

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda. NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
.....---------------------..;.....,
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, l<Iaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highlvay 95
Plummer, IdaiJO 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV·II060
NV·ll061
NV·l1063
NV-II064
NV·lI06S
NV·II061
NV·II068
NV-II072
NV-11073
NV·II074
NV-lI07S

NV·II076
NV-I1077
NV·33054
NV·330SS

NV-33lJZ

QUANTiTY

TERMS

RATE

DESCRIPTION

20 SeneclI Full Flavor H/f., King
S Seneca Light H/L King
S Seneca Menthol HIL King
3 Seneca Menthol Light WI. Kill~
5 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
S Seneca Light SIP IDO's
S Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
50 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's
J S Seneca Light HIL loo's
10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's
5 Seneca Menthol HIL IDO's
10 Sencca Menthol Light HlL 100's
10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Ll BIL 100's
10 Seneca full Flavor HlLid 120's
25 Sencca LighL J-llLid 120's
lO Opal Ultra Lt HlLid J 20's

AMOUNT
456.00
456.00

9.120.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
1,368.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
22,800.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
2,625.00

456.00

456.00
456.00
456.00
4S6.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
262.50
262.5U

6.562:SO

262.50

Total

2,625.00

$79,300.50

PaymentsfCredits

Balance Due

$0.00
$19,300.50

NWS 000220

001049
lOAG 172438

02/15/2068

17:12

-,

PAGE

NW5

17165326137

Invoice

64/67

DATE

INVOICE #

211Zl2008

!J4S9

Po Boll 2tL, O~Ild«, NY' ,.D70
P11o~: (1i1lJ SI2.e.1f
FIX: (7ftJ 121..137

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY

~-------~._---------.

SHIP TO

BILL TO

WlirPlIlh

WorPalth

Norlh 165 l-ligbwly 95
Plummer, ldaho 8385 I

North165 RighwllY9S
Plummer. MallO 8~llS 1

TERMS

P.o. NO.

I'EM

NV·U054
t-/V.J }oc,O
NV·lJ06J
NV·1l065
NV·I1066
NV.J lOti?
NY·l106S

NY. H070
NV-1l07~

NV"1I07~

NY.) '014
NV·l10'15
NV-330S>l
NV·330SS

DESCRIPTION

aUANnTY

RATE

2
20
4
.2

St:ntca Full FllIvor SIP King
Senc:en full Flavor H1L KillS
SC'1euJ.igbt HlL King
Stncc.n Non-Filter li/Lid King
12 Seneca Full FlIlVOl' SIP \00'$

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00

456.00
456.00
4S6.00
456.00

3 Seneca lialtt SIP lOO's

4 SenecA Ultra Lt SIP 1(lO's
2 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP l00's
:20 Scncoa Full F):l.I·or HlL lOO's
7 SelIcca Light H/L IOO'~
8 SllI'IllC<l UlInI Light HfL 100's
S Seneca MentltollJlL IOO's
a ScnOCll Fun Ffavor FIlLld /20's
QO Seneca Mcrtlho1 Light Mid 120's

456.00

456.00
4~6.00
4~6.00

4.56.00
456.00
2tl2,S0
262.50

Total

912.00

9,120.00
1,824.00
912.00

5.472.00
U68.00
1,824.00
912.00
9,120.0()

3,192.00
3,648.00
2,281}.OO

2:100.00
2,<'25.00

$45.309.00

PaymentslCredlts

Balance Due

545,309.00

NWS 000226

001050
IDAG 172444

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

3/1 1/2008

9590

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716~53Z.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

TE~MS

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-1I060
NV·11061
NV·11065
NV-II066
NV·11067
,'IV·' 1072
NV-l1073
NV·11074
NV-11075
NV-l1076

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

20 Seneca Full Flavor H/L King
.. Seneca Light HlL King
IS Seneca Non-Filler HlLid King
10 Seneca FuJI Flavor SIP 100's
5 Seneca Light SIP 1OO's
20 SenecA Full Flavor un, IOD's
IS Seneca Light WI, 100's
15 Seneca Ultra Ught IiIL 100's
3 Seneca Menthol HIL l00's
5 Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100's

RATE

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

9,120.00
1.824.00
6,840.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
9,120.00
6.840.00
6.&40.00
1,368.00
2,280.00

Total
$51.072.00
--,------------_.
p'ayments/Credits
SO.OO

Balance Due

551,072.00

NWS 000233 '

001051
IDAG 172451

....

'

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

3/1212008

9598

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
,...---------_.----'-------,
SHIPTO

BilL TO

War Palll
North 165 Highwlly 95

War Path
North 16S Jlighwft)' 9S
Plummer, Idaho 83851

Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NY·33056
NY·BOS8
NY·33 130
NY·33l3J
NY·33 13)

QUANTIW

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

10 Seneca Ultra Light HlLid 120's
7 Seneca Menthol Light HlLid 120's
1 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5

AMOUNT

262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50
262.50

8 Opal Light H/Lid 120's

5 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120's

Total

2,625.00
1,837.50

1,831.50
2,100.00
I,J 12.50

$9.712.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due
NWS 000237

$0.00
$9,711.50

001052
IDAG 172455

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

417f2008

9721

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

, . . - - - - - - - - _ . -NATIVE
- - - - - - -WHOLESALE
--,
BILL TO

SUPPLY

SHIP TO

WarPalh
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idiilio 8385 I

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
PlunJlller, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.'

ITEM
NY-3130
NY·31J1
NY-3133
NY·I072
NY· 1060
NY'. 1066
NY-I054
NY-1013
NY-1061
NV-1075
NY-I063
NY-J06S
NY-I014

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

5
7·
5
30
20
5
2

10
2
I
2
I
7

TERMS

RATE

Opal Full FhlVor HlLid 120's
Opal Lighl WLid 120's
Opal Menlhol HlLid 120's
Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's
Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Full flavor SIP 100's
Scncca Full Flavor SIP King
Sencca Ligl!l WL 100's
Seneca Light SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol HIL IPO's
Seneca Menthol HIL King
Scneca Non-Filter HlLid King
Seneca Ultra Light H1L 100's

AMOUNT

262.50
262.50
262.50
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
4.56.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

Total

1,312.50
1,837.50
1,312.50
13,680.00
9,120.00
2,280.00
912.00
4,560.00
912.00
456.00
912.00
456.00
3,192.00

$40.942,50

PaymentslCredits

Balance Due

so.oo
$40,942.50

NWS 000241

001053
IDAG 172459

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

5/9/2008

9907

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

War Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

QUANTITY

RATE

DESCRIPTION

NV·IOGO
NY-I061
NV-1D63
NY-I067
NY· JOGS
NV-1069
NY·I070
NV·IO?I
NV-J072
NV·I073
NV·1074
NV·I07S
NV·IO'l6
NY·IOn
NV·313l

25
15
5
5
5
3
:3
2
2.5

NV-3132

8

15
~i

HI
10
2
8

TERMS

Seneca Full Flavor HIt King
Seneca Light HIt King
SellCCa Menlhol WL King
Seneca Ughl SIP 100's
Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
Seneca Mentho! SIP 100's
Seneca MenlhoJ Lt SIP IDO's
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP laO's
Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's
Seneca Ligltl H1L 1DO's
Seneca Ultra Light tilL 100~
Seneca MenthOl H/L J OO's
Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL lOOts
Opal Light H/Lid 120's
Opal Ullra LI HlLid 120's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

11,400.00
6,840.00
2.280.00
2,280.00
2,280.00
1,368.00

1,368.00
912.00
11,400.00
6,840.00
2.280.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
912.00

262.50

2,100.00

262.50

2,100.00

Total

$63,480.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$63,480.00
NWS 000246

001054
IDAG 172464

'-'",

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

6/1212008

101 [4

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
BILL TO

SHIP TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer. Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

TERMS

P.D.NO.

ITEM

NV-1060
NV-1066
NV-1061
NV-1068
NV-IOn
NV-I073
NV·I074
NV-IOn
NV-3130
NV·3132
NV.)t34

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

25
10
10
5
40
15
15
S
IS
IS
5

Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Full Flavor SIP IDO's
Seneca Light SIP 1DO's
Seneca UUra U SIP loo's
Seneca Full Flavor HJL IOO's
Seneca Light BIL 100's
Seneca Ullra Light HIL 100's
'Seneca Menthol Uhra Lt HIL IDO's
Opal Full Flavor HlLid I20's
Opal UUra Lt HlLid 120's
Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00

11,400.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
2,280.00
18,240.00
6,840.00
6,840.00

456.00

456.00
456.00
262.50
262.50
262..50

Total

2,280.00

3,937.50
3,937.50
1,312.50

$66,181.50

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$66,187.50

NWS 000251

001055
lDAG 172469

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

7/18/2008

I0368

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY

~-------------------,

SHIP TO

BILL TO

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.C.NO.

ITEM

NY·IOS4
NY-IOS5
NY-I060
NY·1061
NY-I06J
NY-I065
NY-1066
NV-1067
NY·IOGS·
NV-I070
NV·IOn
NY·1073
NV·1074
NY·IOn
NV-I076
NV-3130
NY-313 \

NY-3132
NY·3133
NY·3134

QUANTflY

DESCRIPTION

TERMS

RATE

10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
3 Seneca Light SIP King
20 Seneca Full Flavor WL King
1 Seneca Light HlL King
5 Seneca Menthol HIL King
10 Seneca Non·Filler HlLid King
10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100'$
3 Seneca Light SfP H)O's
3 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
I Seneca Menthol LI SIP 100'5
35 Sencca Full Flavor HIL 100'5
7 Seneca Light BIL 100's
10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100'5
8 Seneca Menthol HIL 100'5
8 Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100'5
12 Opal Full Flavor I-l/Lid 120'5
I' Opal Light HlLid 120's
15 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5
2 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120'5
5 Opal Menthol La HlLid 120'5

AMOUNT

456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
456.00
4S6.00
262.50 _
262.50
26250
262.50
262.50

Total

4,560.00
1,368.00
9,120.00
456.00
2,280.00
4,560.00
4,560.00
1,368.00
1,368.00
456.00
15.960.00
3,192.00
4,560.00
3.648.00
3,648.00
3.150.00
3,937.50
3,937.50
525.00
1,312.50

sn,966.S0

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$73,966.50

NWS 000258

001056
IDAG 172476

~,

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

8/1812008

10552

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136
.-A..N~·A!L..!!T~'I_L..V~E__!.W...!....iH!!..£.[C~LElr~A'-=L===-E""'--""'S-'=l.J
........
p'.e....:P:L=-Y~·_~

r-

BilL TO

SOLO TO
War Path
North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 83851

Wllr Path
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-105"
NV-\060

NV-I06J
NV-1065
N~.1066

NV·I067
NV·)068
NV~I069

NV·1070
NV·lon
NV·I07J
NV·1074
NV-1075
NV-1076
NV-I077
NV-3133

------,

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

RATE

6 Seneca Pull Flavor SIP King
35 Seneca Full Flavor H/L King
7 Seneell Light H/L King .

3 Seneca N01I·Filler H/Lid King
15 Seneca Full Flavor SIP loo~s
10 Seneca Light SIP I OD's
7 Sentell Ullm Lt SIP 100's
8 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's
5 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's

:35 Seneca FilII Flavor HILWO's
15 SenecR Light H/L /oO's
15 Seneca Ultra Light H/L JOO's
8 Seneca Menthol HfL 1000s
4 S~lIeca Menthol Light WL lOO's
5 Seneca Menlnol Ultra Lt HIL 100's
5 Opal Menthol Hftid 120's

TERMS

.

AMOUNT

516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00

3,096.00
18,060.00
3,612.00
1,548.00
7,740.00
5,160.00
3,612.00
4,128.00
2,580.00
18,060.00
7,740.00
7,740.00

516,00

2,064.00

516.00
292.50

.1,462.50

Total

4,128.00
2,580.00

$93,3 10.50

Payments/Credits

$-93,310.50

Balance Due

$0.00

NWS 000227

001057
IDAG 172445

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

9/16/2008

10709

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136
----'N=...J;A~l~
T:IVE~~W..l..<rH~r~
(LES#~A~lTbU·R!::L£S·U.!=U:.-PP&..!=4.l~VA-

r---

--..

SOLO TO

BILL TO

WuPath
North 165 Highway 9S

WllrPath

North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, JdRho S3SSJ

Plummtr, Idllho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-IOS4
NV-W56
NV-1060

NV-I061
NV-1063

NV-Hl65
NV-I066
NV-I067
NV-I068
NV-I069

NV-1070
NV-I01l
NV·I0n
NY-I 073
NY-l 074
NV-I07S

NY.I076
NV~3{)55

NV-3130
NY·3132
NY·3133
NY·3t34

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

15
3
30
IS
8
to
IS
IS

8
5
10
3
40

TERMS

Seneca Full Flavor SIP King
Seneca Ultra Light SIP King
Seneca Full Flav~r HlL King
Seneca Light HlL King
Seneca Menthol HIL King
Sencca Non-Filter WLid King
Seneca FulJ Flavor SIP lOO's
Seneca Light SIP 100'5
Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's
Sen.CC8 Menthol SIP 100's
Seneca Menthol it SIP 100'5
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP IOO's
Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's
Se.J1¢Cll Ligbt HIL 100'8
Scnc:ca Ultra Light HIL 100'5

516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00

516.00
516.00
S)6.00
516.00

IS
10
15 Scric:ca Menthol HlL JOO's
10 Scneca Menthol LisJ1t HIL 100'8
10 Seneca Light HlLid 120's
8 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5
10 Opal Ultra Lt I-lILid )20'5
5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's
8 Opol Menthol Lt HlLid 120'8

516.00
292.50
292.50
292.50
292.50
29250

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

AMOUNT
7,740.00

1,548.00
15.480.00
7,140.00

4,128.00
5,160.00
7,740.00
7,740.00
4, I2B.OO
2.580.00
S.16().OO
1,548.00
20,640.00
7.740.00
5,160.00
7.740.00

5,160.00
2,925.00
2,340.00

2,925.00
1,462.~0

2,340.00

$129,124.50

$.129,124.50
$0.00
NWS 000001

001058
IDAG 172219

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

11/612008

11003

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda t NY 14070
716.532.6136

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
r---------------------,
BIll TO
SHIP TO
War Path
North 16S Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I

WarPath
North 165 Iiighw8y 95

Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM
NV-lOS5
NV·I060
NV·I064
NV·1065
NV.I066
NV·I068
NV·1072
NV-1073
NV-1074
NV-1076
NV·fon

NV-3130
NV·3131
NV·3132
NV·3134

QUANTITY

RATE

DESCRIPTION
5 Seneca Light SIP King

AMOUNT

516.00
·516.00
5/6.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
516.00
292.50
292.50

40 Seneca Full flavor HI!. King

.s

TERMS

Seneca Menthol Light HIL King

5 Seneell Non·Filler HlLid King
20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's
10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP /OD's
40 Seneca full Flavor filL 100's
40 Seneca Light filL laO's
40 Seneca Ultra Light lUL 100's
5 Seneca Menthol Light H/LIOO's
10 Seneca Menthol Ullra Lt HIL 100's
15 Opal Full flavor HlLid 120's
15 Opal Ughr HILfd 120'5
15 Opeltlllra Lt HlLid t20's
5 Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's

2,580.00
20,640.00
2,580.00
2,580.00
10,320.00
5,160.00
20,640,00
20,640.00
20,640.00
2,580.00
5,160.00
4,387.50
4,387.50
4,387.50
1,462.50

192.50
292.50

'.

Total

$128,145.00

Payments/Credits

Balance Due

$0.00
$118,145.00

NWS 000262
001059

----------------

~!IDAG

172480

Invoice

DATE

INVOICE #

1/9n009

11264

P.O. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

. .N
. . . .f:.A~T:...:I~[VE~WH
. . . . . . ."""[()",LE~'¥'~A~L ..........
ES~U:P......
·P......IJ.....,Y:......--

.-

SOLD TO

BILL TO
. WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 9S
Plummer, Idaho 83851

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NV-I060
NV-I061
NV-1063
NV-1065

NV-JOn
NY-I075
NV~1076

NY·J077
NV-3130
NY-3J3l
NV-3132
NV-3133
NV-3134

!

-.,

RATE

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

2S
10
3
5
25
7
8
3
6
to
15
3
3

Seneca Full Flavor HIL King
Seneca Light HIL King
Seneca Menthol HIL King
Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
Senc:ca Full Flavor H1L 100's
SenCCll Menthol JIlL 100's
SCJlf.ca Menthol Light HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol UltraLtHIL roo's
Opal FuJI Flavor HlLid 120's
Opal Ughf HJLid 120's
Opal Ultra Lf fllLidl20's
Opal Menthol HlLid r20's
Opal Menthol U HlLid 120's

S01.00
501.00
SO),oo
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
292.50
292.50
292.50
292.50
292.50

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

TERMS

AMOUNT
12,525.00
5.010.00
1.503.00
2,505.00
12.525.00
3,507.00
4,008.00
1.503.00
1.755.00
2,925.00
4,387.50
Sn.50
877.50

$53.908.50

$-53,908.50

50.00

j.
I

NWS 000002

001060
IDAG 172220

i

Invoice

DATE

INvorCE#

112312009

11315

P.o. Box 214
Gowanda, NY 14070
716.532.6136

-----*-NJ.,·.,sA60JL
. TL.A..LlVE WLl,...:!,.;!~H~OLESr=A=L=,E~S~·UP~·P. . .IJ
. . . y"'--
..

r----

BILL TO

-----.

SOLD TO

WarPath
Nortb 165 Highway 9S
Plummer,Idaho 83851

WarPath
North 165 Highway 95
Plummer, Idaho 838S I

P.O. NO.

ITEM

NY-1OOO
NV-I061
NV-1063
NV-106S
NY-IOn
NV-1073
NV-1074
NV·I075
NV-I076
NV-I077
NV-3130
NV-3131
NV-3132
NV-3133
. NV-3134

QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

35
10
3
5
35
20
10
2
8
2
5

5
5
3
3

RATE

Seneca Full FlavOf' HIL King

501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
501.00
292.50
292.50
292.50
292.50
292.50

Seneca Light HIL King
Seneca Menthol HIL King
Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King
Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's
Se.neca Light HlL 100's
Seneca Ultra tight HIL 1OD's
ScnccaMenthollIIL 100's
Seneca Menthol Ught HIL 100's
Seneca Menthol U1lra Lt HIL 100's
Opal Full Flavor HlLld 120'8
Opal Light HlLid 120'5
Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5
Opall Mallhol HlLid 120's
Opal MenthOl Lt HlLid 120'8

Total
Payments/Credits

Balance Due

TERMS

AMOUNT

17,535.00
5,010.00
1,503.00
2,505.00
17,535.00
10,020.00
5,010.00
1,002.00
4,008.00
1,002.00
1,462.50
1,462.50
1,462.50
877.50
877.50

$71,272.50
$-71,272.50
$0.00

NWS000003

001061
lOAG 172221

Page 1

Session: Hansen102610
"

:.;I.

Session: Hansen102610
Session Date: 2010/10/26
Judge: Hansen, Timothy
Reporter: Gosney, Vanessa

......

Division: DC
Session Time: 10:56

Courtroom: CR503

Clerk(s):
Olson, Miren
State Attorney(s) :
Armstrong, Shelley
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0002
Case numbel:: CVOC0815228
Plaintiff: Idaho, State of
Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
Defendant: Supply, Native Wholesale
Co-Defendant (s) :
Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
State Attorney:
Public Defemder:

2010/10/26
15:05:20 - Operator
Recording:
15:05:20 - New case
Supply, Native Wholesale
15:05:52 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
Calls case, parties are present and identifed - reviews file
15:06:40 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
argues the motion for summary judgment
15:20:47 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
no questions
15:20:55 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
Mr. Von .Tagen has nothing to add
15:21:21 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
argues the motion for summary· jUdgment
15:42:17 - Judge: Hansen,Timothy
qeustion to Mr. DeLange on the oral'Motionto"strike
15:42:36 - Plaintiff. Attorney: Delange, Brett
will address the motton to strike
15: 47: 35 - Judge: HanSen, Timothy
....
15:47:38 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange,' Brett
final comments on tlt1e. Motion for. su.~. jUdgment.
15: 57: 30 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
...
question to Mr.- McFe1ely
.
15:58:14 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
. ...,

r .
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Session: Hansen102610
.~

:::

'-'

'...,,/

response to the Court
15: 58: 47 - Judge: Hansen" Timothy
comments to counsel
15:59:26 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
comments to the Court
16:01:54 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
no additional comments
16:02:01 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
comments to counsel
16:02:12 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
the Court finds that it has enough information to rule on the motion to
16:02:33 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
strike - with one exception as to footnote 6 - the Court will not consider
16:02:53 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
that in the MSJ - will grant the motion to strike as to that footnote.
16:03:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
Mr. Von Tagen has nothing to add as to the motion for SJ
16:03:32 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
will take the matter under advisement
16:04:23 - operator
Stop recording:
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

2

m AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
~~--~A~':~.~:-.d.c .'J=

3
4
5

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

NOV 26 2010

. !
f

By

J·lp

6

Plaintiffs,

7

8

Case No. CV l0815228
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.

9
10

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,

11

12

Defendants.

13

BACKGROUND

14
15
16

This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes allegedly in violatio
of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.C. § 39-8401, et seq., an
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case, whic

17

will not be repeated here, is set forth in the Court's September 15,2009, Order and its Memorandum
18
19

Decision and Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on May 20, 2010. The Cou
incorporates those orders into this order by reference.

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued

20

Preliminary Injunction Order enjoining and restraining Defendant from engaging in the conduc

21

described in the Verified Complaint.

22
23
24

On June 24, 2010, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, along with
supporting memorandum and the Third Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann (hereinafter Thir
Kittelmann Affidavit). On September 30, 2010, Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of it
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum i

25

Opposition) and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion fo
26
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1

2
3

Summary Judgment (hereinafter Diddle Affidavit) were filed.

Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum i

Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and the Fourth Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelman
(hereinafter Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit) were filed on October 19,2010.
Hearing on this matter was held on October 26, 2010, at which time the Court took Plaintiffs'

4

summary judgment motion under advisement, as well as an oral motion to strike by Defendant.
5

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

6
7
8

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and tha
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(e). If the moving part

9

demonstrates the absence of a question of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party "t
10

demonstrate an issue of material fact that will preclude summary judgment." Wattenbarger v. A. G.
11

Edwards & Sons, Inc., --- P.3d ---, ---, 2010 WL 2560036, at *5 (Idaho June 28, 2010) (citation

12

omitted). If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences fron

13

the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper.

14

Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 779,215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009), citing Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure

15

Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009). However, if "uncontroverted facts exist whic

16

lead to a definite disposition as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate."

17

Boise Tower Associates, LLC v.
Valle~

Callies v.

O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 846,216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009), quoting G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,

119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991).
18
19

DISCUSSION
20

Motion to Strike

21

Plaintiffs summary judgment motion is based upon their memorandum and the Thir

22

Kittelmann Affidavit filed contemporaneously with the motion, as well as the First and Secon

23

Kittelmann Affidavits, filed on April 9 and June 23, 2009, respectively; the Affidavit of Do

24

Anderson filed April 9, 2009; and the Affidavit of Mark Ausman filed June 23, 2009. Plaintiffs als

25

filed the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit with their reply memorandum on October 19, 2010.

26
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Although no written motion to strike was filed, at the hearing on this matter Defendan

1

2

objected to the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs on several grounds. First, Defendant asks the Cou
to find the affidavits inadmissible due to a lack of foundation. Second, Defendant argues that th

3

Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit is untimely filed. Finally, Defendant objects to a portion of Plaintiffs'
4

reply memorandum that contains inadmissible hearsay. The Court will treat Defendant's objection
5

as an oral motion to strih.
6

Plaintiffs concede that footnote six in their reply memorandum, which refers to a newspape

7

story, contains hearsay. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant's motion to strike this referenc

8

on the record. As to the issue of the timeliness of the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, I.R.C.P. 56(c

9

provides that a summary judgment motion, affidavits, and supporting brief shall be served at leas

10

twenty-eight days before the time fixed for hearing. As noted above, the hearing on this matter wa

11

12

held on October 26, and the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit was filed not with Plaintiffs' supportin
memorandum, but with their reply memorandum, on October 19, 2010.

The court may alter

0

shorten the time periods and requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(c) "for good cause shown." See, e.g., Sun
13

Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999).
14
15

Further, I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that a court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed b
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.

16

The Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit consists of Defendant's discovery responses as well a

17

records that were prepared from documents produced by Defendant in discovery. Plaintiffs asse

18

that they were unable to submit these documents earlier because they did not receive the discover

19

from Defendant until September. The Court finds that because the information contained in th

20

Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit was not available to Plaintiffs at the time they filed their summar
judgment motion, there is good cause for the delayed filing of the affidavit. See Sun Vallev Potatoes

21

133 Idaho at 6, 981 P.2d at 241. Further, because the information is based upon responses or record
22

that were produced by Defendants in discovery, Defendants are not prejudiced by the delayed filing.
23
24

See id.

Therefore, Defendant's motion to strike the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit on the basis

untimeliness is denied.

25
26
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0

1

2

3

As to the admissibility of Plaintiffs' affidavits as a whole, I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides tha
affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible i
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters state
therein." The Court is satisfied that the Anderson and Ausman affdavits meet these requirements'

4

however, portions of the Kittelmann affidavits contain inadmissible hearsay.
5
6

Exhibits D, E, F, G, and H to the First Kittelmann Affidavit consist of invoices, bills of lading~
I

and various warehouse records regarding shipments of cigarettes by Defendant. These documents ar '

7

not admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule set forth in I.R.E. 803(6), a

8

the documents were not prepared by Ms. Kittelmann, nor does Ms. Kittelmann appear to hav

9

personal knowledge

10

11

12

oftht~

recordkeeping system used by the entities that created the documents. See.,

e.g., State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 628, 97 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Ct. App. 2004).

Although Ms.

Kittelmann's duties include overseeing and maintaining such records received and compiled by th
Office of the Attorney General, "mere receipt and retention of a document created by another entit
cannot transform the document into a business record of the recipient for the purposes of the busines

13

record exception." ld. The documents also do not fall within the public records exception set forth i
14

15
16

I.R.E. 803(8), as this exception does not encompass "investigative reports prepared by or for
government, a public office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party." I.R.E.
803(8)(B).

17

Further, Exhibit I to the First Kittelmann Affidavit contains compound hearsay, as it is a

18

Excel spreadsheet Ms. Kittelmann prepared based upon the inadmissible invoices and shippin

19

documents noted above. For these reasons, Defendant's motion to strike is granted as to Exhibits D,

20

E, F, G, H, and I to the First Kittelmann Affidavit. For the same reasons, Defendant's motion t
strike is also granted as to Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit.

21

As to the Third Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits A, B, and C consist of copies of web page
22

showing the retail prices for the Opal and Seneca cigarette brands. The Court finds that there i
23

insufficient foundation for these exhibits, and they also do not fall within any of the hearsa

24

exceptions set forth in I.R.E. 803. Defendant's motion to strike is therefore granted as to Exhibits A,

25

B, and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit.

26
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1

2
3

As to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D is admissible, as it contains records tha
were produced by Defendant in discovery, including Defendant's own invoices. Exhibit C to th
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit is also admissible, as the data for this spreadsheet created by Ms.
Kittelmann came from Defendant's records. Finally, the Court is satisfied that the remaining portion
of the Kittelmann affidavits not specifically mentioned above meet the requirements of I.R.C.P.

5

56(e). Therefore, Defendant's motion to strike is granted as to Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I to th
6

First Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit, and Exhibits A, B

7

and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit. Defendant's motion to strike is denied as to the remainde

8

of Plaintiffs' affidavits.

9

10
11

12

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs assert their evidence demonstrates that Defendant has violated I.C. §§ 39-8403(3
and 63-2503(1). Before turning to the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, the Court will briefly se
forth the nature of these Idaho Code provisions.

13

14
15

A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (hereinafter MSAA), I.C. § 39-7801, et

16

seq., states that cigarette smoking "presents serious health concerns" to the state of Idaho and it

17

citizens, as well as presenting "serious financial concerns" for the state.

18

Accordingly, "[i]t is the policy of the state that financial burdens imposed on the state by cigarett

19

smoking be borne by tobacco product manufacturers rather than by the state to the extent that suc

20

I.C. § 39-7801 (a), (b).

manufacturers either determine to enter into a settlement with the states or are found culpable by th
courts." I.C. § 39-7801(d). Any tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers withi

21

the state, whether directly or through a distributor or other intermediary, must either become
22

"participating manufacturer" and perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlemen
23
24

25

Agreement, or place specified amounts into a qualified escrow fund. I.C. § 39-7803.
The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (hereinafter Complementar
Act), I.e. § 39-8401, et seq., was enacted to help prevent violations of the MSAA. Idaho Cod
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i

1
2

section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to "sell, offer

0

possess for sale in this state" cigarettes of a tobacco manufacturer or brand family not included i
Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory, or to "acquire, hold, own, possess, transport,

3

import, or cause to be imported cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended for
4

distribution or sale in the state" in violation of this section. I.C. § 39-8403(3)(b), (c). Further, an
5

person who violates this section is deemed to have engaged in "an unfair and deceptive trade practic
6

in violation of the Idaho consumer protection act," I.C. § 48-601, et seq.

I.e.

§ 39-8406(5). Finally,

7

I.C. § 63-2503(1) provides that it is unlawful for any person to act as a wholesaler of cigarette

8

without obtaining a pemlit from the state tax commission. The term "wholesaler" as defined in

9

§ 63-2502(a) "includes every person who purchases, sells or distributes cigarettes to othe

10

I.e.

wholesalers or retailers for the purpose of resale."

11

12

B. Plaintiffs' Evidence
The Affidavit of Don Anderson demonstrates that Defendant has never applied for or obtaine

13

an Idaho cigarette tax pennit. Anderson Affidavit at

~~

4, 6. Mr. Anderson is a Principal Financia

14

Specialist in the Tax Discovery Bureau and Audit and Collections Division of the Idaho State Ta
15

Commission, whose duties include the enforcement and administration of Idaho's Master Settlemen

16

Agreement. Anderson Affidavit at

17

that Defendant has never applied for or obtained an Idaho cigarette tax permit.

~~

1, 2. Defendant does not dispute Mr. Anderson's statemen

18

The first affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann demonstrates that the Seneca and Opal cigarett

19

brands and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., have never been listed i

20

Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory. First Kittelmann Affidavit at

~

4. Ms. Kittelman

is a paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho Attorney General
21

whose duties include maintaining the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturer
22

and Brand Families. First Kittelmann Affidavit at
23
24

~

1. Defendant does not dispute the assertion tha

the Seneca and Opal cigarette brands are not listed in Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer
directory.

25
26
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1

2
3

As to the alleged violations of the Complementary Act, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs hav
not presented proof of the actual delivery or receipt of any cigarettes sold by Defendant in Idaho.
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 2. The Court has granted Defendant's motion to strike a
to the various invoices and warehouse records attached as exhibits to the First and Second Kittelman

4

Affidavits. However, Exhibit D to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit consists of invoices produced b
5

Defendant in discovery.
6

These invoices show sales of the Opal and Seneca cigarette brands b~

Defendant to Warpath, Inc., in Plummer, Idaho, between February of 2004 and January of 2009.

7

Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D. The invoices show that Warpath is the purchaser of th

8

cigarettes, and they indicate "bill to" and "ship to" Warpath. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D.

9

Additionally, the Court notes that as no answer to Plaintiffs' complaint has been filed by Defendant i

10

this matter, there is no pleading in the record challenging Plaintiffs' allegations as to the sale an

11

12

shipment of the cigarettes to an Idaho retailer.
Pursuant to

I.e.

§ 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act, it is not only unlawful for a perso

to sell, offer, or possess for sale noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho, but also to transport, import,

0

13

cause to be imported noncompliant cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended fo
14

15

distribution or sale in the state of Idaho. Defendant's sales of noncompliant cigarettes to a retaile
located in Idaho demonstrates that Defendant knew or should have known such cigarettes wer

16

intended for distribution or sale in Idaho. Further, in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 110

17

(2010), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that whether Maybee, a member of the Seneca Nation,

18

delivered noncompliant cigarettes "to Idaho consumers personally, or through a common carrier, thi

19

conduct is ultimately

20

tracl~able

to Maybee." ld. at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123. Similarly, the delivery

0

noncompliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers in this case is ultimately traceable to Defendant.

21

C. Applicability of the Statutory Provisions to Defendant's Conduct
22

Defendant argues that its conduct may not be regulated by the state of Idaho and is not subjec
23

to the statutory provisions set forth above. Similar arguments were presented in connection wit

24

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction. In its May 20,

25

2010, order on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court concluded that Defendant's conduct i
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1

2
3

subject to the Complementary Act and I.C. § 63-2503(1). While the Court is not inclined to revisi
these issues, it will briefly set forth its conclusions as they apply to Plaintiffs' motion for summar
judgment.
Defendant asserts that the cigarette sales at issue in this case involve commerce solely amon

4

Indians, in which both the buyer and the seller are Indian-owned businesses, and the buyer is located
5
6

within the boundaries of its enrolled owner's reservation. Defendant's Memorandum in OppositiOl
at 5. Defendant is a cigarette wholesaler incorporated by the Sac and Fox Tribe in Oklahoma, with it

7

principal place of business on the Seneca Nation reservation in New York.

8

Montour in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at

9

Montour Affidavit).

10
11

12

Affidavit of Arthu

,r

2 (hereinafte

Its president and sole owner is a member of the Seneca Nation.

Montou

Affidavit at,-r 1. Warpath, Inc., is an Idaho corporation located on the Coeur d' Alene reservation, th
shareholders of which are enrolled members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. See Affidavit of Samuel A.
Diddle filed June 30, 2009, Exhibits A, B. Warpath sells cigarettes to the public, including person
who are not Native American. See Ausman Affidavit at ,-r,-r 2-5.

13

The Court previously noted that an incorporated business cannot argue that it should b
14

considered an enrolled member of a tribe simply because its sole shareholder is a member of tha
15

tribe. See Baraga Prds., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F.Supp. 294,296 (W.D. Michigan 1977); Ariz. Dept.

0

16

Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).

17

purposes of immunity" from the application of state law. Baraga Prds., Inc., 971 F.Supp. at 298.

18

Accordingly the cigarette sales at issue in this case take place between non-Indians for purposes

19

the applicable statutes.

20

"[A] corporation is not an 'Indian' fo

0

Defendant also argues that the authority Plaintiffs seek to exercise pursuant to the statutes se
forth above is preempted by federal law. This issue was recently addressed in Maybee, in which th

21

Idaho Supreme Court conduded, "There is no conflicting federal law that would prevent the State

0

22

Idaho from regulating how tobacco may be sold or offered for sale in Idaho." 148 Idaho at ---, 22
23

24

P.3d at 1123. In Maybee, the court considered whether Idaho's Complementary Act and Preventio
of Minors' Access to Tobacco Act were preempted under the Indian Commerce Clause, which arise

25
26
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1

from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The court set forth the applicable analysi

2

as follows:

3
4

5

6

In determining how to analyze any state statute that allegedly is in conflict with
the Indian Commerce Clause, it is crucial to determine, as a preliminary inquiry: (1)
whether the regulated conduct occurs on or off a reservation; (2) whether or not the
party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the conduct being regulated does
occur on a reservation, whether State interests outside the reservation are implicated.

Id. at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123.

7

The Maybee court noted that both Acts regulated the activities of Maybee, a member of the

8

Seneca Nation residing on an Indian reservation in New York who sold cigarettes to Idaho

9

consumers.

"However," the court stated, "the Acts do not regulate Maybee's on-reservation

activities, but rather his off-reservation conduct of: (1) selling, and offering for sale, Noncompliant
10

Cigarettes in Idaho; and (2) selling, and offering for sale, tobacco products in Idaho without having
11

12

13
14

first obtained a tobacco permit." Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123.

As in Maybee,

Defendant's activities in this case also constitute off-reservation conduct.
Defendant also argues that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case because the Cou
must apply the balancing test set forth in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 13
(1980), which Defendant asserts is a factual inquiry.

The Bracker balancing test involves "

15

particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
16

designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violat

17

federal law."

18

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically stated that where the regulated conduct occur

19

Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123, quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.

off-reservation, application of the Bracker test is inappropriate. Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d a
1124, citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). In Maybee, th

20

court also noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had reached the same conclusion wit
21

regard to Maybee's sales of cigarettes to consumers in Maine, stating that the B,racker balancing tes

22

was inapplicable "because Maybee's interactions with consumers in Maine extend beyond th

23

boundaries of the reservation." 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1124, quoting Dept. of Health an

24

Human Svcs. v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 2009). As in Maybee, the Court concludes that th
statutory provisions in question are non-discriminatory statutes regulating off-reservation conduc(

25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 9

001072

and as there is no conflicting federal law, the statutes are not preempted by the Indian Commerc
1

Clause. See 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1124.
2

Defendant argues that Maybee is distinguishable because Maybee sold cigarettes to Idaho

3

residents who were not enrolled members of a Native American tribe and who were not residing

4

land within the borders of an Indian reservation. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 14. I

5

0

contrast, Defendant argues, the cigarettes sales here were "to an entity owned exclusively by enrolle
members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe and operating within the boundaries of the Coeur d' Alen

6

Reservation." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 15. However, as the Court noted above,
7

Warpath, Inc., is not an "Indian" for purposes of immunity from state taxation. Further, althougl

8

Defendant asserts that this case does not involve "sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers," th

9

record contradicts this assertion. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 5. Clearly cigarette

10

sold by Defendant to V{arpath have, in tum, been sold to non-Indian consumers.
Affidavit at

~~

See AusmaJ

2-5. The Court concludes that the Maybee decision is controlling, and that is no

11

distinguishable from the instant case.
12

Defendant also argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' action t

13

enforce state law in this case.

14

sovereign immunity "extends to a tribe's commercial as well as to its governmental activities an

15

See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 11-12.

protects the tribe or tribal entity regardless of whether its activities take place on or off a reservation.'
State ex rei. Edmonson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199,210 (Okla. 2010), citing Kiow

16

Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998), and Native American
17

Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1293 (loth Cir. 2008). It does not,

18

however, "automatically extend to every business that happens to be tribally chartered or owned b

19

individuals of Native-American ancestry," but only to an enterprise that "operates as an extension

20

0

a tribe." Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 21 0 (citations omitted).
While Defendant Native Wholesale is an enterprise incorporated by the Sac and Fox Tribe i

21

Oklahoma, incorporation under tribal law is only one factor to be considered in assessing th
22

relationship of an enterprise to a tribe: "Also important are whether the business is managed by triba

23

officials, whether it is operated to further tribal governmental objectives, and whether the business'

24

property is owned by the tribe."

25

Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 210, citing Gristede's Foods, Inc. v.

Unkechuage Nation, 660 F.Supp. 2d 442, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). There is no evidence in the recor
upon which the Court could conclude that Defendant is a tribal entity for purposes of tribal sovereig

26
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immunity. Native Wholesale's principal place of business is not on tribal land of the Sac and Fo
1

Tribe, but on the Seneca Nation reservation in New York. Further, there is no indication that Nativ
2

Wholesale is managed by officials of either tribe, or that it is operated to further the governmenta

3

objectives of either tribe. In analyzing whether Native Wholesale was a tribal entity for purposes

4

tribal sovereign immunity, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that "[t]ribal freedom from suit is a

5

0

attribute of Indian sovereignty and may not and should not be extended to cover private entitie
operating for private gain based solely on the ethnicity of their owners." Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 210.

6

The Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately held that Native Wholesale was "not clothed with triba
7

immunity from suit."

Ill. at 211.

Similarly, in this case Defendant Native Wholesale has no

8

demonstrated that it is a tribal enterprise such that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity woul

9

bar Plaintiffs' action.

10

Finally, Defendant argues that even if it is not considered a tribal entity, it is nonetheless no
subject to Idaho's regulatory power. Defendant cites Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1932), fo

11

the proposition that the regulatory power of a state does not extend into Indian country. Defendant'
12

Memorandum in Opposition at 12-13. However, Native American immunities from state taxatio

13

and regulation "only extend to commerce 'within a particular tribe, not to commerce among differen

14

tribes or their members." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Henry, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3 (E.D. Okla.

15

Mar. 18,2010), citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,720 n.7 (1983). There is no support for th
notion that a tribal entity may immunize goods made within its borders from taxation and regulatio

16

by other sovereigns once those goods leave its boundaries. See Henry, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3
17

(quoting defendant's assertion that just as China or New York State may not decree that theiI

18

products are immune from Oklahoma taxation when those goods enter the state of Oklahoma, neithe

19

may a tribe claim such special treatment).

20

The Court concludes that Defendant's conduct

0

importing or causing to be imported noncompliant cigarettes into Idaho, and selling cigarettes t
Idaho retailers without obtaining a cigarette wholesaler permit, is subject to regulation and taxatio

21

by the state of Idaho.
22
23

D. Conclusion

24

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whethe

25

Defendant violated I.C. § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act.

The evidence shows that th

Seneca and Opal cigarette brands, manufactured by Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., hav
26
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I

never been listed in Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory. First Kittelmann Affidavit a
1

2

~ 4. The evidence also shows that Defendant sold these noncompliant cigarettes to Warpath, Inc., i

Plummer, Idaho, between February of 2004 and January of 2009.

Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit

3

Exhibit D. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether Defendant sold, offered, or possesse

4

noncompliant cigarettes for sale in the state of Idaho, or acquired, held, owned, possessed

5

transported, imported, or caused to be imported noncompliant cigarettes that Defendant knew

0

should have known were intended for distribution or sale in the state of Idaho. Therefore, the Cou
6

grants Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to the issue of Defendant's violation of th
7

Complementary Act.

8

Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that there is no genume Issue of fact as to whethe

9

Defendant violated I.e. § 63-2503(1) ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws. This statute makes it unlawful fo

10

any person to act as a wholesaler of cigarettes without obtaining a wholesaler permit. The activitie
Defendant engages in when selling cigarettes to retailers in Idaho constitute wholesale sales unde

11

Idaho's cigarette tax laws. See Anderson Affidavit at ~ 5; I.e. § 63-2502(a). The evidence show

12

that Defendant has never applied for or obtained a wholesaler permit. Anderson Affidavit at ~ 4.

13

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to the issue of Defendant'

14

violation of I.C. § 63-2503(1).

15

Applicable Penalty and Injunctive Relief
16

Plaintiffs request that the Court impose a civil penalty for Defendant's violations of th
17

Complementary Act and grant a permanent injunction, enforceable by contempt proceedings,

18

enjoining Defendant from selling cigarette brands that are not listed in Idaho's compliant tobacc

19

manufacturer directory, and from engaging in wholesale sales of cigarettes in Idaho without holding

20

valid cigarette tax pennit.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summar

Judgment at 8-13 (hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum).
21
22

A. Permanent Injunction

23

Idaho Code section 63-2519 permits the state tax commission to seek an injunction to preven

24
25

a person from continuing to engage in business as a wholesaler without holding a valid cigarette ta
permit. The state is also authorized, pursuant to I.e. § 48-606(1 )(b), to seek a permanent injunctio
for violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. As noted above, a violation of I.e. § 39

26
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-'
8403(3) of the Complementary Act is deemed an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation

0

1

the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. I.C. § 39-8406(5).
2

The Court issued a preliminary injunction order in this matter on August 24, 2010, enjoinin

3

and restraining Defendant from engaging in the conduct described in Plaintiffs' complaint. Citin

4

several decisions from the courts of other states, Plaintiffs assert that when a statute provides fo

5

injunctive relief and it is determined that the statute is being violated, a balancing of the equities i
not necessary and the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm for the court to issue

6

permanent injunction. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 12. There is no Idaho case law to support thi
7
8

9

10

assertion. There is, however, federal case law that provides guidance with respect to the issue.
An injunction is an equitable remedy.

The United States Supreme Court has stated, "I

exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the publi
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Morrison & Foerster LIP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp.

11

2d 1125, 1129 (D. Colo. 2000) (citations omitted) (noting that because an injunction is a
12
13

14

15

extraordinary remedy, "the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal"). In Weinberger, the Cou
also stated that
the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in
the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in
equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.

16
17

456 U.S. at 313; see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9 th Cir. 2007) (holdingl

18

that a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act is subject to traditional standards in equit '

I

19
20

for injunctive relief).

In this case, although the relevant statutes authorize the state to seek a

injunction, the Court cannot conclude that the statutes explicitly or implicitly restrict the court'
equitable jurisdiction with regard to determining whether a permanent injunction should issue.

21

Accordingly, the traditional standards for injunctive relief are applicable here.
22

The United States Supreme Court has described the standard for granting a preliminar
23

injunction as "essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintif

24

must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success." Amoco Production Co.

25

v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 (1987), citing University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

26
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1

2
3

390, 392 (1981). In applying the traditional standards for determining whether to grant a permanen
injunction, a court should consider whether:

5

(1) the moving patty has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the moving party will
be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief; (3) the granting of the
permanent injunction will result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the
injunction would be in the public interest.

6

Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3 fd Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Public Service Co.

7

ofColo. v. Andrus, 825 F. Supp. 1483, 1505 (D. Idaho 1993) (deciding to follow the approach take

4

8

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amoco with regard to the standard for granting a permanen
injunction).

9

In granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court has already determined tha
10

Plaintiffs have shown success on the merits. Having considered the findings and purpose of th

11

MSAA and the Complementary Act, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs would be irreparably injure

12

by the denial of injunctive relief in this case. In enacting the MSAA, the legislature found tha

13
14
15
16

cigarette smoking
presents serious financial concerns for the state. Under certain health-care programs,
the state may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons
for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons may have a
legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance.
I.C. § 39-7801 (b). The legislature also concluded that it is in the interest of the state to require tha

17

cigarette manufacturers who determine not to enter into the Master Settlement Agreement "establish

18

reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from derivin

19

large, short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise." I.C. § 39
7801(f).

The Complementary Act sets forth the legislature's finding that "violations of Idaho'

20

master settlement agreement act threaten the integrity of Idaho's master settlement agreement wit
21

leading tobacco product manufacturers, the fiscal soundness of the state, and the public health.'

22

Because of these concerns, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury i

23

Defendant were not permanently enjoined from violating Idaho's laws regarding cigarette sales.

24

The Court must also weigh the relative hardship to Defendant should injunctive relief b
granted. See Public Service Co. of Colo., 825 F. Supp. at 1508. There has been no showing in thi

25

case that a permanent injunction would cause Defendant any harm beyond the obvious loss
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 14

001077

0

continued profits from its sales of noncompliant cigarettes.

The Court finds that the threat

0

1

irreparable injury to the public health and the fiscal soundness of the state, when weighed agains
2

Defendant's loss of profits, tips the balance of harm in favor of issuing a permanent injunction.!

3
4

5

Finally, the public interest does not favor Defendant's continued sales of noncomplian
cigarettes in Idaho.

As noted above, the legislature has determined that violations of th

Complementary Act threaten the public health as well as the fiscal soundness of the state. The Cou
finds that the permanent injunction sought by Plaintiffs would be in the public interest.

6

Having concluded that (1) Plaintiffs have shown success on the merits, (2) denial of injunctiv
7

relief would result in irreparable injury to Plaintiffs, (3) the harm to Defendant if an injunction i

8

issued does not outweigh the harm to Plaintiffs, and (4) a permanent injunction would serve th

9

public interest, the Court grants Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. Injunctive relief i

10

appropriate under both I.e. § 48-606(1)(b) and I.C. § 63-2519. Defendant is permanently enjoine
from selling noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho in violation of I.e. § 39-8403(3) and from engaging i

11

business as a wholesaler without obtaining a valid cigarette tax permit in violation of I.C. § 63
12

2503(1 ).

13

B. Civil Penalty

14

Plaintiffs also request that the Court impose a civil penalty pursuant to I.e. § 39-8406(1),

IS

which provides:
16

Each stamp affixed, each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation
of section 39-8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each
violation hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to
exceed the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes
or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.

17

18

19
20
21
22

23
24

25
26

In Public Service Co. oIColo., the party opposing the injunction had committed obvious violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act. Weighing the relative harm to each party, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho took
into consideration the opposing party's "record of disregard for the law" in concluding that the balance was tipped in
favor of issuing an injunction in the interest of safety and to protect the environment. 825 F. Supp. at 1509. Similarly,
Defendant in this case was notified by a June 5, 2008, letter from the Idaho Attorney General's Office that sales of
cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises to Idaho retailers had been enjoined. The letter demanded that
Defendant cease the unlawful sales of these cigarettes to Idaho retailers. First Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit C. After
receiving the notice of violation letter, Defendant continued to sell these cigarettes to Warpath. First Kittelmann Affidavit
at ~ 9. Since receiving the letter, Defendant has sold 14,272,000 cigarettes in Idaho, 8,850,000 of which were sold after
Defendant was served with the summons and complaint in this action. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit at ~~ 5-6.
I
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Plaintiffs are seeking a civil penalty of $2,000,000 for Defendant's violations of I.c. § 39-8403(3).
1

Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 9.
2

As a preliminary matter, Defendant asserts that the Court cannot impose a civil penalty in thi

3

case. Citing federal case law, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form

4

an injunction, and a court sitting in equity cannot impose civil penalties. Defendant's Memorandu

5

0

in Opposition at 23. In Idaho, however, "distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity ...
are ... prohibited." Idaho Const. Art. V, § 1. As a court of general jurisdiction, the district court rna

6

grant relief in any case where the pleadings and proof entitle the plaintiff to relief, whether legal
7

0

equitable. Miller v. Remior, 86 Idaho 121, 127-28,383 P.2d 596, 600 (1963), citing Addy v. Stewart

8

69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949); see also Idaho Const. Art. V, § 20 and Lodge v. Miller, 91 Idah

9

662, 665, 429 P.2d 394, 397 (1967) (the district court, having jurisdiction both at law and in equity

10

will grant all proper relief consistent with the case made).
Defendant also asserts that it is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of the imposition of

11

civil penalty.
12

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 19-20.

Without deciding whethe

Defendant would be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the civil penalty as a matter of right, th

13

Court finds that Defendant has waived any such right to a jury trial in this case. No answer

14

demand for jury trial has ever been filed by Defendant. Failure to make a timely demand for a tria

15

0

by jury constitutes a waivt:r of the right. City ofPocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2
647,649 (1984), citing Meyer v. Whipple, 94 Idaho 260, 486 P.2d 271 (1971); I.R.C.P. 38(d). To th

16

extent that Defendant is making a demand for jury trial at this time, the Court denies the request.
17
18

19
20

I.R.C.P.39(b).
Next, Defendant argues that I.C. § 39-8406(1) is unconstitutional on its face because th
formula set forth in the statute would allow a court to impose excessive penalties; for example,
$1,000,000 penalty could be imposed for the sale of one carton of noncompliant cigarettes.
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21. Defendant asserts that the potential for imposition of

21

large penalties under I.e. § 39-8406(1) implicates the Eighth Amendment protection agains
22

excessive fines. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21-23.

23

A facial challenge to a statute is a question of law. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C v. State, 147 Idah

24

232, 240, 207 P.3d 963, 971 (2009), quoting State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 24

25

(1998). In order for a facial constitutional challenge to succeed, the party must demonstrate that "th
law is unconstitutional in aU of its applications." Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 240, 207 P.3d at 971. I

26
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other words, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
1

would be valid." Id. at 240-41, 207 P.3d at 971-72, quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 6
2

P.3d 126, 132 (2003). The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment limits the government'

3

power to extract payments as punishment for an offense. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v.

4

Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 898, 136 P.3d 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2006).

5

A civil sanction is considere

punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes if "it can only be explained as serving in part to punish.'

Louis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9 th Cir. 1999), quoting Austin v.
6

United States, 509 U.S. 602,610 (1993).
7

A district court's imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to I.e. § 39-8406(1) is discretionary
8

both in terms of the amount of the penalty and whether a penalty will be imposed at all. In focusin
9

10

on the potential for the imposition of large penalties under I.e. § 39-8406(1), Defendant does no
demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. In bringin

11

a facial constitutional challenge to I.e. § 39-8406(1), Defendant must show that the statute i

12

unconstitutional in all of its applications. Even if the Court were to assume that the civil penalt

13

allowed for in I.C. § 39-8406(1) implicated the Eighth Amendment, the statute is not unconstitutiona

14

on its face because it does not mandate an excessive penalty, or indeed any penalty at all. See, e.g.,

15

United States v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 389, 392 (D. Del. 1988) (holding that eve
if civil penalty at issue falls under the Excessive Fines Clause, it cannot be unconstitutional on it

16

face "because it in no way mandates an excessive fine").
17

Next, Defendant asserts that the penalty sought by Plaintiffs does not comply with due proces
18

requirements.

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21. Defendant does not articulate th

19

basis for this assertion. Substantive due process "prohibits imposition of penalties for violations

20

rules or statutes that do not convey sufficiently definite warnings as to proscribed conduct." Pence v.

21

Idaho State Horse Racing Comm 'n, 109 Idaho 112, 115, 705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Ct. App. 1985), citin

22

Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 607 P.2d 1066 (1980).

23

Idaho Code section 39-8403(3) contains sufficient detail as to the conduct proscribed, and I.e. § 39

24

0

8406 sets forth the potential penalties for violation of that statute. This statutory scheme complie
with substantive due process requirements.

25
26
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1

2
3

Procedural due process "requires that there must be some process to ensure that the individua
is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions." Meyers v.

Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, "--, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009), quoting Cowan v. Board ojComm'rs, 143 Idah
501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006).

The individual "must be provided with notice and a

4

opportunity to be heard." Meyers, 148 Idaho at ---, 221 P.3d at 89, quoting Spencer v. Kootena
5
6

County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008). As noted above, the relevant statutes ar
sufficiently clear to provide notice of the proscribed conduct. Further, Defendant received a notice

0

7

violation letter from the Idaho Attorney General's Office stating that Defendant's

8

noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho were unlawful, and demanding that the sales cease.

9

Defendant has fully participated in the action before the Court and has been given ample opportunit)

10
11

12

for briefing and oral argument on these issues.

Finally,

There is no basis upon which the Court coul

conclude that the relevant statutes themselves fail to comply with due process requirements, or tha
Defendant has not been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence upon which th

13

Court could determine an appropriate penalty. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 19. I
14

light of the Court's decision regarding Defendant's motion to strike set forth above, the Court agrees.
15

Assessment of a civil penalty under I.C. § 39-8406(1) requires a determination of the retail value

0

16

the cigarettes. Plaintiffs' evidence regarding the retail value of the Opal and Seneca cigarette brand

17

was set forth in Exhibits A, B, and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit, which the COlirt will no

18

consider as a result of its granting Defendant's motion to strike as set forth above. Accordingly, th

19

Court finds that a hearing on this matter is appropriate, at which the parties may present evidenc

20

relevant to the issue of the amount of any penalty.

21
22

CONCLUSION

23

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

24

Court also grants Defendant's motion to strike as to Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I to the

25

Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit, and Exhibits A, B, an

26
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1
2

C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit. Defendant's motion to strike is denied as to the remainder

0

Plaintiffs' affidavits.
Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction is granted. Plaintiffs are directed to prepare a

3

appropriate order and permanent injunction consistent with this decision for the Court's signature.
4

Finally, the Court reserves ruling on the amount of civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending
5
6

hearing on this issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

7

Dated this
8
9

2t.I-c-. day of November, _2_0G£_1
0-'-.--='"-

-----

_

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

18

19
20
21
22

23

24
25
26
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2

I, J. David Navarro, the ~ndersigned authority, do hereby certify that I havemailed.by
United States Mail, on this J4'.U:1.day of November, 2010, one copy of the ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule ned) LC.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed
as follows:

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR.,
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
800 PARK BOULEVARD
P.O. BOX 36
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
P.O. BOX 1368
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

1. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

BY~

23
24

25
26
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Df:C 1': 2010
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KAIHNG, TURNBOW
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED

.

,':-'.,\

1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0815228

MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF A
PORTION OF MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER OF
NOVEMBER 26, 2010

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company (''NWS''), by and through its
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and pursuant to Rule
II(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the Cowt to reconsider that
portion of its decision and order holding that Defendant has waived its right to a jury trial on the issue of
the imposition ofa civil penalty.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010- 1
57032-1/00200201.000
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I.

FACTUALBACKGROl~

As the Court knows, this case has a fairly complicated procedural history. The Complaint was
filed on August 14, 2008. The Defendant attempted to remove it to Federal Court but the case was
remanded on April 7, 2009. Two days later, on April 9, 2009, the Plaintiffs State of Idaho and Idaho
State Tax Commission moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and the parties started briefing
in earnest. Most recently, the Court has heard and decided Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction but reserving its ruling on the amount of civil
penalty requested by the Plaintiffs pending a hearing on the issue.
The Court will note that, in light of the filing of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction
immediately after the case was remanded from federal court, Defendant never had the opportunity, nor
was it required, to answer the Complaint, as the request for injunctive relief and Defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction postponed any requirement to file an Answer. Defendant is
filing an answer concurrently with this motion for reconsideration. In that answer, Defendant requests a
jury trial.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
In its Decision ofNovember 26,2010, the Court stated:
Without deciding whether Defendant would be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the
civil penalty as a matter of right, the Court fmds that Defendant has waived any such
right to ajury trial in this case. No answer or demand for jury trial has ever been filed by
Defendant. Failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes a waiver of
the right.
Memorandum Decision and Order at 16.
The Court cites City ojPocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2d 647,649
(1984), and Rule 38(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Anderton case does indeed
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010- 2
57032-1/00200201.000

001085

hold that failure to make a timely demand constitutes waiver of the right to a jury trial. It held
that because the defendants had filed an answer without demanding a trial by jury, their right to
demand a jury trial was extinguished. The Court noted that since no new issues were raised by
any of the subsequent pleadings, an amended pleading cannot "revive the right to demand a jury
trial as to that new issue." Id. at 372.
Rule 38(d) does state that the failure of a party to serve a demand as required by the Rule
constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury.
But, Rule 38(b) provides:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the
commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service
of the last pleading directed to such issue. (emphasis added.)
"Pleadings" are defined in Rule 7(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as "a
complaint and an answer," reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, a third party
complaint, and a third party answer. "No other pleading shall be allowed ...." Therefore, in the
case at bar, there has pn:viously not been any "last pleading directed to such issue" because
Defendant has not previously filed an answer, as it is entitled to do. No other "pleading," as
defined in Rule 7(a), has been filed and therefore Defendant has not in any way waived its right
to demand a trial by jury.
Because all prior issues before this Court involved either questions of law under Rule
12(b) or equitable issues involving injunctive relief which were not triable by jury, the first time
Defendant was required to file this answer is now when the Court has made its determination on
equitable relief and is moving on to the penalty determination phase. Because Defendant is

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
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concurrently answering the complaint and demanding a jury trial, it is entitled to trial by jury on
the amount of penalty to be assessed.

III. CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests the Court to reconsider that paragraph in its
Memorandum Decision and Order which holds that Defendant has somehow waived its right to a
jury trial on the issue of amount of penalty. Defendant respectfully requests the Court to find that
Defendant has a right to jury trial to determine the amount of civil penalty, if any, which would
be appropriate.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2010.

EBERLE, BERLIN
DING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEE CHARTERED

By_-----.f---7<~+-...L...:.-~fL---=->.J------'<J.L.J"-----"'=----Samu. A. iddle, of the firm
Atto eys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 10th day of December, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Brettt T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
PO Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010

William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
POBOX36
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-4151
] Electronic Court Transmission

~

[
[
[
[

U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-7844
] Electronic Court Transmission
/
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542

.

~~
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Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Case No. CV OC 0815228
ANSWER TO VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS") and hereby admits and
denies the allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint as follows.

To the extent that any

allegation is not specifically admitted, it shall be deemed denied.
1.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 1
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2.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
3.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
4.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
5.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
6.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
7.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
8.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
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9.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
10.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
11.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

12.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
13.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
14.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

15.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

16.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

17.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 17 of Plaintills' Complaint.

18.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

19.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

20.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

21.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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22.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
23.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
24.

In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,

NWS admits that it is a tribal entity chartered by the Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma. NWS
denies all remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph 24.
25.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
26.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 26 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the same.
27.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

28.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

29.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

30.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

31.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
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32.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
33.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
34.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

35.

NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the
same.
36.

NWS admits the allegations set for in Paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

37.

NWS

38

In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,

deni{~s

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

NWS admits that it has purchased cigarettes from Grand River and sold those cigarettes to
enrolled members of tribes or tribal entities on Indian Country. NWS denies all remaining
allegations set forth in Paragraph 38.
39.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

40.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

41.

NWS admits that it has not procured a cigarette permit but fervently denies that

any such permit is required of it.
42.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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43.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 43 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the same.
44.

In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,

NWS admits that it received a letter from the State of Idaho setting forth various statements of
law under the Complimentary Act. NWS specifically denies all remaining allegations set forth in
Paragraph 44 and affirmatively states that its conduct is not in violation of the Complimentary
Act.
45.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 45 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the same.
46.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 46 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the same.
deni~~s

the allegations set forth in Paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

47.

NWS

48.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 48 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the samt:.
49.

The allegations set forth in Paragraph 49 are not short and plain statements of fact

on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on
that basis, denies the

sam~~.

50.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

51.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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52.

NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1.

Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred based upon tribal sovereign immunity.

2.

Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because NWS has engaged in no

conduct within the boundaries ofthe State ofIdaho, not located within the Coeur d' Alene
reservation.
3.

Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims must be barred because the Plaintiff lacks

authority to regulate Indian commerce.
4.

Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they would violate due

process.

5.

Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because it would constitute an

excessive fine barred by the Eighth Amendment.

JURY DEMAND
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury of at least twelve members on all issues in the
above-entitled matter.
Before having fully answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant requests that the Court
dismiss the action, deny Plaintiffs any recovery and award NWS its fees and costs incurred in
defending this matter.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2010.

EBERLE, BERLI ,
& MCKLVE

By_-+~.-+

----Io~_~",""",c.....-

_

Sa e
Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 10th day of December, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:

[
[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-4151
] Electronic Court Transmission

[
[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Fax (208) 334-7844
] Electronic C rt Transmission

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Brettt T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office ofthe Attorney General
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
PO Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010
William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410

S
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DEC 1 S 2010
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIs~jMII§~itAmt\.J,~
THE STATI~ OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 8yE.CHlD
IM!FVT'V

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
)
)

) PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER
vs.

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY:
Pursuant to this Court's November 26,2010, Memorandum Decision and Order entered
in the above-referenced case, the Court hereby enters the following orders:

IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 48-606(1 )(b) of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (CPA Act), Idaho Code Section 63-2519 ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws, and Rule
65(d), I.R.C.P., that Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company, its officers, employees,
agents, servants, attorneys and all other persons in active concert with them and who receive
actual

of this

notice

permanent

injunction

by

personal

service

or

otherwise

are

PERMANENTLY ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from:
1.

Sel ling, transporting, importing, or causing to be imported into

Idaho cigarettes, as that term is defined by Idaho Code Section 39-8402(2) of the
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Act), that are not
included on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and
Brand Families, as provided by Idaho Code Section 39-8403 of the Act; and

PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER - 1
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2.

Engaging in business as a wholesaler of cigarettes, as those terms

are defined by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(a) and (d) of Idaho's cigarette tax
laws, with other wholesalers or retailers located in Idaho, without first applying
for and possessing a valid permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1)
of Idaho's cigarette tax laws.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any material violation of the injunctive provisions by
Native Wholesale Supply Company, its officers, employees, agents, servants, attorneys and all
other persons in active concert with them and who receive actual notice of the permanent
injunction by personal service or otherwise shall be punishable by this Court. Sanctions for such
contempt may include, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 48-615 of the CPA Act, the assessment
of civil penalties of up to Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) per violation should the Plaintiffs be
required to return to this Court to seek enforcement of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce all
provisions of this Permanent Injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ~ day of

0.

!

, 20 10.

TIMOTHY HANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

k...

,

I hereby certify that on the ~ day of
2010, I mailed, by United
States Mail, one copy of the foregoing document to each of the attorneys of record in this cause
in envelopes addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKI veen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83701
William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150

1. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

By

2.

Deputy Clerk
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0815228
NOTICE OF HEARING RE:
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF A
PORTION OF MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER OF
NOVEMBER 26, 2010

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

TO:

ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 8 th day of February, 2011, at the hour
of 3:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the Ada County Courthouse,
Boise, Idaho, Defendant will call up for hearing Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of a
Portion of Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010.

NOTICE OF HEARING RE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010-1
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DATED this 15 th day of December, 2010.

EBERLE, BERLI,

DING, TURNBOW

By&_M_C;::7Ks-L.....,Vr-E~_C_Hi_AR- -=~: . . :. .E_~.- -e-.D.J£.-'-I -: .~

__

Sam
iddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company

NOTICE OF HEARING RE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010 - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this 15 th day of Deceber, 2010, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:

I

Brett T. Delange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney Gtmeral
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax (208) 334-4151
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission

William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax (208
4-7844
[ ] Electro IC ourt Transmission

~

I
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NO.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

--",_~

FI~J~:...J4.dL

A.M

OEC 2~ 2010

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Facsimile: (208) 334-4151

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
3y eARLY LAT!lV:OR:::
J[P:";;"I

Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

--------_.-----

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
)
CIVIL PENALTIES
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2010, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
(November 26 Order), ruling, among other things, on the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax
Commission's (Plaintiffs) motion for summary judgment. Therein the Court ruled in part, as a
matter of law, that Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company (Defendant) has violated:
1.

Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Idaho Tobacco Master

Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act), as a result of
Defendant's sale of millions of cigarettes unlawful to be sold under the
Complementary Act. November 26 Order, pp. 11 - 12; and
2. Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws, as a result
of Defendant's selling these cigarettes at wholesale without first obtaining the
Idaho wholesaler permit required by Idaho's cigarette tax laws. November 26
Order, p. 12.
As a result of these rulings, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. It also granted their request for a permanent injunction. November 26 Order, pp. 15,
18.
With respect to the State of Idaho's request for civil penalties under the Complementary
Act, the Court reserved ruling on the amount of civil penalty requested by the State pending
further hearing on the issue. November 26 Order, p. 19. The primary reason for this was the
Court's ruling that the State could not establish the retail value of the illegal cigarettes Defendant
sold based upon the affidavits that had been, as of that point in time, filed with the Court.
November 26 Order, p. 18.
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At the time the State moved for summary judgment, it had attached, as exhibits, true and
correct copies of web pages from three different Internet cigarette retailers, indicating that the
retail price of Opal cigarettes was between $23.10 and $28.99 per carton and for Seneca
cigarettes the range was $21. 80 and $26.99 per carton.

See Third Affidavit of Beth A.

Kittelmann, p. 2 paras. 4 - 6. The Court ruled that these exhibits are hearsay and not admissible.
November 26 Order, p. 4.
The reason for reporting the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes is that Idaho Code
Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states that the Court may, as one alternative in
determining the appropriate amount of penalties to assess in a given case, impose a penalty of up
to 500 percent of the retail value of the cigarettes at issue.
Subsequent to the Court's November 26 Order, the State proceeded to purchase Seneca
cigarettes in Idaho.

The Affidavit of Roderick Howard, filed concurrently with this

memorandum, indicates that on November 30, 2010, he personally bought a carton of Seneca
72's in Idaho for $23.25 and a carton of Seneca 120's also in Idaho for $23.80. See Affidavit of
Roderick Howard, p. 2, paras. 2 - 3. I These prices are consistent with the pack of Seneca
cigarettes that the State purchased in 2009. Specifically, on June 9, 2009, Mark Ausman bought
a package of Seneca cigarettes for $2.55. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman, pp. 1 - 2, paras. 2 - 3.
Multiplying that by ten, the number of cigarette packages in a carton of cigarettes, equals $25.50.
These purchases, and the affidavits reporting these purchases, are not subject to hearsay or other
evidentiary objection and provide adequate evidence for this Court to consider the retail value of
the Seneca cigarettes that were illegally sold into Idaho.

I

The State was not able to purchase any Opal cigarettes.
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ARGUMENT
By way of quick background, civil penalties may be imposed for violations of the
Complementary Act. Idaho Code § 39-8406. The undisputed fact is that since at least January
2004, Defendant's own records indicate that it has sold at wholesale, and/or imported or caused
to be imported for sale or distribution in Idaho, over 115 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers for
which neither the cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations,
Ltd. (Grand River), were ever on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product
Manufacturers and Brand Families. See Fourth Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann (Fourth Kittelmann
Affidavit), p. 2, para. 4. 2 And the further undisputed fact is that Defendant continued to engage
in such sales-over 14,000,000 in fact-after being advised by the State of Idaho that such sales
violated Idaho law. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 3, paras. 5 - 6.
The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3)
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides:
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39
8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
Applying Section 39-8406(1) is thus straightforward and clear, namely that the Court is
statutorily authorized to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000 per violation,
or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes.
The State has respectfully requested that Defendant be assessed civil penalties and, given
the record in this case, suggested that $2,000,000 is an appropriate amount of penalties.

It

2 The Court rejected all of Defendant's challenges to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit. November 26
Order, p. 5.
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certainly falls within the range of penalties the Legislature has authorized this Court to assess.
But if the Court determines, in its discretion, based upon the record in this case, to assess a
different amount, it clearly has the authority to do so.
It is undisputed that the State's civil penalty request falls well within that allowed for by

the Complementary Act. Defendant has sold and imported or caused to be imported into Idaho
over 115 million illegal cigarettes.

It sold them in cartons of 200 cigarettes.

115,000,000

cigarettes equates to 575,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes. 3 A $2,000,000 civil penalty
would equal $3.48 per Calion of cigarettes. 4 In short, a civil penalty of $2,000,000 falls well
within the statutorily authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the Complementary
Act.
Alternatively, as also explained in Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers, utilizing the
Complementary Act's "not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold cigarettes
penalty calculation, a $2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily
allowable. s Shortly before Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment papers, the average retail
value of a pack of Seneca cigarette that Defendant illegally sold into Idaho was $2.55. Affidavit
of Mark Ausman, p. 1, para. Multiplying that by ten, the number of cigarette packages in a
carton of cigarettes, equals $25.50.

Subsequent purchases of a carton of Seneca cigarettes

indicate a retail range between $23.25 and $23.80. See Affidavit of Roderick Howard, p. 2,
paras. 2 - 3.
As noted above, the State was unable to purchase any Opal cigarettes. This fact does not
undercut the State's request for $2 million in civil penalties. A review of Exhibit C to the Fourth
Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann indicates that of the 115 million illegal cigarettes at issue in this
3

4
5

115,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 575,000.
$2,000,000 divided by 575,000 equals $3.48.
See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9 - II.
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case, 8,586,000 are Opal cigarettes. If all Opal cigarettes are removed from the total amount of
illegal cigarette sales, there are still 107,412,000 illegal Seneca cigarettes remaining.
107,412,000 cigarettes equates to 537,060 cartons of cigarettes. 6

Utilizing, conservatively,

$23.00 as the retail price of a carton of the illegally sold Seneca cigarettes and multiplying it by
537,060 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes equals $12,352,380.

7

In short, even if the Court only

considers Defendant's illegal sale of Seneca cigarettes and utilizes an average retail value
formula for those cigarettes in evaluating the State's requested civil penalty, the amount of
$2,000,000 falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail value of
these illegally sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act. 8
The reasonableness of the State's request is further highlighted by just looking at the
illegal Seneca cigarettes sold after Defendant was advised by the State that such sales violated
Idaho law. Review of Exhibit C to the Fourth Affidavit of Kittelmann indicates that there were
12,934,000 illegal Seneca cigarettes sold after Defendant was advised by the State on June 8,
2008 that such sales violated Idaho law.

12,934,000 Seneca cigarettes equates to 64,670

cartons. 9 That figure, multiplied by $23.00, equals $1,487,410. $1,487,410, multiplied by 500
percent, equals $7,437,050, a figure far in excess of the $2,000,000 that the State requests here.
Thus, even if the Court were to look only at Defendant's post June 2008 Seneca sales, the State's
requested $2,000,000 civil penalty is still reasonable and within the law.
Previously, Defendant has argued against the imposition of any civil penalties, stating
that all it has done is "simply exercise[e] its right to have these issues addressed by the Court,"
and that what the State of Idaho is doing in response "is seeking to punish NWS for exercising
107,412,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 537,060.
$23.00 multiplied by 537,060 cartons equals $12,352,380.
8 500% of the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes would equal $61,761,900.
multiplied by 500% equals $61,761,900)
9 12,934,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 64,670.
6

7

($12,352,380
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that right ...." Defendant's Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, p. 25. Defendant
does not cite any support for the proposition that a tobacco seller can continue to violate specific
Idaho law and avoid consequence for such lawbreaking so long as the case addressing the
violations is ongoing.

The record reflects that regardless of the warning letter received and

regardless of the filing of this litigation, Defendant did not stop selling and importing cigarettes
into Idaho in violation of Idaho law. Rather, Defendant opted to continue to sell millions and
millions of cigarettes that were and are today illegal to be sold in Idaho under the
Complementary Act.

These are not facts of good faith or innocent mistake.

They are facts

indicative of the need for the deterring effect of civil penalties. 10 Indeed, it is the rule that a
defendant's refusal to cease the illegal conduct is a reason to support the imposition of civil
penalties.

See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (Cal.

Ct.App. 2000) (Defendant's failure to cease its unlawful conduct when notified the conduct was
illegal is one reason for upholding the penalty) and People ex reI. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life
Ins. Co., 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 (Cal. Ct.App. 2002) ($2.5 million civil penalty upheld, the court
observing that the defendant continued to sell policies after it had been notified by the
Department of Insurance that the policy language was deceptive). In short, Defendant has not
acted reasonably. Its conduct does not justify an award of zero or de minimus civil penalties.
Rather, it justifies the imposition of civil penalties reflective of the violations in this case.
Plaintiffs have previously noted that absolving Defendant of any civil penalty, or
imposing one that is not commensurate with the unlawful conduct involved in this case, will
As Plaintiffs pointed out in their summary judgment papers, civil penalties are a proper tool to
implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex reI. Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio
App. 1981). Civil penalties deter future unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated.
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to
compensate society at large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the
government for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Goffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn.
Ct.App. 1996).
10
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produce negative results for at least two reasons.

First, it will send a message to tobacco

companies disobeying Idaho law that it makes more financial sense to litigate and not settle:
Why settle when, even if you are found to have violated Idaho law, there will be no or trivial
financial consequence for continued illegal cigarettes sales?
Second, absolving Defendant punishes the companies who were willing to be accountable
for their conduct and amicably and promptly resolving those problems.

In short, absolving

Defendant here will reduce other future settlements and cause the Court to have to deal with
significantly more tobacco related litigation.
CONCLUSION

Concerning civil penalties, the undisputed fact is that Defendant has sold over one
hundred million non-compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary
Act. An appropriate civil penalty is necessary to address Defendant's systemic, repeated and
long-term violations of Idaho law. Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the Court
assess civil penalties against Defendant and that the amount of civil penalties be $2,000,000.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this2'1~ofDecember,2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

BY:~'1r
{-
BRETTT.DE~--------Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the t:11ay of December, 2010, I caused to be served, by the
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

flI U.S. Mail
DHand Delivery

D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile

Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By eARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
Facsimile: (208) 334-4151
Attorneys for the State of Idaho
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671)
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
Telephone: (208) 334-7530
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission
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STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
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COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.
----------------

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 0815228
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S JURY
DEMAND

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DENY
DEFENDANT'S JURY I>EMAND - 1
001112

BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2010, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
(November 26 Order), ruling, among other things, on the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax
Commission's (Plaintiffs) motion for summary judgment.

In ruling upon the various issues

presented to it, the Court rejected Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company's (Defendant)
argument that it is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of civil penalties. The Court ruled
that Defendant has waived any such right to a jury trial. November 26 Order, p. 16.
Defendant has now filed a motion to reconsider related to the Court's ruling on
Defendant's jury request, contending that it "never had the opportunity, nor was it required, to
answer the Complaint" and that now, even after summary judgment has been granted, it may still
file an answer which, in part, requests a jury trial. Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion of
Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010 (Reconsideration Motion), p. 2.
Defendant asserts that it "has a right [which it has not waived] to jury trial to determine the
amount of civil penalty, if any, which would be appropriate." Id. p. 4. Concurrent with its
motion for reconsideration, Defendant has also filed an answer, which, in part, demands a jury
trial.
Defendant is wrong on the facts and the law. The Court was correct: Defendant has
waived its right to a jury trial. In any event, even if the Court were to allow Defendant to request
a jury, Idaho law statutorily assigns the Court the duty to assess civil penalties and there is no
constitutional right to a jury that conflicts with that statutory delegation of duty. Accordingly,
the Court should deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration and grant Plaintiffs' motion to
deny Defendant's jury demand.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO A JURY

After this case was remanded from federal court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
which this Court denied on May 20,2010. Normally, Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(a) requires a defendant
to file an answer within 20 days after the service of the summons upon it. In instances such as
here, though, where Defendant filed a Rule 12 motion, Rule 12(a) alters the 20-day time period
as follows: "if the court denies the motion ... the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action." (Emphasis added). Thus, in this case, pursuant to Rule
12(a), Defendant was required to file its answer on or before June 1, 2010.' Accord Bach v.
Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 552, 224 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2010) ("Under I.R.C.P. 12(a), where a motion
is made under rule 12(b) prior to filing a responsive pleading, a responsive pleading must be
filed within ten days of the denial of the last rule 12(b) motion in order to avoid default. Idaho
R. Civ. P. 12(a)." (Emphasis added»

Of course, as the record reflects, Defendant did no such

thing.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12's applicability is important. Defendant claims that it was not required
to answer the Plaintiffs' complaint until now. Reconsideration Motion, pp. 2 - 3. This is in
error. Defendant was required by Rule 12 to file an answer by June 1, 2010, but simply did not
comply. 2 After June 1, 2010 it was in default. Further and relevant here, the time to request a
jury trial commenced on June 1,2010.

I Normally, Defendant's answer would have been required on May 30, 201 O-which is ten days after
the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss-but that day was a Sunday and the next day, May 3],
2010, was the Memorial Day holiday. In such circumstances, Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(a) extends the deadline
to the next applicable day, here June 1, 2010.

2 Defendant also claims that it did not have an opportunity to file an answer. Reconsideration Motion,
p. 2. This also is in error. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Defendant was denied
opportunity to file an answer. Indeed, the record reflects that after June 1, 2010, Defendant filed seven
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With respect to jury requests, Idaho R. Civ. P 38(b) states that a party may demand ajury
trial for any issue "triable of right by a jury." Such demand, however, must be no later than 14
days "after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue."

Defendant argues that

because it never filed an answer, the time period in which to demand a jury never began. In
other words, Defendant's argument is that its noncompliance with Idaho R. Civ. P. 12 protects
and extends months out its right to demand a jury trial. There is no precedent for the proposition
that disobedience to a court rule can be used to extend the time by which a jury trial must be
requested. Indeed, persuasive judicial precedent is to the contrary.
In Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 387 (N.D. III 1982), aff'd 851 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1047 (1989), the defendants were required to file their answer on or

before September 20, 1982, making the deadline (under the federal rules) to request a jury trial
September 30, 1982. They did not, however, file their answer until October 7, 1982, at which
time they requested a jury trial. In response, the Court ruled that the defendants' "jury demand
must be measured not from the Answer's actual filing date but rather from its September 20 due
date . . . ." Jd.

Accordingly, because defendants did not file their jury demand until after

September 30, 1982, they had "no right to jury trial under Rule 38(b)." Jd. Accord Larson v.
General Motors Corporation, 134 F.2d 450, 452 (2 nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied 319 U.S. 762
(Plaintiffs request for a jury trial was untimely because it was made after the 20-day time frame
he had to respond to the defendant's counterclaim.)
The analysis of these cases is square on here. Defendant was required to file its answer
by June 1, 2010.

It did not do so.

Defendant's delay should not be a tool it may use to

circumvent Idaho Rule Civ. P. 38's requirement that requests for a jury be timely made. Instead,
different notices, motions and memoranda in this case, none involving an answer or a request for a jury
trial.
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the 14 days in which to request a jury trial should be measured from the date that Defendant's
answer should have been filed, which in this case was June 1,2010. Because Defendant failed to
request a jury by June 15, 2010, its request for a jury now should be deemed to have been
waived. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for reconsideration should be denied and its request
for a jury rejected.
II.

THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE
THE AMOUNT OF A CIVIL PENALTY
Defendant contends that it "has a right to jury trial to determine the amount of civil

penalty, if any, which would be appropriate."

Reconsideration Motion, p. 4.

Defendant is

wrong. Even if this Court were to allow Defendant to request a jury here, it is clear that the issue
of what amount of civil penalties to assess in this case is not a matter, constitutionally or
statutorily, that is subject to jury review. Thus, on this separate ground, Defendant's request for
a jury may be rejected. 3
Although the right to a jury trial is protected by the Seventh Amendment, that provision
has not been applied to the States. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n. 6 (1974). Thus, in
considering jury requests, Idaho courts have historically looked to Idaho's own constitutional
provision, Article I, Sec. 7, which guarantees the right to jury trial "as it existed at common law
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted." Sheets v. Agro-West, 104 Idaho 880, 884, 664 P.2d
787,791 eCt. App. 1982); accord Rudd v. Rudd. 105 Idaho 112, 115-16,666 P.2d 639, 642-43
(1983). This analysis is quite analogous to that performed by the United States Supreme Court
under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).

3 With respect to the determination of grounds for the imposition of a civil penalty, Defendant does not
dispute the rule that any matter, whether subject to trial by jury or not, may be resolved pursuant to a
motion for summary judgment as happened here without the need or requirement ofjury review. See, e.g.
G & M Farms v. Funk lIT. Co . , 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).
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The State has not found an Idaho case declaring a jury right to the assessment of civil
penalties.

In Tull, the United States Supreme Court, analyzing the issue under the Seventh

Amendment, noted that assessment of civil penalties does not "involve the 'substance of a
common-law right to a trial by jury.'" 481 U.S. at 426, quoting Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103, 109 (1914). Accordingly, the Court declared that the Seventh Amendment does not
confer a constitutional right to a jury assessment of civil penalties. Tull, 481 U.S. at 425 - 27.
As a result the Court held that Congress can authorize judges to assess civil penalties. Id Said
the Court: "Since Congress may itself fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that determination
to trial judges."

Id at 427.

The Court stated that such determinations are "traditionally

performed by judges." Id 4
TuB's analysis on this issue is persuasive and should apply here. The Idaho Legislature
authorized the "district court" to assess a civil penalty for violations of the Idaho Master
Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. See Idaho Code § 39-8406(1). At the time the
Idaho Constitution was adopted, there was nothing in the common law indicating that
determining the amount of a civil penalty was the province or duty of a jury. Accordingly, as in
Tull, even if the Court were to allow Defendant to request a jury, this Court should nevertheless

rule that Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial with respect to the assessment of civil penalties
It is true that Tull held that the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment does apply to the
detennination of liability for civil penalties under the federal Clean Water Act. Id. at 422-23. That issue
is not present here, because with respect to liability there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning
Defendant's illegal sale of cigarettes into Idaho. Thus, the Court need not consider Tull on this issue,
which, in any event, has not been followed by a number of state courts interpreting their state
constitutional provisions related to jury trials under their respective consumer fraud statutes. See, e.g.
State of Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds, 2008 WL 7929225, pp. 4-5 (Vt.Super. 2008) (no state constitutional
right to a jury trial in the context of a civil penalty claim in a consumer fraud statute); Associated
Investment Co., L.P. v. Williams Associates IV, 645 A.2d 505 (Conn. 1994) (same); State v. Ameritech
Corp., 517 N.W.2d 705 (Wis.Ct.App. 1994), aff'd 532 N.W.2d 449 (1995)(same); Walsh v. Chestnut Hill
Bank & Trust Co., 607 N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (Mass. 1993) (same); State v. I.H. Schroeder, 384 N.W.2d
626 (Neb. 1986) (same); Kugler v. Market Development Corp., 306 A.2d 489 (N.J.Super.Ch.Div. 1973)
(same).
4
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in this case. That duty has been assigned by the Legislature to this Court and there is nothing
unconstitutional with such a delegation.
In short, even if the Court were to rule that Defendant has not waived its right to a jury,
or for other reasons should be allowed to request a jury in this case, there is no constitutional
right to a jury for the assessment of civil penalties. And because the Legislature has delegated
that duty to the Court, there is nothing remaining for a jury to do. Accordingly, on this ground as
well, Defendant's request for ajury should be stricken.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendant's motion for
reconsideration and grant the Plaintiffs' motion to deny the Defendant's request for a jury.

K
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 'l11ay of December, 2010, I caused to be served, by the
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701

5Q U.S. Mail
DHand Delivery

D Certified Mail, Retum Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile

Brett T. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
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Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
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(208) 344-8542
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JAN 19 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By ELYSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Case No. CV OC 0815228
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

To:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO by and through

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERK FO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, Native Wholesale Supply Company, appeals against

the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

001120

Order regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered May 30,2010, the Preliminary
Injunction Order entered August 24, 2010, and the Permanent Injunction Order entered
December 13,2010, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen presiding.
2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders

described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to R~le 11 (a)(l), I.AR.
3.

The issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal:
(a)

Does the State of Idaho have personal jurisdiction over appellant.

(b)

Does the State of Idaho have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims

raised in the Complaint.
(c)

Does the Federal Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause

prohibit Idaho from exercising jurisdiction over appellant.
(d)

Did the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, Idaho Code §§

39-7801 et seq. and/or the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complimentary Act, Idaho

Code §§ 39-8401 et seq., apply to these transactions by appellant.
(e)

Is the Defendant entitled to sovereign immunity.

(f)

Is State law preempted by Federallaw.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript

as defined in Rule 25(c) I.AR., supplemented by the following:
Transcript of the hearings on July 2,2009, December 17,2009, August 24,2009
and October 26,2010.
6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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All briefing and affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction;
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and
Subject Matter Jurisdiction;
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; and,
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.

7.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Vanessa Gosney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5113
Boise, ID 83702
(b)(1) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation
of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1), Idaho Code.
Dated this

J!i- clay of January, 2011.
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
BY& MCKLV

7;r~~

Sainu ~. Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for the appellant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney this
day of January, 2011, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:

Jt-

Brett T. Delange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[0Fax (208) 334-4151
[J Electronic Court Transmission

William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
Fax (208) 334
Electronic

rX1
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,

Case No. CV OC 0815228

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO DENY
DEFENDANT'S JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to NWS' Motion to Reconsider and in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand.
NWS submits that it did not waive its right to demand a jury and that it would be appropriate for
a jury to consider whether to assess civil penalties.
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 26,2010, the Court entered its Memorandmn Decision and Order which, runong
other things, concluded that Defendant had waived its right to a jury trial. Defendant timely filed a
motion asking the Court to reconsider that specific ruling and allow a jury to decide the remaining issue
of the imposition of civil penalties. Defendant filed an answer to the Verified Complaint containing a
demand for jury trial on December 10,2010. Plaintiffs have now filed a memorandmn in opposition to
this motion for reconsideration and also asked the Court to deny Defendant's jury demand.
II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO DEMAND A JURY TRIAL

The procedural history ofthis case is long and involved. In short, Plaintiffs filed a Verified
Complaint in August of2008, Defendant removed the case to federal court, the federal court remanded
the case and immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction in May of2009 and the parties engaged in
substantial briefmg and argmnent before the Court. Supplemental authority was requested by the Court
and submitted by the parties. The Court issued a preliminary il1iunction order in May of2010.
Defendant sought permission to appeal that order and at the same time that Plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment. Additional briefmg and argwnent ensued. The Court denied Defendant's motion

for permission to appeal. 111e Court then entered its Memorandmn Decision and Order ofNovember 26.
2010, noting that the issue of whether civil penalties should be assessed remained to be determined.
Based on this course of proceedings, Defendant felt justified in not answering the Complaint and
demanding a jury trial until the Court made its determination on the permanent irUunction. Up to that
point, the parties were dealing with the issues specified in their pleadings and no Answer was required
until dispositive motions had been decided.
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Plaintiffs ignore most of this procedural history, and focus on the Rule 12 proceedings. They
point out that the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on May 20, 20 1O. They ignore the reality
that the parties were still embroiled in briefing on other dispositive motions and had never abandoned
motion practice for actual trial preparation.
More importantly, Plaintiffs ignore the reality that Defendant was not obligated to file its Answer
containing a jury demand unless and until Plaintiffs gave it a three-day notice of intent to take default,
which they still have not done. Plaintiffs misread or misrepresent the holding ofBach v. Miller, 148
Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010), which was based on the previous Rule 55(a)(1), which did not require
a three-day notice before default could be entered. Under the previous 2003 Rule, the Plaintiffs'
argument that Defendant waived its right to file an answer and demand a jury trial might be valid; under
the current Rule, the argument is specious. Under the current Rule, Defendant has filed its Answer
timely and has the opportunity to demand a jury trial.
III. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURy TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR
NOT A CIVIL PENALTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AND THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH
PENALTY

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) provides: "The right oftrial by jury as declared by the
Constitution or as given by a statute of the state ofIdaho shall be preserved to the parties inviolate except

in the small claims department." The Constitution of the State ofIdaho, Article I, Section 7, specifically
provides: "The right oftrial by jury shall remain inviolate." As the State notes in its brief, the Idaho
Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial "as it existed at common law when the Idaho Constitution
was adopted." Sheets v. Agro-West, 104 Idaho 880, 884, 664 P.2d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 1982). And, as the
United States Supreme Court noted after doing historical legal research on the 7th Amendment to the
United States Constitution in Tull v. United States, 481 US 412, 417 (1987), the English common law
treated a civil penalty suit as a particular type of action in debt, requiring a jury trial. "Actions by the
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government to recover civil penalties under statutory provisions therefore historically have been viewed
as one type of action in debt requiring trial by jury." Id Thus, Defendant has a constitutional right under
the Idaho Constitution to determination of its liability for a civil penalty. It is also entitled to a jury trial
on the amount ofpenalty, if any, under the case law discussed in Defendant's Memorandum of Law in
Support of its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
While Tull did hold that that a court may determine the amount of civil penalties that should be
paid to the government after a jury determined liability, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
523 U.S. 340 (1998), the Court rethought this whole issue and concluded that the 7t1l Amendment
guaranteed the right to a jury trial on statutory damages due under the Copyright Act as there was direct
historical evidence of such practice as a general matter and in copyright cases. In the present matter,
analogous common law proceedings similar to the punishment contemplated under the Tobacco Statutes
would be criminal fmes which obviously required ajury trial at the time the Idaho Constitution was
adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant did not waive its right to ajury trial on its liability for and the amOlmt of any civil
penalties. It has appropriately demanded a jury trial and should be permitted to have a jury decide the

issues. The State has apparently conceded and the United States Supreme Court has determined that the
7t1l Amendment right to a jury trial applies to determination ofliability for civil penalties, and the state
does not suggest that the Idaho Supreme Court diverts from this holding under the Idaho Constitution.
Finally, this case is analogous to common law cases in which the jury also determined the amount of
civil penalties. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to grant its motion to reconsider
the issue of its right to a jury trial and to deny Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defendant's jury demand.
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Dated January 25,2011.

EBERLE, BERLI~'DING, TURNBOW,
& MCKLVEE
BARTERED

"
By_-+""""*----+~OL......:-.:.....+__4".£~-----''----------=----Sam I
iddle, of the finn
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney on January 25, 2011, as indicated below and addressed as
follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
650 W. State Street, Lower Level
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-2424
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
(208) 334-7530

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
NFax (208) 334-4151

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
Fax (208) 334

):2
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Page 1

Session: Hansen013111pm

Session: HansenO 13111 pm
Session Date: 2011/01/31
Judge: Hansen, Timothy
Reporter: Gosney, Vanessa

Division: DC
Session Time: 12:54

Courtroom: CR504

Clerk(s):
Olson, Miren
State Attorney(s):
Bandy, R. Scott
Public Defender(s):
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0003
Case number: CVOC0815228
Plaintiff: Idaho, State of
Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
Defendant: Supply, Native Wholesale
Co-Defendant(s):
Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
State Attorney:
Public Defender:

2011/01/31
13:57:48 - Operator
Recording:
13:57:48 - New case
Supply, Native Wholesale
13:58:18 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
Calls case, parties are present and identified
13:58:29 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
reviews file
13:59:33 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
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aregues the motion to reconsider
14:06:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
argues the motion to reconsider
14:14:31 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
final Comments
14:16:56 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
comments
14:20:19 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
will deny the motion to reconsider at this time
14:23:46 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
would like to have a written opinion
14:24:01 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
no objection to that
14:24:06 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
will issue
14:24:52 - Operator
Stop recording:

.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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OR\G\NAL ,_,
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

CHAISTC)H';;::':1 D. HlCH, Clerk
By KATHY BIEHL

1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542

Deputy

Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 0815228

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
CIVIL PENALTIES

vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does I
through 20,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penalties. NWS asserts that the State's
request for a $2,000,000 penalty is unjustified and excessive.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES - PAGE 1
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I. CONTINUING SALES
One of the primary argmnents the State raises to support its contention that NWS should be
subjected to a large penalty is that NWS continued to engage in cigarette sales even after being advised
by the State ofIdaho on June 8, 2008 that such sales violated Idaho law. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4.)
At first blush, this argmnent suggests some superficial appeal: NWS simply ignored the State with no
justification. If, however, the Court looks more closely, it will see that NWS had legitimate reasons to
believe the State had no jurisdiction to regulate NWS' activities.
NWS is not attempting to reargue the substantive jurisdictional issues which the Court has
already decided. Instead, NWS is simply explaining the historical context in which the Idaho actions are
placed. That context involves concerted attacks on NWS sales by the Attorneys General of various
states, all of which (except Idaho) were unsuccessful, at least at the trial court level, during the time that
NWS continued to sell cigarettes after the State's notice. Specifically, the trial court in Oklahoma on
June 10, 2009 found in State ofOklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply that enforcement of the Oklahoma
Complementary Act would violate the Indian commerce clause, and thus the Court had no subject matter
jurisdiction. l The jurisdictional issue was also raised in California where the state attempted to regulate
NWS' activity but the trial court in State of California v. Native Wholesale Supply on September 25,

2009 again found that a state did not have the right to regulate NWS' activities. That decision was
reargued and again NWS prevailed.
This history shows that at the time NWS was being sued by the state of Idaho to stop its sales,
other state courts had already determined that a state did not have jurisdiction over NWS' sales of

I
NWS concedes that the Oklahoma trial court's decision was reversed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on July 6,
20 IO. That decision is the subject of a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. While the
Oklahoma Attorney General attempted to waive its right to oppose the petition, the Supreme Court has adviied the
Oklahoma Attorney General that the Court wishes the state to file a response. This suggests strongly that the United
States Supreme Court is taking the issue seriously.
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES - PAGE 2
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tobacco into Indian country within a state. NWS believed it had legitimate and more than persuasive
reasons to proceed with its business in Idaho.
II. THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE NUMBER OF SALES BY NWS
The Complementary Act, Idaho Code § 39-8406, defines a "separate violation" as including
"each sale or offer to sell." It allows a civil penalty of $5,000 per violation. The State appears to suggest
to the Court that NWS ha'3 committed 115,000,000 separate violations, or perhaps 575,000 separate
violations (cartons), or 107,412,000 violations (Seneca cigarettes), or 537,060 violations (Seneca
cartons), or 12,934,000 violations (Seneca cigarettes sold after advice by state). This inconsistency itself
dooms the State's argument.
The reality is that NWS did not sell any cigarettes at retail to individual customers. There is
absolutely no proof NWS engaged in retail sales. Thus, the only "violations" that might have been
established were the few sales at wholesale to Warpath, which was the tribal entity which sold the
cigarettes at retail.
The sales data that the Court may consider is submitted the Fourth Affidavit of Beth A.
Kittelmann on or about October 19, 2010. That affidavit shows that NWS made only seven sales to
Warpath after the State's letter of June 8, 2008. (See Exhibit C to Kittelmann Affidavit.) That nwnber

should be the limit on asserted penalties. Even if the Court takes into account all ofthe sales listed by the
State going back to 2004, before NWS even had an inkling its sales onto Indian country were somehow
able to be regulated by the State, that total is only 51 sales, which would be the absolute maximum
number of ''violations'' that could even be contemplated as a basis for imposing penalties.
Moreover, Idaho Supreme Court case law prohibits the stacking of penalties for what is
essentially one violation. In Employers Resource Management Co. v. Department of Insurance, 143
Idaho 179, 141 P.3d 1048 (2006), the Department of Insurance imposed sanctions against Employers
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES - PAGE 3
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Resource Management for improperly transacting insurance without a proper license.

The hearing

officer and the Director of the Department attempted to impose the maximum per violation penalty for
84 individual sales. The Supreme Court vacated this stacking of penalties, noting that the proper penalty
would be for the single violation oftransacting insurance without a proper license. ld. at 184, 141 PJd at
1053.

In the present case, NWS' violation (if any) of the tobacco statutes consists of the sale to
Warpath. It is not the sales of individual cigarettes to individual conswners.

III. THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE RETAIL VALUE OF THE
ALLEGEDLY ILLEGALLY SOLD CIGARETTES
The State's evidence on the retail value of the cigarettes sold appears to consist of an affidavit
regarding the price of a pack of Seneca cigarettes. That is the only evidence regarding sales occurring
before the summary judgment motion was filed, and thus is the only evidence that should be considered.
(The State itself acknowledges that it did not purchase any Opal cigarettes and thus cannot base its claim
on the importation of Opal cigarettes.) There is no evidence of the retail price of a carton of cigarettes.
which is how most cigarettes are sold. (Simply multiplying the price of a pack x lOis not sufficient to
establish the actual sales price of a carton, just as multiplying the price of a single soda does not
accurately reflect the retail price of a carton of sodas.) Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' evidence fails and
there is no basis on which the Court can assess penalties. More important, NWS has not engaged in any
retail sales in Idaho.

IV. THE REQUESTED PENALTY IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH OTHER
PENALTIES ASSESSED AGAINST SIMILARLY SITUATED COMPANIES
As discussed in Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 30, 2010 and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle
submitted in support of that opposition which is incorporated hereto by reference, the State sued various

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
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......
other cigarette companies and entered into various consent decrees with those companies. The amounts
of those consent decrees are de minimus; some only require payment of the State's attorney fees. What
is the difference between NWS and Blacksheep Distributing, Carolina Tobacco, Changdee Cigarette
Factory, Smokin Joes and Yakima Distributors, where consent decrees sought only a few thousand
dollars? The difference is clear: NWS was the only company that attempted to assert its right to have a
court determine whether it actually was in violation of the state law. It is clear not only that the
$2,000,000 penalty requested by the State is out of proportion to those companies' consent decrees, but it
is also clear that the State is attempting to punish NWS simply because it had the audacity to ask this
Court to consider whether the State actually had the right to prevent it from continuing its business.
NWS had the audacity to challenge the State's exercise ofjurisdiction over it. NWS had the audacity to
exercise its right to seek resolution of the complicated question of tribal sovereignty. The State is
attempting to punish NWS for that audacity, which flies in the face of due process and the American
judicial process.
Even in the case where the matter went to trial and judgment was granted to the State, State v.

Maybee, Judge Sticklin assessed only a $163,225.00 civil penalty. The State has not shown why NWS
should be penalized ten times as much.

It is important to note a distinction between this case and the Maybee case. Here, NWS sold to
an Indian corporation within reservation boundaries. In Maybee, the defendant sold by internet sales to
any individual purchaser at any place throughout the state of Idaho. There was no Indian to Indian sales
but rather simply retail sales to consumers no matter whether they were Native American or not and no
matter whether they lived on a reservation or not.
Unlike NWS, Maybee had no strong legal claim under the Indian Commerce Clause. Unlike
NWS, Maybee made hundreds of individual sales to individual consumers. Unlike NWS, Maybee was
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTlFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES - PAGE 5
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.........
not relying on other states' court decisions upholding NWS' right to conduct a business which Idaho wa'>
attempting to shut down. 'Thus, Judge Sticklin's imposition of the $163,000 penalty, while supported
against Maybee, has no precedental value justifYing any penalty against NWS.

v.

$2,000,000 IS SIMPLY TOO MUCH

NWS believed that it was acting within its right to conduct business as a Native American
corporation selling cigarettes to another Native American corporation within reservation boundaries.
'This Court has decided otherwise, but NWS' actions do not justifY the imposition of a $2,000,000 fine.
The State has presented no argument why $2,000,000 or $1,000,000 or $20,000,000 would be
appropriate. NWS has disobeyed no Court order and will not do so.
The tobacco statute, by setting maximum amounts instead of fixed amounts, vested in the courts
broad discretion in imposing penalties based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the
absence of a statutory minimum, this broad discretion includes the power to impose no penalty at all for
violations if the facts and circumstances justifY such a result. See State ofNew York v. Town of TYallkill,
170 A.D. 2d., 8, 11-12,572 N.Y.S. 2d. 758 (N.Y. A.D. 1991). In the present case, NWS acted in good
faith and has not violated any Court orders. The State has obtained a permanent injunction and thus the
purposes of the tobacco statutes have been and will continue to be served. There is no need for any type

of penalty. If the Court concludes that some type of penalty would be appropriate, it should assess a
nominal penalty. 'This would serve the purpose under the statute by enforcing the State's interest and
warning other similarly situated companies to comply with tobacco laws.
VI. CONCLUSION

NWS conducted its business in a good faith belief that, as found by the trial courts in Oklahoma
and California, the State had no jurisdiction to regulate NWS' sales on reservations. The Court ha'>
decided NWS' sales are in violation of Idaho Code and that Idaho does have jurisdiction to regulate
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL
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NWS' business. Accordingly, NWS has discontinued its sales. A penalty would serve no further
purpose and would be unjustified under the circumstances of this case. NWS respectfully requests the
Court to reject the State's request for a $2,000,000 penalty.
Dated February 1, 2011.

EBERLE, BERL , KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLV N, CHA
B

y------\..,L-~---=-~-=--=----==---L------'~----L.~,...L:--b......L--
Sa uel A. iddle, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney on February 1,2011, as indicated below and addressed as
follows:

u.s. Mail

Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
nd
954 West Jefferson St., 2 Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 no-oo 10
(208) 334-2424
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
L-------'-(2_0-L8)_3_34_-7_5_30

] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
Fax (208) 334-4151

U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
Fax (208) 334-784~

0.
------'

----T-7"--_ _ ----r""'1=~_ _
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~/J~

iddle
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OR\G\NAL ~Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0815228

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR CIVIL PENALTIES

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
: ss.
)

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant Native Wholesale Supply

Company in this matter and as such have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL PENALTIES-I
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the decision of the Oklahoma District Court
in Oklahoma County dated June 10, 2009 and captioned State ofOklahoma v Native Wholesale
Supply. That decision was overturned by an Oklahoma Supreme Court case filed July 6, 2010.
That decision is the subject of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Order of the California Superior Court
for Sacramento County dated September 25, 2009 and captioned The People of the State of
Cal(jornia v Native Wholesale Supply. To my knowledge, that decision has not been reversed.
Further, your affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

I 61 day of February, 2011.

/s!

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisL
_ _ day of February, 2011.
""

~
Residing: Nampa,ID
My Commission Expires: 1/25/12

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CIVIL PENALTIES- 2
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.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney on February 1,2011, as indicated below and addressed
as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Brett T. DeLange
Office of the Attorney General
954 West Jefferson St., 2 nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

LXi u.s. Mail
[ ) Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
k] Fax (208) 334-4151

Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
PO BOX 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
(208) 334-7530

[ U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[)4 Fax (208) 334-7844

S

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY !i
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
STATE OF OKLAJIOMA ex I'l'l. WA
"DREW" EDMONDSON, ATrORNEY
GENERAL OF OKLAIIOMA,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs

)
)

e<lSe No. CJ-2008-4942

)

NAIlVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY, a
Corporation chartered by the Sac and Fox
Tribe of Oklahoma,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)

JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Now on this 10'" Day of April, 2009. this matter comes on for hearing all
Defendant Native Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended
Petition bases upon lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, read the briefs filed by the panics and
heard argument finds that the Defendant has sufficient contacts with the State of
Oklahoma for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. The
DeJendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction should b<~ and is
hereby deni cd~
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, read the briefs filed by the parties and
heard argument linds that the relicf PlaintilT seeks, injunctive relief and disgorgemelll of
thc gross proceeds realizcd by Native Wholesale Supply for cigarette sales to the
Muscogee Creek Nation for resale to Oklahoma consumers, in violation of the Oklahoma
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, 68 O.S. § 360.J el seq., is
barred by the indian Commerce Clause.
The Court further llnds that Plaintiffs Amended Pelition seeks relief Ihal is
baITed by the Indian Commerce Clause which cannot be cured by amendment. Theref()re,
this matter is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AJUDGED AND DECREED that Native
Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is hereby denied.

001144

iT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Native
Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby
granted and this matter is dismissed with prejudice.
,.~/

(~fl,
/~~---'~

?/

Bryan C. Dixon
District Judge

Certificate of Mailing

This is to certify that on the WIll day of June, 2009, I mailed a true ancI
coneet copy of the foregoing Order to:
E. Clyde Kirk

Robert Sheets

Assistant Altorney General
313 NE 21 st Street
OKC, OK 73105

101 N. Robinson, 13 th Floor
OKC, OK 73102

Vh71lF~~~

~-lf!dfJ

Deputy Court Clerk
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,,-,UPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
"-'
GORDON 0 SCHABER COURTHOUSE

Time: 02:25:14 PM

JAN 0 6 2010
FP&M-Sacramento

MINUTE ORDER
Date: 09/25/2009

RECEIVED

Dept: 54

judicial Offjcer PresIding: JUdge Shelleyanne W L Chang
Clerk: E. Higginbotham
Bailiff/Court Attendant: None

ERr0:

None

. Case lnit. Date; 06/30/2008
Case No: 34~2008~00014593-CU~CL-GDS

Case Title: People of the State of-California ex real Edmund
G Brown Jr Attorney General vs. Native Wholesale Supply

Case Category: Civil - Unlimited
Event Type: Motion to Quash Service of Summons - Civil Law and Motion
Causal Document & Date Filed:
AppearanGes~

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Quash Service of Summons (Taken Under Submission
8/2412009)
TENTATIVE RULING·
Defendant Native Wholesale Supply {"NWS")'s motlon to quash is granted for the reasons set forth
below.
The complaint alleges that NWS has violated Rev. & Tax.· Code section 30165.1 by selling to California
businesses brands of cigarettes that are not listed In the Attorney General's directory of manufacturers
who have complied with -this state's financial responsibility laws. 9uch sales also allegedly violate Health
and Safety Code section 14950 (establishing .ignition-propensity standards), 15 USC section 375 ~t. seq
(shipping cigarettes'ln interstate commerce to persons or entities' in California that are not licensed as
cigarette distributors by the California Board of Equalization) and Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200
{unfair competition). .
.
.

.

.

NWS contends that California does not have personal jurisdiction over it because it has no minimum
contacts with the State of California 1 ,as it is an out-of-state corp'oration that sells and shlRs cigarettes
only to Native American tribes and Native American-owned entities located on the land of recognized
Indian tribes.
. .
The following facts are undisputed. NWS is chartered by Sac and Fox Nation, a federally recogniz.ed
sovereign Native American nation, and is wholly owned by Arthur Montour, a member of the Seneca
NatIon of Indians. a federally recognized sovereign Native American nation. Its business operations are
maintained on the Seneca Cattaraugus, Indian Territory which is physically situated in New York. NWS
does not have an office, Rersonnel, mailing address, bank accounts, sales agents, telephone, real estate
or vehicles in California. NWS is an oLJt-of-state corporation that has no offIce or other presence in this
State. Montour dec!.
The record before the Court establishes that the only entity in thl·s state to which NWS' has directly sold
. Date: 09/25/2009

Dept: 54 ,

MINUTE ORDER

Page: 1
Calendal No.,:
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Case Title: People of the stare of California ex real
Edmund G Brown Jr Attorney General vs. Native

Case No:

34~08-00014593-CU-CL-GDS

cigarettes is Big Sandy Rancheria, a recognized Indian tribe. Big Sandy, in turn, has soId cigarettes
purchased from NWS to 'other Indian and non-Indian persons and entities in California. Some of NWS
sales to Big Sandy were shipped directlyto other entities in California..
.
Plaintiff concedes that the State has no general jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff contends, however,
that this court has specific jurisdiction over NWS. Specific jurisdiction arises when a defendant has
Rurposefully availed Itself of the privilege of conductifl9 activities. in California; the claim arises out of
defendant's California-related activity; and the exerCIse of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. F.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782; 796. Plaintiff asserts that NWS
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California by:
its direct sales to
Big Sandy Rancheria, and 2) its indirect sales to entities and persons "downstream from Big Sandy.
The' Court examines each of these contentions in turn.

11

Whether mInimum contacts are established by sales to Big Sandy
Plaintiff has cited no authorities, and the Court is aware of none, holding that sales by an out~of-state
corporation to an Indian tribe on a reservation located in this state constitute minimum contacts with this
state that will support personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporation. Indeed, the Court has found
no California authoritIes applying' a minimum contacts analysis where any activities on an Indian
reservation were involved.
.
Authorities in other jurisdictions applying a minimum contacts analysis' involVing Indian reservations have
concluded that activities takjng place 'solely on Indian lands do not constitute contacts with the forum
state. InFlammond v. Flammona(Mont. 1980) 621 P.2d 471, the Court held that Montana did. not have
personal jurisdiction to enforce a CalifornIa court's order. to pay child support against a father who was
an enrolled member of the' Blackfeet Tribe and lived on the tribe's reservation. The Montana court
reasoned that there were no off-reservation acts in Montana sufficient to vest that state's courts with
personal jurisdiction over the father. The marriage had taken place in California, and the mother had
returned to California after separating from the father. The father's domicile on the reservation 'was not
' .
.
an in-state contact that would supporf jurisdiction.
In Martinez v. Superior CourtJAriz.App .1987) 731 P.2d 1244, 1246, a dissolution action by a non-Indian
wIfe against a reservation In ian husband, the court applied the general rule that state courts do not
have jurisdiction over an IndIan living on an Indian reservation absent sufficient minimum contacts by the
Indian within the state away from the reservation. As the marital domicile was on the reservation, the
children were conceived on the reservation and the separation occurreq on the reservation, the court
concluded that it had no jurisdiction. On similar facts, the court in Byzewski v. ByzBwski (N.D. 1988) 429
N.W.2d 393, 397 came to the same conclusion.
Out-of-state authorities are not, of course, controlling. Further, these cases involve domestic
relationships, while this case involves commercial activity. However, to the extent that plaintiff asserts
that NWS' sales to Big Sandy constitute minimum contacts with this state simply because Big Sandy is
physically located in thi~ state, the ·Court rejects that proposition. The Court is persuaded by the cases

discussea above that on-reservation conduct is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with a forum

state absent off-reservation activities within the forum state.
Plaintiff further contends that NWS' sales to BIg Sandy constitute minimum contacts with this state
because state law applies to reservations located In this state. The issue of the application of state law to
Indian reservations IS not as simple as the broad generalities relied upon by plaintiff, e.g. "reservations
are part of the 'state within which they lie and state laws, civil and criminal, have same force within
reservation as elsewhere exceRt for restricted application to Indian wards. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook
(1930) 281 U.S. 647, 650-651. That statement was, in any event, dicta as the only issue decided by the
court was state taxation of non-Indian owned private property located on a federal military base·. As the
U.S. Supreme Court later observed, "That Is not to say that States may exert the same degree of
regulatory authority within a reservation as they do without. To the contrary, the principle that lndians
have the right to make their o~ laws and be governed by them reqUires 'an accommodation between
the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government; on the one hand, and those of the State, on the .
other.''' Nevada v. Hicks (2001) 533 U.S. 353, 362, quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
.
.
Colville Reservation (1980) 447 U.p. 134,156.
..

__....__ .-.. ---._------
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As the court in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB {D.C.Cir. 2907) 475 F.3d .1306, 1312,

concluded "l a]n examination of Supreme Court cases shows tnbal sovereigntY' to be at Its .strongest.
when exp jicitly established by a treaty ... or when tribal goverhment acts wIthin the borders of its
reservation, in a matter of concern only to me'!1bers of tbe tribe[.] [citations omitted] ~onversely, whe~ a
tribal government goes beyond matters of mternal self-9~vernance and enters Into off-reservation
business transaction with non-Indians, its claim of sovereigntY is at its weakest."
In sum, state's interests are generally highest when the individual Indian or Indian tribe engages in
off-reservation conduct within the forum state. E.g., Nevada v. 'Hicks, supra (state officers executing
process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan (1962)
369 U.S. 60 (state regulation of fish traps operated in non-reservation waters); .Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones (1973) 411 U.S. 145 (state tax on gross receipts of ski resort operated on land outside' the
tribe's reservation).
The state's interests are weakest where the conduct of the individual Indian or Indian tribe is
on-reservation conduct., relating to tribal sovereignty. "When on~reservation conduct involving only
Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapPlicablebfor the State's regulatory interest is likely to be
minimal and the federal interest in ,encouraging tri al self-government is at its strongest." White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) 448 U.S. 136, 144. ,
"
Plaintiff contends that, where state interests outside the' reservation are implicated, a state may regulate
the activities of even tribe members on tribal land, such as sales of cigarettes on reservation land by
tribal entities to nonmembers from off the' reservation. Nevada v. Hicks, supra, 533 U.S. at 362, citing
Washington'v. Federated Tribes of Colville Reservation (1980) 447 U.S. 134, 1151. Plaintiff urges the
Court to fin? that NWS'. sales to Big Sandy implic~te ~.midentjfi~d s~ate int~tests outside the reservation
because Big Sandy, In turn, selfs those cigarettes to California' entitles and consumers off the
reservation.
The Court initially notes that the power of the state to regulate on-reservation conduct implicating
off·reservatjon state interests cannot be assumed in ev~ry situation. In Lawrence v. Barona Valley
Ra.nc~ ~esort &, Casino (2007) 153 ~al.App.4th 1~64, 13~8-1370, the court held it had no subjec~ matter
JUriSdIction to aRply state tort laws against IndIan casino operated on reservation. In Amerlloan v.
Superior Court (2008) 169 CaLAppAtti 81,·84" the court held that tribal immunity extends to a tribe's
for-profit business entities when the entity is operating on behalf of the tribe. In Middletown Rancheria v.
Workers' Comp-. Appeals Bd. (1998) 60 CaI.App..4th 1349, the court concluded that Public Law 280 does
not confer on California the power to enforce Its full eanoply of general, civil regulatory jurisdiction over
Native American Indian tribes, and therefore the Cahfornia WorKers Compensation Appeals Board had
no jurisdiction over injuries sustained by an employee of an Indian casino operating on reservation land.
Recognition by the courts that states have the power to Impose taxes on the o'n~reservatjDn sales of .
cigarettes, to non-Indians Is not authority that the'states may regulate on-reservation sales'in general, or
NWS' sales to Big Sandy In particular. As the \J.S. Supreme Court explained in Federated Tril5es, supra,
state taxing schemes on cigarettes and other goods sold to non-Indians have beEm upheld because the
legal incidence 'of the tax fell on the non-Indian purchaser. The effect was simply to neutralize the
competitive advantage gained by the tribes 'over other retailers by exploitiqg the willingness of
non-Indian purchasers to "flout" their legal obligation to pay the taxes. 447 U.S. at 151. States are
categorically barred from placing a tax's legal incidence on· a tribe or on tribal members for sales made
inside Indian country. Wagnon v. Prarie Band Potawatomi Nation (2005) 546 U,S. 95, 106 (upholding
sales tax imposed on in-state distributors, manufacturers or importers of fuel sold to Indian tribe for sale
on tribal land because the legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the tribe).
Here, the legal incidence of the statutes at issue in this case would not fall on 1l0n~lndian consumers.
These statutes do not Impose. a tax that can be passed along to the non-Indian consumer. Rev. & Tax.
Code section 30165.1 imposes an absolute ban on the sates of certain brands of cigarettes that are not
listed on the Attorney General's directory: "No person shall sell, offer, or possess for sale in this state, or
import f9r personal consumption in this st~te, cigarettes of a !obacco p'r~duct mar1ufac~urer not, incluqed
In the directorY." Rev. & Tax. Code section 30165.1 (e)(2). rhe legal incIdence of thiS ban, If apphed
here, would fall, directly on Big Sandy as an importer as well as NWS as a seller of unregistered
cigarettes,
,
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Of even more significance, NWS' sales to 'Big Sandy constitute' not only commerce between
Indian-owned entitles but also interstate commerce, The authorities upholding the power of a state to
impose taxes on sales of goods have concerned only sales within that state. Plaintiff has not cited, and
this Court is not aware OT any authority permitting a state to regulate interstate commerce between
Indian tribes or tribal entities. Such activIties are more p'roperly subject to Congressional regulation,
which' has plenary power to regulate Indian commercial activities. Agua 'Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians v. Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 239, 249.
.

As the Court finds that the state cannot regulate the interstate commerce between NWS and Big Sandy,
it rejects defendant's contention that NWS' sales to Big Sandy constitute minimum contacts with thIs
state.

.

.

.

Stream of commerce theory
Plaintiff alternatively contends that purposeful availment can be shown by placing goods in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. Bridgestone
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 CatApp.4th 767, 777. Plalntiff contends that courts regularly find
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the defendant's product arrived through' the stream of
commerce In the forum state '(ia. a'1 e.qually foreig!l middleman. A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo (.t:\riz. 1995)
892 P.2d 1354, 1362-1363 OUrlsdlctlon over Italian manufacturer whose guns were sold In Arizona
throuph third part)' middleman in Massachus~tts); Duple Motor Bodi~SI L,.td. v. Hollingsworth (9th Cir.
·1969).417 F.2d 231 (sale of product by foreIgn manufacturer vIa mldaleman in England to buyers in
. Hawaii); Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Dlspray Fireworks Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 610, 613-614
'
(Japanese corporation subject to suit in Nebraska where middleman was South Dakota distributor).
Defendant contends that shipments of cigarettes Rurchased' by Big 'Sandy to other entities IS at the
direction of Big S;lndy, and that Big Sanay's re-sales of cigarettes to other entities are the unilateral
activities of a tnird party.
Plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate facts that sUPp'ort the exercise of jurisdiction. Bridgestone
Corp. v: Superior Court, supra, 99 CaLAl?pAth 767. PlaintIff has produced the follOWing evidence in
opposition to this motion: declarations of· Cook, Allison, Carlson and Diaz regarding their purchases of
Opal and Seneca cigarettes from Big Sandy Rancheria, Huber Enterprises Smoke Shop, Native Made .
Tobacco Shop, and Black Hawk Tobacco Shop; the declaration of Gable regarding various records
demonstrating the amount of sales and shipments made by defendant to Big Sandy and to BIg Sandy
consignees. The Court notes that the. Gable declaration includes as an exhi~if the declaration ofVincent
Buehrer, a law clerk who prepared spread sheets based on sales and shipping documents. Notably,
Buehler's declaration states at para. 8 that the only I?urchaser identified on any of the 234 shipments
made by defendant from December 203 to mid-2008 was Big Sandy Rancneria, although several
shipments designated Huber Enterprises and Native Buy as consignees. Gable's declaration states that
. her revIew of all records available regarding defendant's sales and shipments to entities in California
show sales only to Big Sandy, with 40 shipments to HUber Enterprises, 27 shipments to Native Made'
Tobacco. 6 shipments to Native Buy and one shipment to Black Hawk Tobacco.
.
Plaintiff's contention that this evidence shows that defendant directed the sales to Big Sandy and
downstream to other California entities Is not persuasive. The only inference the Court draws from the
evidence of Big Sandy's downstream sales is that Big Sandy acted as a seller and distributor of
cigarettes to otller entitles in California, Indian and non-Indian, as a result cif the tribe's own Independent
economic decision. There is no evidence supporting an itifer~nce that NWS exercised any control over
Big Sandy's downstream sales. The record establisfJes only that NWS filled orders placed by Big Sandy
ana shipped those orders to Big Sandy or other entIties designated by BIg Sandy. NWS did not Qlace its
.own name on the cigarettes as the Massachusetts distributor' dId in Ubertl, supra, 892' P.2d at
1360~1361. Unlike the manufacturer in DURie, supra, who made special modifications to its coach for the
Ha\yaii !TIarket. NWS. did not m~dify the cigarettes it sold to B!g Sandy in any way so as to serve the
Calrfornla market. Rather, the eVidence that each package of cigarettes sold by NWS was stamped "for
reservation sales only" indicates NWS intended to sell its cigarettes only to Indian reservations and not
the wider California market.
.
While it mi3Y have b~el) fore;;;~eable to NWS that <:i.ga.re~e~ s.old to Big Sandy wowld be resold to oth~rs,
foreseeabIlIty alone IS inSUffICient to support speCIfic jUrisdictIon. As You Sow v. 'Crawford LaboratOries,

------------.,----
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Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859, 1868-1869 (mtJltl~mll1iol) dollar sales to GSA's California depot over a
period of six years insufficient ..to apply·stream of co.mmerce theory where seller had no contro over final
. destination of its products). "Foreseeability that a product will enter California Without having some
control over its ultimate destination does not satisfy the due process clause of the United States
Constitution."
Finally, the C9urt must also find that the exercise of jurisdiction in. t~!s cas(~ would be f~ir. and
reason~ble. Bndgestt;>n.e Corp., s!Jpral..99 Cal.AppAth.at 774. The Court 1n!t1ally observ~s that thiS IS not
the typical personal Injury case In wnlcR a manufacturer places a defectIve produc~ In the stream of
commercehand jurisdiction will allow a California consumer to seek redres~ from injuries caused by tnat
product. T is is also not a case where the sales of unregistered cigarettes is a criminal violation, and
'
thus the ban on such sales would be enforceable against Indian tribes und,er Public Law 280.
This case Involves state laws which allow some cigarette manufacturers and not others to sell their
cigarettes in California. The primary burden of these laws falls on the manUfacturer, Le. to meet the
financial responsibility requirements and ignition-propensity standards. There is no evidence here that
NWS knew or should have known. that Grand River,' the cigarette manufacturer and another
Indian-owned entity operating in Canada, was SUbject to and had not complied with these conditions
when NWS sqld the cigaretfes to Big Sandy. As the state's genera) civil regulatory power does not
extend to Indian tribes, there is uncertainty at the oth.er end of the distribution as to whether the state's
financial responsibility and other laws at issue in this case could be enforced against Big Sandy. It would
be unfair to place the burden on an out-of-state distributor to determine, whenever it sens products to an
Indian tribe located in California, what state laws are enforceable agamst the tribe with respect to any
resales of those products. In the Court's view, that burden more faIrly falls on the tribe importing the
products for resale. The Court finds that, under these circumstances, it would not be reasonable Dr fair
to exercise jurisdiction over NWS.
Transportation of c.igarettes over state highways
Plaintiff contends that defendant's shipment of the cigarettes by truck over California roadways is
sufficient to find jurisdictional contacts. However, there is no evidence in this case to on which the Court
may find that defendant has directed the shipments on California roadways. Rather, the evidence shows
only that defendant has sold cigarettes to a California Indian tribe l and at that tribe's direction, has
shipped the cigarettes primar~y to the tribe itself and occaslonall~ to consignees. In these
circumstances, mere shipment of goods over CalifolTlia roadways is insufficient to establish minimum
contacts. Lakeside Bridge and Steel CD. v. Mountain State Construction Co., Inc.. (7th Cir. 1979) 597
F.2d·596, 604 n.14 (out-of-state defendant's shipment of goods through state to another forum did not
constitute minimum contacts not established solely by fact that goods were transited through a state).
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to
notice is required.

eRe

Rule 3.1312 or further

COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. The Court took this matter under submission.

SUBMITTED MATTER RULING
Having taken this matter under submission, the Court now rules as follows. The tentative ruling is
affirmed with the follOWing comments and evidentiary rulings.
At the hearin'g, plaintiff contended that the law recognizes no distinction between sllipments of cigarettes
to Big Sandy and shipments of cigarettes to a WalMart store located in the State of California. The
argument is fundamentally flawed as it ignores the fact that Big Sandy is a sovereign Indian tribe.
Activities involving a sovereign physically located in California are not treated in the same manner as
activities involving other entities located in California. "When on-reservation conduct involVing only
Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regUlatory interest Is likely to be
minimal and the federal Interest in encouraging tribal self-government IS at its strongest." Nevada v.
Hicks (2001) 533 U.S. 353, 361-362. Absent Congressional authorizatIon or a tribe's or consent, the
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a tribe. Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort &
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Casino (2007) 153 Cal.AppAth 1364, 1368-1370..
Plaintiff is' correct that thlS, is not a lawsuit against an Indian tribe, However, plaintiff too narrowly
construes the subject matter of this action as merely sales by an out-of-stale corporation to a California
entity, as though the sales were a unilateral act of NWS. No sales would be made by NWS unless Big
Sanaypurchased, the cigarettes. Thus, the activity which plaintiff contends is unlawfur is not just the act
of NWS in shipping cigarettes Into California; It is a business transaction between an out-of-state
corporation: a.nd. an Indian en~ity located in Califorflia. This kind of busjn~ss transa~tion is. n~t ~nly
~ubJect to limitatIons .on a state's power to regulate Interstate cOIT1JTlerce, .It IS also subject ~o .IJml~atlon~
Imposed by the Indian Commerce c1au~e. None of the authOrities relied ,upon by pl~lntlff diSCUSS
minimum contacts where the activity involve~ interstate commerceand/or the Indian Commerce clause. '
, Defendant's request for ru'/lngs on Its objections to plaintiffs evidence

i~

granted as follows.

Defendant's objections to the declarations of Gerald K. Carlson (4/15/09 and 5/18/09), Chris Cook,

AI.ber:t Allison (4/15/09 and 5/15/09). and Andrew Diaz are sustained on the ground of relevance. These
declarations are not relevant in the absence' of a showing that defendant exercised control over Big
Sandy's sales to downstream customers. Having sustained-the objections on the qrounds of relevance,
~
the court n,sed not rule on defendants' other objections (e.g. hearsay, etc.).
Defendant's objections'to'the declaration of Monica Gable are overruled.
Defendant's objections to the lodging of the transcript of the Jo Anne Tornberg deposition are overruled.

Declaration of Mailing

I hereby certify that I am not a party to the within action and that I deposited a copy of this document tn '
sealed, envelopes with first class postage prepaid, addressed to each party or the attorney of record in
the U.S, Mail at 720 Ninth street, Sacramento, California.
Dated: September 28, 2009

E. Higginbot,ham, Deputy Clerk lsf E. Higginbotham
Michelle Hick'son
Dennis Eckard
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244
John Peebles
Darcie Houck
Robert Rhoades
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan
1001 Second Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Date: 09/25/2009
Dept: 54

MINUTE ORDER

Page: 6
Cal!3ndar No.:

001152

DECLARATION'OF SERVICE BY-U.S. MAIL
Case Name:

PEOPLE v.NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY) et a1.

Case No.:

34-2008-00014593 CU--CL-GDS

I declare:
Gener~l, which is the office of a member of the
California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. lam 18 year~ of age or
older and not a palty to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the
Attorney deneral for collection and processing of correspondence for'mailing with the United
States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal
mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States
Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney

On' January 4, 2010, I served the attached roDGE CHANG'S 0912512009 ORDER by placing a
true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal
mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 110 West A Street, Suite 1100,
P.O. Box 85266, San Diego, CA92186-S266, addressed as follows:

Fredericks Peebles & Morgan, LLf
John M. 'Peebles
'
1001 Second Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Fred~ricks Peebles & Morgan, LLP
Darcie L. Houck
1001 Second Street '
Sacramento, CA 95814-3201

I declare under p~nalty of peljury tinder the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true
and correct and that this declaration was execut~cr-=- 20 10, at San Di~go, califor'fC\ .

. Charlette SheP,Eard
Declarant·

~J2'-Q(2Y".
SIgn r
,
,
~
~

~

\\

'

SD20091 ll174

80419182.doc

001153

,

"

016H26502775

1"050
'-~o·'
!.r
'_
.O·iI0412010
f:l"ill>(} From 9 2101

US POSTI.\G E.'

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office ofthe Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 9210 I

P.O. Box 85266
San Diego, CA 92 J 86-5266

RECEIVED
JAN 06 2010
FP&M"'Sacramanto

John M. Peebles
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan, LLP
1001 Second Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

001154

,

'-,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJ1t;1(f.Y OF AD~

A.M:J[~.M.- - 

2
3
4
5

FEB 07 2011
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

1srt4~.f1n:1A..QI

H, Clerk

6

8

Case No. CV OC 0815228

Plaintiffs,

7

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.

9

10
11

12

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

13

14

BACKGROUND
15

This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes in violation of th

16

Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.C. § 39-8401, et seq., and th

17

Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.e. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case has bee

18

set forth in the Court's previous orders, which are incorporated herein by reference.

19

Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26,2010, (hereinafte

20

Memorandum Decision and Order), the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, a

21

well as Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The Court reserved ruling on the amount dfth
civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending a hearing on this issue.

Without deciding whethe

22

Defendant would be entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial on the issue of the civil penalty, th
23

Court found that Defendant had waived any such right by failing to make a timely demand for a jur
24

25

26

trial. Memorandum Decision and Order at 16.
On December 10, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion

0

Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010, asking the Court to reconsider whethe
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1

2
3

Defendant had waived its right to a jury trial on the issue of the assessment of the civil penalty. 0
the same date, Defendant fLIed an Answer to Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand was filed on

Decembt~r

29, 2010, along wit

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and in Support

0

4

Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand.
5
6

Defendant's Memorandum in Reply t

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion t
Deny Defendant's Jury Demand was filed on January 25,2011.

7

Hearing on this matter was held on January 3 1, 2011, at which time the Court denie

8

Defendant's motion for reconsideration, based on the Court's conclusion that its previous findin

9

regarding the waiver of a jury trial by Defendant was correct. The Court indicated that it woul

10

reduce this ruling to a written decision that would also address the issue of whether Defendant woul

11

be entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right on the issue of the civil penalty.

12

DISCUSSION
13

A decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration brought pursuan
14

15

to I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B) "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Van v. Portneuf Medica

Or., 147 Idaho 552, 560,212 P.3d 982,990 (2009), citing Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M &

16

Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008). The procedure for demandin

17

a trial by jury is set forth in LR.C.P. 38(b): "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issu

18

triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any tim

19

after the commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the las

20
21

pleading directed to such issue." Failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes
waiver of the right. City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2d 647, 649 (1984)

citing Meyer v. Whipple, 94 Idaho 260, 486 P.2d 271 (1971).
22

The Verified Complaint in this matter was filed on August 14, 2008, and the summons an
23
24

complaint were served on Defendant by August 20, 2008. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l2(a
provides that a "defendant shall serve an answer within twenty (20) days after the service of th

25

summons upon the party, or within such longer period as is provided by statute." However, the filin

26

of certain motions will alter this requirement. On May 6, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismis
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1

2
3

for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction. A Memorandum Decision and Order Regardin
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered on May 20, 2010, in which the Court denied Defendant'
motion. Pursuant to LR.C.P. l2(a), if the court denies such a motion, "the responsive pleading shall
be served within ten (10) days after notice of the court's action." Accordingly, Defendant shoul

4

have filed an answer within ten days of the Court's May 20, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order,
5
6

and a demand for jury trial within fourteen days thereafter. The Court concludes that Defendant'
failure to file a timely answer should not toll the period for filing its demand for jury trial.

7

No answer or demand for jury trial had been filed by Defendant at the time that the Court'

8

Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26, 2010. Further, the filing of Defendant'

9

answer and demand for jury trial on December 10, 2010, was not timely pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(a

10
11

12

and LR.C.P. 38(b). Defendant's failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes
waiver of the right. Anderton, 106 Idaho at 372, 679 P.2d at 649, citing Meyer, 94 Idaho 260, 48
P.2d 271. Therefore, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied.
The Court also concludes that Defendant does not have a right to a trial by jury on the amoun

13

of the civil penalty. It is well settled that the Seventh Amendment to the Unites States Constitution
14

"does not apply to the states in so far as the right to a jury trial in civil cases is concerned.'
15

Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644, 39 P.3d 577, 584 (2001), quoting Sheets v. Agro-West,

16

Inc., 104 Idaho 880,884,664 P.2d 787,791 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 29

17

(1877)). Under the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, § 7 "preserves the right to jury trial as it existed a

18

the common law and under the territorial statutes when the Idaho Constitution was adopted.'

19

Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 467, 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (2000), quoting Stat

20

v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952, 957 (1986). Accordingly, "the right of trial by jury i
strictly enforceable only as to rights, remedies and actions triable by jury under the common law, an

21

not necessarily as to new or different rights or remedies not in existence or in contemplation of th
22

constitution when adopted." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300,
23
24

310 (1999), citing Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 751,242 P. 314,315 (1925).
Defendant has not cited any Idaho case law recognizing the right to a jury trial in th

25

assessment of civil penalties, nor is the Court aware of any such precedent. The issue was addresse

26

by the United States Supreme Court in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), in which the Cou
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3

concluded that although the petitioner had a right to a trial by jury on the issue of his liability fo
violations of the Clean Water Act, the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial fo
determination of a civil penalty for such violations. The legislative history of the Clean Water Ac
indicated that Congress "intended that trial judges perform the highly discretionary calculation

4

necessary to award civil penalties after liability is found." 481 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted). Th
5
6

question considered by the Tull court was "whether Congress can, consistent with the Sevent
Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties." Id The Court concluded that the assessmen

7

of civil penalties does not involve the "substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury," nor

8

"fundamental element of a jury trial." Id. at 426. The Court therefore held "that a determination of

9

civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial, and that the Seventh Amendment does no

10

require a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action." Id at 427. This Court finds the reasoning se

11

12

forth in Tull persuasive with regard to the question of whether a right to a jury trial on the assessmen
of civil penalties existed at common law.
Defendant asserts that the United States Supreme Court later "rethought" this issue and hel

13

differently in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), which involve
14

15

violations of the Copyright Act. However, the Feltner decision is distinguishable from Tull and i
also distinguishable from the case at bar. The Feltner court noted that unlike many of its recen

16

Seventh Amendment cases, "which have involved modem statutory rights unknown to 18th-centur.

17

England," in Feltner there were "close analogues to actions seeking statutory damages" under th

18

Copyright Act: "Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes it

19

England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement.

20
21

importantly, copyright suits for monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus befor
juries." 523 U.S. at 348-49. In distinguishing the case from its holding in Tull, the Feltner Cou
noted that in Tull,

22
23

24
25
26

we were presented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount
of civil penalties to be paid to the Government. . .. Here, of course, ... there is clear
and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright
cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Tull is thus
inapposite.
Id at 355. Similarly, in the case at bar, the Court has been presented with no evidence of an

historical analogy that would suggest that juries must determine the amount of civil penalties to b
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assessed pursuant to I.C. § 39-8406(1). Thus, the assessment of civil penalties by a court in suc
1

cases does not violate Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution.
2

There is also no statutory requirement for a jury trial on this issue. See, e.g., Coeur dAlen

3

Lakeshore Owners and Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 590, 596-97, 661 P.2d 756,

4

762-63 (1983) (finding no right to a jury trial in taxpayers' refund actions existed at common law

5

and stating that therefore if there is such a right its basis must be statutory). The Idaho Legislatur
has provided that "the district court may impose a civil penalty" for violations of the Tobacco Maste

6

Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. I.C. § 39-8406(1) (emphasis added). This appears t
7

express a legislative intent that a court, rather than a jury, determine the amount of the civil penalty t

8

be imposed in such cases. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners and Taxpayers, 104 Idaho a

9

597, 661 P.2d at 763 (concluding that I.C. § 63-38l2(c) seems to express a legislative policy tha

10

taxpayers' appeals in general should be heard by a court sitting without a jury). For the reasons se
forth above, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the civil

11

penalty to be imposed for its violations ofI.C. § 39-8403(3).
12

CONCLUSION

13

14

15

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion of Memorandum Decision and Order of
November 26,2010, is denied.

16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17

Dated this

7-/1..

day of February, 2011.

18
19
20

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

21
22
23

24
25
26
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13

14

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010
Via Fax No. 334-4151
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR.,
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
800 PARK BOULEVARD
P.O. BOX 36
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150
Via Fax No. 334-7844

15
16
17
18
19

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
P.O. BOX 1368
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
Via Fax No. 344-8542
J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21
22
23

By

\f IJ-Y'\r/_ _

~-

24

25
26
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15:19:57 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
no opening argument or statement
15:20:13 - State AttOrney:
15:20:17 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
nothing to submit at this time
15:20:42 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
comments - will rely to many of the affidavits that are already in the Court
15:21 :12 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
record - will have some excerpts from documents
15:21 :46 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
15:21 :51 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
, argues the civil penalties
15:36:58 - Pers. Attorney: Diddle, Sam
argues,the civil penalties,
16:07:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
Mr. Von Tagen has nothing to add
16:07:59 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
final comments
16:15:58 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
Comments - will issue a written opinion
16:17:54 - Operator \
Stop recording:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NO.

2

AM~'11\\FiLeD
.~~P.M .

_

3
4

5

MAR 09 2011

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KARl HOPP
OEPVTY

6

Plaintiffs,

7

8

Case No. CV OC 0815228
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON CIVIL PENALTY

vs.

9
10

NATIVE WHOLESALE S'UPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,

11

12

Defendants.

13

14
15

BACKGROUND

This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes in violation of th
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.e. § 39-8401, et seq., and th

16

Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case has bee
17

set forth in the Court's previous orders, which are incorporated herein by reference.
18

19

Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26, 2010, the Cou
granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and found that Defendant had violated

20

§ 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act and I.e. § 63-2503(1) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws. Th

21

Court also granted Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The Court reserved ruling on th

22

amount of the civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending a hearing on this issue.

23
24

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Civil Penalties (hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Memorandum) was filed on December 29, 2010, along with the Affidavit of Roderick Howard. 0
February 1, 2011, Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penaltie

25

(hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum) was filed, along with the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle i
26

Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penalties.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 1

001163

......'

1

2

Hearing on this matter was held on February 8, 2011, at which time the Court took the issu
of the civil penalty under advisement.

3
4
5

6
7
8

DISCUSSION

Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) authorizes the Court to impose a civil penalty for violations of I.e.
§ 39-8403(3) as follows:
Each stamp affixed, each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in
violation of § 39-8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each
violation hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to
exceed the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes
or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of § 39-8403(3),
Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.

9

10

I.e. § 39-8406(1). Both parties agree that the determination of the amount of the civil penalty to be
imposed, if any, is within the discretion of the Court.

11

Plaintiffs seek a civil penalty of $2,000,000 in this matter, arguing that this amount falls weI

12

within the range of the penalties permitted by I.C. § 39-8406(1). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert tha

13

since at least January of 2004, Defendant has sold over 115 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers i

14

violation of I.e. § 39-8403(3), which equates to 575,000 cartons of cigarettes.

15

Plaintiffs'

Memorandum at 4-5. A civil penalty of $2,000,000 would equal approximately $3.48 per carton,
which is substantially less than the penalty that could be assessed if the Court considered the sale

16
17
18
19

20

0

each carton as a separate violation and imposed a penalty of $5,000 per carton. Plaintiffs'
Memorandum at 5.
Plaintiffs also assert that they have submitted evidence demonstrating that the retail value of
carton of Seneca cigarettes is between $23.25 and $23.80. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant ha
illegally sold 537,060 cartons of Seneca cigarettes. Therefore, even if the Court only considers sale
of Seneca cigarettes, the requested penalty of $2,000,000 falls well below the penalty that could b

21
22

assessed if the Court were to impose a penalty of 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. Plaintiffs'
Memorandum at 5-6.

23

Defendant argues that the $2,000,000 penalty sought by Plaintiffs is excessive and is no

24

commensurate with the amounts set forth in consent decrees that the State has entered into with othe
similarly situated tobacco sellers.

Defendant's Memorandum at 4-5.

Defendant notes that th

25

penalty assessed by the district court in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010), wa
26

only $163,225, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated why Defendant should be penalized ten times a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 2
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much. Defendant's Memorandum at 5-6. Defendant also asserts that in determining an appropriat
1

penalty, the Court should only consider the number of "sales" made by Defendant, rather than th
2

number of cigarettes or cartons of cigarettes sold. Since 2004, Defendant has made a total of 51

3

"sales" of cigarettes to Warpath, and only seven of these sales occurred after Plaintiffs sent Defendan

4

a notice of violation letter in June of 2008. Defendant's Memorandum at 3. Finally, Defendan

5

asserts that its conduct in continuing to sell non-compliant cigarettes in Idaho was not the type

0

wanton or egregious conduct that would justify imposition of a civil penalty; rather, Defendant ha
6

simply defended itself in good faith in this legal proceeding, which has involved complicated issue
7

8
9

10

of jurisdiction and sovereignty, against enforcement of a statute that had never before been applied t
on-reservation tobacco sales. See Defendant's Memorandum at 2-3.
The Court notes that while it agrees Defendant should not be penalized for seeking a lega
determination of its rights, Defendant's conduct in continuing to sell non-compliant cigarettes in
Idaho after receipt of the June 2008 notice of violation letter was not reasonable. Even thoug

11

Defendant had apparently sold cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises to Idaho retailer
12

since at least 2004 with no interference from the State, the June 2008 letter put Defendant on notice

13

that the State of Idaho considered such sales violations of the Complementary Act.

14

demanded that Defendant cease the unlawful sales of these cigarettes to Idaho retailers. See Affidavi~'

The letterl
I

15

of Beth A. Kittelmann dated April 9, 2009, Exhibit

e.

There is no reason Defendant could not hav

suspended its sales of cigarettes in Idaho pending legal determination of the applicability of th
16

Complementary Act to such sales. Further, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument tha
17

it was simply winding up its affairs in Idaho during the seven months it continued to sell cigarettes t

I.e.

18

Warpath following receipt of the notice of violation letter. In exercising its discretion pursuant to

19

§ 39-8406(1), the Court concludes that the civil penalty imposed in this matter should be based on th

20

sales made by Defendant after the June 5, 2008, notice of violation letter. The Court further finds tha
a penalty based on the retail value of the cigarettes sold, rather than the number of violations, i

21

appropriate since Defendant is a wholesaler and each of the seven "transactions" during the reIevan
22

period involved the shipment of numerous cases of cigarettes.

23

Plaintiffs' evidence of the retail value of the cigarettes sold by Defendant is set forth in th

24

Affidavit of Roderick Howard filed on December 29, 2010, as well the Affidavit of Mark Ausma

25

filed on June 23, 2009. Mr. Howard, a Senior Tax Compliance Officer for the Idaho State Ta
Commission, visited the Warpath Smoke Shop in Plummer, Idaho, on November 30, 2010.

26

Mr. Howard purchased one carton of Seneca Menthol 72's cigarettes for $23.25 and one carton
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 3

001165

0

Seneca Menthol 120's cigarettes for $23.80. Affidavit of Roderick Howard at

~

2. Attached t

1

Mr. Howard's affidavit are his receipts and the images of the cigarette cartons he purchased.
2

Mr. Ausman, a Tax Compliance Officer for the Idaho State Tax Commission, visited the Warpat

3

Smoke Shop on June 9, 2009. Mr. Ausman purchased one pack of Seneca Menthol Ultra Light

4

100's cigarettes for $2.55. Affidavit of Mark Ausman at ~ 2. Attached to Mr. Ausman's affidavit ar

5

his receipt and an image of the pack of cigarettes he purchased.
Defendant's invoices indicate that Defendant sold two brands of noncompliant cigarettes,

6

Opal and Seneca, after the June 5, 2008, notice of violation letter. See FOUIth Affidavit of Beth A.
7

Kittelmann, Exhibit D. Plaintiffs have not presented any admissible evidence from which the Cou

8

could determine the retail value of the Opal cigarettes sold.! Therefore, the Court will focus only 0

9

the Seneca cigarettes sold by Defendant after the June 2008 notice of violation letter.
In reviewing the relevant invoices, the Court finds no sales of Seneca Menthol 72's cigarette

10

or Seneca Menthol 120's cigarettes by Defendant during this time frame. The only Seneca cigarette
11

sold by Defendant after the June 2008 notice of violation letter for which the Court has evidenc
12

concerning retail value are the Seneca Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes. See Fourth Affidavit

0

13

Beth A. Kittelmann, Exhibit D. The Court has not been presented with any evidence from which i

14

could reasonably conclude that all of the various types of Seneca cigarettes sold by Defendant woul

15

necessarily have the same retail values. For purposes of calculating the civil penalty in this matter
therefore, the only relevant, admissible evidence before the Court is that the retail value of one pac

16

of Seneca Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes is $2.55.
17

Defendant's invoices indicate that Defendant sold 28 cases, or 1,680 cartons, of Senec

18

Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes to Warpath during the relevant time period.

19

Affidavit of Beth A. KittelmaJID, Exhibits C, D. With each carton containing ten packs of cigarettes

20

See Fourt

the evidence presented by Plaintiffs indicates that the total retail value of these cigarettes wa
$42,840.1 In exercising its discretion, the Court finds it appropriate to impose a civil penalty fo

21

Defendant's violations of I.C. § 39-8403(3) in the amount of 500% of the retail value of thes
22
23

Plaintiffs indicate that the State was not able to purchase any Opal cigarettes. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3 n.l.
Defendant argues that the civil penalty should not be calculated by the retail value of one pack of cigarettes, a
Defendant is a wholesaler that has 110t engaged in any retail sales in Idaho, and most cigarettes are sold by the carto
rather than by the pack. Defendant's Memorandum at 4. However, I.e. § 39-8406(1) clearly states that the retail value 0
the cigarettes is a basis upon which the Court may calculate the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Further, Defendan
has made no showing that the civil penalty must be calculated according to the retail value of a carton of cigarettes, rathe
than the retail value of a pack of cigarettes. Based on the guidance provided by I.e. § 39-8406(1) and the evidenc
presented in this matter, the Court concludes that a civil penalty based on the retail value of a single pack of the relevan
cigarette brand and type is both reasonable and appropriate.
I

24

25

26

2
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cigarettes. I.e. § 39-8406(1). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the amount of the civil penalt
1

to be imposed in this matter shall be $214,200.

3

2

CONCLUSION

3

Pursuant to I.C. § 39-8406(1), the Court orders that Defendant shall pay a civil penalty in th

4
5

amount of$214,200 for its violations ofI.C. § 39-8403(3).
Plaintiffs are hereby directed to prepare an order and judgment consistent with this opinion.

6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7

Dated this

8

Jic-.. day of March, 2011.

9

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

10
11

12
13

14

15
16
17

18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26

The Court notes that neither party has raised the issue of the applicability ofI.C. § 39-8407(6), which provides:
If a court determines that a person has violated this chapter, the court shall order any profits, gain,
gross receipts or other benefit from the violation to be disgorged and paid to the state treasurer for deposit in the
general fund. Unless otherwise expressly provided the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are
cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
This remedy has not been pursued by Plaintiffs, and the Court does not find it appropriate to address the provision sua
sponte. Additionally, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence from which the Court could determine an amount to
be disgorged pursuant to this provision.
3
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I faxed on this 9th
day of March, 2011, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule ned) r.C.R. to each of the
attorneys of record as follows:

3

4

5
6
7

8

9

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
BRETT T. DeLANGE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010

10
11

12

13

THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR.,
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
800 PARK BOULEVARD
P.O. BOX 36
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150

14
15
16

17
18
19

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
P.O. BOX 1368
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
CHRITOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21

By _\-,.I'\-¥t->.ool-\~lj--L'-----_.

22
23
24

25

26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~~3 1 2011
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY ~ItmtOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MIREN OLSON
--------------------------

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

) Case No. CV-OC-0815228
)
)

) JUDGMENT

vs.

NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1
through 20,
Defendant.

DEPUTY

)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------)
Pursuant to this Court's August 24, 2010 Permanent Injunction, November 26, 2010,
Memorandum Decision and Order, and March 9, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order

THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company is permanently enjoined from:
A.

Selling, transporting, importing, or causing to be imported into Idaho

cigarettes, as that term is defined by Idaho Code Section 39-8402(2) of the Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Act), that are not included on
Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families, as
provided by Idaho Code Section 39-8403 of the Act; and

B.

Engaging in business as a wholesaler of cigarettes, as those terms are

defined by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(a) and (d) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws, with
other wholesalers or retailers located in Idaho, without first applying for and possessing a
valid permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws.

JUDGMENT - 1
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_.
2.

Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company shall remit to the Office of the

Idaho Attorney General, as a civil penalty, the sum of $214,200.
3.

The State of Idaho is the prevailing party and is entitled to costs and reasonable

attorney fees upon timely presentation of an appropriate Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees.
DATED this ~ day of March, 2011.

r

TIM OTHY HANSEN
District Court Judge

JUDGMENT - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ::~ / day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Samuel A. Diddle
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Brett 1. DeLange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83701
William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Boulevard
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH

ADA COUNTY CLERK

J0u1"-- {2l-Az/

.--1------2_

Deputy Clerk

JUDGMENT - 3
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WNO.

F-J'l~M.~2

A.M.

MAY 05 2011

Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKL VEEN, CHARTERED
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P. O. Box 1368
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone:
(208) 344-8535
Facsimile:
(208) 344-8542

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JAMIE AANDi~LL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Case No. CV OC 0815228
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants.

To:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO by and through

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERKFO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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~~

..........
1.

The above named appellant, Native Wholesale Supply Company, appeals against

the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and
Order regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered May 30, 2010, the Preliminary
Injunction Order entered August 24,2010, the Permanent Injunction Order entered December 13,
2010. The Memorandum Decision and Order on Civil Penalty entered on March 9,2011 and the
Judgment entered on March 31,2011, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen presiding.
2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders

described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1), I.AR.
3.

The issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert in tht:: appeal:
(a)

Does the State of Idaho have personal jurisdiction over appellant.

(b)

Does the State ofIdaho have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims

raised in the Complaint.
(c)

Does the Federal Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause

prohibit Idaho from exercising jurisdiction over appellant.
(d)

Did the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, Idaho Code §§

39-7801 et seq. and/or the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complimentary Act, Idaho

Code §§ 39-8401 et seq., apply to these transactions by appellant and did the appellant violate
those statutes.
(e)

Is the Defendant entitled to sovereign immunity.

(f)

Is State law preempted by Federal law.

(g)

Did the Court err in entering its December 13, 2010 Permanent Injunction

(h)

Did the Court err in entering its injunction and assessing its civil penalty

Order.

as set forth in its March 9, 2011 Memorandum Decision and/or March 31, 2011 judgment.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript

as defined in Rule 25(c) I.A.R., supplemented by the following:
Transcript of the hearings on July 2,2009, December 17,2009, August 24, 2010
October 26,2010 and February 8, 2011.
6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
All briefing and affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction;
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and
Subject Matter Jurisdiction;
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration; and,
Plaintiffs Motion for Civil Penalties.

7.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Vanessa Gosney
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5113
Boise, ID 83702
(b)(l) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation
of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.
Dated May 5, 2011.

EBERLE, BE
& MCKLV

By

, KADING, TURNBOW
N,CHARTERED

~J.4/£

S
e . Diddle, of the firm
Attorneys for the appellant Native Wholesale
Supply Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney on May 5, 2011, as indicated below and addressed as
follows:
Brett T. Delange
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
~Fax (208) 334-4151
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission

William Von Tagen
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Tax Commission
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722

b<] U.S. Mail

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

~

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight M '1
[b4Fax (20 3 ~-7844
[ ] Electr i ourt Transmission
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TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET
B 0 I S E , I DAH 0 8 3 7 0 2

NO.
A.M

f3~OC)

~

_

AUG 08 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,C1erk
By BRADLEY J. THIES

STATE OF IDAHO,

DEPUTY

)

) Supreme Court No.
38780-2011

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

vs.

)Case No.

NATIVE WHOLESALE
SUPPLY COMPANY,

)
)
)

CVOC-08-15228

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

------------------)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on June 9,

2011,

I

lodged a

transcript 225 pages of length for the above-referenced
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of
Ada in the Fourth Judicial District.

Court Reporter

001177
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HEARING DATES INCLUDED:

Jul y 2, 2009
December 17, 2009
August 24, 2010
October 26, 2010
February 8, 2011
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IN THE DISTRI[CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Supreme Court Case No. 38780
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiffs- Respondents,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 10th day of August, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
,/

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Supreme Court Case No. 38780
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs- Respondents,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or maile:d, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

SAMUEL A. DIDDLE

BRETT T. DELANGE;

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

WILLIAM VON TAGEN

BOISE, IDAHO
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BOISE, IDAHO
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IN THE DISnUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO, by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

Supreme Court Case No. 38780
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiffs- Respondents,
vs.
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
through 20,
Defendants-Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
5th day of May, 2011.
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Clerk of the District Court
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